Inside the RAAF: To the Super

Background to BACC

In the late 1990s Australia began to address the looming obsolescence in the twin pillars of its air power capability – the F-111C/G andF/A‑18A/B Hornet. A formal project to examine options, AIR 6000 or New Air Combat Capability, was established to examine the acquisition of 100 new air combat aircraft of a single type.

A number of modern multirole fighters were to be considered but one in particular claimed to offer an attractive mix of low observability, range, payload, systems integration and low cost due to planned huge production volumes. It was Lockheed Martin’s Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and it quickly became AIR 6000’s front runner.

In 2002, the Howard government terminated the competitive selection process of AIR 6000, instead electing to join the JSF System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase.

To Australia, the opportunity to participate in the JSF’s SDD potentially yielded three significant benefits:

>> First, it would provide Australia with access to detailed information about JSF capabilities, cost and schedule.

>> Second, it would offer the prospect of Australian industry participation in the largest military program in history (valued at US$375 billion).

>> Third, it could result in substantial cost savings if and when the JSF was selected as Australia’s future combat aircraft.

This was almost a foregone conclusion, as then Minister for Defence Senator Robert Hill had publicly announced that the JSF was the preferred aircraft to fulfill AIR 6000 and no other types would be contemplated. However, a final decision was not to be made until 2005-06.

Meanwhile, moves were afoot, in the words of then Chief of Air Force, AIRMSHL Geoff Shepherd, to “get the RAAF out of the F-111 business”, explaining: “Despite its range, in the modern battlespace, in the last four to five years of its life, the F-111 needed to be escorted by Hornets to keep situational awareness.

“It didn’t have Link 16 and just running low and fast doesn’t mean anything against air defence radar and modern fourth gen fighters with APG-73. The F-111s needed to go with Hornets ‘hung on the wing’, for protection. So they were limited to the range of the Hornets with the 707 tankers, meaning the range advantage it had in the old days was nullified.”

In November 2003, Minister Hill announced that the F-111 would be withdrawn from service in 2010 – 10 years earlier than previously planned. Australia was to offset this loss of long-range, precision strike with a raft of new platforms and capabilities. He said: “The Air Force has plans for the acquisition of Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles and a replacement for the AP-3C under the further maritime patrol and response capability.

“In such circumstances, the Air Force has advised that by 2010 – with full introduction of the AEW&C aircraft, the new air-to-air refuellers, completion of the F/A-18 Hornet upgrade programs including the bombs improvement program and the successful integration of a standoff strike weapon on the F/A‑18s and AP-3C – the F-111 could be withdrawn from service.”

Given the timetable for JSF delivery as it stood in 2003, RAAF leadership felt confident no air combat capability gap would emerge following the retirement of the F-111 in 2010 and the introduction into service of the F-35 two years later.

But events were to prove this timeline to be wildly optimistic. By 2006 schedule delays beset virtually all of Australia’s major air power acquisition programs and by the time Dr Brendan Nelson took over as Defence Minister that year, Australia faced the deferred delivery of such key enabling air combat capabilities as the AEW&C Wedgetail and the KC-30 Multi-Role Tanker.

Dr Nelson also had to contend with the increasing political turmoil around the JSF program in the US, where its funding was under continued scrutiny. In August that year the US Navy called for a one year delay to its F-35B and F-35C acquisition program to free funding for other priorities.

At the same time, US House and Senate defence committees were debating whether to enforce a slowdown on the program so risk could be spread over fewer development aircraft across a greater period of time, thus putting the brakes on what was perceived to be an overly ambitious testing and development schedule.

Compounding these, the aircraft itself was also facing its own technical and project management challenges. A 2004 program review found that the STOVL F-35B version was tracking to be 1,500kg overweight and other models were affected to a lesser extent. To combat the excess weight, Lockheed Martin established a STOVL weight attack team and, through a series of airframe and engine design refinements as well as some performance and capability compromises, was able to remove all but 275kg of this excess and bring it back on track.

