The First Battle of Britain

The British had fully expected devastating attacks by zeppelins to begin from the moment the war began on 4th August 1914, but no such attack occurred for nearly six months. Meanwhile, they were able to do much to improve their air defences, the responsibility for which lay with the Admiralty and not the War Office. The origin of this arrangement went back to the very beginning of the British air services.

Early Air Defence

The Royal Flying Corps formally came into existence on 13th April 1912, absorbing the Air Battalion created the year before. The new service came entirely under War Office control but consisted of a Naval Wing as well as a Military Wing. Right from the start, however, the two wings developed quite separately and became very independent of each other. This was recognised officially on 1st July 1914 when the Naval Wing became the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and was placed directly under the control of the Admiralty. Ttie Military Wing adopted the tltle OT the Royal Flying Corps (RFC), and remained under the War Office

Originally the War Office was to be responsible “for. . . air supremacy in the British Isles or in any land operations in which the army are concerned. ” The Admiralty was to be responsible “for all aerial services of the fleet. ” It was further agreed that the Navy would have the task of preventing air attacks against warships, dockyards, and all other naval targets along the coast. Even so, the War Office insisted they operate under Army Control, thus claiming complete responsibility for the Air Defence of Great Britain.

Despite this responsibility, the War Office made no effort to establish any units or organisations for home defence. The Admiralty on the other hand, decided to set up a chain of air stations right along the east coast from north to south. When WWI began the army did not even have enough aircraft to meet their complement to accompany the Expeditionary Force to France. They were just able to muster a total of four squadrons for this purpose, with nothing left over.

The RNAS, on the other hand, already had a number of air stations favourably situated to intercept any raiders, and also the aircraft to go with them. Very few of these would be able to go to sea with the fleet. Thus it looked as if the air defence of Britain would pass to the Admiralty by default. The government then agreed that the entire responsibility should officially pass to the Admiralty on 3rd September. As part of this new role, it soon followed that the Admiralty was to man all anti-aircraft guns for the defence of London and other centres. The army was only to be responsible for manning the guns at defended ports and other vulnerable points, and then solely against surface attack from the land or sea.

At the time the Admiralty took over, there was a total of only 33 guns available for air defence. Of these, a mere three light porn-porns had been allotted for the inner defence of London. One each was allotted for protection of the Admiralty, the Foreign Office and the Crown Agents. The remaining 30 guns were spread out at vulnerable points throughout the country. Nevertheless, extra guns and some searchlights were quickly obtained and put into position. London was ‘dimmed-out’ on 1st October, and by this time the defences of the city had been increased by an additional twelve heavy guns and twelve searchlights to go with them.

Although now responsible for home defence against air attack, the navy believed that the real safeguard was to set up a vigorous offensive against the airship sheds and to intercept the enemy well before they reached the shores of Great Britain. They already had an RNAS force of three squadrons at Dunkirk in support of a marine brigade. Plans were drawn up to bomb the sheds at Dusseldorf and Cologne at the earliest opportunity, but bad weather intervened. Even so, the first attacks were launched on 22nd September, but were not successful. On 8th October the raids were repeated and one shed at Dusseldorf and the airship inside it were completely destroyed. On 21st November a raid was carried out against the sheds at Friedrichshafen. All aircraft reached their objective and bombed the shed causing severe damage to the zeppelin inside. These raids were to continue.

All these preparations, and the raids, had been carried out with an extreme sense of urgency. Airship raids continued to be expected against England at any moment, but still, the zeppelins did not come. Fortunately for the defence, the German airship service was not yet in a position to begin their attacks.

The Zeppelins

At the outbreak of war, the German navy had only one zeppelin, having just lost two others in accidents. However, they quickly acquired a further seven from commercial sources. The German army had a strength of six, but in the first month of the war, they lost four in flying accidents and two by fire in their sheds. A building programme was started at once, with the production being shared between the two services. New designs were also initiated, with the object of improved performance, particularly in speed and lift capacity. However, the need for ever higher altitudes soon became the top priority.

