Taipan Strike

The MRH 90 was selected as the successful Phase 2 contender inAugust 2004, and a contract for 12 aircraft was signed on June 2 2005.

Second pass approval for an additional 34 MRH 90s for Phase 4 and 6 was given in April 2006, and a contract amendment for these aircraft was signed on June 19 2006.

The report into the $4 billion project revealed that the ADF’s original recommendation to buy 12 new-build Sikorsky S-70M (UH- 60M) Black Hawks for Phase 2 and up to 36 new-build S-70Ms or remanufactured S-70A-9 Black Hawks for Phase 4 in June 2004 was overruled by the then Howard Coalition government, despite Sikorsky’s bid being significantly cheaper than Australian Aerospace’s.

The report says the Black Hawk recommendation had the support of the Secretary for Defence, the Chief of the Defence Force, the Chief of CDG, the CEO of the DMO, the Chief of Army, and the Chief of Air Force. It said Defence’srecommendation was based on the Black Hawk’s cost advantage, its robust construction, ballistic protection and crashworthiness.

It is also well known and has been reported extensively that the Army has a long-held ambition to retain a number of Black Hawks for the special operations support and counter-terrorism role, as this machine is well-understood and its assault capabilities are considered unparalleled.

And it should also be noted that the initial UH-60M acquisition cost quoted by Sikorsky was for just 12 aircraft and was before full-rate production of many hundreds of airframes in the US had commenced. It is therefore fair to assume the aircraft cost would have fallen due to economies of scale after full-rate production commenced in 2007, and as the aircraft from the larger followon Phase 4 and Phase 6 orders entered production.

While the NH90 was an allnew design, the UH-60M is a development of a well-understood platform that had been in service since the early 1980s. And while the UH-60M is basically built as a single common variant with the vast majority going to a single service, the NH90 has multiple variants and is built at six different production facilities around the world. But that said, the comparison is an unfavourable one when taken in the context of Australia’s AIR 9000 Phase 2/4/6 requirements.

The prototype NH90 first flew in 1995, and initial orders for a total of 259 aircraft were placed by France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Finland and Norway in 2000 and 2001. By comparison, the UH- 60M system design and development (SDD) contract was awarded to Sikorsky in May 2001, and the first flight of a vastly upgraded UH-60A was conducted in September 2003.

Considerable work remains to implement and verify some design changes.

The first flight of a production NH90 occurred in May 2004.

As of April 2014, Sikorsky had advised the ANAO that a total of 714 UH-60Ms and HH-60Ms had been delivered to the US Army and customer nations such as Sweden, Mexico and Turkey, whereas just 198 NH90 TTH, MRH and maritime NFH variants had been delivered.

The report notes that, despite its initial recommendation Defence also found that the MRH 90 would also meet its capability requirement, that it considered that it was better marinised for amphibious operations, and that Australian Aerospace’s bid had Australian industry capability advantages. Indeed, all but the first few MRH 90s have been assembled at Australian Aerospace’s Pinkenba, Brisbane facility alongside the Tiger ARH line with increasing levels of locally-produced materials and components. Further, the capabilities developed by this local manufacturing have spawned a dedicated composite component manufacturing capability at nearby Eagle Farm.

But problems such as broken windscreens, the need to replace cabin floor panels, issues with the placement of the door gunner, low availability rates, and inconsistent spares supplies have all been raisedduring the MRH 90’s protracted development. The floor and windscreen issues have since been fixed in the ultimate Production Baseline 3 (PBL3) iteration, and availability rates have steadily improved as the PB3 aircraft are delivered. But the placement of the door gunner in order to allow rapid ingress and egress from the helicopter remains an issue.

Some positives from the report include the results from a series of trials conducted aboard HMAS Choules in 2012 which showed the MRH 90 has impressive handling over the deck and showed considerable potential for embarked operations. Defence says the MRH 90 has shown that it has the “potential to offer greater capability in some areas than the Black Hawk and the Sea King,” and that “Defence continues to adjust operational tactics, techniques and procedures to account for the differences between the platforms. ” Navy sources have indicated they are generally very happy with the MRH 90, and that when sufficient spares are available it performs the support role well. A deployment of an MRH 90 to Papua New Guinea in mid-2013 and again aboard HMAS Tobruk for Operation Philippines Assist in late 2013 proved the aircraft’s versatility and reliability, particularly in those hot and humid climates. They said that while the air-deployable warehouse (ADW) of spares they take on deployments and the logistics support aspects of the program are still maturing, they anticipate these will improve as the capability matures.

Interim clearance for a number of immature capabilities was granted for Philippines Assist, including some aeromedical evacuation (AME) equipment such as stretcher racks, and some load-lifting procedures, and that these all worked as well as had beenexpected. The report notes that by March 2014 more than $2. 4 billion had been spent on the program with 27 MRH 90s delivered. It highlighted that the program was running more than four years behind schedule, with the first operational capability milestones for both the Army and the Navy yet to be achieved.

It said “considerable work remains to implement and verify some design changes, and to adjust operational tactics, techniques and procedures in order to develop an adequate multi‑role helicopter capability for Army and Navy operations. ” These design changes include the selfdefence gun system, cabin seating and cargo hook, all of which needed to “overcome significant operational deficiencies. ” It said operational test and evaluation was yet to validate any of the 11 operational capability milestones set by the Army and Navy.

MRH 90 manufacturer, the newly renamed Airbus Group Australia Pacific (formerly Australian Aerospace) was given the opportunity to comment on the draft report. In a June 10 statement to the ANAO, CEO Jens Goennemann accepted that early versions of the MRH 90 were “less reliable than the PBL3 variant”,and agreed that industry’s ability to provide support spares and repairable items demands had been “poor”. But he said “significant changes to the MRH sustainment construct” had been agreed upon, and he was also confident that, as more NH90s entered service worldwide the overall cost of ownership of the aircraft would fall.

Goennemann’s statement said the problems with the door gunner position and the helicopter’s fast rope repelling device (FRRD) had been attributed to them being designed to European specifications before any NH90s had entered service. He said Airbus was “working closely with all stakeholders to ensure that any redesigned equipment takes full cognisance of the operational requirements of all Australian users of the aircraft. ” He also said “a number of very successful capabilities” had been established in Australia as a result of the MRH and ARH programs – including the Safran Turbomeca engine maintenance facility at Bankstown in Sydney and Airbus Group’s own internal capabilities to support the helicopter’s avionics, gearboxes and sensors.

Sikorsky was also given an opportunity to comment on the report. In a one page statement dated June 3, general manager of Sikorsky Helitech, David Stilianos, said the company accepted that decisions of the past would not be changed while it “remains committed in supporting the Commonwealth for any current or future requirements. ” With the acquisition of MRH 90, the S‑70A‑9 Black Hawk fleet was to have been withdrawn between January 2011 and December 2013. But the withdrawal didn’t commence until January 2014 and is now not scheduled to be completed until June 2018. The original project schedule called for final operational capability (FOC) of 46 MRH 90s to be achieved in July 2014, but this is now not expected to be realised until April 2019, a delay of nearly five years.

The report says the extended concurrent operations of both the Black Hawk and MRH 90 fleets has led to “significant problems for funding of Army aviation” leading to likely “compromises to levels of capability,” and also identifies the capability gap experienced by Navy since its Sea Kings were retired in 2011.