Opinion: Drones are changing wars, but not as we thought

But as the world knows, Russia never made it to Kyiv. Instead, the Russian Armed Forces’ lumbering 60-something kilometre convoy was bogged down with constant ambushes from Ukrainian special forces and attacks from uncrewed aerial vehicles.

Some savvy social media users even assessed that poor vehicle and tyre maintenance also made it impossible for the trucks to drive on melting spring ground. It was amid this constant barrage on Russian supply chains that the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone made its name to devastating effect, with cellphone footage on YouTube illustrating just how vulnerable Russian logistics and supply chains were to drone strikes.

However, as the war continued and Russia became entrenched in Ukrainian territory, so did their air defence systems. Shortly, Ukraine all but removed these costly drones from the battlefield with Ukraine seeing little cost-benefit to risking the $5 million systems.

“The TB2 may maintain some relevance – its sensor suite and considerable range still enable Ukrainian operators to collect intelligence – but Ukraine has nonetheless shifted to using smaller drone technology to adapt to Russian advances,” Kristen Thompson wrote for the Council on Foreign Relations.

While not placing an operator at risk, large drones are still costly weapons systems. In November, it was revealed that the Houthis in Yemen shot down an MQ-9 Reaper system valued at an estimated $30 million. With the growing capabilities of air defence systems fielded by militaries across the globe, larger and costlier drones may not be the game changer on the modern high-intensity battlefield as previously assumed.

Identifying this change, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have embraced the concept of smaller, cheaper, and more plentiful first-person view (FPV) drone systems. Footage of these drones on the battlefield has caught the attention of national security pundits, with the cheap and readily available systems demonstrating the ultimate concept of distributed lethality.

The simplicity of the build has also enabled the Ukrainian government to seemingly pass the cost onto citizens, encouraging them to build the drones themselves under programs such as Victory Drones.

“Do you want to build an FPV drone with your own hands that will burn a Russian tank? Then this opportunity is for you!” the Victory Drones website read.

Victory Drones and domestic drone manufacturer Vyriy Drone launched a free online engineering course called People’s FPV. “Every day, FPV drones hit dozens of enemy targets at the front and save the lives of our military. The amount of equipment needed for combat is huge, and we invite you to join in its production!”

The much-touted first-person view drones, many of which can cost as little as a few hundred dollars, allow the Ukrainians to strike Russian targets and aid close-quarters fighting. Though they are providing critical for combat units, they may not yet be the strategic or operational-level godsend for Ukraine that many hoped.

Stacie Pettyjohn, writing for the Center for a New American Security, contended that “mass artillery fires still dominate battlefield outcomes”.

“Because small drones can only carry meagre payloads, even large drone swarms cannot rival the potency of artillery salvos. Similarly, small drones cannot match the volume of fires that bombers could provide if either side had air superiority.”

Pettyjohn continued, asserting that from the first-person view, drones do not work in networked swarms, but rather are operated by individuals overseeing one or several small systems, their impacts are thus diminished. However, where the capabilities are truly a game changer is in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR).

According to the researcher, cheap and plentiful FPV drones allow every unit to deploy ISR capabilities before combat or a strike. It has also thus reduced the opportunity for militaries to conduct surprise attacks through a greater appreciation of the battlefield.

So what actionable insights are there for the Australian Defence Force from the use of uncrewed aerial vehicles in Ukraine?

There is clearly no panacea to Australia’s inability to project mass, as it is unlikely that the Commonwealth will be able to afford the luxury of losing a drone as expensive as the MQ-9 Reaper. Nor would small first-person view drones afford many benefits across a large landmass and expansive maritime approaches.

Though a domestically designed and manufactured capability to bridge the two will be a wise place to start – providing our units with real-time intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, while simultaneously providing the opportunity to conduct networked strikes.

But without an armed drone capability, Australia must take long strides to catch up.