RAAF Mustang Exploits In Korea

At 04:00 hours on Sunday June 25, 1950, North Korean forces, under the command of General Lee Kwon Mu crossed the 38th Parallel in South Korea and launched attacks against Kaesong hungchon and Kangnung Spearheaded by Russian-built T. 34 tanks, the North Koreans advanced quickly against light opposition and by 09:00 hours had occupied Kaesong and overrun the airfield at Kangnung.

The North Koreans had made numerous prior incursions into South Korean territory but the ferocity of these attacks combined with the fall of Kaesong made it clearly apparent to the US Korean Military Advisory Group that this aggression was more than a mere border skirmish. News of the attack reached 77 Squadron, then based at lwakuni, Japan, at 11:00 hours on the 25th when ltazuke Base Operational Control on nearby Kyushu Island placed the squadron on emergency standby with other units of the US 5th Air Force.

By early afternoon of the same day the squadron’s aircraft had been fully armed and eight of the Mustangs placed onstrip alert in the event of a bombing attack being carried out against lwakuni.

In the early hours of June 26, a request was made by the US 5th Air Force to Brig. General J. V. Crabb, the Far East Air Force Director of Operations, that 77 Squadron’s Mustangs assist the F-82s of the 68th Fighter All-Weather Squadron in providing fighter cover tor the evacuation of American nationals and their dependants from Inchon and Seoul. Despite the state of emergency, however, the request was denied as neither the United Kingdom nor Australia had for­ mulated any policies on the Korean situation. The Australian squadron remained on standby while the situation around Seoul rapidly deteriorated until June 29, when a signal was received from Lieut. General, Sir Horace Robertson, Com­ mander in Chief of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan, that they should prepare for immediate com­ bat. Shortly after midnight on the morning of July 7, the squadron, then under the command of Wing Commander L.

T. Spence, learned that the Australian Government had plac­ed it at the disposal of the United Nations for operations in conjunction with the US 5th Air Force: later that day the unit received orders for its first combat duties since the end of the Second World War.

The squadron’s first missions in Korea comprised three escort duties: the first in conjunction with C-47s evacuating wounded trom Taejon; the second, a low level close support to B-26 Invaders of the 3rd Bombardment Group on a strike against the Han River bridges near Seoul and the third, medium level escort to B-29 Superfortresses of the 19th Bom­bardment Group which were attacking Yonpo airfield near Hambung. These first 16 sorties were carried out without loss or damage to any of the squadron’s aircraft. However, F/O K. Horsman and Sgt B. Nicholls were forced to take evasive action when they were mistaken for North Korean Yaks and fired upon by two US F80 Shooting Star jets near Seoul while escorting the 3rd Group’s Invaders. On these initial missions, as with all other Korean sorties employing the Mustang, 77 Squadron used the callsign “Dropkick”.

The squadron’s main role in the Korean War was that of tactical support to the United Nations’ ground forces which were being pushed back by a massive North Korean attack on three fronts. During July, despite gross shortcomings in target selection and attack co-ordination by the 5th Air Force which was brought about by the daily changing bomb line, squadron attacks were carried out against the bridges at Kongju and Pyongtack, troop concentrations at Simchon Pobang and Yongdong and road and rail transport at Samchok, Pyongtack, Hamchang and Cochiwon.

On the afternoon of July 3, valuable, though bitter, ex­ perience was gained as a result of the squadron’s attack on transport and troop concentrations near Osan. The squadron had been directed to attack “targets of opportunity” along the Suwon-Osan road in the vicinity of Pyongtack as it had been reported that an enemy troop column was proceeding southwards along this route. After their arrival in the target area the eight Mustangs led by Spence separated into two sections and systematically attacked and destroyed road and rail transport in Pyongtack and completely destroyed a heavi­ly laden motorised column north of the town. Prior to the mission, Wg Cdr Spence had voiced misgivings to ltazuke Operations Control that the North Koreans could not have advanced so far south but he was repeatedly assured that this was the case. After returning from the strike, Spence again contacted ltazuke who reiterated their previous advice that the area was under the control of the North Koreans. However, some hours later it was learnt that the town was oc­ cupied by both US and ROK troops.

