Learning to heed the advice

That is not to say that selecting the MRH 90 was necessarily a mistake. Despite the project’s numerous delays and the aircraft’s serviceability issues and higher than expected support and spares costs, the MRH 90 is a fundamentally sound helicopter that offers increased capability over the Black Hawk in many key areas. It has greater range and endurance, it carries more people and/or equipment, it has the flexibility of a rear loading ramp, and many of its key systems like avionics and sensors are more advanced than those of the Black Hawk.

But the fact remains that it was government that chose the MRH 90 back in 2004 despite Defence overwhelmingly recommending the rival UH-60M/S-70M Black Hawk to replace its predecessor, ostensibly because Australian Aerospace (now part of Airbus Group Australia-Pacific) offered to assemble and support the helicopters in Australia.

In this regard and to its credit, Airbus has kept to its commitment – all but three of the MRH 90s are being assembled at Brisbane with increasing levels of local content, Australian companies are supplying components back into the company’s global supply chain, a dedicated composite component manufacturing facility has been established in Brisbane, and Safran Turbomeca has established a regional turbine support facility in Sydney.

But in 2004 the Black Hawk was seen as a much lower risk proposition compared to the then under-developed MRH 90, despite first flying nearly a decade later, and its configuration stability and systems development was assured by an overwhelming requirement for hundreds of new Black Hawks for the US Army. It was for this reason Defence recommended it be chosen.

Move ahead seven years to 2011 and, when faced with an eerily similar choice for the AIR 9000 Phase 8 naval combat helicopter, Defence again recommended a significantly enhanced version of a machine the ADF was already familiar with, over a newer and more advanced alternative.

The MH-60R Seahawk Romeo is an much-evolved development of the S-70B Seahawk which has been in service with the RAN for more than 20 years and is thus very well understood. The Romeo features cutting-edgeIn 2004 the Black Hawk was seen as a much lower risk proposition. sensors, communications and avionics wrapped up in what is a familiar and well-understood conservative engine, dynamic component, and airframe package. Perhaps equally importantly, the US Navy has committed to more than 500 Romeos and the similar MH‑60S Sierra so, as with the Black Hawk, configuration stability, a development path, and support is assured for decades to come.

Compare this to the Romeo’s Phase 8 rival, the NH90 NFH, a marinised version of the NH90 with a surface search radar, dipping sonar, and a naval combat system. On paper, the NFH looked to be a potential winner – it is bigger, has better range and endurance, is more mission-flexible, has a more advanced combat system with greater growth potential, and it can carry a bigger payload including stand-off anti-ship missiles.

But the NFH comes from the same disjointed original requirement as its MRH cousin, one where multiple national interests are constantly competing for the development dollar, and where there is little configuration stability among the NH Industries partner nations and customers. It’s not necessarily NHI or Airbus Helicopters’ fault the NH90/NFH family continues to suffer design stability and availability issues like our own MRH 90s have – it’s just the nature of the multi-national system in which it was developed.

It is now history that the Romeo was selected for Phase 8, and less than four years later in December this year 725SQN will return to Australia with several machines and an initial cadre of aircrew and maintainers to be commissioned at its new squadron headquarters at Nowra. As good as the capability the NFH promised and almost certainly one day will be, it is highly unlikely it could have met such a demanding schedule.