The Aviation Hall of Doom

What I have done is to express publicly in this article some of the sense of frustration, disappointment and anger which I have experienced during a two-year trip through what I call the Aviation Hall of Doom. It has involved me in hundreds of wasted man-hours and considerable expense. I have tried to tackle a great blancmange of impenetrable bureaucracy and feather-bedding bureaucrats who entrench themselves behind silly regulations of their own devising and display no sense of responsibility or accountability whatever to the public in general and to people in aviation in particular.

Most people engaged in aviation explode occasionally when they talk about the Department. I have tried in this article to do a bit more’. to explode, certainly; but to go on to make a constructive suggestion – and to make it publicly.

That does not imply any criticism of all my friends, both within the Department and outside of it, who see far more clearly than I do all that is wrong with “the system” and have tried in a quiet way to reform things. There are two reasons for their lack of success. The first is that if they “rock the boat” – whether they are public servants or private citizens – they become marked men. I have given examples in this article. The second is that, with the best will in the world, they just cannot hope to reform the Department from within. The stage has been reached at which only some kind of powerful external force can bring about reform.

That is the constructive suggestion I make. Instead of stopping short at criticising the department, I am pressing for the positive, constructive step of appointing an outside body to help the Department by looking into its composition and functions. What is needed is a completely fresh, independent, untrammelled external investigation. Timid or incompetent departmental officers will shudder at the suggestion, of course. They have much to hide, and good reason for fear. Fortunately, they are a minority. In my experience the overwhelming majority of departmental officers are capable, experienced people with enormous latent creativity, who are every bit as frustrated by “the system” as people in the aviation industry. They have nothing to fear, and would rejoice to see an inquiry set up at which they could put forward their ideas and suggestions.

To push things forward I have started an informal organisation with the acronym ACORP, meaning “Aviation Committee of Review Proposal”. All it aims to do is convince the general public and the Parliament that an independent inquiry into the structure of our aviation regulatory body would be in the public interest.

Finally, I make it clear that what follows in this article represents only a few of the very many examples I have encountered of departmental incompetence. I think my facts are pretty right. If there is any small error in detail the Central Office bureaucrats who attended my addresses in Queensland, N. S. W. and Victoria during November and December 1984, at which I covered these facts, have not told me: they came armed with tape recorders and note books and, I am aware, submitted reports of what I said. Unfortunately, they disappeared immediately after every meeting before I could speak to them. Nevertheless, I hope you will agree that the broad information I have supplied provides solid grounds for setting up an independent enquiry. THE BACKGROUND

Two years ago I returned from the first stage of an around-the-world helicopter flight which had opened my eyes.

I had left Australia thinking our aviation was the safest and most modern in the world; but I had found overseas flying regulations were much safer, more modern and above all, based on common sense.

I set to work with enthusiasm to bring us up to date – surely a straightforward task, I thought. First, I asked advice from everyone, from Qantas Jumbo captains to retired departmental executives, and I was shocked by what they told me. Not that they didn’t support updating the regulations – quite the opposite. They said they had been trying to make changes for years.

They said I would get nowhere because the Department was incapable of change; that it was hiding behind its own outdated regulations; that it was too unsure of itself to debate with the industry and that the only changes it would dare to make would be those that protected itself even more.

“Be careful, Dick”, I was told. “If you stir or rock the boat in any way. . . they are all-powerful. ”

I simply could not believe what they were saying. All I was asking for was common sense – what had been tested and proved overseas for many years. I had always had the friendliest relationship with the Department, which had given me dispensations from the regulations to do almost anything from flying under the Harbour Bridge to building my helipads in Sydney.

I was soon to learn that getting a dispensation for one person’s personal advantage was one thing; to update a regulation to benefit a whole industry was quite another.

My first meeting with the Department took place over two years ago, on 16 December, 1982, with the then Deputy Secretary, Jim Schofield, and two of his top advisers, Allan Newman and Bob Whitecross, at their Central Office in Canberra.

At that time, they were the pinnacle of the Department’s Operations Branch.

At this meeting I brought up two major safety issues: the way single-engined aircraft were constantly and needlessly radar vectored over densely populated residential areas and the way helicopters were held circling over built up areas, sometimes for ten minutes at a time, so that they could be given the same separation from other helicopters as two Jumbo jets would be given from each other.