The strike had been called as the result of a report receiv­ed by 5th Air Force Advanced Headquarters that a North Korean convoy was moving southwards towards Osan. Some delay was incurred in the transmission of the report and ad­ justments were subsequently made by Operational Head­quarters to compensate for this delay which, theoretically located the target between Suwan and Osan. The attack was carried out in a “highly methodical manner” which led many of the American and ROK troops in the target area to believe that the North Korean Air Force was more greatly skilled and aggressive than had at first been anticipated. An inquiry was later held into the incident which resulted in the squadron’s complete exoneration and, as a direct result of this attack, the methods of target selection and identification were drastically reorganised to preclude the possibility of further grave errors.

The squadron’s first month of tactical experience was not gained without loss. On the afternoon of July 7, Sqn Ldr G. Strout was killed when his aircraft, A68-757, crashed and burned on target during a rocket strike on the Samchok marshalling yards; his death was the first fatality incurred by BCOF in Korea.

Following its operations in July the squadron was award ed the Duke of Gloucester Cup as the most highly efficient Royal Australian Air Force unit during the period 1949-1950. Although this award is one of the highest attainable by an RAAF squadron, its effect on morale had been greatly reduc­ed by both the death of Strout and the memory of the attack on Pyongtak.

The first month of combat operations had resulted in 206 sorties, only 34 of which were aborted due to bad weather. The successful sorties caused the destruction of six bridges, 45 trucks, 12 tanks, miscellaneous vehicles, artillery positions and much river traffic for the loss of one air­ craft destroyed and eight damaged by ground fire. The low attrition rate was attributed to the fact that the North Korean Air Force was equipped with obsolescent fighter aircraft prin­cipally Yak 3, 7 and 9 fighters which rarely took an aggressive role although participating in several small scale attacks. On July 16, the squadron was scrambled to intercept four Yaks that were straffing positions in and around Taejon, but due to the squadron’s recent return from an earlier operation their ammunition had not been replenished when the scramblewas ordered and thus a priceless and never-to-be­ repeated opportunity for air to air combat in the Mustang was missed.

The Australians were meeting the North Korean advance with strikes originating from their base at lwakuni, Japan, and in an attempt to increase their efficiency, the squadron began staging out of Taegu Airfield (K2) Korea where they refuelled and rearmed prior to the continuation of further strikes. Arm­ed reconnaissance flights were increased and targets became more lucrative as the squadron’s aircraft. penetrated into North Korean airspace to the Manchurian and Russian borders. Supply dumps and troop transport received the highest priority as the United Nations forces were slowly pushed towards and, it seemed, into the sea, by the North Koreans. The move to a Korean airfield for aircraft replenish­ment during day operations proved an enormous success as previously the Mustangs had been forced to return to Japan after each mission and thus time over the target area was considerably diminished.

On August 22, the American Legion of Merit was award­ ed to Wg Cdr L. T. Spence, then in command of the squadron, for “outstanding leadership, devotion to duty and great per­sonal courage”. This was the squadron’s first Korean service decoration and was greatly appreciated, not only by Spence, but also by the entire squadron, who considered it a personal commendation for the work performed by them on behalf of the Republic of Korea.

August had dramatically advanced the squadron’s proficiency and a total of 612 sorties were flown, 322 of which were from Taegu, in a total of 1745 hours. They had destroyed 35 tanks, 182 trucks, 30 assorted vehicles, four locomotives, 13 ammunition and fuel dumps, 14 box cars and one power sta­tion; in addition they had probably destroyed 31 heavy trucks.

Following the completion of their second month in the combat zone, September opened tragically. On September 3, P-O W. Harrop flying A68-753 crashed five miles from Taegu, on the banks of the Naktong River while returning from operations over Pyongyong and, six days later, Spence was killed when his aircraft, A68-809, crashed on target while rocketing the town of Angang-ni. With Spence’s death the command of the squadron was taken over by Sqn Ldr Richard C. Cresswell who had commanded the unit in 1942.

