Do-it-yourself warfare

IEDs have been one of the most effective forms of the trend towards ‘do-it-yourself’ warfare that increasingly has been adopted by technologically inferior nations and groups to circumvent the West’s overwhelming conventional military superiority. Other examples of DIY warfare include al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attack on New York’s World Trade Center, and the widespread use by extremists of suicide bombers.

The versatility and low cost of IEDs has made them effective despite their crudeness. The US spent $12. 6 billion on counter-IED equipment between 2005 and 2008, but has been unable to develop effective long-term countermeasures. For instance, when radio frequency jammers to block IED triggers were introduced, insurgents regressed to detonating IEDs with victim-operated triggers or command wires. Because countermeasures have been largely unsuccessful, IEDs have caused 63 per cent of US casualties in Iraq and 66 per cent in Afghanistan.

Prevailing theory on the future of warfare suggests it will generally involve asymmetric conflicts between technologically sophisticated nations and lessadvanced failed states or non-state militias. IEDs’ potential to inflict damage disproportionate to their simplicity and low cost indicates they will continue to constitute a dangerous threat in this environment.

It now seems probable that the next iteration of DIY warfare will also involve commercially available, off-the-shelf drones.

Like IEDs, drones are low-cost, adaptable and readily available.

Equipped with cameras they can provide important intelligence or targeting information. Alternatively, they can be loaded with explosives and used as precision-guided weapons against mobile or stationary targets.

Compared to manned aircraft or missiles, drones pose three challenges for advanced militaries: the cost-exchange ratio between expensive defensive measures and cheap drones; the potential for drones employed in swarms to overwhelm defensive magazines (it might not be possible to shoot them down quickly enough); and, because drones are small, quiet, low-flying and can be built with non-reflective materials, they are unlikely to be detectable using existing air or missile defence systems.

Drones are lowcost, adaptable and readily available

The West has had control of the air – indeed, air supremacy – since World War 2. In every subsequent conflict, it has gained a unique advantage from being able to see what is happening, and strike anytime, anywhere. To an extent, drones could weaken this dominance by giving less well-resourced groups similar capabilities.

Off-the-shelf drones with modified weaponry and surveillance instruments are already being successfully employed by the Ukrainian army against Russian-backed rebels. With its MiG fighter jets unable to effectively defend themselves, Ukraine turned to commercially-available drones for gathering aerial intelligence. Within a year, its drone reconnaissance unit has gone from being a self-taught group of amateur volunteers to one of the Ukrainian military’s most vital components. ISIS has also used off-the-shelf drones to gather footage of military targets.

IEDs are often only detected through local tip-offs, or by searching for indicators that something is amiss – disturbed soil, rubbish piles in unexpected places, or heavily-laden vehicles with no occupants. To avoid a similarly unreliable approach to combating drones, countries like the US and Australia should begin planning to encounter them in future conflicts.

Like IEDs, drones can be modified to defeat defensive measures. For example, electronic jamming can sever the link between drones and their controllers, but after being briefly grounded by Russian jamming, the Ukraine army quickly developed methods to shield its drones from radio interference.

Similarly, ‘spoofing’ enables defenders to hijack drones by feeding them false GPS coordinates. However, this can easily be countered by configuring drones to ignore GPS signals during their final approach, instead flying on autopilot using an inexpensive magnetometer-disciplined inertial navigation system.

Laser defence is another option. Lasers’ virtually inexhaustible magazines could make them a valuable weapon against drone swarms. In November 2014, China revealed a laser system especially designed for countering small drones. During a recent trial, it claimed to have shot down over 30 drones with a 100 per cent success rate.

Drones’ low cost and adaptability gives them the potential to become the new IEDs, balancing out asymmetrical conflicts. Australia is unprepared for this eventuality – UNSW researcher Jai Galliot has estimated that the Australian Defence Force is 20 years behind the US in preparing for drone attacks. ADF contingency planning must respond to the probability that drones will be a serious threat in future conflicts.