I was pleased to receive an extremely positive response. Jim Schofield said that the Department knew the helicopter regulations were out of date. He told me two specific things. Firstly, the Department was going full speed ahead on modernising the regulations and secondly, that helicopter lanes and also “see and be seen’ separation would soon be introduced.

I went away from that meeting feeling pleased and encouraged. I told everyone I knew in the industry that everything was going to change soon.

I was naturally surprised to find everyone – and I mean everyone – both in the industry and the NSW Regional Office of the Department, was totally cynical. They all said I had been “conned”.

“We have heard it all before”, they said. “Nothing will change. You will get nowhere. ”

What started out as a campaign to modernise helicopter regulations quickly broadened as I became involved in assisting other people in the industry.

As a so-called public figure I found no barriers to direct access to the leading people in the Department, from the Minister down. Not that it really helped, as my story will show. At about this time I heard more quite extraordinary stories.

For example, I was told that one operator tried to introduce a twin-engined helicopter on the Heron Island route because it would be much safer than the single-engined Jetranger he was using. He was refused permission!

Similarly, people within both the Department and the industry told me the only reason the Sydney Darling Harbour helipad was prevented from operating commuter or night flights was departmental infighting – the restrictions had absolutely nothing to do with safety! If true, this was serious. I knew that the Gosford commuter service had closed down because it was not allowed to land at Darling Harbour. Worse, helicopters were forced to fly extra miles over built-up areas to land at Mascot, mixing with Jumbos and the like.

More importantly, I knew that at night helicopters were coming into Sydney and landing at helipads in built-up residential areas because they were refused permission to land at Darling Harbour, an industrial area with no houses nearby.

These matters are covered in detail in the following two sections. They provide good examples of my education through the Aviation Hall of Doom, and the mental attitude of the people making (or not making) the rules. They provide a classical case study of the technique brilliantly applied by senior bureaucrats to keep the Secretary and the Minister under complete control. By mentioning the word “safety” whenever they believe their unfettered control is threatened, or if anyone queries their deliberate preference for granting selective dispensations instead of updating a regulation. This maintains the enormous power base of the bureaucrats concerned.

THE ARP SMOKESCREEN

The Department constantly claims that it has an open and accountable system for rule-making through the system of Aviation Regulatory Proposals (ARPs). These are advance notifications of proposed new rules or changes to existing rules which are supposed to be circulated in advance throughout the aviation industry for comment before they are promulgated in final form.

The following will provide evidence that the ARP system is nothing but a giant sham which appears to allow industry participation but in practice does not.

This example is also important as it shows the bureaucrats will go out of their way not to make a commonsense change to their regulations so that they can protect their power base and themselves, even when it results in substantially less safety for the travelling public.

In the U. S. A. , Australia and in many other countries during the late 1970s, the Swearingen Metro 11, a 19-passenger aircraft, became a popular aircraft in the commuter airline industry.

It was designed to operate up to a maximum weight of 12,500 lbs and earned an excellent reputation for its safety record.

From the experience gained by the successful operation of this aircraft the manufacturer designed a new version called the Metro Ill. Because of modern technology this aircraft incorporated substantial additional safety improvements over its predecessor. These ranged from expanded fire protection and electrical system redundancy to an ability to operate to accelerate go, accelerate stop, and landing criteria similar to those required for Jumbo jets. It was undeniably a very much more modern and safer aircraft.

Because of the extra safety equipment and more modern design the aircraft was certified to operate up to 14,000lbs gross weight, 1500 lbs more than the Metro II even though it carried exactly the same number of passengers. Therein lay the problem! Away back in the 1950s a decision had to be made on a weight to be the dividing tine between aircraft of different certification standards. At that time the weight of 12,500 lbs was agreed on internationally as it was the dividing line between the Beech 18 and the Lockheed Loadstar. (Yes, I kid you not. )

The weight has no other significance. It is quite arbitrary and is hopelessly out of date. Today it is generally accepted that passenger-carrying capability is a more sensible criterion.

In the United States, where the F. A. A. has a good record of statutory accountability to the industry, after lobbying by the manufacturers and a fair, impartial enquiry it was found that the arbitrary 12,500 lbs rule was ridiculously out of date. After all, 30 years is a long time in aviation technology.

Therefore, a new certification standard was designated, called SFAR-41, which approved the Metro Ill and similar aircraft which, even though they were over the old 12,500 lbs limitation, could not be placed in the same certification category as a Jumbo jet or the like.