Despite the initial shortage of airships, the German Navy and Army fully intended to use the zeppelins against England at the first opportunity. However, there were constraints placed on them quite apart from their operational readiness. Offensive use of the zeppelins was prohibited by personal direction from the Kaiser. For the time being, they were to be used solely for reconnaissance work.

As far back as 1899 there was a Hague Declaration that prohibited combatants from “launching projectiles or explosives from balloons or other kinds of aerial vessels. ” Another agreement was the Land War Convention of 1907 which stated, simply, that the bombardment of undefended places “by any means whatever” was forbidden. The Naval Convention, however, did modify the bombardment of other- wise undefended places by stating that: “Military works, military or naval establishments, depots of arms or war material, workshops or plant which could be utilized for the needs of a hostile fleet or army, and ships of war in the harbour are not included in this prohibition. ” In the spirit of the times it must be considered that, at least in the beginning, there were really strong moral considerations on both sides about the bombing of cities and towns as opposed to obvious military targets which lay apart from them. For the time being, therefore, the Kaiser’s prohibition remained in force.

The German navy in particular disagreed strongly with this restriction, saying London was a highly important target with its docks, arsenals and military establishments. Their arguments were reinforced by the British raids from Dunkirk. It was now feared that these continuing attacks might well mean the eventual destruction of the zeppelin fleet while still in their sheds. This view gained further impetus from a special raid by the RNAS on 24th December 1914 against the German naval base at Cuxhaven. Although it did little material damage, it forced the fleet to move further up the Kiel Canal out of range of further attacks.

Finally, on 9th January 1915 permission was given for limited airship raids on Great Britain. However, the Kaiser laid down personally that such raids were to be: “Expressly restricted to military shipyards, arsenals, docks, and in general military establishments; and that London itself was not to be bombed. ” The first raid against England was mounted ten days later.

Early Airship Raids

On 19th January 1915 three zeppelins set out to raid East Anglia, but one (L6) was forced back with engine trouble. The other two (L3 and L4) attacked Yarmouth and other coastal towns. They dropped sixteen H. E. bombs and seven incendiaries, resulting in casualties of four killed and sixteen injured, with some damage to several houses. There was no response from the defences, and the two airships returned home safely. This raid, as with all subsequent zeppelin raids, took place at night.

A shortage of airships, combined with extremely bad weather, kept the raiders away for a further three months. Several sorties were mounted but all were driven back either by the weather or mechanical failures. Indeed several were lost from both causes. It was not until 14th April that the next zeppelin raid took place. This was made by a single airship (L9) against the Tyneside, where 31 bombs were dropped, but casualties were light. There were no deaths, and only two injured. Two aircraft from the defences managed to take off, but did not make contact.

The very next night three zeppelins carried out a raid against some further targets in East Anglia. This time, approaching at about 1500 metres, the raiders were met by concentrated and accurate small-arms fire from mobile army units on the ground, which had been specially established for this purpose. One of the raiders was forced to retire as a result. The others dropped all their bombs, but there was no damage and only one person was injured. Raids continued during April and May, but were still confined to the coastal areas.

Originally, the airship sheds and bases were, of course, confined to Germany. However, with the fall of Belgium the Germans began to concentrate all airships in that area, and airship sheds began to spring up right across the country. This shortened their trip to England and allowed deeper penetration. Sheds were also erected for the new series (LZ37, LZ38, LZ39} which were now becoming available. After a few skirmishing raids had been made on East Anglia, these were ready to carry the air war to London, and could be expected to produce significant results.

