The Billion Dollar Deal

To select a suitable replacement for the Mirage is akin to selecting a gourmet’s fare at a renowned French restaurant. Two decades back, when the Mirage was a paper aeroplane, you did not expect your fighters to have to carry a relatively large ordnance of ground attack weapons. Today the primary requirement is for an aircraft to provide full ground support in addition to the entire range of interdiction and air superiority tasks.

So involved and complex is this requirement that no less than 10 aircraft types are actively involved in the TFF deci­ sion. An additional half dozen aircraft can be added to the melting pot when you include future requirements revolving around the trainer replacement and the RAN Fleet Air Arm. However, before we look at the aircraft on offer let us delve into the operational requirements involved in actually replacing the Mirage.

Basically our Mirages were purchased to provide air superiority in any area where Australian ground forces operated in addition to providing air defence to mainland cities if ever the need should arise. Secondly, they had to have some form of modest ground support ability, though 15 years ago this was very much a back seat requirement.

Today we are fortunate to have the F111C in service as in the period up to 1990 this aircraft may prove its worth amplyin providing a tirst rate maritime strike capability second to none. Indeed this is the first moat of the giant Australian cas­ tle – we must not let any hostile forces land while such forces must be constantly monitored before they range close enough to launch a Cruise missile attack. This is a vital re­ quirement, stop the trouble before it starts, and not all the TFF contenders achieve this ability.

To cover the above option an aircraft must have very good range, sophisticated avionics, probably backed up by slower P3 aircraft, and be armed with missiles of the Harpoon variety.

fhe second requirement is for ground support of the Army. Whether a landing has been made on Australian territory or you are fightin_g guerrilla activity in the jungles of New Guinea, an aircraft is needed that, by design, conflicts to some considerable extent with that required for maritime strike and air superiority. Furthermore, if the enemy is using highly accurate manportable surface to air missiles, he can in­ flict very great damage upon your Mach 2 $10m a copy air­ craft. So do you offer that hidden enemy the chance to hit you-r 50 or so $10m planes or do you invest in 100 smaller air­ craft at half the price? This is a very real problem of the future and one of which the Israelis learnt the full impact of in the first days of the Yorn Kippur War.

Furthermore, your GA aircraft must be extremely tough, able to suffer small arms fire and able to operate from semi prepared strips with a minimum of maintenance in all weather conditions. This again does not sound exactly like an air superiority fighter’s design requirement.

Basically there is little wrong with our Mirages. Kangaroo II proved their air to air ability even against the sophisticated F14, however their GA ability is very limited when it is con­ sidered that the enemy will most probably be firing back with radar directed cannon and man-portable missiles. The Mirage was not really designed for GA and consequently its risk fac­ tor is often too great when viewed from the amount of damage it could do to most surface targets in a truly hostile environment. Therefore we come to the most likely, though more ex­ pensive option of having two types in. service for the ’80s/’90s. There is a lot of merit in a hi/lo mix; though in a small air force such as the RAAF it creates budgetary problems in that you have split maintenance facilities, air training programmes and even deployment problems in a real war situation. Still this can be offset by the requirement of perhaps a lesser number of specific aircraft to fulfil the requirements of air defence and ground support. Even the NATO air forces now solit their responsibilities as the state of the art becomes more demanding on operational types. Conversely it you have the one aircraft type you must suffer a trade off in one or two areas of performance. While if an aircraft exists that does not have above average capabilities in each environment then cost will render it so expensive that we once more return to our hidden enemy blasting it out of the sky with a missile worth a few hundred dollars.

So much for the basics.

You can study the facts relating to each of the short list TFF contenders and probably come up with three viable choices. However, again to complicate the situation, you can get heavily involved in just what trainer the RAAF will opt for and what will the RAN be doing in 1985 when HMAS Melbourne is paid off. Neither of these situations is of ex­ treme urgency, though they do become important when ex­ amined for mission compatibility into the last quarter of this century. For instance the Hawk, Maccn1 and Casa all have relative­ ly cost effective GA capabilities, certainly not in the context of Jaguar, Viggen or A10 but there again they don’t cost all that much if destroyed in action and sufficient numbers can be deployed to offer reasonably constant ground support pro­ viding total air superiority has already been achieved. Furthermore you have the situation of trainer engine com­ monality with that of the bigger aircraft, a Hawk/Jaguar relationship is very important on an AIP basis – which after all is one of the high points in the TFF choice.

