Comment

Undoubtedly the politicians of the day had been acquainted by their non-government advisers of the Glassco Royal Commission on Government Organisation in Canada and the MacPherson Royal Commission, Transportation, both convened early in 1963.

However, implementation of the recommendations of both Commissions took some time to effect and, as late as 1979, the Canadian authorities were still grappling with them!

Of interest to us in Australia was the finding of the Glassco Commission “that a separate Department of Aviation (be formed) as the burden of responsibility carried by the minister and deputy minister (Canadian term for Permanent Head) of Transport for both policy and administration appeared to press hard against the upper limit of manageability”‘.

Glassco also suggested “that the Government would have to decide whether the public interest would be better served by the creation of a separate ministry to give more single-minded attention to the problems of civil aviation, or by maintaining the present organisation as a more suitable context within which to attack the broader problems of transportation policy”.

The Canadian Government, in late 1963, decided against a separate Department of Aviation “because it wanted to preserve the Department of Transport’s overall approach to transportation policy”. The problem was that the Canadian Department of Transport, at that time, did not have an overall approach to transportation policy, but has attempted that task between 1963 and the present time.

In 1970 the present Secretary to the Australian Department of Transport joined the Canadian Ministry of Transport and, before he arrived in Australia in October 1973, had been very closely involved in the implementation of the structuring of the Canadian Ministry of Transport.

Looking at the Australian Department of Transport structure formulated and approved since 1973 shows a decided tendency towards a Canadian influence, although it must be admitted that other administrations, US, UK, and so on, were examined for possible ideas regarding the structure for the new Department of Transport.

The same 1963 Canadian Government emphasis on an overall transportation policy has, to a certain extent, been reproduced in Australia, but in Australia, we have not yet seen brought into effect what the Canadians saw fit to introduce post-1973.

It was realised in Canada that the multi-modalism concept for the transport administration just was not working so a fundamental change in thinking brought into being a revised structure which, if adopted in Australia, may go some way to alleviating the feeling of some sections of the aviation industry that they have “lost touch” with the civil aviation administration in this country.

In Australia, up to the time of writing, there are three deputy secretaries appointed to assist the secretary whose titles are – policy and planning, surface operations and air operations. The equivalents in Canada are administrators for marine transportation, surface transportation and air transportation.

However, there is a fundamental difference in the administrative roles played by the deputy secretaries and the administrators.

In Australia, in all the line and staff diagrams issued, there is no direct line of responsibility shown from deputy secretaries to those below them – a distinctly “grey” area of direct/indirect responsibility.

In Canada the administrators are autonomous in their administrative control of those under them and work through the deputy minister to the minister – a set-up that could be made to work in Australia.

Before turning to the question of the future civil aviation administration in Australia, a few observations on the comments of various people referred to earlier would not go amiss.

On the surface, the Department of Transport is a large organisation in terms of numbers – some 11,500 persons, of which the civil aviation content still absorbs over 70 per cent – Some of his readings during a typical test flight make interesting reading:

Mach 0. 9; vibration-free. Control harmony is satisfactory for continuous cruising without auto-stability. Lateral response is perhaps a little too sensitive relative to the effects of inertia.

Mach 0. 94; onset of very slight buffet vibration. No trim change.

March 0. 98; cessation of any buffet vibration. No trim change.

Mach 1. 0 2; no vibration trim change. PE (position error) jump as the shock wave passes the static holes.

Mach 1. 1; no vibration or buffet. No trim change. Lateral control response in exact harmony with pitch and yaw axes and virtually ideal for flight conditions . . .

In manoeuvring, the low tailplane position was highly effective in sustaining longitudinal stability at transonic speed, reported test pilot Beamont.

There was no pitch-up when transitioning back to subsonic.

Such was the efficiency of this wonder machine that the first supersonic transition, first cross-country, first weather penetration and first instrument descent were all made on its first flight!

Beamont got rid of excess speed in the circuit (always a problem with high-speed aircraft) by a high induced-drag turn before dropping the undercard.

En route to Warton, he found there wasn’t all that much startling manoeuvrability in the clean condition below about 300 knots.

In landing mode he found longitudinal and directional stiffness and control harmony giving him a feeling of immediate security and confidence, flying a two-degree glide slope. There was no throttle-pumping even when well below the minimum drag speed of 16 5 knots indicated.

Landings in high-lift configuration ( 50 degrees flap) and using flap-blowing resulted in a positive pitch control to the 14- 15 degrees flare incidence, he reported. Result? A gentle touch and minimum run without being brutal on either brakes or drag chute, of a maximum of 850 yards!

The only critical item – apart from the Olympus bell-mode syndrome which was being ironed out – was the undercard. The spring rate of the mains was obviously not matched to landing loads. There was consequently a tendency to rebound strongly, commented Roly Beamont. In fact, on the eleventh flight, the TSR. 2 landed heavily enough to damage its undercard.

This problem was being resolved when the Government-wielded chopper fell.

The whole concept is best summed up in the words of Wing Commander R. P. Beamon!, who was in charge of the TSR. 2 flight test program:

“TSR. 2 was a brilliantly successful pilot’s aeroplane which, at the time of cancellation, had already demonstrated successful confirmation of its most significant aerodynamic and engineering features, and had in parallel reached a point of similar success in the developing and testing of its advanced navigation/attack and reconnaissance avionic systems.

“It seemed well set to achieve all the targets of its stated operational role and in the process to set new standards of precise controllability which have not been surpassed, or perhaps even equalled, to this day . . . ”

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