Seahawk or Lynx?

Why is a helicopter so important to our FFGs?

As was so ably illustrated in the Falklands conflict, the modern naval light helicopter (in that case the Lynx) is a truly multi-role aircraft. It can perform some measure of ASW warfare, can carry a small number of specialist troops, can act in the liaison role between ships at sea, can target over-the-horizon targets for the mother ship’s cruise or sea-skimming missiles and can launch offensive attacks in its own right using a number of potent weapons such as homing torpedos and air-to-surface missiles. It is primarily the latter two tasks which our own FFG-based helicopters would largely be optimised for. Australia’s FFGs have a formidable weapon in their RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship sea-skimming missile. With a maximum effective range of around 100 kilometres though the Harpoon is forced to operate autonomously, in other words once fired it is on its own and its own internal guidance system will select a target, lock on and carry out the attack in a remorseless fashion. If for instance, the target blip on the launch ship’s radar turns out to be a ‘friendly’ then once launched, it is too late to abort the Harpoon flight. On the other hand, at around half a million dollars a copy, the smart commander does not wish to expend his scant supply of Harpoon missiles on such relative trivia as junks, patrol boats and other small vessels.

A ship-based helicopter can launch and close in on the target, identify via its own sophisticated radar, verify identification and then assist in guidance of the Harpoon, via the mother ship. If there are a number of targets, the biggest and most important is the first to designate. Without the helo, the FFG can only use its potent Harpoon weapon system in a situation where it has confirmed beyond all doubt the status of its intended target. In the history of modern warfare, there are few cases where this style of combat can be tolerated as is evidenced by the ‘real world’ limitation on the firing of Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles by fighter aircraft.

The second situation revolves around the ability of the helicopter to be able to augment the offensive and defensive nature of the FFG. As was shown in the Falklands the Lynx was a potent killer of small patrol craft.

The third requirement is that of point defence ASW capability. What has happened with the RAN’s $80 m Sea King ASW helicopter capability can only be described as tragic. These excellent state-of-the-art helicopters were once tasked with fleet ASW protection. As it takes a large helicopter of Sea King size to perform the ASW role in-depth it cannot be expected that a smaller helicopter, which is really intended as an extension of the integral weapon systems aboard its mother ship, be able to exhibit the bulk of equipment fit or operational endurance of the larger, dedicated design ASW helo. Point defence ASW operations from the FFG are however required as in many cases these ships will be operating alone or on the extreme perimeter of a convoy or fleet.

This then leaves the primary objectives of the RAN requirement as point defence ASW, over-the-horizon targeting, or anti-ship, surveillance and targeting (ASST) and the ability to launch attacks on hostile surface and sub-surface craft independent of the FFGs weapon system.

Since the late seventies there were only two really serious contenders for this role – the Sikorsky Seahawk from the US and the Westland Lynx from the UK. Therefore it is not surprising that in October 1983, Defence Minister Gordon Scholes announced in Parliament that versions of these two types were short-listed for the future RAN FFG helicopter purchase.

Sikorsky S-70B Seahawk

Hardly surprisingly, the Seahawk is the favourite with the Navy, it is big, exhibits unparalleled mission flexibility, has significant endurance and is the airframe the USN will be operating from its own FFG7s. Though it is here that the ironies begin, as ironically our FFG7s are not specifically common the USN versions. Our first three ships (Canberra, Adelaide and Sydney) do not have aft landing decks stressed to the all-up weight of the Seahawk, nor do they have the USN style RAST Bearcat recovery and traverse system, nor do they have stabilisers to limit ship roll in heavy sea states. Opponents of the Seahawk point out that these first three ships (the fourth is so modified} will each be laid up for one year at a cost of at least $8 m per ship. Obviously, this is a further embarrassment to some extent in a programme that is already a decade behind the originally conceived schedule and at a far higher cost (excluding inflation) than was dreamt of in the late sixties.