Other countries such as Germany and the United Kingdom followed with similar rulings so that these more modern, safer aircraft could operate in their countries. It should be clearly noted that SFAR-41 resulted in a significant upgrade of the existing small aircraft safety standards.

And what happened in Australia?

Your guess is correct! Our concrete-brained bureaucrats were not going to have a bar of it. There was just no way they were going to change our 1950s Lockheed Loadstar regulations even if it did result in more safety. As far as they were concerned any aircraft that went 1 milligram over 12,500 lbs had to comply with the same design criteria as a Jumbo jet and it was nothing to do with them if the world aviation industry did not and never would manufacture such an aircraft.

Today, after over five years of lobbying by the manufacturers, the General Aviation Association, the Regional Airlines Association and many individuals, there has still not been the slightest move by the Department towards any open, impartial review of this issue. Therefore, none of these more modern, safer and more economical aircraft operates in Australia.

It should be noted that the Department of Aviation has never issued a warning to Australians overseas not to travel in Metro Ills and other SFAR-41 aircraft. It might be hoped that if they genuinely believed for one second that their autocratic ruling was a genuine safety matter they would do this.

They have not, because they know full well that the Metro Ill and the other SFAR-41 aircraft are safer than the earlier aircraft they have replaced.

Nevertheless, you and I, and all other Australians, are prevented from enjoying this higher level of safety (unless we travel overseas) so that a ridiculous and hopelessly outdated regulation can be blindly maintained. And anyone who makes representations to the Minister or the bureaucrats on this issue will be automatically given the same old irrational reflex response “we cannot change safety standards”.

Over the last two years the pressure on the Minister and the Secretary to let common sense prevail and reverse this pathetic decision (or non-decision) has become so great that the bureaucrats have been forced into the smokescreen tactic of issuing an ARP. This, it was thought, would defuse the issue: it had always worked in the past; it would work again.

One would assume that in a democratic country an open meeting would be called of all interested parties in the issue. From this meeting a balanced group of experts would normally be formed, representing both the Department and industry, which would investigate the facts openly and issue proposals tor all to comment on. This would then form the basis for any recommendation to the Minister for proposed changes in the regulations.

Thus, everything would be done openly – a requirement of prime importance where safety issues are involved – and our elected representative would then be in a position to make a sound decision on the basis of all the facts placed before him.

Let us look at what happened – in Australia in 1984, not Germany in 1934.

Firstly, the ARP (designated 84/15) was secretly written within the Department and then just as secretly (it is rumoured) handed around from bureaucrat to bureaucrat to add his or her piece of wisdom.

It appears that this took about 12 months and at no time was any discussion held with the industry as to what was going into the document. In fact, to this day, no one in the industry has any real evidence about who were involved and what experience and expertise they had.

Of course, there were plenty of rumours; but never anything definite – it was all done in secrecy.

Why? For surely there could be absolutely no need for anything but full and open disclosure and discussion on such an important safety issue?

Finally, in September 1984, ARP 84/15 was issued.

It must rank among the least professional and most dishonest documents spawned by any bureaucracy in human history since the Roman Empire at its zenith.

I use the term “dishonest” deliberately, for good reasons, as will be seen.

This ARP proposes to approve SFAR-41 aircraft by imposing a number of extra conditions which are so patently ridiculous, and so expensive, that no aircraft could ever be economically produced to comply with those conditions. They have not issued an ARP that anyone could conceivably regard as a basis for fair discussion. Instead, they have produced a document with conditions so absurd as to kill any possibility of discussion stone dead.

Remember, the Metro Ill and other SFAR-41 aircraft are already designed to meet higher safety certification standards than the older aircraft they are replacing but, on top of this, our Australian bureaucrats demand the following,

1. Damage tolerance be increased to take a 1. 81 kg bird strike. (This would require new windshields and complete structural changes to the wings, fin and tail and therefore require re-certification of the aircraft. )

2. A two-shot fire extinguisher system in place of the already approved single-shot system (adding substantial expense and weight for no measurable increase in safety).

3. A fatigue monitoring recorder, a flight data recorder and a cockpit voice recorder (adding about $200,000 to the cost of the aircraft plus extraordinarily high maintenance costs with no direct influence on flight safety).

4. A completely new stall warning system (this would be extremely costly, add weight and be unique in the world for such an aircraft).

5. Special performance requirements on take-off (meaning new larger engines if the aircraft were to be able to use the same runways as its predecessor.