But more challenges lay ahead for the F-35, and by 2006 more schedule slippages were certain.

For its part, the RAAF knew it could not sustain the F-111C past 2012. A two-year delay to the delivery of the first F-35s to Australia to 2014 or 2015 therefore meant the very real possibility of a capability shortfall of two or more years opening up in the 2016 to 2018 timeframe.

Minister Nelson set about addressing the situation: “I was convinced by July that year that there was a real risk of an air combat capability gap emerging and I knew that the most important capability that we had to have was air combat, so that we could be confident about moving our army and navy in terms of its safety.

“So in my office we set up a great big sheet of paper and I started with 2006 and we went through to each year, including 2014. We looked at the New Air Combat Capability program and where it was in terms of schedule and then the outer limits in terms of schedule slip to the right. I was concerned enough that we needed a contingent capability. I was not prepared to go to Washington and sign the PSFD MoU [production, sustainment and follow-on development memorandum of understanding] on the JSF until I’d seen the fully costed contingent option.”

Three contingent options were contemplated:

1. Australia could ride out the JSF delays, hope for a politically benign environment during the intervening period and try to safely wring the last possible effort out of the upgraded Hornet fleet.
2. Extra capabilities could be acquired such as longer-range stand-off weapons for the Hornet, AP-3C and Collins class submarines, more tanker aircraft and perhaps even more F/A-18 centre barrel refits.
3. The nation could procure a bridging fighter, to be bought or leased for 10 years to cover the retirement of the F-111 and arrival of the F-35.

Having weighed each carefully, Nelson made his choice. He explained: “I thought under no circumstances am I going to tolerate, or allow to be tolerated on my watch, the prospect that we carry a gap in air combat capability. The obvious choice was the Super Hornet.”

Bridging Air Combat Capability

In December 2006 media reports emerged that Dr Nelson had set up an Air Combat Transition Office (ACTO) to explore the possibility of leasing a bridging fighter to cover the period between the F-111’s retirement and the arrival of the JSF.

In command of the ACTO was then GPCAPT Steve ‘Zed’ Roberton: “I had just given up command of 75SQN in 2006 and had been posted to be staff officer to AIRMSHL Shepherd. I was unpacking boxes when I got the call at 10pm to come in for a meeting at AF HQ. I was told I would stand up the Air Combat Transition Office and that we’d formulate options for government consideration.

“By the end of 2006, we were working with the guidance to get to government options to consider 24 Super Hornets and systems, as well as looking at other options like the F-15. It was pretty clear early on that the Super was it. It had the capability. It was in production and affordable and we had the capacity to introduce them.”

The AIR 5439 Bridging Air Combat Capability project, overseen by the ACTO, studied a range of fourth-generation multirole fighters. The Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale were eliminated as being under-developed and too expensive.

The F-15, thought by many to be the aircraft closest in range and payload capability to the F-111, also was ruled out as it was not in production for its US parent service, was not capable in all air combat roles and did not provide adequate maritime strike capability.

In any event, the F-15E, like the Typhoon and Rafale, was hindered by its price tag and deemed a poor fit for the then current and planned RAAF order of battle.

While still publicly “1,000 per cent” behind the JSF, Minister for Defence Nelson had sought out Boeing for a briefing on the capabilities of the Super Hornet. The company pointed out that despite its more complex systems, the Super Hornet featured a similar layout and shared many operating concepts with the classic Hornet, and that due to long-established relationships with the US Navy, Boeing, Raytheon and General Electric, transitioning to the Super Hornet for the RAAF would be a far easier exercise than with other types.

Reflecting some years later, AIRMSHL Shepherd explained what the Super Hornet offered that its AIR 5439 rivals didn’t: “The Typhoon that I flew was still tranche 1, had no air-to-ground capability and at the time, was purely air-to-air.

“The Rafale had only just been released into French service and was very much air-to-air. It needs to be stressed that we needed to have an operational capability up and running – not some training system or pipeline that would eventually produce something in the future. It wasn’t a mythical thing we were worrying about. We needed something people could go to war with in two years from the decision to replace the F-111.