On September 15, United Nations forces spearheaded by the US X Corps made a successful amphibious assault at Inchon near Seoul, while the US 8th Army, under the com­ mand of General W. Walker mounted a large co-ordinated offensive from the south towards Seoul. 77 Squadron com­bined with the US Marine and Navy pilots supporting the Inchon bridgehead and made attacks in areas Oboe, Nan, Mud, and Peter to a 50 mile radius from Inchon. Several squadron aircraft were also deployed to cover a secondary operation approximately 20 miles north of Pohang on the east coast. Soon after the Inchon landing a squadron attack was made on Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, which resulted in the destruction of two Yak 9U aircraft on the ground while covering patrols were also undertaken as far north as the 40th Parallel. While engaged on an armed reconnaissance flight during this period P-O R. Whittman narrowly avoided crashing on a low level straffing run after striking a tree which sheared four feet from the port wing. However Wittman, exhibiting considerable flying skill, succeeded in regaining control of the failing aircraft and nursed it back to base.

The squadron’s aircratt were now flying a maximum ef­fort and travelling as far as 1000 miles per sortie which im­posed a great strain on both men and machines. Thus, the decision was made to permanently base the squadron at an airfield in Korea. On October 12, the squadron was installed at Pohang (K3) where it was integrated with Mustang squadrons of the 6150th Tactical Support Wing, 5th Air Force, under the command of Colonel T. B. Hall. This unit was later redesignated the 35th Fighter Interceptor Group.

In the first weeks of October the squadron’s missions were flown principally against road and rail transport in order to block the North Koreans’ evacuation routes. On October 20, close support was given to a paratroop operation carried out by the US 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Unit, 30 miles north of Pyongyang. The North Korean capital had fallen the previous day and this operation was designed to capture a large number of troops and officials who were be­ ing evacuated. At 14:00 hours the first wave of parachutists were dropped over target zones at Sukchon and Sunchon outside the capital following preliminary attacks by fighter bomber and medium bomber aircraft of the 5th Air Force. These softening up attacks forced the abandonment of numerous fortified positions which greatly assisted the UN advance.

On the completion of the operation, 2700 North Koreans had been killed and 3000 caputred of a force estimated to be in the vicinity of 6000; in addition large quantities of munitions and winter clothing were captured in Sunchon and Sukchon. The entire action was deemed an outstanding success with particular mention being made of the Mustang units participating in the assault. On the same day two of the squadron’s aircraft completely destroyed a heavily laden troop train that was evacuating troops from the vicinity of the capital.

The rout was almost complete; all North Korean units were scattering in confusion towards the Yalu River ahead of the ROK and 8th Army troops that were now advancing along the east and west coasts. Between October 19 and 29 few strikes were carried out by 77 Squadron due to the scarcity of targets, although armed reconnaissance continued unabated in spite of the decreased acitivity. The squadron suffered its sixth casualty on October 22 when P-O D. Ellis was shot down after A68-726 was hit by ground fire while on an armed recon­ naissance mission five miles east of Pyongyang.

When the UN forces were almost within sight of the Manchurian border the war took a surprising reversal with the intervention of Communist China. The first signs of Com­munist intervention in the conflict exhibited themselves in the last weeks of October when several Chinese infantrymen were captured fighting in North Korean units. In addition to ground forces, Chinese aircraft, including Russian built MiG- 15 jet fighters, crossed the Yalu on several occasions on November 1. By November 7 it was evident that a sizeable Chinese Communist force had begun assisting the shattered remains of the North Korean armies. On November 5, the squadron provided close support to the Australian 27th Brigade who were making a counter-attack against a large enemy force at Pakchon. Troop convoys from the north became more and more frequent, in two days alone, 74 trucks were destroyed. Reconnaissance missions on November 7 and 8 disclosed that a large number of armoured and transport vehicles had been moving south from Kanggye towards the Changjin (Choshin) Reservoir under cover of darkness and reports were received of troop movements south of Huichon.

