Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld adjusts his flying suit prior to his final combat mission in the Middle East.(Defence)

Inside the first planned Hornet bombing mission in Iraq

In this exclusive extract from his new book, Air Vice-Marshal (Ret’d) John Quaife tells the inside story of the first pre-planned bombing mission by RAAF F/A-18s during Operation Falconer.

The seemingly rigid view of the United States Air Force (USAF) that every aircraft type has one defined role made it seem difficult for the Australian Hornet pilots to escape the defensive counter-air role. Although counter-air was the role coveted by Group Captain Brown, the Iraqi Air Force did not join the fight, and within two days the Australians, were looking to swing from combat air patrol (CAP) missions devoid of enemy action into a strike role.

Although earlier generation fighter aircraft dropped bombs and attacked ground targets, F/A-18 aircraft gave the RAAF its first opportunity for fighter aircraft to be reassigned into a legitimate strike role at the discretion of an air operations centre. Reassignment could happen airborne if necessary or in a more deliberate fashion under the air task order. The very credible precision strike capability of F/A-18A aircraft allowed frontline fighters to become front line attack aircraft.

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Two RAAF FA-18 aircraft wait to refuel from a USAF KC-135 over international waters south of Basra. (WO2 Al Green, Defence)

Dedicated fighter aircraft of the USAF and Royal Air Force, released from the CAP task but lacking genuine multirole attributes, played no further role in the campaign and were withdrawn from the region. Being relieved from the air-to-air task was not as difficult as it may have seemed to F/A-18 pilots anxiously urging their contribution to the air-to-ground campaign. Manning three defensive CAP stations continuously was a significant drain on the most critical resource of the air component – airborne fuel. Lieutenant General Moseley was keen to husband that resource if possible, but not to the point where his most valuable assets – tankers, reconnaissance and airborne early warning and control aircraft – would be exposed to any credible threat. Balancing that risk allowed Australian F/A-18A aircraft to be released for deliberate strike tasking from 23 March 2003.

Now classed as strike assets, the Australian Hornets were competing for targets with more than 770 other Coalition strike aircraft in the Middle East theatre. General Tommy Franks’ campaign of ‘shock and awe’ had already unleashed a truly awesome barrage of firepower as the opening gambit of the deliberate air campaign. Waves of venerable Boeing B-52 Stratofortress aircraft attacked Saddam Hussein’s fielded forces. Rockwell B-1B Lancer aircraft, each loaded with 48,000 lb (21,700 kg) of guided weapons, stood a continuous airborne alert to suppress the launch of Iraqi ballistic missiles. Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk stealth aircraft strikes, along with cruise missile attacks, destroyed the effectiveness of Iraqi command arrangements and Iraq’s air defence system. Grumman EA-6B Prowler aircraft jammed Iraqi radars, and F-16CJ ‘Super Weasel’ aircraft targeted Iraqi missile sites. The complete absence of the Iraqi Air Force ceded air supremacy to the Coalition without a fight. With freedom of action and precision weaponry, Coalition strike aircraft proceeded to work their way quickly through the campaign target list. As early as day two of the campaign, deliberate targets were starting to become hard to come by.

Once more, the presence of RAAF personnel in key planning positions in the Coalition’s combined air operations centre (CAOC) worked in Australia’s favour. Being tightly integrated with the United States Air Force (USAF) command and control machinery meant suitable targets conforming with Australia’s national rules of engagement could be assigned to Australian aircraft. This close integration came naturally from many years of experience working and exercising with United States squadrons. Group Captain Geoff Brown noted, when it came to operations, very little liaison was required to ensure Australia’s national interests were protected. To reach this outcome, specific effort was made to ensure rapidly developed Australian targeting policies, delegated authorities and collateral damage tolerances aligned as closely as possible with those of the USAF, with only the most minor of adjustments made when absolutely necessary. As the senior Australian airman, Geoff Brown held the same degree of delegated authority from Canberra as Lieutenant General Moseley held from Washington.

While Australians were participating in the air defence mission, the ground invasion of Iraq commenced. General Franks, as the commander in chief of Central Command, devised a plan that reflected the geography of Iraq and the principal construct of his ground forces. Special forces entered Iraq’s western desert region prior to conventional forces, with the intent of suppressing and eliminating Iraqi mobile missile launchers. Heavy armour of the United States 3rd Infantry Division advanced north through the western desert towards Baghdad, engaging and defeating Iraqi forces entrenched around Tallil Air Base, 20 kilometres to the west of Nasiriyah. The United States 1st Marine Expeditionary Force moved quickly along the main Highway 1 that follows the Euphrates River northwest through Nasiriyah to Baghdad. The United Kingdom 1st Armoured Division moved northwards through marshland and then swung east towards Basra.

Lieutenant Ray Simpson next to a Hornet, photographed later in 2011. (LAC Craig Barrett, Defence)

Movement on the ground was swift. The collapse of the Iraqi government and military occurred in about three weeks. Major battles were fought at Nasiriyah, Najaf, Basra and Karbala. A six-day battle for Baghdad was fought between 3 and 9 April 2003. On 16 April 2003, Australian special operations forces captured Al Asad Air Base, 183 kilometres to the west of Baghdad.

