End of the line

That relationship started with the Douglas DC-2 in 1934 and captured the world’s imagination and admiration when KLM’s first DC-2, Uiver, was the handicap winner of the famous McRobertson Air Race from London to Melbourne in October of that year.

That win of course was thanks to the wonderful help from the people of Albury who pulled the DC-2 out of the mud to fly off into the record books.

KLM purchased every basic model that Douglas built including the DC-5, although not always every variant.

The MD-11 was quite possibly the least successful of all McDonnell Douglas aircraft, suffering from initial range deficiencies and it proved to be unstable and not for inexperienced pilots.

Its genesis lay in the desire to stretch the DC-10 that dated back to 1974 when MDC touted a Super DC-10 and a Long Range DC-10. These concepts later morphed into the DC-10 Super 60 series to emulate the highly successful DC-8 Super 60 models.

However, dithering by the MDC board and the tragic DC-10 accidents of 1979 thwarted efforts to get the aircraft off the drawing boards.

Eventually MDC launched the MD-11, a very modest stretch of just 6. 6m, in late 1986 with orders from 10 airlines for 52 aircraft and 40 options.

However, the design was a compromise as MDC elected not to build a new wing and reduced the size of the horizontal stabilizer and when it first flew in January 10 1990 serious range problems emerged.

In an effort to improve fuel efficiency, McDonnell Douglas also designed the MD-11’s centre of gravity to be further aft which significantly reduced the margin for error during takeoff and landing. This has led to many landing accidents – mostly to freighters.

And that is where most MD‑11s ended up being converted for these operations due to performance shortfalls of around six to seven per cent in fuel burn in the GE and P&W engines.

MDC with the engine makers launched a Performance Improvement Program and not only clawed back all of the shortfall but exceeded guarantees. Interestingly, a considerable margin of the gain was in an aerodynamic clean-up of the airframe.

KLM purchased every basic model that Douglas built including the DC-5.

However, the program was dealt a massive blow when Singapore Airlines cancelled its order for 20 MD-11s in August 1991 because it was utterly underwhelmed by MDCs and Pratt & Whitney’s top management’s plans to fix the shortfall.

Before the range shortfall had become evident MDC had garnered orders and options for 315 aircraft from 29 airlines and leasing companies.

In September 1996 MDC unveiled at the Farnborough Airshow the MD-XX trijets which were stretched MD-11s with a new wing. Two models were offered – a three-class 375-seat stretch version and a smaller 309-seat long-range variant that could fly 20 per cent further than a MD-11. But less than eight weeks later on October 25 and despite having orders for 40 aircraft from six airlines, the MDC board killed off the program.

CEO Harry Stonecipher, who had been very bullish on Douglas’s future in the civil market, explained to the media that “I don’t see MDC as a major standalone player in commercial airlines. The investment required to make us into a full-fledged major player is probably in the order of $15 billion over the next 10 years. ” On December 15 of that year the merger with Boeing was announced and in 2000 the 200th and last MD‑11, a freighter for Lufthansa, was delivered.

Years of neglect in R&D had taken its toll. In the 30 years from when McDonnell took over Douglas in 1967 only one all-new civil design – the DC-10 – had emerged, while Boeing had launched four, including the 747, and Airbus three and was preparing to launch the A380.

Contrast that with five designs – DC-3, DC-5, DC-4/6/7, DC-8 and DC-9 – in the prior 30 or so years.

That lack of R&D was highlighted in the first nine months of 1996 when Douglas had won only 40 orders compared to Boeing’s 435 and 269 to Airbus.

One senses that before too long the only McDonnell Douglas aircraft left plying the commercial skies will be the DC-3!