As a result of a further redeployment of the Mustang Wings of the 5th Air Force, the 35th Group, which incor­poraporated 77 Squadron, moved to Yonpo (K27) between November 17 and 19 where they shared the field with aircraft of the US Marine Corps.

On November 22, a few days after completing the move, 77 Squadron accompanied by two flights of Mustangs from the US 39th and 40th Fighter Squadrons, attacked a North Korean headquarters with rockets and napalm, completely destroying the target.

The 8th Army renewed its advance with a final attack towards the Yalu on November 24, encountering only light resistance until the 26th when the Chinese Communist 4th Army, commanded by General Lin Piao. entered the combat in force with massive assaults being made on the US I and IX Corps. On November 28 the Chinese 3rd Army, under the command of General Chen Yi, attacked the 1st Marine and 7th Infantry Divisions in the Changjin Reservoir area. During these attacks 77 Squadron flew in close support of United Nations forces embattled in and around the Changjin Reser­voir. These troops were bearing the brunt of the Chinese breakthrough and notwithstanding the immense airpower at their disposal, the situation soon became hopeless. In order to cover their retreat the X Corps called for huge air support on November 28 and as part of 35th Group, 77 Squadron con tinued to carry out numerous attacks on enemy troops con centrations until the X Corps had been safely evacuated to positions inside the defence perimeter at Hamburg.

Large quantities of United Nations vehicles and equip­ ment had been abandoned in the retreat due to extensive Chinese roadblocks and to prevent these falling into enemy hands the squadron was allotted the galling task of this destruction. With the retreat of Allied troops all available aircraft converged on Yonpo airfield inside what was to become known as the Hamhung-Hungnam defence perimeter, located on the east coast some 30 miles to the north of Won­ san. In order to ease the mounting congestion at Yonpo the 35th Group, including 77 Squadron, left Yonpo on December 3, and proceeded to Pusan East (K9). From this date the squadron’s aircraft concentrated on the suoply network from Manchuria where they disrupted transport and com­ munications and supply dumps.

On December 17 a flight of four Australian Mustangs at­ tacked and destroyed the heavily defended double-track rail bridge at Sanchon on the main rail line to Manchuria. Several other US squadrons of both fighter bomber and medium bomber aircraft had unsuccessfully attempted to breach this all-important link to the north but all had been beaten back by the intense concentration of anti-aircraft fire.

At dawn on New Year’s Day 1951 the Chinese Fourth Army advanced towards Seoul and on January 4, following three days of heavy fighting, the South Korean capital fell for the third time since the outbreak of hostilities. On January 6, A68-765 flown by P-O G. Stephens was shot down by heavy anti-aircraft fire while flying on an armed reconnaissance mis­ sion near Munsan-ni. Stephens being killed instantly. On January 15, a major Chinese supply dump was completely destroyed by four of 77 Squadron’s aircraft, while on January 19. the entire squadron took part in an attack on the head­ quarters of the Chinese Communist forces in an old school building at Pyongyang. A sad ending. More than two hundred RAAF Mustangs were broken up for scrap during the fifties, these five are ex-77 Squadron aircraft at lwakuni, Japan in 1952. On today’s market they would be worth as much as $100,000 apiece! Following the attack the target area was left a smoking ruin with little of the building remaining intact. During this operation A68-772 piloted by Flt-Lt G. Harvey was hit by ground fire and force-landed on an island in the middle of the Taedong River, four miles north-west of Pyongyang. Harvey survived the crash and was listed by the Red Cross as a prisoner-of-war in December, 1951.

The increase in targets was a direct result of the Fourth Phase of the Chinese offensive which was begun on February 12, the attack launched towards Hoengsong and Wonju. In conjunction with these advances the necessary supplies were moved to the front in daylight hours which provided ample targets for the 77 Squadron Mustangs. Flying in pairs, the pilots were allocated specific areas in which to perform their armed reconnaissance missions, returning to these same areas each day.