“It was going to have to be able to hit the ground running and do the strike role but in its own way with its own systems. The Super Hornet’s got a massive [stand-off attack] capability and it’s the best around.

“I mean, we’d been operating the Hornet for 25 years, we know the US Navy inside out, they know us, we know their systems program office, pilots do five or six rides to convert. It’s a seamless transition. It’s like getting out of a Holden Calais and into a Holden Special Vehicle. So, to do it in two years, it was the only answer. It comes around to training and logistics.

“And also, here’s the key thing. The US Navy said: ‘You can have our bloody slots on the production line and you can have them right now. Right now. You can have that aeroplane tomorrow’.”

In late 2006, the Defence Minister took his growing concerns over the looming air capability gap to Cabinet’s National Security Committee. He said that, taken as a whole, Australia’s regional air combat capability was being perilously degraded by slippages in the delivery of key systems such as F-35, Wedgetail and KC-30, increasing maintenance demands of the F-111 and risks associated with the classic F/A-18’s centre barrel replacement program.

Dr Nelson advised his colleagues that the best solution to this capability shortfall was the acquisition of a squadron of Super Hornets. Funding was duly approved and with that Australia became the first export customer of the Boeing Block II Super Hornet. So on March 6 2007 he formally announced Australia’s decision to acquire not one but two squadrons of Super Hornets (a second for training), to be based at RAAF Amberley, at a cost of $6.6 billion over 10 years.

Convinced he had prevented a capability gap from endangering Australia’s national security, Dr Nelson stated his case in a lengthy public statement. Entitled‘$6 billion to maintain Australia’s regional air superiority’, it read in part:

The acquisition of the Super Hornet will ensure the transition to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter over the next decade. The $6 billion outlay will include 24 aircraft, initial support and upfront training for aircrew and maintenance personnel.

The F/A-18F Super Hornet is a highly capable, battle proven, multirole aircraft that is currently in service with the US Navy through to 2030. The next generation Block II Super Hornets will provide a more flexible operational capability than currently exists with the F-111.

The selection of a next-generation fighter allows for upskilling of the workforce. The Super Hornet brings a significant growth of capability within the support and supply chain, low observable materials [stealth], advanced sensors and IT. This will ensure that Australian industry is trained, qualified and has access to both USN and then JSF markets as they share common technologies.

There is no gap in Australia’s air combat capability and the government is taking all necessary steps to ensure a gap does not emerge.

The withdrawal of the F-111 is expected in 2010 with the F/A-18F Super Hornets to be operational that same year.

The Super Hornet provides Australia with the greatest capability enhancement and least risk option to ensure Australia’s capability edge.”

In later questioning, Minister Nelson stated that the option of a force mix of F/A-18Fs and F-35s was one “available to government” in the following decade, depending on whether the aircraft were retained or on-sold, though four squadrons of JSFs would remain the government’s first choice.

He also pointed out that to maximise capability, aircrew and technical personnel for the new aircraft would be drawn from both RAAF fast jet communities.

Queried about how the purchase was being funded, he said the government had provided full supplementation and that there had been no impact on the current level of funding for the JSF project, nor deferrals/deletions from the Defence Capability Plan.

Critics of the Super Hornet decision queried the circumventing of long-established Defence procurement protocols such as the Kinnaird two-pass process, and argued that the BACC decision had been made too hastily.

Dr Nelson explained that the two-pass system “requires analysis of the capability options before then undertaking risk reduction and cost investigations. Defence has kept a continual watch over capability options as part of the Project AIR 6000 Air Combat Capability project, as well as through international exchange programs – Australia’s needs for an air combat capability are therefore well understood.

“The risks and costs have been evaluated through the letter of offer and acceptance for the Super Hornet from the US government.”

Describing the acquisition review process as “rigorous”, the Minister compared the F/A-18F buy with another rapidly expedited procurement decision, the Boeing C-17 Globemaster, saying that despite their levels of technological advancement, the Super Hornet and C-17 essentially were off-the-shelf products with minimal changes. He argued also that joint support options were being developed that would potentially benefit both Super Hornet users, the RAAF and USN, as each used common combat system software.