The Seahawk is a derivative of the US Army UH-60A Blackhawk which has been in service since 1978 and has accumulated more than 150,000 flight hours in all types of environments and under extreme operational conditions. Most of the Seahawk dynamics are identical to Blackhawk and many of the remaining components are similar in design. To date, there have been deliveries of more than 400 Blackhawks to the US Army (as against a requirement for more than 1100 aircraft) while the US Navy is planning to acquire a total of 204 SH-60B Seahawks. It must be pointed out though that the USN SH-60B is a different aircraft than the S-708 being offered to the RAN. Australia’s Seahawk is a simplified version and therefore is substantially cheaper than its US counterpart. In the past, this has often clouded the issue as the SH-60B is equipped with more than a tonne of expensive IBM electronics which the simplified S-70B does not have.

Major operational benefits of the Seahawk are that it can maintain a patrol station for 2. 7 hours some 100 miles from the ship, can ferry 500 miles, can uplift a twelve-man specialist team, can carry an external load, has a standard rescue hoist, dual controls and also exhibits future growth capability not always available in a smaller airframe. The drawbacks are that the Seahawk costs much more than the Lynx 3 and with the present fiscal problems in Canberra one wonders if sufficient funding will be available for the more expensive options in any future shortlist. This is particularly evident when the more expensive aircraft has to be paid for in US dollars which, as everybody well appreciates, is the source of many of Defence’s current problems.

The Seahawk is an excellent helicopter though and as (Sikorsky rightly points out they are probably the most advanced manufacturer of rotary wing aircraft) both the Blackhawk and Seahawk are the product of more than a billion dollars of R&D money over the past ten years. The helicopter itself offers a quantum leap forward in reliability. The twin General Electric T700 engines are as much as six times more reliable than baseline engines of the fifties. Furthermore, the engine/gearbox/rotor system has been fully tested via the Blackhawk which has logged in excess of 300,000 flight hours to date experiencing an in-flight shutdown rate only every 14,000 hours.

Apart from the fact that the Navy has made a specific preference for the Seahawk, the biggest thing Sikorsky has going for them is the Blackhawk being tailor-made as the eventual RAAF UH-1H Iroquois replacement. Commonality is more than a buzzword in these cost-conscious days and a teaming of both types would ultimately provide a simplified support base but also allow a better long-term offset package from Sikorsky as the total airframe requirement could exceed eighty units. The cost of the Seahawk on offer to the RAN is difficult to accurately estimate as the specific equipment fit has still to be fully disclosed. However, industry sources have been quoted as stating the Seahawk project cost would be in the region of $570 m for 14 to 17 aircraft. This compares with around $300 m for the Lynx 3 project estimate which also compares favourably with the relative weight ratios of the two competing types. Whether or not the cost of FFG ship modification is included in the Sikorsky figure is not known though it has to be kept in mind that the three early FFGs (Canberra, Adelaide and Sydney) would be converted for stabilisers regardless of which helo is chosen.

Westland Naval Lynx 3

The basic Lynx helicopter needs little introduction. It earned its medals in the gale-swept wastes of the South Atlantic-Falkland Islands campaign and proved that the small frigate-based helicopter can also be a highly lethal weapon system against small high-speed patrol boats. To date, there have been more than 300 Lynx ordered in their respective versions including 190 naval Lynx models.

On offer to the RAN though is a totally new Lynx, a third-generation model which denotes the Lynx 3designation. At 12,000lbs (5445 kg) Navy Lynx 3 can carry a greater range of weapons and sensors, including active and passive sonobuoys, dunking sonar, magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) and a 360-degree radar with considerable increases in time on station and mission endurance.

