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Bell's Model 301 XV-15 Tiltrotor operates in two distinct modes helicopter and aeroplane, with a transition mode termed conversion'. General pilot felling Is that the XV-15 is easier to fly than most conventional helicopters
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V/Stol New Concepts
Flexible response is the name of the game, in current warfare, the side which can get the most hardware to the battlefield first is the side most likely to succeed. The ability to respond quickly is an essential part of deterrence, one must have the ability to deploy front-line weapon systems at any time or place necessary, at very short notice. If a defence force has this capability, any potential aggressor will have to seriously consider it’s probability of succeeding or failing in a first strike. If the victim is tied down to smooth, long, concrete runways and cannot deploy air power at sea, the situation will favour a pre-emptive air strike, followed by an invasion force.
This scenario may well apply to Australia, in the future, as the F-111C and F-18A both require runways, even though shorter than older jet aircraft would demand. In this sense, a very high priority must be allocated to point air defence systems to cover these runways, something that will drain resources otherwise applicable to offensive systems. SAMAAA systems are inflexible, they must also be kept up-to-date, as ECM will rapidly degrade their capabilities, leading to situations such as the Israeli knock-out strike on Syria’s SAMAAA belt in the Bekaa Valley, in 1982.
V/STOL (Vertical/Short Take-off Landing) aircraft offer freedom from the fixed runway, allowing operation from roads, and the decks of naval vessels, in fact, any flat area large enough to accommodate an aircraft of this type. Dispersed V/STOL aircraft can be extremely difficult to detect, as a defensive weapon, they become immune to the classical “massed air strike on enemy aircraft and airfields” tactic. Israel’s stunning success in its 1967 pre-emptive strike at the Egyptian air force hinged on the fact, that Egyptian fighters were concentrated at a number of airfields, knowing where and when these aircraft would be allowed Israel to take them out within hours, in a precisely planned, massive air strike. In a strategic context, precise low-yield nuclear strikes on key installations could cripple an opponent, something the RAAF should consider in the context of it’s planned NT and WA Northern airbases, as a single Backfire could knock out both installations in a single strike, with standoff missiles. Even if only some aircraft were deployed and destroyed in the strike, the airfield is a write-off and that would seriously hamper further redeployment, creating opportunities for enemy naval and air operations, in the region. Dispersal of V/STOL aircraft, in situations where conflict may arise, reduces the usefulness of this type of strike and also serves as a convenient political gesture. On the offensive side, flexibility of deployment is a major advantage. V/STOL aircraft may operate from naval vessels, not only dedicated carriers, and subsequently redeploy at beachheads, accompanying advancing ground forces. As an attacking force need not secure runways for it’s aircraft, the defender will have difficulty in predicting the point at which the invading forces will land. This was the key to Britain’s remarkably successful landing at San Carlos, during the 1982 Falklands war. Harriers operated from the beachhead could carry more weapons or alternately, had greater endurance, as they did not bum fuel in covering the 200 to 150 nm to the carriers, East of the Falklands. Effective close support is essential for advancing ground forces, as much as the RAAF likes to believe in crippling an opponent before it comes close, the harsh reality of most modern wars is the political necessity to allow the enemy a first strike to justify waging a way this means the enemy may just succeed in gaining territory in the initial hours of a conflict. Regaining that territory will require close support, and dropping retarded iron bombs on foxholes and gun emplacements hardly justifies the exposure of high-value interdiction aircraft to mass small arms and AAA fire which is usually oblivious to ECM.
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