The dotted line

Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the RAAF’s Super Hornets was projected to take place by the end of 2010 with 12 aircraft and trained crews, with the aircraft having full stand-off weapons capability. The last aircraft were expected to be delivered in 2011 with Full Operational Capability (FOC) by the end of 2012. This was to include full indigenous training, support, EW support, full deployment capability and mature crew numbers.

At the time of Dr Nelson’s decision to acquire the Super Hornet, the first test JSF had completed eight successful flights with Defence anticipating IOC by the type in 2015.

In February 2007, a month before the official announcement, Australia submitted a formal request for an F/A-18F buy with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the arm of the US Department of Defense that provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense materiel, training and services to US allies.

DSCA notified to Congress, under Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, that Australia sought to acquire:

• 24 Boeing Block II F/A-18F Super Hornets;
• 48 installed and 6 spare F414 engines;
• 24 APG-79 AESA radar systems;
• 24 US-140 multifunctional informational distribution system low volume terminals (MIDSLVT Link 16);
• 30 ALR-67(V)3 electronic warfare countermeasures receiving sets;
• Integration of the ALE‑47 electronic warfare countermeasures systems;
• 145 LAU-127 guided missile launchers;
• 30 PVS-9 night vision goggles;
• 12 joint mission planning systems; and
• ALE-55 fibre optic towed decoys.

The sale also covered system integration and testing, software development and integration, test sets and support equipment, spare and repair parts, maintenance and pilot training, software support, publications and technical documents.

Subsequent Congressional approval was sought in October of the same year for the procurement of associated F/A-18F weapons and associated equipment.

These included 43 AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles, 50 AGM-154 joint stand-off weapons (JSOW), 18 ASQ-228 (V2) advanced targeting forward-looking infrared (ATFLIR) pods, 24 ALQ-214 radio frequency countermeasures, 90 Joint Helmet Mounted Cueing Systems, US government and contractor technical assistance and other related elements of logistics and program support.

2008 air power review

Australia saw a change of government in 2007 with the Coalition’s defeat at that year’s federal election. New Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon, a vocal critic of the 2002 JSF and 2006 Super Hornet decisions, immediately initiated a wide-ranging review of Australia’s air combat power options.

Under the terms of his ‘Air Combat Capability Options Review’ chaired by Defence’s First Assistant Secretary for Policy Development Neil Orme, Fitzgibbon examined the wisdom underlying the Super Hornet and JSF commitments and explored what other options existed on air combat capability.

The second stage of the Review considered “trends in Asia-Pacific air power until 2045 and the relative capabilities of current and projected fourth- and fifth-generation combat aircraft such as the Joint Strike Fighter”.

Fitzgibbon was faced with four choices:

• Continue with the plan to retire the F-111C and introduce the Super Hornet bridging capability from 2010, then introduce the F-35 JSF from about 2015.
• Cancel – at a cost of $500 million – the Super Hornet deal and persist with the F-111C and the upgraded classic Hornets until the JSF was ready.
• Retire the F-111 force and make do with KC-30 tanker-supported and stand-off missile- armed classic Hornets, as per the former Coalition government’s plan before the Super Hornet acquisition.
• Go down a totally separate path such as request and, if approved, order the F-22.

Results of the review were to be used to inform the 2009 Defence White Paper, planning for which was already underway.

It was quickly realised by the Review panel that there was marginal feasibility in the retention of the F-111.

Were it to be retained for more than a few years past 2010, the F-111 would have required ongoing upgrades to see it through to its revised life of type. Enhancements of the aircraft’s ESM/EWSP system, the addition of J-class GPS-guided weapons such as JDAM and improved communications to give it a semi-networked capability would be needed were the aircraft to successfully operate in a post-2012 combat environment.