As Coalition ground forces moved northwards, the targets presented for Coalition strike aircraft were Iraqi ground forces, artillery, barracks buildings and the like. Working ahead of the forward edge of the battle area, strike aircraft performed battle area interdiction missions, independently seeking out their own military targets of opportunity in designated areas known to be clear of friendly forces. As the ground forces advanced, targets were identified, located and added to the target list to be deliberately attacked by pre-planned strike missions specifically tasked by the ATO.

F/A-18 Hornets taxi for their final combat mission in the Middle East. (Defence)

The first deliberate (pre-planned) Australian strike mission was flown on 23 March 2003. Sensing some pressure for a more defined result after the ‘Chemical Ali’ strike, Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld assigned fighter combat instructor Flight Lieutenant Ray Simpson to lead the mission. Simpson was supported in his fighter combat instructor role by Flight Lieutenant Stephen Chappell, a fighter combat instructor from 2OCU.

As Simpson went into a mandatory pre-flight rest period, Chappell did the planning for Simpson to lead a pair of Australian F/A-18s (callsign ‘Useful 33’ and ‘Useful 34’) supported by four General Dynamics F-16CJ Super Weasel aircraft from the United States Air National Guard armed with HARM missiles. The F-16CJs were role specialised aircraft, armed and ready to attack any Iraqi anti-aircraft system daring to engage Coalition aircraft. Four Royal Air Force Panavia GR4 Tornado aircraft would join the Australian Hornets from Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait, and a US Navy Grumman EA-6B Prowler electronic warfare aircraft would jam Iraqi defences. The Prowler was joining from an aircraft carrier positioned in the Arabian Gulf.

A US Air Force refueller and British GR-4 Tornados are pictured with an Australian F/A-18, which is waiting to be refuelled during Operation Falconer. (Defence)

Simpson and his wingman, Flight Lieutenant Tim McDowell, launched at 3 am in F/A-18A aircraft armed with two 2,000 lb (21,700 kg) GBU-10 laser-guided bombs apiece. They refuelled from a USAF Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker as the sun was coming above the horizon. Even without the sun in their eyes, tanking from a KC-135 was always an unpleasant experience. The tanker was fitted with a hard metal basket that converted a single air-to-air refuelling boom into a receptacle that could accommodate receiver aircraft, such as F/A-18s, fitted for ‘probe and drogue’ rather than ‘boom’ refuelling. It was difficult to activate fuel flow from the metal basket, and its short connecting hose and the basket itself were quite unforgiving if the contact did not go well.

As the aircraft cycled through refuelling from the tanker, Simpson was contacted by ‘K-Mart’ (the callsign of the CAOC) looking for aircraft to re-task for a time-sensitive target. The significance of this strike mission to the Australian task group and the vagaries of time-sensitive targets presented Simpson with a dilemma. If he accepted this ad hoc time-sensitive task, he would lose ‘more guaranteed’ results from the carefully planned deliberate strike. Fortunately, there were evidently plenty of other aircraft available for the CAOC to reallocate to the time-sensitive task, so Simpson fudged a lengthy estimate for the time his formation would leave the KC-135, and this produced the desired result – the time-sensitive task did not come their way. The success of their strike was also challenged by the late arrival of the GR4 Tornado aircraft and a minor delay on the tanker, leaving the Australian aircraft a little short of the fuel planned for their attack. They would only be able to make one pass.

Their target was a military base in the vicinity of Al-Kūt, located inside the Baghdad ‘Super MEZ’. The Super MEZ was living up to its reputation by the number of alert warnings being received and displayed to the Hornet pilots. The F-16CJ crews confirmed they too were receiving the same indications, which gave Simpson some confidence they were being protected. Regardless of that support, and feeling a little exposed flying at 20,000 ft in clear view of the missile systems, the Hornet pilots flew a manoeuvring approach that would make any engagement a little harder for Iraqi defenders. As they approached within range, Simpson’s APG-73 radar gave him a clear and unambiguous picture of the target. This was a gift. He had acquired the target and met his rules of engagement with plenty of time to run his preattack checks and confirm his switch selections, all well before reaching the bombs release point.

A21-022 – which took part in 20 combat missions in Iraq – is lifted by a crane onto at trailer at RAAF Base Williamtown prior to its move to the Australian War Memorial. (CPL Brett Sherriff, Defence)

Restricted to one pass, the Hornets could only attack two of their four assigned targets, so Simpson selected the highest priority impact points. Both pilots achieved good hits and continued to manoeuvre as they egressed the target, heading south for their tanker. There was no sense of celebration. The military base was located, rules of engagement were satisfied, and the strike was executed as planned. Those targets they could not engage were handed back to ‘K-mart’ to be reassigned. All bombs came off their aircraft and were guided to impact. Now the two pilots concentrated on flying their aircraft clear of the Super MEZ and clear of Iraq.

Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld gestures to his maintainance crew prior to taxing his F/A- 18 Hornet on its final combat mission. (Defence)

The RAF GR4 aircraft also went through the target successfully. In a quirk of fate, flying in the lead GR4 was Flight Lieutenant Craig Whiting, an Australian F-111 pilot serving on exchange with the Royal Air Force. Simpson noted the Aussie accent when the GR4s checked in on the common radio frequency and broke the disciplined patter with an informal exchange of greetings:

“Who’s that?”

“Fish.”

“Hey Fish, it’s Homer.”

As they left Kuwait, they passed Wing Commander Hupfeld leading a pair of Hornets in the opposite direction. This was not unusual, as the large number of aircraft transiting to and from Iraq flew on defined ‘highways in the sky’. As he passed overhead, Simpson gave his boss a wing waggle to show his bombs were gone and to indicate mission success.

Eighteen years later and a million miles away, Ray Simpson (now retired from the permanent air force) can still be overwhelmed by the emotion he finally felt that day when taxying his aircraft back into the flightline. His immense pride in his squadron and his personal effort in developing the program of work-up training, combined with the extraordinary effort to get Australian aircraft into position to provide an effective contribution to a global effort, reached a personal culminating point for this 32-year-old pilot from Sylvania Waters in Sydney. As they taxied into their parking positions at Al Udeid Air Base, it seemed the entire detachment was lined up to greet them – and to celebrate the fact the bombs were gone from their aircraft. Simpson, not prone to overt displays of sentiment, was swamped by a surge of relief and a potent mix of emotions.

“I just wanted to do a good job, and we did.”

There would be many more bombs dropped during the operation, but that initial strike validated everyone’s efforts, as Simpson recorded when writing up the lessons learnt. Deliberate, pre-planned strikes would continue, but targets were quickly drying up. Not everyone would get the opportunity to participate in such a well-conceived strike package, but as the campaign rapidly unfolded, all the Australian aircrew participated across the range of applications this extraordinary aircraft could execute. From vital area defence and precision strike, the core work over the next two weeks of the campaign became interdiction of Iraqi forces in areas ahead of the front line of Coalition troops.

Flying Officer Anthony D’Alessandro, now flying with Squadron Leader Terry Van Haren, participated in a few of these missions. Putting some distance between their attacks and the positions of friendly forces on the ground gave pilots freedom from tight controls and the careful integration otherwise required when supporting ground forces in closer proximity. That same freedom also transferred responsibility to the cockpit for ensuring selected targets conformed with Australian law and did not place the civilian community at risk. Squadron Leader Phil Eldridge managed to translate a nuanced and sometimes confusing legal argument into a simple five step ‘decision-tree’ checklist all pilots carried in their kneepads. The checklist served them well. On more than one occasion, Australian pilots refused to drop bombs, preferring to leave military targets alone rather than potentially injure civilians or risk unnecessary damage.

Pilots would launch with guidance from the ATO regarding their area of operation and allocated height block. With so many Coalition aircraft operating over southern Iraq, deconfliction was essential. As they prepared for their mission, aircrew would brief with intelligence officers looking for detail of any targets known to be in their assigned patrol area. They took input from wherever they could find it. D’Alessandro had befriended Mark Kelly’s neighbouring F-15E Strike Eagle squadron at Al Udeid Air Base and, when visiting their operations room, noted possible targets displayed on a whiteboard. Armed with tasking details, intelligence input and whatever data they could scrounge, the F/A-18s would patrol in pairs, working their way along a route defined by a sequence of waypoints entered into the navigation computer of their aircraft. Occasionally, possible F-15E targets could find their way into this route sequence.

Patrolling at medium altitude, aircrew depended on the aircraft’s sensors to find targets of interest. They found a lot of empty bunkers, but every now and then they found a worthwhile objective. As the two Australian pilots worked their way through a series of possible targets, D’Alessandro found something that looked like an artillery piece. He brought his aircraft around for another look and dropped to a lower altitude to give his targeting pod a better chance of picking up some detail.

Sure enough, it was a very large gun. With his flight lead, he methodically worked through the rules of engagement and estimated the potential for collateral damage. Finding something located at one of their grid references and judging the gun to be a legitimate military target clear of any collateral damage risk gave them the assurance needed to drop a bomb and destroy the gun. After the frustration of his earlier time-sensitive target mission, Anthony D’Alessandro found the cool methodical interdiction process and the way things so neatly ‘clicked’ into place immensely satisfying. D’Alessandro was not alone in drawing immense pride in the controlled and deliberate manner Australian pilots dispensed lethal force.

Realising ultimate decision making was now out of both his hands and the impressive machinery of the COAC, Group Captain Geoff Brown was obliged to place his trust in the training, discipline and professionalism of each Australian F/A-18A pilot.

They did not let him down.

The Classic: F/A-18A/B Hornet Aircraft in Australian Service by John Quaife is published by Big Sky Publishing and will be released on 5 July.

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