Finally, in February the Kaiser gave approval to attack London but such raids were to be limited “to military objectives east of the Tower of London. ” This embargo kept them away from central London and the city proper. It was not until 20th July that approval was given for the central areas to be bombed, but again with the restriction that “buildings of historic interest were not to be damaged. ”

First Raids on London

On the night of 31st May 1915 one of the new naval zeppelins (LZ38) finally made the trip to London and attacked the north east area, dropping a total of 89 incendiary bombs and 30 grenades. Casualties on the ground were 7 killed and 35 injured. The airship got clean away, but did meet some NA fire at the coast coming and going. Warning of her approach had been received and nine aircraft were sent up to intercept. They were typical of the period. One was an F. E. 2a two-seat pusher. The observer sat in front in the nose, his sole weapon a rifle, loaded with incendiary bullets. The machine failed to reach the 1500 metres needed and crashed on landing, killing the pilot. Another defender airborne that night was a Short S81 two-seater seaplane. It was so underpowered, however, that it could only carry the pilot, who was armed with a rifle and two grenades in his lap. This aircraft also failed to make contact and crashed on landing, although the pilot was unhurt. Another aircraft aloft that night was a pre-1914 Deperdussin. The pilot of this machine also was armed with a rifle and grenades. It failed to make contact, but surprisingly remained aloft for two hours, and finally made a safe, if rough, landing. One other zeppelin (LZ37) flew in company with L38 that night but had been forced back by heavy NA fire at the coast. This raid, the first time a major city was bombed from the air, became a turning point in the war.

On the surface, the zeppelin attacks were certainly awesome, and they filled the British public with horrified indignation. Yet in effect, the net result achieved to date was rather negligible and hardly menaced the security of the home base. So far, the casualties were comparatively light and damage amounted to only a few thousand pounds, with none of it of military importance. It was rather a feeling of utter helplessness that affected the populace, more than the actual damage or casualties. Despite public pressure, it was wisely decided not to direct any resources from France, or elsewhere overseas, to protect the country against what appeared to be very occasional and fairly harmless raids.

In fact, after this first raid, it was to be another four months before London itself was bombed again. In the meantime, attacks on the coastal areas continued. It was on one of these missions, and only four days after the earlier raid on London, that the first zeppelin was destroyed in the air by an attacking aircraft. This first victory was scored by the RNAS units at Dunkirk.

First Zeppelin Destroyed from the Air

Early in the morning of 7th June two airships were returning from a raid on Kent. One of these (L37) was sighted over Ostend by Flight Sub-Lieutenant R. H. J. Warneford flying a Morane parasol. At the time he was on a bombing mission against the zeppelin sheds. He soon caught up with his target, but met with withering machine gun fire from the airship. He then pulled out of range and climbed above the zeppelin to a height of 3600 metres. He next went into a dive and released his six 9 kg bombs from 45 metres above the airship as he passed from one end to the other. The zeppelin burst into flames with a violent explosion which turned the attacker onto his back and out of control. Regaining control, the pilot was forced to land in enemy territory due to a damaged fuel line. He was able to repair the line and restart the engine. He then managed to take off again and return safely to his base. SubLieutenant Warneford thus became the first airman to destroy an airship in mid-air combat. For his action he was awarded the Victoria Cross.

A third zeppelin which had set out with the other two had returned earlier with engine trouble and had been put back in its shed at Evere. There she was bombed and destroyed that same night by an RNAS force from Dunkirk of which Warneford had originally been a part. By a remarkable stroke of retribution, this airship was the L38 which had carried out the first raid on London, just a few days earlier. There was now only one survivor of the three latest airships, and she was withdrawn from Belgium and moved to the Russian front. The continuing and persistent attacks by the RFC, as well as the RNAS, were now so successful and disruptive that all the Belgian sheds were abandoned as permanent bases, and thereafter only used in emergencies.

Further Raids

The loss of two of their latest airships put a stop to any further raids on London for another two months. In between these widely spaced raids, however, sorties by the older type of zeppelin continued against East Anglia and the Midlands. The total casualties from these raids were 76 killed and 164 injured. It was in one of these raids (on 9th August) that one zeppelin was so damaged by gunfire that it was forced to land in the sea near Ostend. There it was taken in tow by a German patrol boat, but was destroyed by bombing by the RNAS force from Dunkirk. Then on the night of 17th/18th August the raiders struck again at London.

This second raid was followed by a further series of attacks on that city on 17th August, the 2nd and 7th September, and again on 13th October. Total casualties for the August and September raids were 50 killed and 173 injured. In the October raid alone, however, there were 47 people killed and 102 injured. There was now to be another respite for London, and no further attacks were made against that city until April of the following year.