Armament comprises homing torpedos of the new British Stingray class or the Mk46 which is already in the inventory of the RAN. Combat-proven Sea Skua missiles can be used against fast surface vessels and it is able to defend itself with Stinger air-to-air missiles or 20 mm cannon. The Lynx 3 then is capable of a broad range of functions including anti-surface vessel strike, electronic surveillance measures, search and rescue as well as casualty evacuation. Navy Lynx can also carry nine specialist troops when used in the transport role. Lynx uses the proven and economical harpoon deck lock system which is known to be favoured by the RAN and Lynx also has its unique negative thrust rotors and inward casting main wheels to provide additional deck adhesion in high sea states. All of these features and roles were ably demonstrated in the Falkland conflict including a level of operational availability exceeding 90%.

The Lynx 3 comprises the latest electronics available including a digital core avionic system, with integrated cockpit displays and controls including a MIL-STD 1553databus which can integrate new weapon systems and sensors as required. Like the Seahawk, the Lynx also has substantial room for future growth capability. Lynx 3 weighs in at 12,000 lbs gross and therefore does not require any modification to the deck area of our FFGs. This, plus the obviously lower project cost of the Lynx has to be considered as a very great asset working in Westland’s favour. The fact that Westland are also long term RAN helicopter supplier with a known track record also works in their favour as does, in the shorter term, the fact that Lynx would be paid for in Sterling.

In terms of commonality, Westland point out that if the Lynx 3 were chosen for the RAN then their Westland 30 military variant would make an ideal Iroquois replacement for the RAAF. The Westland 30 has not been purchased to date for this task and only exists in demonstrator form though it would be difficult to see such a variant not being officially ‘sold’ in the coming two years as it has the hallmarks of a highly capable tactical helicopter for the land forces. The commonality between the Lynx and W30 is high as both share basically common engines, dynamics, tail boom and rotors in addition to the entire upper fuselage region. The W30 however, is currently being certified with the more powerful General Electric CT7 engines in place of the traditional Rolls Royce Gems, while this would eliminate one area of commonality it would offer significant increases in the operational capability of the W30 military and civil variants.

So there you have it, two excellent helicopters competing for an order that is generally regarded as merely the tip of the iceberg in what could eventuate as a long-term billion-dollar order. The overall question is also confused to some extent by what Navy will do to get the Sea King ASW helos back into the fleet. At time of writing, the RAN were extremely interested in the SCADS approach (refer p60, September 1983 issue) in addition to a proposal put forward by Carrington Slipways for a series of modified Tobruk class vessels tailor-made to the heavy ASW helicopter blue water requirement.

The fact that this excellent, and indeed vital, helicopter weapon system is grounded at Nowra is a travesty and tends to negate much of the saving expected from the non-replacement of HMAS Melbourne. If Navy cannot get their Sea Kings back to sea then the better mission endurance of the Seahawk will become vital though even Sikorsky are quick to point out that they are no match for the Sea King in the all-important ASW role. On the other hand if the Navy can get a SCADS system deployed aboard a leased ANL or BHP container ship (of which several ideal examples are available and on firm offer to the RAN) then the money they save in opting for Lynx can go towards maintaining a long term Sea King force at sea.

In summary, the Seahawk offers greater overall mission capability, state-of-the-art engineering, and large-scale commonality with a proven Army support version and is of course the helicopter originally intended for this class of vessel. Seahawk would also provide equipment commonality with the US Navy in view of the fact that in a real war that would be the force we would be largely tasked alongside in regional waters. On the debit side all this capability does not come cheap and no matter how you look at it a Seahawk is always going to cost at least 60% more than the smaller Lynx 3.

Westland to their credit, are already a proven supplier to the RAN, they have an excellent, combat-proven, light helicopter that does not require hull modifications to the FFGs to be able to deploy aboard them. On the debit side is the fact that its army support counterpart is not a production aircraft and that the Lynx 3 does suffer from its size when mission endurance is taken into account. On the other hand it offers considerable operating and acquisition cost savings that may just swing the decision from a Cabinet not exactly flushed with funds.

We have waited nearly twenty years to get to this stage, hopefully, a firm decision on the successful tenderer will be made by mid-84, though whichever helicopter is chosen will certainly provide a massive tactical extension of the mission capabilities of our FFG fleet.