A Disruptive Capability

The first challenge is space, most importantly on the flightdeck. There has to be space to land, space to take off and space to park. (Yes, size does matter. ) A conventional ‘cat and trap’ naval aircraft requires ships of at least 75,000 tonnes and larger to operate effectively. But STOVL is to naval aviation what these days would be called a ‘disruptive technology’, and it delivers the ability to put highly capable fighter aircraft to sea in ships of less than 20,000 tonnes.

It’s worth pointing out that this ‘disruptive’ event was not initially noticed by any of the world’s navies. After much travail, the UK and USMC led the way, and found (to the astonishment of many critics) that they could take relatively small ships out in the foulest seas, thousands of miles from home, and stay there for months. Not only that, the Falklands showed that, with advanced weapon technology and highly trained pilots STOVL aircraft, so often derided for their alleged poor performance, could take on and defeat substantial land-based air forces. It’s notable that the F-35B’s critics often focus on its allegedly ‘inferior’ performance – but in modern air combat, it is its sensors and weapons that tip the balance. The Sea Harrier FA2,despite a very limited airframe, was a simply outstanding fighter aircraft throughout the ’90s, due to its outstanding radar/missile combination.

Meanwhile, a long and highly effective technology development program led by the US resulted in advanced STOVL concept designs appearing in the 1990s. As a result, by 1995 the Pentagon was able to set a realistic requirement for the supersonic, stealthy STOVL F-35B, which could operate from the 40,000-ton Wasp class LHDs. This led to a compact aircraft. It also led to an extremely advanced flight control system that gives precise landings and short takeoffs. Fortunately, UK requirements gave it the ability to use a ski jump.

So, for a STOVL aircraft like F-35B, the 27,000 tonne Canberra class are not a ‘small’ ship – they are significantly bigger than the UK’s highly effective Invincible class STOVL carriers (and, by the way, much bigger than the RAN’s last carrier, HMAS Melbourne). The LHD’s flightdeck is very close in size to that of the Wasp class, but with the massive advantage of a ski jump. This would allow full use of the whole flightdeck length, as aircraft doing ‘flat deck’ STO launches have to lift off well before they reach the deck edge. The ski jump would also deliver significant improvements in launch weight (over a ton) and safety, especially for night ops. The elevators are big enough and strong enough to take the F-35B. In short, the F-35B would be a very good fit for the Canberra LHD decks.

Other dimensions would need to be checked, but remember, F-35Bs are designed for smaller ships. They don’t need high deckheads (ceilings), and can be packed close together. A tightly constrained ‘maintenance box’ was ruthlessly applied during development tomake best use of valuable space, as was a requirement for a very small logistics footprint. Of course, an aircraft like the F-35B is going to make demands on space elsewhere in the ship. Some of these, like fuel and other consumables will already have been covered. Weapon stowages would need to be checked, but the UK’s experience is that with determination and ingenuity, squadrons make excellent use of the space available to get the job done. It’s a normal part of naval aviation.

There are understandable concerns about the challenge posed by the F-35B’s jet blast. But it needs to be understood that this issue has been considered, researched and tested right from the start of the F-35 program. The jet blast has been computer-modelled, tested in sub-scale rigs, tested on engine rigs and finally exhaustively tested during early flight tests. New and highly effective flightdeck coatings have been tested and trialled, and are being adopted by the USN and the Royal Navy. Consequently, the F-35B’s impact on flightdecks is understood and manageable. It’s possible that some minor ship modifications may be required, including protection for deck equipment, or possibly even deck reinforcement, but measures like these are normal for STOVL operations on ships.