On top of this the ARP dogmatically states that even if aircraft complied with all these extra conditions they would only be ·approved for “supplementary airline operations”. In other words, an operator would be prohibited from using one for business, charter, or private flights.

It should also be noted that the weight of all the additional equipment could limit the passenger-carrying capacity of the aircraft to less than that of the older, existing fully approved aircraft.

It is obvious that any new aircraft complying with these incredible proposals, unique to Australia, would be economically unacceptable.

So here is the position.

All the industry wants (and no doubt the public if they had a say in it) is to be able to operate the new aircraft in the way they have been designed. They carry exactly the same number of passengers with undeniably greater safety than the existing aircraft they have been designed and built to replace and which are now operating in Australia.

Of course it is obvious to the bureaucrats that these new and safer aircraft will only be operated if they can be imported and used as they are designed. The bureaucrats have, therefore, successfully prevented any change whatever while giving the impression that it is all being fairly discussed through an ARP.

It goes without saying that the industry has totally rejected the Department’s proposals.

The Regional Airlines Association has responded as follows to the ARP.

Unless the Department revises its approach to the whole question the Department will succeed in condemning the Australian commuter traveller to carriage in an aircraft meeting airworthiness standards of a decade ago. Consequently, no new 19-seat aircraft certified to the higher American standard will be introduced into Australia. This will leave the Australian industry to operate its comparatively aging fleet of 19-seat aircraft. Such a situation will arise purely because of the Department’s inflexible attitude to the acceptance of a standard which has been proven to be of benefit to the traveller and the operator in the world’s foremost aviation environment. It should be mentioned that safety experts in the industry believe the additional requirements imposed by the Department, as well as being economically impossible to achieve, have not been based on any known scientific evaluation. The Department has simply developed a list of requirements capable of theoretical achievement, then defined them as “important” and autocratically demanded that they be accepted.

Well, that explains the con job – the industry has got absolutely nowhere after 5 years and no doubt the Minister and the Secretary are being fed the same old delaying tactic:

“We are awaiting comment on the ARP” Let me give the last word to the general manager of Air Queensland who stated in a recent address to the Department –

In the airline industry (with rare exceptions) you don’t get to senior management level on any other basis than years of industry experience. It’s such a complex industry – finance, personnel, commercial, operational, engineering, industrial, to name a few aspects, that executives can’t just move in from another industry and hope to be effective. It is strongly felt in the industry, that equivalent depth of experience is not always available amongst “opposite numbers” at senior level. Until it is, you won’t have the depth of industry knowledge necessary to detect weaknesses in your regulations and rules, or to devise ways of patching them up. You will go on drafting rules and procedures which stifle the industry and produce a nett degradation of standards, without knowing what is happening.

Yes, obviously true words borne out by the ARP issue discussed.

Until our industry forces totally open, free discussion on all relevant issues before any ARP is released then ARPs will remain what the bureaucrats intend them to be: elaborate smokescreens to frustrate and delay all change, while maintaining and strengthening the unchallengeable power base of the bureaucrat concerned.

THE CITATION SAGA

I have a huge file, the content of which would gladden the heart of Nicholas II, Tsar and Autocrat of all Russia, as an excellent example of the precise nonaccountability to which he was accustomed. The only difference is that all his people knew the face of Nicholas. The bureaucrats who spawned this file remained faceless as they made dictatorial decisions that could not affect their livelihoods, but only entrench their own personal power base at the expense of an industry they were supposed to be serving.

The Cessna Citation S. P. (single pilot) is a beautiful little business jet designed specifically for single pilot operation.

It is fully approved and flown by single pilots in countries like the USA, Canada, United Kingdom, Germany, Papua New Guinea and, up until 1979, in Australia.

In 1979 the Department of Aviation, without consultation with Rex Aviation, the Cessna distributor, or indeed anyone in the industry, issued a “policy document” which stated that henceforth the Cessna Citation S. P. would no longer be allowed to operate with a single pilot.

They gave no reason, apart from typical murmurings about “safety standards” to justify putting Australia out of step with the rest of the modern world. That was it, the decision had been made.

Anyone will understand what this did to the sales of the aircraft in Australia.

So Rex Aviation have fought long and hard to get the decision reversed, or at least to have fair and open discussions with the Department on the issue.

After profitless verbal exchanges, they forwarded the Department an extremely thorough and lengthy submission on the issue. The technical details of this submission need not be reproduced here. It is enough to say that Rex bwlt up an excellent, rational case which they submitted with incontrovertible hard evidence to show that there could be no possible reason for the Department of Aviation to ban single pilot operations in Australia.

More importantly, they were obviously very worried about the way the original decision had been made. To quote from their submission –

As the representative of the manufacturer, and one who must make financial commitments for literally millions of dollars, up to five years ahead for jet equipment, we believe we should have a reasonable expectation that they are certified in accordance with the Air Navigation Orders prevailing and that any forecast changes to such Air Navigation Orders should be circulated for comment prior to change. A “policy” document is not in the best interests of harmony in acceptance of rule-making.

Two of the specific requests made by Rex are worth quoting. They said (paragraph 6-3:) –

We further request that Rex Aviation and other qualified parties be permitted maximum input into the deliberations into this matter and to be in a position to jointly evaluate such testing as may be carried out. and (paragraph 6-4:) – Rex Aviation recommends that for this . . . determination and any s1m1lar . . situations in future the Department of Aviation form a multiple expert opinion team to carry out such testing as is required. We also offer a current model Citation for the purpose of test and evaluation.

All three entirely reasonable requests were completely ignored.

They were made for a very important reason: Rex had already heard, through the grapevine, that the senior bureaucrats’ minds were made up. The concrete had set. There was to be no change – ever.

During the seven months after the submission was made the chief executive of Rex Aviation telephoned the Flight Standards Division at Central Office each six weeks to see if they had any results, if they wanted any help, any discussions, a test flight in the aircraft perhaps, anything.

No, he was told. It was all being thoroughly investigated. He would be notified in due course.

He was. On 6 January 1983, after some three years of lost sales and without even a courtesy phone call, with no discussions, no industry meetings, no test flights, he received a letter refusing any change. The whole “investigation” had been done in secret.

A reason was given for rejecting his requests and recommendations. It was that ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) recommendations stated that a crew of “average ability” must be able to handle an aircraft properly. And in the opinion of some unnamed person in the Department of Aviation such an “average ability” pilot would not be able to handle the Citation! ‘ How could Rex, or anyone, answer such a purely subjective opinion?

Of course, all of the other countries who approved single pilot Citation operations were also signatories to the same ICAO recommendations. They merely interpreted them differently, or perhaps the bureaucrat considered that Australian pilots are inferior to those trained elsewhere.

It was about this time that I got involved in the issue. I had spoken to the chief . executive of Rex Aviation, as he was one of the most respected and experienced members of the aviation industry, to ask for his advice on my project of updating the helicopter regulations.

He was full of gloom. He said, “You won’t get anywhere, Dick. I’ve been in the industry for 27 years, and they treat us all like errant schoolboys”.

I was shocked at the way he had been treated when he explained the full story. Here he was, the chief executive of one of Australia’s largest aviation companies, and also president of the General Aviation Association, yet he could not even find out who had done the investigation that was affecting his company’s viability, let alone take part in any fair, open discussions on the matter. Why, I wondered, would such an investigation, if it was fair and above board, need to be done in secret?

I was furious, mainly at the system, but also at the way he was forced to accept that these unknown and possibly incompetent people were all-powerful and there was nothing he could do about it.

I thought, “I’ll find out who made this decision if it’s the last thing I do. I’ll get them to explain it openly. Surely that’s a fair thing?”

So I set to work and rang every major operator of Citation jets in Australia:

Colin Stewart, chief pilot of North Broken Hill; George Williams, chief pilot of and Bruce Harris, chief pilot of Skywest Aviation in Perth. Surely, I thought, these experienced, regular operators would have taken part in the Department’s enquiries. They would know who was in charge of them. The Department itself did not own a Citation. If it wanted to use one, then it would, of necessity, have had to hire the aircraft from either Rex or one of these operators.

They all mad the same tale to tell. They had heard rumours that an investigation Yt’. as being done, but not one had been asked for an opinion, either directly or indirectly. One even told me that the Department had made up its mind years before, so any inquiry was pointless. The most startling fact I uncovered was this: one of these pilots was continuing to fly a Citation as a single-pilot operation because he had a departmental dispensation to do so! I spoke to one of the departmental examiners of airmen for the Citation. He burst out in friendly laughter at my question whether he had been consulted. He said, “The Department doesn’t work like that. I’m only in the Regional Office and they would consider it nothing to do with me. ‘

So there it was – and is. I have no personal opinion on whether Citations should be flown one pilot or ten, but this shocking arrogance and lack of accountability was yet another example of what I was to find more and more. If a man of the calibre and experience of the chief executive of Rex was to be treated in that fashion, or in his own words, like an errant schoolboy, how were less well-known people in the industry be treated?