Secondly what if the RAN puts into operation the Harrier Carrier when HMAS Melbourne is withdrawn. If the RAN operated either the Sea Harrier or the AV8B then it would stand to reason that the RAAF could do well to employ a squadron or two in the direct GA role with a pure air defence/superiority fighter to ensure passive airspace. Not requiring elaborate runways and bases, the new generation Harriers at around $Sm apiece provide attractive answers to many defence problems.

This ot course leaves us with a potpourri of scenarios due to the overall complexity of the basic TFF requirements and the large number of aircraft worthy of detailed con­ sideration.

I would be putting it mildly to suggest that there is a love affair between the McDonnell Douglas F15 Eagle and the RAAF. Just as the Mustang was everything the RAAF neededin the Pacific in World War 11, the Eagle may well prove the same in the ’80s. Capable of flying without refuelling for up to 3400 miles, carrying fast pack fuel pallets and external tanks without sacrificing any of its air superiority payload, the Eagle could well be an able back-up to the F111C units engaged in maritime strike. Like the F111C, the Eagle can patrol for several hours engaging surface targets hundreds of miles from the coast using Harpoon and PGM weapons.

Powered by two advanced technology Pratt and Whitney F100 turbofans the F15 offers a remarkably high fuel fraction of 28% with high rates of SEP ensuring the ability to use its vast reserves of power to the utmost in any combat situation without having to run for base or rendevous with a tanker in less hostile airspace. The F15 is designed to fly to the combat area carrying its standard air to air armoury of four Sparrow and four Sidewinder missiles, 20mm M61 gatling gun and three 500 imp gallon drop tanks. Even without the addition of the unique fast pack fuel pallets, the Eagle has a tactical radius in excess of 1100 miles. Another unique feature is that the Eagle can carry 15,000lb of GA stores in addition to the aforementioned air o air weapons. This means that in a hostile environment the Eagle can hit hard and fast and then provide its own cover on the way out without tying up other fighters. Through the advances of the past decade in aerospace technology this is value _for money paying off in that a smallish buy of high capability higher priced aircraft cando the job of many cheaper, smaller ones. Though, as– we mentioned earlier, with a numerically low buy you cannot afford to suffer a high attrition rate.

Panavia Tornado Cutaway Drawing Key

The F15 Eagle can carry a wide range of PGM smart bombs, ECM and sensor and reconnaissance pods and longer range Harpoon missiles. Its surplus SEP and high Mach 2. 5 in­ tercept speeds allow it to remain a hot air superiority machine for well into the ’90s, particularly in this neck of the woods. F15 must also receive some points for commonality with USAF aircraft serving in our region.

Indeed it is an outstanding aircraft suited dramatically to our needs, about its only drawback being a high unit price which would naturally result in a fairly limited purchase.

Even more expensive – by about 40 per cent – is the outstanding Grumman F14 Tomcat. Twin seat variable sweep air defence fighter and Foxbat killer utilising the brilliantaltitude targets automatically with an extremely high hit ratio. The AWG9 can track 24 targets simultaneously with Phoenix missiles while continuing_ to scan the airspace for secondary tar ets. The AW_G9 has a brilliant look-up, look-down facilitywhich along with the total Hughes radar/missile package makes the Tomcat a mini AWACS aircraft in its own right Something indeed that would be very useful in defending Australia’s 12,000 miles of coastline. The AWG9 can detect targets at a range of 115 miles over a150 mile front, more than twice the range of other combat aircraft. In addition to com­ manding the Phoenix missile, the AWG9 launches Sidewinder and Sparrow missiles and directs the fire of the 20mm M61 gatling gun. Phoenix missiles have taken out drone targets simulating low level Cruise missiles at 50 feet, to targets Page 15simulating the Foxbat at 80,000 feet-plus altitudes at ranges up to an unprecedented 110 miles. Truly a remarkable weapons system but very expensive at around $15m or so a copy.

In the air to air dogfight arena the F15, F16 type aircraft have far more manoeuvrability and SEP to use, though the total realm of the Tomcat is to prevent these aircraft reaching the F14 and those GA units it would be escorting. In the ’60s the US Navy learnt the hard way over North Vietnam that often a fighter carrying only missiles was at a distinct disadvantage to the smaller cannon armed MiG 21s. Due to the ineffec­ tiveness of the early generation Sparrow missiles to hit the desired targets several Phantoms were lost resulting from fire instituted by their own back-up aircraft. The Phoenix/AWG9 system is the product of a decade of technical refinement ,·ust as latter day Sparrow missiles would have done themse ves justice in 1967 over Vietnam had they been available. .