Let’s look at the challenge of the F-35’s operational effectiveness from the ship. It’s been argued that F-35Bs would ‘displace’ other aircraft on the LHD flightdeck and would lead to ‘loss of capability’. This appears to ignore the significant capability the F-35B would bring to the fight. Concerns have also been expressed over whether both fixed and rotary-wing aircraft could safely be operated from a single deck. These concerns reflect a lack of appreciation of what can be achieved from comparatively small flightdecks. The simple fact

In short, the F-35B would be a very good fit for the Canberra LHD decks.

is that operating different types of aircraft simultaneously from small spaces is, like handling jet blast, a routine and well-understood aspect of naval aviation. It happens all the time, and with training, practice and a healthy dose of common sense, it can be carried out effectively and safely.

This ‘challenge’ can be turned into a real opportunity. A space like the LHD’s flightdeck could be used by ‘tailored’ air groups, composed of varying numbers of different aircraft types so as to meet the (often unexpected) tasks that circumstances will present. This is normal practice for the USMC from their Wasp class ships, it was trialled by the USMC from UK carriers, and it would be wholly practicable to use Canberra class LHD flightdecks in the same way. This would give the ADF an extremely flexible and adaptable force asset.

There is a key point here, which is not well understood by thoseunfamiliar with naval aviation, and it’s this: aircraft and ships can deliver operational effect very, very efficiently indeed. Packing aircraft, stores, fuel, weapons, support facilities and personnel close together on a ship results in high sortie rates and high operational tempo. In short, a lot of aviation ‘bang’ for the ‘buck’. This fact has been demonstrated many times over many years, from the South Atlantic to the Bay of Sirte, from Korea to Suez, and it is a highly attractive feature for operational commanders (and politicians). The amount of ‘air’ an LHD could generate from five to 10 F-35Bs, and the amount of time it could be maintained for, would startle anyone who hasn’t done ‘STOVL at sea’.

There’s another key point. Aircraft carriers can move about – this allows them to optimise their distance from the target, depending on the threat. (Incidentally, it also

Put simply, maritime aviation usually gets to the fight first.

makes them a lot harder to find and hit than airfields. ) The recent Libya campaign showed that while land-based aircraft could deliver operational effect at long range, it also showed that carrier-based aircraft could deliver more sorties in a short time, and react more quickly to emerging needs. USN and USMC carrier-based aircraft, with excellent assistance from the French, very effectively delivered the initial (and crucial) phase of the air campaign.

Put simply, maritime aviation usually gets to the fight first. Since the end of WW2, every single enemy aircraft shot down by a British aircraft has been shot down by a naval aircraft. It’s not that naval aviators are better than their land-based counterparts – it’s just that they usually get the first chance.

Here’s the punch line: coupling high sortie rates with the ability to minimise distance to the target is the essence of naval aviation, and proximity equals capability.

Arguably, the key challenge in delivering that capability would not be the physical aspects of putting the F-35B on board the LHD. The real challenge would be regenerating the required operating expertise and special skill-set that’s required to deliver that valuable and rare commodity called ‘naval aviation’. Fortunately, Australia has a strong Fleet Air Arm heritage, and a number of ex-RAN aviators whowere (not that long ago) involved in the UK’s Sea Harrier operations. They were an absolutely outstanding group of aviators.

The Australian government could do worse than assembling some of that priceless maritime STOVL experience and putting it to work assessing the F-35B/LHD option. The US does this extremely well, and the ‘greybeards’ would, I am sure, be invaluable in looking at the F-35B/LHD combination as knowledgeable naval war fighters.

Regenerating a fixed-wing naval aviation capability would be the key to exploiting the F-35B at sea – but there is no doubt the RAN would be equal to the challenge. The question is, then, does the Australian government and the ADF have the courage, imagination and funds required to ‘give it a fair go’? Stephen George is a former Air Engineering Officer in the Royal Navy, with postings including Air Technical Desk Officer in the UK Embassy in Washington DC and Air Engineer Joint Force Harrier. He subsequently worked for BAE Systems as engineering manager on the Joint Strike Fighter project. Since 2007 he has run his own consultancy business specialising in defence acquisition, project management and systems engineering.