I was to find later that the Department actually sent a person around the world to look into the issue. And the whole inquiry was done with so much secrecy that I have never even been able to find who did it. The information is presumably someth\ng which affects national security.

So far, Rex Aviation have been unable to get the Department of Aviation to agree to have an independent team look into the matter and the arbitrary rule imposed five years ago is still in force.

There is, however, a light on the horizon as I have recently heard that the arbitrary decision is now likely to be reversed.

When this happens I wonder if any damages will be paid to Rex for the loss of sales they have incurred?

FIASCO AT HERON ISLAND

Lloyd Helicopters had been operating single-engined Jetrangers from Gladstone to Heron Island about 30 miles over water – for some years.

They owned a Bell 412 twin-engined float equipped helicopter (worth over $1,000,000). It was a magnificent machine, designed to the highest standards of safety with features such as duplicated hydraulics. It was ideal for over-water work.

They decided they would put it on the service for a while. It would cost them extra money, but it would give the passengers greater safety and it would be a good test of its economic viability.

Alas! They made one mistake. Instead of asking for approval they simply informed the Department what they proposed to do. They nearly fell over backwards when told they could not use it under any circumstances and that the pilot would be prosecuted if he flew it on the Heron Island run.

Here is the relevant part of a telex from Lloyd to the Department, dated 26 August, 1982- As an operator of both single-engine and twin helicopters, we are convinced that a twin machine is safer than a single-engine.

This view is endorsed by your Department in that it is a mandatory requirement to use only twin-engined helicopters for distances greater than 50nm over water.

We therefore cannot understand your Department’s refusal to approve the operation of a twin where a single-engine helicopter is acceptable. To put it simply we can use single engine aircraft where an engine failure guarantees ditching, but we cannot fly a twin with its demonstrated and acknowledged additional safety.

I request your URGENT attention be directed to the resolution of this anomalous situation so that the travelling public may benefit. The ordinary citizen with no aviation experience may look at the facts so far, shake his head and say that there must be something to it – more than meets his inexpert eye – if a responsible Department of Aviation seems to act counter to common sense. He would be correct: there is more to it. However, it is not about common sense – it’s about an irrational following of an outdated regulation.

A departmental bureaucrat had worked out that if one of the two engines failed during a period of some 30 seconds after take-off from Heron Island then the helicopter would end up descending into the shallow lagoon! Such an occurrence was not permitted under the archaic regulations. In fact, the only possible way of complying with the regulations was for Lloyd to build a runway at Heron Island.

Lloyd persisted in their attempt to discuss their proposal rationally. They got nowhere. They said it was like talking to a brick wall.

Lloyd cited the example of another operator using twin-engined helicopters who had been given a dispensation by being called a developmental charter. (A dispensation is often used to “bend” the regulations without updating them. ) Couldn’t their flights be classed in the same way? No way! This answer came back almost immediately- Developmental charter operations are operations determined as such by the Secretary to the Department. These determinations are made for the purpose of facilitating multi-engine helicopter operations in remote areas where no other means of transport is practical.

The Gladstone-Heron Island operation has not been determined to be developmental and it would not meet the criteria for such a determine- tion.

Lloyd promptly telexed back that the twin operation they were talking about was at Essendon in Melbourne, an area that could hardly be declared “remote”. They were not going to win that one; logic would get them nowhere, Here is the answer they received from the Department – The two helicopters operating out of Essendon are engaged in servicing off-shore oil/gas installations and all such operations have long since been declared to be developmental charter.

Frustrated at what they considered to be incomprehensibly irrational and unjust behaviour, Lloyd contacted the then Minister, Wal Fife. Surely, they believed, he would speedily sort matters out.

His answer was even more incredible than what had already happened – and it was the kind of answer I was to see time and again sent to others, from Qantas to the smallest operator – it was the universal cop-out.

Lloyd were told “as it was a matter of safety it was the responsibility of the Secretary. The Minister could not interfere. ” What a magnificent twist! Lloyd were attempting to improve safety, but the opposite was implied.