There have always been two distinct schools of thought when talking air interception. You either go up there with a hot-rod dogfighter and outmanoeuvre the enemy, blasting him with cannon and short range IR dogfight missiles or you stand off firing the longer range sophisticated missiles guided by computer. Over Vietnam the cannon armed USN F8 Crusaders of the US Navy scored a four times greater kill rate than their missile armed F4B on a mission/aircraft basis. In the Middle East, the IAF largely relies upon its cannon, though in all fairness they have never been able to down Foxbat recce overflights over their territory using the M61. Overall the F14 is the supreme air defence fighter though it does lack in SEP and engine performance.

Powered by two TF30 20,900Ib Pratt & Whitneys the F14 scores top marks for USN local commonality and support from the existing RAAF maintenance base via the similarly engined F111C. However, Australia would probably opt for the more powerful F14B with the 28,090Ib P&W F401. Com­ bined with total SEP and the ma_gic Hughes fire control system the F14B would then truly be a oeautiful weapons system.

Virtually a miniature F111, the Panavia Tornado also offers extremely good value in ground attack accuracy and maritime strike roles using PGM in an effort to isolate it from close-in hostile ground fire. It is a lot less painful to lose a $4m plane than to lose a $10m aircraft to a man portable missile.

Panavia is a partnership of the aerospace talents of Great Britain, Italy and West Germany, 807 aircraft are on order and through the ’80s these will supply the GA and interdiction backbone, combined with the Jaguar for NATO while the F16 looks after air superiority. Again the overriding problem is choosing an aircraft that can do all things equally well, this is a near impossibility without breaking budget and is emphasised Page 16in that even a large force such as NATO must share out the specific role responsibilities amongst its various national air forces.

Powered by two 14,S00lb Turbo Union turbofans the Tor­ nado lacks in SEP and direct air superiority capability in the current version though the air defence model planned for the RAF with uprated turbofans probably offers better long term value for Australia. The Tornado offers true all weather close support though lacks the endurance of, say, the A10. Cost aside though I would suggest that the Tornado and the Eagle probably come closest overall to fulfilling our local require­ ment for a Mirage replacement. The Tornado also gains full points for its ability to operate from short airfields and also offers good AIP involvement on the proposed stretched air defence version ordered for the RAF.

Another new breed American fighter is the pint-sized F16 from General Dynamics. Ordered for the Four Nations and the USAF in quantity, this excellent fighter should see more than 3000 units produced by the end of the ’80s.

The F16 is a small, lightweight air superiority fighter with very good range and excellent manoeuvrability in extreme combat situations. Compared to the aircraft it will tend to replace over the years – the Phantom – the F16 turns in half the radius, accelerates twice as fast and travels twice as far on internal fuel – quite an achievement for an aircraft of similar size to our own Mirages.

Armament is quite sparse at one M61 Vulcan cannon and two AIM9 Sidewinders. Still the F16 is a “get up there and shoot it out” type f[ghter, optimised for heavy SEP and near vertical combat performance. Certainly a match for the MiG 23, which will be the real high altitude threat during the ’80s to countries such as Australia. At around four to five million dollars a copy, the F16 looks inviting when considered as a four or five squadron buy. Also able to carry up to 15,000lb of GA stores, the F16 would benefit by a more advanced GA avionics pack.

SEPECAT Jaguar Cutaway Drawing Key

IAI Kfir-C2 Cutaway Drawing Key

Jaguar is indeed an excellent GA aircraft, carrying up to 10,000lb of stores and overwing Matra Magic dogfight missiles and twin 30mm Aden cannon. This aircraft offers very good value for money and has commonality with the Adour engine of the Hawk trainer, if that aircraft were chosen. Export Jaguars are now available with uprated Adours offering an in- crease of some 27 per cent in power, enough to lift total thrust to around 18,000lb in a moderately light aircraft with apparently good combat handling characteristics. There is also a Dash 58 Adour under development that again lifts thrust to excess of 10,000lb per engine. As most air combat is fought under 20,000ft at subsonic speeds the Jaguar could prove handy though I hardly think a match for the MiG 23 overall.