It was adjudged that there would be an insufficient return on the investment of time and money to pursue this option. Furthermore, the training pipeline and support for the aircraft was, in 2008, being wound back to free capacity for a smooth Super Hornet introduction. Once turned off, the RAAF argued, these were very difficult and very expensive to turn back on again.

Dr Nelson has said Air Force leadership’s undue confidence in its ability to stretch the F-111 beyond 2012 to 2013 at the latest helped convince him on the merits of a Super Hornet purchase. But as AIRMSHL Geoff Shepherd later clarified: “We gave the government the option to extend for two years but at the end of that two years there would still be aeroplanes with hours on them. So if the government said ‘go to war’ on the last days of the F-111’s life, we still had hours on the aircraft’s life.

“That’s when we said ‘You can take it another year’ but at the end of that year, they’re f*****.’ And they’re due for deep maintenance – and that’s the difference between two years and three years.”

The Air Power Review also pondered the acquisition of the USAF’s superlative air dominance fighter, the F-22 Raptor. But in reality it was never a serious contender for Australia’s BACC and NACC requirements. The US Congress stubbornly refused to release the aircraft and even if it had done Australia, as the first F-22 international customer, would have had to stump the $1 billion development costs of an exportcleared variant.

As it was, there was virtually no official enthusiasm for the Raptor among the RAAF leadership. The F-22 was perceived to be too highly specialised for the air-to-air role and the technological challenge it represented for the RAAF was simply too great.

The Pentagon also had made it clear that it intended to terminate F-22 production after 187 aircraft to free funding for more “usable” and urgently needed aircraft such as the F-35 and KC-45 tanker.

When the results of the panel’s findings were released, these endorsed Dr Nelson’s decision to acquire the Super Hornet to address the coming shortfall in Australia’s air power capability.

The dark lord

Rick McCrary was the point man for Boeing efforts in Australia and a critical part of the Super Hornet sale. A retired Lieutenant Colonel in the US Air Force, with which he flew the General Dynamics FB-111A and Lockheed SR-71 Blackbird, McCrary was based in Boeing’s Canberra office from the late 1990s, helping to keep the RAAF informed of Boeing options for AIR 6000. McCrary quietly worked the RAAF and Parliament over several years in the lead-up to the 2007 Super Hornet decision.

The benefits of buying the Super Hornet were obvious to McCrary: “While some Air Forces will probably have to take the JSF in whatever form they can get due to a lack of other options, the RAAF can now wait and buy the F-35 when it has proven the capability they are looking for and once its price has come down to an acceptable level.” He also noted that the adoption of the F/A-18F subsequently allowed the RAAF to enter the airborne electronic attack domain through its purchase of the EA-18G Growler, which would not have been possible without the original Super Hornet acquisition.

McCrary’s understated efforts, typically out of the public or media eye, would earn him the title of the “Dark Lord” from former Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Mark Binskin, for his ability to influence the path of Australian air power while largely remaining out of the spotlight.

Hindsight

Today, with the Rhino established as the RAAF’s pre-eminent fighter, Dr Nelson had cause to reflect on the wisdom of his decision: “I drove the decision and I’m proud of it, it was the right thing to do. [But] I was disappointed, in some cases angry, in 2007 when we announced that we were doing this, I basically got no support in the public arena from the defence, aviation, space community.

“There were five people in the country critical of the decision and they kept getting a disproportionate amount of air time. I kept saying, rather pointedly, that they had 95 per cent of the information in relation to the aircraft but it was the five per cent they didn’t have that really counted.”

His acquisition of the Super Hornet is now widely accepted as having been prudent, sensible and courageous in the face of institutional pushback from Air Force chiefs worried that a Super Hornet buy would scupper any prospect of a future fleet of 100 JSFs.

Informing some of the service’s initial scepticism about the Rhino purchase was the belief that the government simply didn’t have the wherewithal to fund it. That it did says much about Dr Nelson’s powers of persuasion and force of argument.

As he recounted: “I had to cut through the usual processes. I felt we had to. Yes, we didn’t follow the usual processes. But in the end – isn’t that what you have a minister for?”