This procedure was adopted in order that the pilots would become so familiar with the are as that slight changes in terrain, denoting camouflaged vehicles and equipment, would become easily recognisable. Missions of this nature proved highly successfuI and conventional fighter-bomber aircraft were attributed with the most outstanding successes, some 1282 vehicles being destroyed or damaged during the month. The usual armament carried by the Mustangs for these operations consisted of 6 x 5 in. HVAR rockets, max­ imum 0. 50 in. calibre ammunition and drop tanks to suit mis­sion requirements. The usual duration over the target area was two hours.

On February 19, a flight of four aircraft attacked and destroyed 10 large camouflaged vehicles on the roads around Yangyong while another flight trapped a force of Chinese in a tunnel north of the Han River to the east of Seoul and as ex­plosive weapons would have proved ineffective napalm can­nisters were dropped at the entrance to the tunnel, presumably killing the occupants. While engaged on an inter­diction strike north of Seoul on February 26, P-O K. Royal was killed when hrs Mustang A68-704 crashed and burned in a paddy field on the Kimpo peninsular north west of Seoul.

By February 21, the Communist Fourth Phase offensive had collapsed and given way to the UN “Operation Killer”. The US IX and X Corps advanced against little opposition and there was much evidence of the ferocity of preceding fighter bombeer attacks: the hills around Hoengsong and Chechon were littered with Chinese dead and injured. “Operation Killer” was phased on March 7 into “Operation Ripper” which was aimed at the recapture of Seoul.

On March 4, prior to the initiation of “Operation Ripper”, camouflaged Chinese positions close to the Han River near Seoul were attacked and, as a result, several heavy mortar positions that had been inflicting heavy casualties on friendly troops were silenced. Interdiction strikes werecarried out in addition to armed reconnaissance missions and on March 19 the squadron lost another pilot, Sgt Pit H. Strange was killed when his parachute failed to open after he bailed out from A68-782 over Wonsan Bay, two miles north of the city. His death was the last casualty incurred by 77 Squadron while engaged on Mustang operations in Korea.

On March 23, the Squadron participated in “Operation Tomahawk”, the largest paratroop operation of the Korean War. Aptly named, “Operation Tomahawk” was designed to cut off and trap an estimated 12,000 North Korean troops who were retreating in the vicinity of Munsan-ni. Eight of the squadron’s Mustangs helped escort the 135 C-119 and C-46 transports over Munsan-ni and silenced any sign of opposi­ tion from both ground and air. Following this mission the squadron continued to harass the enemy supply lines in and around Pyongyang. During March, nine Mustangs, while fly­ing on an armed reconnaissance mission north of Pyongyang located and destroyed a heavy tank, three artillery pieces and destroyed or damaged 150 buildings that were sheltering enemy troops. This proved to be the squadron’s most successful mission for the month.

Between April 3 and 5 the squadron concentrated on destroying roads in the area around the 40th Parallel to hinder the retreat of the Communist forces. Each aircraft carried two 500 lb bombs that were dropped on main supply roads at half to three-quarter-mile intervals making many of these roads impassable. On the evening of April 4, the squadron was called together and informed that it would be withdrawn from operations on April 6, at which time they would return to their former base at lwakuni, Japan, and begin the long awaited conversion to Gloster Meteor Mk 8 jet fighters.

On the morning of April 6, four Mustangs discovered a large concentration of Chinese trucks along the Koksan­ Singye road. Following rocket and machine gun attacks, 12 of the vehicles had been destroyed and many others damaged. This proved a fitting climax to Australian Mustang operations in Korea. By midday on the 6th all operational fly­ing had ceased and on the morning of April 7, the 27 Mustangs flew low in formation over Pusan East (K9) then headed towards lwakuni.

From July 2, 1950 to April 6, 1951, 77 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, had completed nine months and four days of operations in the Korean campaign, had flown 3800 sorties and had lost eight pilots. The squadron had dis­tinguished itself as a highly efficient tactical weapon and its pilots had won recognition from all quarters as being skilfuI, efficient an highly aggressive in the face of the enemy; a tradition which they carried on throughout their Korean ser­vice. As a result of their operations while flying Mustangs in Korea the squadron members had been awarded the follow­ ing decorations: