Angle of attack

In truth, it was probably a bit of both, coming as it did within the same 24-hour cycle that saw Muilenburg acknowledge there were flight control software issues common to both the loss of the Lion Air MAX 8 in October last year and the Ethiopian MAX 8 in March.

“The full details of what happened in the two accidents will be issued by the government authorities in the final reports, but, with the release of the preliminary report of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 accident investigation, it’s apparent that in both flights the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, known as MCAS, activated in response to erroneous angle of attack information,” Muilenburg said.

He also issued a heartfelt apology to the victims, families and loved ones affected by both crashes: “We at Boeing are sorry for the lives lost in the recent 737 MAX accidents. These tragedies continue to weigh heavily on our hearts and minds, and we extend our sympathies to the loved ones of the passengers and crew on board Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. All of us feel the immense gravity of these events across our company and recognize the devastation of the families and friends of the loved ones who perished. ” While to-ing and fro-ing over MCAS – what it is, what it does or doesn’t do, how pilots can or cannot disengage it, training in its use or lack of it – has dominated much of the reportage on the disasters, the significance of the Muilenburg statement was lost on many.

Not the lawyers or the insurers or the shareholders or Boeing’s order book or its bottom line, however.

It was a huge step for Boeing to issue that acknowledgement, even more so against the history of its statements, first after the Lion Air crash and early rumbles about MCAS, and then after the Ethiopian crash when eerie similarities between the two accidents emerged: the line all along was that the company had every faith in the MAX; that it was a safe aircraft and had been shown to be a safe aircraft over countless cycles since it first entered service in 2017.

Now the push is on to roll out software upgrades and training manual enhancements across the more than 300 MAXs that have sat idle at airports and airparks around the world since the original groundings in March. How long that will take is anyone’s guess, with some suggestions it will be well into June. Meanwhile, more international regulators are joining the FAA’s review into the safety of the aircraft.

That has a 90-day timeline in its own right.

Statistics published by The Conversation at the start of April estimated a revenue loss to airlines of around $60 million a day, not taking into account costs associated with rescheduling, cancellations and route suspensions. In a deeper and potentially more worrying hit on Boeing’s very deep pockets (it made a profit of US$10. 5 billion in 2018 alone) Garuda Indonesia cancelled an order for 50 MAXs worth nearly US$5 billion and Boeing slowed its production line by 20 per cent.

But all this talk about money, technology, computers and training competency cannot hide the stark reality: more than 300 lives have been lost. In this edition we take a close look at not only the issue of the MAX, but problems among other OEMs in recent times that may speak volumes about the nature of the competitive marketplace.

MAXED OUT, Tom Ballantyne’s excellent report, starts on Page 22