As usual, however, raids continued to be mounted at fairly frequent intervals on provincial targets, and casualties continued to rise, but were very much lower than expected.

During the whole of the eight months between the last and the very next raid on London, from June 1915 to April 1916, it is recorded that only one zeppelin was brought down by gunfire and none by defending fighters.

PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE

Early Warning

The initial failure to destroy the zeppelins was mainly due to a complete lack of an early warning or communications system. Added to this was the real need for more equipment and better all-round performance. Furthermore, there was a total lack of night flying experience. At the time it was not even known if it was possible to fly in the dark.

A basic system of observer posts and communication net had been set up once the first raids began. This was enlarged and refined as time went on, and one of the improvements was to interpose area control centres between individual posts and the operational centre in Whitehall. These were able to provide immediate warning to aircraft and guns in their area, and thus speeded up the reaction time, as well as acting as filters for the main centre. Also as early as October 1914, the War Office had set up a listening station to monitor the main German radio transmitters. This was now expanded to include the zeppelins. They were all fitted with radio, and they used this frequency to pass and receive weather reports, position reports and orders. The unit was given a direct line to Whitehall and the movements of the airships plotted. Also when they were noted to be over the French coast, either coming or going, the RNAS unit at Dunkirk was alerted.

Night Flying

The first experimental night flying tests were carried out by the RNAS. A searchlight was set up on the aerodrome, and the pilot then flew down the beam to a landing. As they gained confidence, the searchlight was done away with, and a flare path was set out on the ground in the form of an ‘L’. The pilot landed parallel to the longer arm, towards the short one, which indicated the up-wind direction, and also the limit of the landing run. This method proved most satisfactory in practice. In fact, it remained in use right up to, and into, the Second World War as the standard night flying aid.

A special night-landing device to indicate height above the ground was also developed. This was a length of cord, with a weight at one end, which could be reeled out so that it lay fifty feet below the aircraft. Then, when coming in to land, the weight would touch down first. The pull exerted on the string released a catch which started a buzzer and lit up a red light in the cockpit. In practice, false heights were indicated if the weight hit a tree or other obstruction such as a tree or a· building. Also, more often than not the pilot was so startled by the buzzer and red light at a most critical point in his approach to land, that the crash rate rose, rather than fell.

Despite their huge size, zeppelins were also very difficult to see at night. On the ground, a sense of direction could be obtained from the noise of their engines, and even on a dark night, it might be possible to see them against the stars. In the air the noise of the attacking plane’s own engine would, of course, drown out the zeppelin engines, and even if right over the airstrip it could not be seen against the ground unless there was a background of lights or other illumination from below, such as searchlights.

Finally, of course, having first caught your zeppelin, the next problem was to shoot it down. Part of this problem was the lack of aircraft performance, but this was not so important in the early days as the lack of any suitable ammunition to do the job Ordinary ammunition just went straight through the light structure of the airship.

Special Ammunition

As early as 1912 the zeppelins had been recognised as the main threat, and many ideas were tried out in an effort to find a suitable weapon for dealing with them. By the outbreak of war, however, the only weapon considered effective was the Hales grenade, specially designed for the purpose. However, it had to be fired from a normal service rifle. Even so, this was the ‘preferred’ weapon, along with a pistol or a shotgun firing chain shot.

Also developed were the Rankey darts. These were cylinders of explosive designed to penetrate the outer skin of the zeppelin, and then hold fast. On contact, a friction strip ignited the contents which then burst into flames. Finally, of course, many considered the only effective way to destroy a zeppelin would be to ram it. Pilots often discussed the best way of achieving this and the best place to strike. However, bombing soon became the popular method, particularly after the success by Warneford over Dunkirk.

The most vulnerable part of the zeppelin, of course, was the hydrogen-filled gas bags. Finding a bullet capable of igniting them was not as simple as it sounds. The normal small arms (0. 303 inch) ammunition had no effect, and would not ignite either the hydrogen or the fabric. Any punctures made were infinitesimal compared to the total volume of gas. Also as the gas was not under pressure, any such teaks would in any case be very slow.

A bullet filled with phosphorous, soon to be known as the incendiary or tracer bullet, was quickly developed, but the gas still failed to ignite. For a while, it was thought that the zeppelins were provided with a layer of inert gas protecting the hydrogen, but this was not so. The problem turned out to be one of finding a way to mix the hydrogen with enough oxygen to create an explosive mixture, and then set it alight. An explosive projectile was needed, and to fit the standard machine guns. Such a bullet, known as the Pomeroy, was eventually produced, but it also had problems of its own.

If the bullet was too sensitive, it would explode in the gun. If not sensitive enough it would not explode on contact with the gasbag, and the latter characteristic was essential. The whole idea was for the bullet to pierce the outer fabric covering of the zeppelin without exploding, and then to detonate on the surface of the gasbags. A mixture of incendiary and Pomeroy bullets, finally appeared to be the answer. It now only awaited a trial against a real target.

In September, a combination of factors gave the defenders their first real taste of success.

Victory over London

On 2nd September 1916 a fleet of twelve navy airships was detailed for an attack on London. These were augmented by three of the very latest airships provided by the army. At least fourteen of the attackers reached the coast. The adequate warning had been received through the by now very efficient wireless intercept service, and the defenders were ready. The first of the zeppelins (L11) arrived in London at 1. 50 a. m. on the morning of the 3rd of September. It was caught in the searchlights and came under heavy fire from the London guns. It immediately released its bombs, without damage or casualties, and beat a hasty retreat.

The cooperation between guns, searchlights and aircraft had by now reached a high degree of understanding and efficiency. The defending fighters had been alerted early and were already on patrol. The pilot of one of these aircraft, Lieutenant W. Leete Robinson, flying a B. E. 2c, had already been on patrol since 11. 10 p. m. and had earlier sighted the same airship about 1. 00 a. m. on its run in, but lost contact in cloud. Now he sighted it again at 2. 00 a. m. on its way out. This time he was at a height of 4,000 metres and well above the airship. He dived towards it and drew close up. Shells from the gun barrage were bursting all around him – and his target- but he continued to press home his attack. Then when he was in position, he fired a recognition flare and the guns stopped firing at once.

Lieut. Leefe Robinson emptied one drum of mixed incendiary and explosive ammunition into the belly of the zeppelin but with no apparent effect. He next flew down one side, again emptying a drum of similar ammunition without any noticeable effect. He then made a third attack concentrating a whole drum on just one part of the hull. This started to glow at once, and in a few seconds, the whole rear end was blazing. To observers, suddenly a flame flashed out from one end, and almost at once, L11 went into a nose dive.

The flames soon spread throughout the whole length of the immense body. The area round London was lit up for miles around as the one-and-a-quarter million cubic feet (31,864 cu. metres) of hydrogen erupted. It took ten minutes for the airship to fall to earth, and it was said that the light was bright enough to read a newspaper at a distance of 25 kilometres. Leefe Robinson quickly slipped out of the way of the falling zeppelin and landed safely at 2. 45 a. m. He was awarded the Victoria Cross for this action.

The effect on the rest of the zeppelin force was devastating. They had all witnessed the spectacle, some from as far away as 64 kilometres. One by one, they turned for home, dropping their bombs quickly to lighten their load and gain as much height and speed as possible. The ‘Leefe Robinson’ raid was significant in that it showed the success that could be achieved by a closely coordinated and carefully worked out scheme in which guns, searchlights and aircraft each had a definite role, and each supported the other. It was the beginning of the end of the airship menace.

Effect of the Raids

Despite the disaster to L11 and the complete failure of what was to have been the greatest air raid of all time, the Germans were not deterred. They quickly recovered from their shyness about London and resumed normal operations about a week later. By now it was obvious to both sides that in combat between an airship and an aircraft, the odds were heavily against the airship. Unless the latter could get completely out of reach of the aircraft, she was virtually useless and particularly vulnerable. Thus began the struggle for more height.

