Tiger tales

But the project has led a troubled existence, with several major milestone resets and negotiated agreements and settlements between Defence and Eurocopter being required to remediate issues such as unsatisfactory through-life support, inadequate external lighting, low aircraft serviceability and availability, a cockpit fumes incident, and other issues. Another reported issue includes the MTR390 engine, which is considered underpowered in the tropics and in certain flight regimes, and which provides unsatisfactory single-engine margins.

More than 10 years after the first ARH was delivered, the type’s scheduled final operational capability (FOC) has been pushed back several times, and is now not planned to be achieved until 2016, some 12 years after entering Army service and, according to the 2012‑13 ANAO Major Projects Report, 79 months behind schedule.

It was proposed by some elements in Defence and industry to deploy a small number of ARHs to Afghanistan in 2011 to provide organic air support to Australian ground forces in and around Uruzgan Province. A deployment of three French Tiger HAPs to Kabul in 2009/10 had been considered a success and had proved the Tiger’s ability to operate in an austere environment, with a small support footprint supported by industry. Such an Australian deployment, as often happens, may well have facilitated accelerated fixes for the ARH’ssupport and technical issues. But for whatever reason, Defence leadership and the government baulked at the idea, and Australian forces were instead forced to rely on Dutch Apaches and later USMC air support.

But even now the Tiger continues to achieve lower than budgeted availability. Indeed, the 2012-13 Defence Annual Report revealed the fleet achieved just 74 per cent of its already revised-down budgeted 2,886 flying hours, attributed to an extended fleet-wide grounding following the fumes incident, an increased number of special technical inspections, and a reduced number of aircrew and key maintenance personnel.

And even before the ARH achieves FOC, a mid-life upgrade is already planned for the aircraft. Dubbed AIR 87 Phase 3, the upgrade is a capability assurance program (CAP) that will improve the aircraft’s software and system reliability and maintainability, and will add capabilities such as datalinks designed to improve interoperability with other ADF and allied elements. A decision on the scope of the CAP is due to be made in the next 12 months, with IOC expected in about 2020.

Other enhancements to the ARH include an upgrade to the Tiger’s advanced dome simulators, a recent ministerial approval of the integration of an interim tactical datalink, and the August test firing from an ARH of a BAE Systems Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) which turns standard unguided 70mm FZ rockets into precision guided missiles.

But what alternatives are there to the Tiger? The AH-64D Apache lost out to the Tiger in 2001, reportedly because it was too heavy and not nimble enough to be an armed reconnaissance helicopter, and because at the time there were reported releasability and price issues with the mast-mounted Longbow radar. The latest AH-64E features greater digitisation and automation of its avionics and a reduced pilot workload, but is still a big machine more suited to the heavier gunship role than that of a lighter ARH. The AH-1Z Cobra is based on a 50-year-old design and was discounted even earlier in the AIR 87 process, and is nearing the end of production.

The pilots who fly the Tiger, when it flies, love it! The ARH’s 30mm gun is very highly regarded, as is the aircraft’s human-machine interface (HMI), and the Hellfire missile gives it a real hard-kill capability. Defence probably does need to make an ultimatum, not only to Airbus Helicopters but also to Army, and ultimately decide what level of capability it is willing to accept.