Jaguar is really a ground support aircraft offering limited air defence against MiG 21 type aircraft. Armed with PGM, rockets and sensor pods it is an excellent aircraft and could be teamed with something like the F16 in a hi/lo mix.

At around $5m a copy, Jaguar offers very good value, almost a mini Tornado in many respects though it lacks the COIN type endurance of the A10 which it would be more directly compared with in a New Guinea type situation.

From Sweden hails the Saab JA37 Viggen. The Viggen is a single engined delta wing with small delta canard aircraft in both GA and air superiority models. Capable of operating from highways and semi-prepared airfields in the true STOL manner Viggen offers a lot in AIP mileage in addition to ex- cellent capabilities in both its designed mission profiles.

Furthermore the ground attack version offers Australia a golden opportunity to become involved at the grassroots level in systems design and engine overhaul/assembly by opting for the P&W F100.

The RAAF could then optimise the F100 powered F16 for the hi scenario while the F100 powered Viggen GA aircraft offers ground support. Australia, with some hard nosed bargaining, could then become the SE Asian support facility for this excellent powerplant and even attract future F16/Viggen buys to the region.

Viggen itself is a single seater, a true pilot’s aeroplane with one of the finest gun armaments ever designed – the Oerlikon 30mm tank killing cannon while missile arma- ment is presently free to use future acquisition of advanced missile fire control systems and full look up/look down radar.

A very good aircraft indeed and at around $6m offers very good value in either version.

The only drawback is the rather nasty aftertaste still left over from the Vietnam Carl Gustaf anti tank rocket affair. Sweden Page 18 does not like to supply arms or spares to nations at war, which is all very ethical but not very useful when your aircraft are grounded five miles from the front! Still this is a political con- sideration and one that the Swedish parliament has expressed equal concern with over the past few years. I am certain a concrete contract could be negotiated where the RAAF need not fear an arms embargo from the suppliers, after all Sweden itself is now promoting export orders to ensure its own solid aircraft industry.

Heading back to pure ground support aircraft we have a very real lo mix contender in the Fairchild A10. A square bulky aircraft that was designed purely for one mission – to provide orbiting fire support for ground forces at a moment’s notice and be able to suffer considerable small arms fire and still limp back to its makeshift base. Hence all vital systems are able to be plugged in/plugged out for speedy repairs to damaged components. Engines are in protective housings while all vital lines and systems are mounted above the fuselage away from ground fire. The two 9065lb GE turbofans are of the low heat emitting variety to deter our man with his deadly shoulder fired rocket.

The A10 has a remarkable loiter capability and can re-

Powered bf a single P&W F100 (as is the F15) the F16 gains marks for loca assembly and commonality with US Pacific forces. Still unless the emphasis can be turned more towards ground support I cannot see it being selected as an all out buy, though it would amply fill thehigh end of the mix with a p_ure GA aircraft down at tree tops level operating in secured airspace.

A joint development between France and Great Britain is the BAC Aerospatielle Jaguar. Again, twin engined for extra survivability the Jaguar, role wise, is virtually the F16 in reverse with theemphasis on GA, while offering limited air superiori­ ty performance similar to that of the FSE Tiger II in high altitude performance. main on station for several hours awaiting the call for ground support, something that is a MUST in the true GA require­ ment and something only realistically offered by the A10. To • be operated by the USAF in great numbers, the A10 will no doubt be just what many small air forces are seeking in dollar effectiveness.

The A10 armament ranges to a full 16,000lb of underwing weapons including all varieties of PGM and sensor/ECM pods, etc. The 30mm gatling gun is specifically designed for hitting armoured vehicles. At around $4m a copy it represents good value coupled with a capable air superiority aircraft such as the F16, etc. However, the A10 does require totally passive airspace in which to operate owing to its extremely low speed capabilities.

Another handy US ground attack aircraft is the llV A7 Corsair II. Well proven and tested in operation, the A7 has the bonus points of excellent bad weather operation, and a mam­ moth weapons load totalling 20,000lb with some sacrifice in range. There have been rumours of a government to govern­ ment deal of refurbished A7s for around $3m apiece. This, if true, would offer very good value if powered by· the P&W F100 and coupled with the F16 for the hi end of the mix. An interesting proposition as the A7 is also reasonably efficient a\ a low altitude subsonic fighter armed with AIM9 Sidewinders,in some operations it could look aftE>r itself or oher problems for other intruding subsonic aircraft. Still the A7 is the last generation of avionics design, though the value is there.