The supreme irony was this. The Secretary, whose responsibility was invoked, was not then and is not now, a person with any practical training or experience in flying, aeronautical engineering or air safety investigation. He is what is called a “pure” administrator. In practice, when any so-called “safety” issue comes up, he is wholly in the hands of the bureaucrats below him. Some of these in the distant past were pilots and engineers. Today they appear to be completely out of touch with practical aviation in real life.

I was starting to learn how immensely powerful, and wholly non-accountable some of these senior officers were. Just imagine, in democratic Australia, our elected representative cannot interfere.

So Lloyd gave up. They had wasted time and money. They were trying to run a business and just could not afford to waste more. Of course, all the departmental bureaucrats were being paid for every letter, every telex, every delay. In the meantime, passengers, mainly families with children, were forced to travel in the single-engined machines because the Department, in flagrant defiance of common sense, persisted blindly in enforcing an irrational, outdated regulation.

Fortunately there is a happy ending.

About twelve months later Lloyd decided to try again. In the meantime they had been told that the only reason they did not get their approval was that they had not asked in “the night way”. They had not shown the respect-with a touch of servility – which departmental bureaucrats expect from the taxpayers who pay them.

Lloyd sent a nice, conciliatory letter respectfully asking approval. Back came a reply-approving it this time by updating the regulations but by allowing them to operate under a “developmental charter” concession! Here is the actual wording.

I agree to waive the existing multi-engine performance standard for this class of operation and prescribe the following operational performance standards: A) Take-off weight shall be limited to that at which the helicopter, in the ambient conditions, can comply with the performance standards prescribed for the developmental charter.

This was only 12 months after they had been told that they could not possibly operate under the standard prescribed for developmental charter! This story has been recounted in some detail as it is a typical example of what I was to see again and again. Common sense was irrelevant. The outdated regulations are blindly quoted and the only way most things get done is by “dispensations” or “concessions” which are in reality favours which bend the rules. And any complaint to the Minister results in quick use of the emotive word “safety”.

Every helicopter operator in Australia needs constant dispensations merely to earn a living and each one knows that a dispensation may not be given, or could be withdrawn, if he rocks the boat, if he is a stirrer.

I spoke to Wal Fife about this case and asked him why he didn’t simply order them to allow the safer twin-engined operation. He said that no minister would be prepared to risk going against the advice of his staff once the word “safety” was mentioned.

In fact, the position could be much worse than that. Many people, including legal experts, claim that under the Air Navigation Act, and the Regulations, the Minister is legally powerless. He cannot legally intervene in operational flying matters. The Prime Minister cannot intervene. The whole Cabinet can do nothing. In practice, all power is vested theoretically in the Secretary who appoints what are called “delegates” to exercise that power over every conceivable aspect of aviation – down to the tiniest detail. This could be all right if the Secretary himself were an aviation man. But what is bound to happen if he is not? And if his delegates have completely lost touch with the realities of aviation as they are known to pilots and operators in the field, and to air traffic controllers and others who experience those realities every day of their lives? There is worse to come. How many citizens realise that our elected Parliament itself may be powerless? Let me explain why. Everyone connected with aviation knows that we have Air Navigation Regulations and the Air Navigation Orders. Both virtually affect us. Now, the ANRS must be approved by the Parliament. They must lie in each House of Parliament for a certain time, at the end of which they have the force of law unless they are “disallowed” by a majority of either House.

The ANOS are never scrutinised even by the Minister, let alone by Parliament. So we have the position of laws being made by bureaucrats who are out of touch, and approved by a top bureaucrat who may not know the difference between pressure altitude and a pitot tube. The Parliament does not even have a standing committee to look at ANOS.

NEXT ISSUE: Dick Smith recounts the saga of the Darling Harbour Fiasco and reveals the sad plight of helicopter operators flying in controlled airspace, the See and Be Seen rule, and the incredible lengths one has to go to to have a fully FAA and CAA Certificated helicopter accepted as safe by Australian DofA standards. Don’t miss it.

Readers are reminded that this series is reprinted from the book of the same name. “Two Years in the Aviation Hall of Doom”, by Dick Smith, is available for only $3. 00 at McGills (Melbourne), Dymocks (Sydney) and Moorabbin Aircraft Spares outlets throughout Australia. You may also receive the book by mail by sending $3. 00 direct to ACORP, PO Box 681, North Sydney, 2060.