An Emirates A380 at Melbourne Airport. (Mr Ozturk/Pexels)
Lessons from the Middle East: Securing Australia’s airports
At the time of print, each and every hour, it appears that the situation in the Middle East continues to deteriorate, with more and more civilian and military infrastructure under bombardment by both sides.
At the most basic level, these strikes and counter-strikes by ballistic and cruise missiles, and increasing numbers of low-cost, one-way, ‘kamikaze’ drones inflicting mass damage on critical infrastructure, including world-class airport hubs demonstrating the vulnerability of this critical national and international infrastructure.
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Iranian-launched UAVs struck Dubai’s Terminal 3 and its iconic Burj Al Arab hotel, and debris from an intercepted drone tore through Abu Dhabi’s Zayed International terminal, killing one and injuring several more.
Bahrain’s international airport was also hit by a drone (prompting an evacuation) and suffered minor damage. These incidents have forced evacuations, flight diversions and highlighted gaps in layered defences. In short, even well-resourced aviation systems can be caught off guard.
Australia must heed these warnings. Experts note that unauthorised drones pose an emerging security risk to critical infrastructure. A University of Canberra study warns that Australia’s current airport and infrastructure systems have “limited detection capabilities, minimal guidance and rising drone use”, creating growing vulnerabilities.
Similarly, strategic analysts point out that the inability of operators to detect or neutralise nefarious drones is a “growing vulnerability” for national security. Indeed, cheap civilian drones can be bought off-the-shelf and easily weaponised or used for surveillance, challenging airports’ traditional defences.
In effect, the Gulf attacks expose a gap: even if Australian airports have radars and patrols, they may lack dedicated systems to spot small, low-flying drones or the authority to engage them.
While Australia has begun to respond, the scale, scope and complexity of the strikes in the Middle East are demonstrating not just urgency, but also the increasing necessity of such countermeasures to defend Australia’s civil aviation capabilities.
Airservices Australia, which manages civilian airspace, has already deployed basic drone-detection sensors at its major airports and is trialling advanced 3D radar systems at Sydney Kingsford Smith Airport.
The federal government has formed a Counter Small UAS (CsUAS) advisory panel and amended defence regulations to let authorised personnel “detect and disable or destroy” hostile drones over Australia.
Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy has stressed that Australia “already has sophisticated capabilities to detect and counter drones,” and these new rules simply allow them to be used safely in domestic airspace.
However, outside of those defence changes, there is still no comprehensive civilian counter-drone regime or clear legal framework for airport authorities. (Current laws even make it a criminal offence for civilians to interfere with a drone, except in strict circumstances.)
Leveraging technology to establish multi-layered detection
Modern counter-drone systems use an array of sensors and AI to achieve early warning. Airports abroad are fitting integrated radar, optical, acoustic and RF detectors to continuously watch their airspace.
For example, Sydney Airport has been trialling a Thales 3D “holographic” radar since 2022 that can spot very small, low-altitude drones in real time.
Sensor data is fed through AI-driven fusion platforms that flag anomalous objects and auto-cue cameras or jamming units. In practice, this means a small UAV drifting near a runway would trigger an alert and be tracked across multiple sensors before it ever nears an aircraft.
Once a drone is detected, automated response systems can engage countermeasures. Australian company DroneShield (headquartered in Sydney) produces combined sensor-and-jammer kits.
Its research arm notes that future airport systems could “integrate long-range sensors with a synchronised jamming system” so that, once a threat is detected, radio-frequency jammers automatically attempt to sever the drone’s control link. In short, AI and automation can drastically cut reaction time.
Such systems are already used overseas: Heathrow Airport in London has deployed AI-supported multi-sensor networks for years, quietly scanning the skies, while U.S. airports are increasing “Airspace Awareness” tools to reduce false positives and focus on real threats.
Industry experts emphasise that AI should support human operators, not replace them, so that trained controllers verify any hostile drone before action is taken.
Beyond RF jamming, new interdiction tools are on the horizon.
High-energy lasers are one cutting-edge option: in February 2026, the U.S. Army tested a 20‑kW ground-based laser system (AeroVironment’s LOCUST) near El Paso Airport, shooting down drones while radar-shutting down the airport temporarily.
Australian firms are also exploring lasers: Melbourne’s AIM Defence is supplying portable “Fractl” high-power lasers for military tests.
Other kinetic options include net-capture drones or mobile launchers. However, experts caution that any hard-kill method (guns, missiles, lasers) must be used very carefully in a civilian area.
Even so, Australia’s defence planners assume a “layered” approach: soft-kill jamming as a first line, with heavier strike systems reserved for worst-case attacks.
The intersection of policy and strategy: closing the gaps
Technology alone won’t suffice; a cohesive policy framework is needed. Australia can learn from its international peers by issuing risk-based authorisations that let high-security airports deploy counter-drone sensors under oversight.
Legally, police need special delegations from CASA to deploy jammers and interceptors without breaching communications or aviation laws. Co-ordination between regulators, airport operators and airlines is also vital. For example, as Gulf nations have done, Australia should ensure that clear evacuation and contingency plans are in place if an incursion occurs.
The aforementioned University of Canberra report urges “greater education, industry collaboration, and more counter-drone capability” across all critical sectors. In practice, that means running joint simulations (airport police, military liaison, Airservices, airlines) to rehearse the detection and response to drone incursions.
Changing and adopting new laws is needed so that airport security teams can take direct action against a hostile drone. Importantly, governments should make it clear that civil operators testing detection equipment or exercising drone control have mechanisms to do so safely, avoiding false alarms.
In sum, the strategy should be to update laws and regulations for C-UAS (counter-UAS) deployment at critical sites, fund research into Australian-designed systems, and share intelligence about drone threats among allies, just as the recent Gulf incidents showed how attacks can spill across borders.
Leveraging our home-grown advantages
Critically overlooked, Australia is not just a consumer of counter-drone tech – it is also a global supplier.
A number of local companies are world leaders in elements of C-UAS. Sydney’s DroneShield specialises in RF sensing, AI-driven sensor fusion and jamming equipment; it currently markets products for land, sea and air platforms.
To date, DroneShield has sold over 1,000 units (including handheld DroneGun jammers and patrol-mounted sensors) to allied militaries and police, and even to Ukraine’s defence forces.
Canberra-based Department 13 makes a sensor and protocol manipulator that takes command of a drone and can control every aspect of its flight.
Australian thought leaders urge the leveraging of local expertise. As one industry source noted, electronic warfare remains “part of the counter-drone arsenal,” but kinetic and high‑energy laser options are increasingly recognised as key to defending against hardened, enemy UAVs.
In practice, this means Australia should continue R&D and export of C-UAS products while also buying or co-developing new systems (land-, air- or sea-based) for domestic use.
Notably, the locally based branch of American Silicon Valley darling Anduril and AIM Defence’s lasers have already been field-tested by ADF for base defence.
The Gulf incidents offer a clear lesson: no civilian airport is too big or too modern to ignore the drone threat. Australia’s geography may give it a temporary reprieve from such conflicts, but terrorism or state-backed “grey zone” attacks can target commercial hubs anywhere.
By learning from recent events, Australian authorities can bolster defences before tragedy strikes.
Only with a comprehensive strategy that combines cutting-edge technology and smart policy can Australia ensure its busiest runways and crowded terminals are shielded from the invisible menace of unmanned threats.
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