Not running high in the TFF stakes but there nevertheless are the AV88 projected for the USMC and the HS Sea Harrier for the RN. Both aircraft are direct developments of the current Harrier and AVSA aircraft offering a far greater radius of action with roughly twice the weapons capabilities. Truly great aircraft for the ’80s able to operate out of virtual backyards hidden under trees, caves and the like away from intruders. Furthermore if the RAN chooses to purchase a Harrier Carrier during the ’80s a FAA squadron of eight of these aircraft would oe a tine complement to a squadron or two of RAAF models. At around $6m a piece, they represent very good military insurance.

129Leading edge construction 130Control rod linkage 131Wing constructionThe AV8B is being built purely (at this stage) for the USMC whose overriding responsibility is to provide full ground support for its landing forces. However, the HS Sea Harrier is rather different being more optimised for limited air defence against bombers and maritime strike aircraft in­ cluding helicopters. The Sea Harrier probably will have slight­ ly better combat type performance but its systems will be more oriented for maritime situations and providing air cover for the fleet at sea. The AV8B will be largely optimised for ground attack and loiter over land regions in support of Marine Corp units. So it is again obvious that the RAN and RAAF would virtually want the two different aircraft using identical engines and systems compatibility where possible. Unfortunately this scenario is too far into the future to truly affect the reasoning behind the present TFF discussion.

So much for VTOL.

A dark horse which has just entered the race, albeit on a rather soft note, is the IAI Kfir. Interest in this aircraft stems from its parental heritage with obvious AIP boom type reper­ cussions.

The Kfir is basically a Mirage 5 with the GE )79 (compati­ ble with the IAF Phantoms) providing a considerable boost to performance and GA ability over that of the earlier Mirage. The AIP consideration is that Australia could build its own cheap (three to four million dollars each) and effective fighter and not have to rely upon the larger nations for support and acquisition. No doubt great reasoning if you are an Israeli surrounded by 200 million Arabs and the deep blue Mediterranean but not quite relevant to Australia in the next quarter century.

Still an attractive proposition would be to refurbish two squadrons of our own Mirages which still have plenty of fatigue life remaining, perhaps equip them with the TF30 powerplant from the F111 and then purchase an A10 type aircraft for ground support coupled with a hot trainer. I can­ not see us actually realistically purchasing the existing Kfir, however, as it is basically little· different from our own Mirages and after all is merely a stop gap for the !AF till their F16 squadrons are operational later this decade.

The final aircraft to be considered is perhaps the mostapplicable.

Northrop’s excellent Cobra II could be just what the RAAF requires at a price lower than that of the Tornado and Eagle and less than half that of the Tomcat. Cobra 11 is the land based derivative of the naval F18, 800 of which are on order for the USN as their F4, A7 replacements for the ’80s. Basically the F18/Cobra II are derived directly from the YF17 which lost out to the YF16 in the Air Combat Fighter flyoff back in 1975. This doesn’t mean that the YF17 was not hot, it just lagged behind the YF16 at that stage of development.

However, the Cobra 11 is far advanced on the original design concept of the YF17. More powerful 16,000lb P&W F404 engines enable the Cobra II to carry up to 13,000lb of un­ derwing stores of all varieties for all mission profiles from in­ tercept to interdiction, recce and direct ground support. Be­ ing closely associated with the F18 the Cobra benefits in that it must also demonstrate very good survivability and operational radius of action. A major point of similarity between USN and RAAF requirements.

The Cobra II is even more advanced than the Eagle, Viggen, Tornado or F16 in its avionics and allround capabilities compared to unit price and operation by the RAAF. The one big drawback to the Cobra acquisition is that we would not be able to obtain operational status within the RAAF probably till as late as 1984 or 1985. However, as we stated earlier in this article, the Mirage will be able to handle its role as interceptor and air superiority fighter till that time without too much trouble.

Therefore it may become reasonable to purchase a specific COIN type GA aircraft now for introduction before 1980 and to wait and procure the Cobra II during the mid ’80s, about the time the AVBB/Sea Harriers could be introduced to provide backup tor earlier mooted COIN type purchase, probably of A7 or A10 aircraft.

Again this represents long term problems in that we would be operating three distinctly different aircraft in the latter ’80s which can only serve to illustrate the immense dif­ ficulty in actually making a concrete decision on which air­ craft type/s will actually succeed the Mirage.

Anyone for chess!

TFF The Contenders