Until now the Germans had been raiding at 3,000 to 3,650 metres. They felt the minimum altitude should now be 4,500 or even 5,000 metres.  However, to maintain this height they would need to greatly reduce their bomb load. As this was not readily acceptable, for the time being, they decided to stay away from London and attack other targets where the defences were not so strong. They at once also instituted the building of a new series of zeppelins designed to operate at a height of 5,500 metres.

However, the fighter was already developing at a faster rate.

The newer British fighters were already more than a match for the new zeppelins, and not only in having a higher ceiling. They were faster, more manoeuvrable, and had a very high rate of climb. All of them, of course, were also now equipped with fixed machine guns firing forward through the airscrew. The zeppelin crews also had other problems associated with increased altitude. There was the need to provide oxygen and protection against cold for prolonged periods. In addition, navigation became more difficult and weather forecasts more uncertain. Nevertheless, the Germans continued to press on with their attacks against Britain.

By now the defences were clearly in the ascendancy, and the very next raid was to show that Lieut. Robinson’s victory was not just a lucky chance. Now, for the first time, the home forces were to achieve a double victory against the raiders in one raid.

Double Victory

On 23rd September, a raid was again mounted against London with three of the newest super zeppelins, with a diverting raid on the Humber area by six of the older airships. The latter attacks resulted in 40 killed and 130 injured, whilst the London casualties amounted to 37 killed and 114 injured. One of the London raiders (L33) received a direct hit from the defending guns, but the shell passed right through the hull. She was also severely damaged by near misses but continued on her way. She was later intercepted by one of the defending fighters which kept up a running attack for about twenty minutes. Although the zeppelin did not catch fire, she rapidly lost height. Soon after passing out to sea, she decided to turn back and carried out a forced landing in a field. There was a slight fire which quickly burnt itself out, there being practically no gas left to burn. There was almost no damage to the structure or equipment, and one of the very latest German airships thus fell into British hands more or less intact.

One of the two remaining raiders was intercepted by a British fighter at 4,000 metres, and an attack was initiated from below. As had happened before, the first two drums of ammunition appeared to have no effect. It was the third drum that was seen to cause the envelope to catch fire in several places. The airship quickly burst into flames and fell to the ground. The third London raider got away safely, as did the ones which attacked the Humber area, although the latter were diverted by intense NA fire.

End of the Zeppelins

The defending fighters continued to have ever-mounting successes against the raiders. The zeppelins were falling victims to the new incendiary and explosive bullets against which they had no defence. Even the latest, high flying zeppelins were not immune. One more zeppelin was destroyed in the next raid on 2nd October, and then another double victory, this time both by fighters, on 28th November. Although the British did not know it at the time, they had just won a great victory. There was only ever to be one more airship raid against London, and that was exactly a year away. In fact in all, there were only to be about another half-dozen or so zeppelin raids against any part of Britain from here on until the end of the war. However, there was now to be a new and far more deadly threat.

At noon on 28th November 1916, a single high-flying aircraft bombed London without warning. It dropped six 10 kg bombs on the central city, and people were not even too sure what had caused the explosions. There was no reaction by the defences, and the _ raider returned the way it had come, completely unscathed. This daring raid, in broad daylight, had been a complete success and was to change the whole pattern of air warfare.

Fortunately, it was to be another six months before the bombers returned, this time in strength. In the meantime, the threat from the zeppelins was definitely at an end, and the war in the air appeared to be over. In fact it had hardly begun, and the next two years were to see an ever-increasing battle for mastery of the skies over Britain.

IN OUR NEXT ISSUE we will follow the development of the bomber attacks against Britain. They quickly developed into ‘Blitz’ proportions, and at first completely overwhelmed the defence. Gradually, however, the defences were reorganised and new and successful methods of dealing with the menace were found and the bombers were also driven from the skies over England, as had been the zeppelins before them. These events led directly to the creation of the Royal Air Force and also produced the basic principles and tactics which the new service was to apply so successfully twenty years later in that summer of 1940.