What’s in a name?

Initially, no-one cared too much, because real pilots flew real aeroplanes, and the roles of those aeroplanes – fighter, bomber, airlifter, etc – told us unambiguously what they were for and what their pilots did. Unmanned platforms, by contrast, were regarded as just another supporting technology. Typically, UAVs flew pre-planned routes – that is, there was no human directly in the piloting loop – and, unlike manned aircraft, they were implicitly considered disposable. The most common names of ‘drone’ and ‘UAV’ said nothing about the platforms’ warfighting roles and were indicative of a somewhat offhand institutional attitude to their place in the greater scheme of things.

But as technology continued its inexorable march, that attitude had to change. The rapid emergence of large numbers of increasingly capable UAVs which were controlled (‘flown’) throughout their mission in real-time via data links, by remotely-located ‘pilots’, created operational and cultural imperatives that could not be ignored. Those imperatives grew even stronger when drones became the system of choice for many ISR (intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance) missions; and when, fitted with precision weapons, they were used in highly successful (if controversial) anti-terrorist campaigns in Afghanistan, the Yemen, the Gaza Strip, and west Pakistan.

Descriptions such as ‘Unmanned Aerial System’ and ‘Remotely Piloted Vehicle’ started to enter the military lexicon, with the introduction of ‘system’ and ‘piloted’ tacitly acknowledging the platforms’ new-found status. The USAF was the most assertive player in the re-naming game, describing its fleet as ‘Remotely Piloted Aircraft’, a title intended to leave no doubt that (1) these things were neither ‘drones’ nor ‘vehicles’, but aircraft, and (2) they were neither autonomous nor pre-programmed, but were at all times controlled by a man-in-the-loop – a pilot.

Who, though, were these ‘pilots’ to be? Here, the differing approaches of the USAF and the US Army have been instructive, reflecting contrasting cultures as much as operational practicalities.

For armies, aviation has never been anything more than one of a number of secondary arms whose main purpose is to support the infantry in the ‘real’ battle on the ground. Consistent with this (dangerously misguided) perception of military power, the US Army initially set a low base for its UAV pilots. Whereas its fixed- and rotary-wing pilots had to be fully qualified and were officers or warrant officers, some drone operators had minimal flying experience and held junior enlisted rank.

Perhaps sensitive to longer-term institutional implications, and with a surplus of pilots following the decommissioning of some strike/fighter squadrons, the USAF preferred to use pilots or non-pilot aircrew, all of whom were commissioned.

As institutional differences – some might say prejudices – played themselves out, lessons were learnt. Perhaps the most important is that it is advantageous for drone pilots to have a strong sense of aviation-related situational awareness. And as things stand, that awareness is best developed in the traditional way, namely, by undergoing traditional military flying training.

The RAAF’s experience with its flight of Herons in Afghanistan has reflected those lessons. RAAF Heron pilots have been selected from the Air Force’s existing pool of qualified pilots, and have come from the full range of operational backgrounds. On completion of a Heron tour, they have usually returned to a manned aircraft squadron.

In other words, the RAAF has elected not to make flying RPAs a specialist pilot role. But developments in the (British) Royal Air Force and the USAF may change that.

Recently the RAF established a specialised flying branch for drone pilots. Candidates undergo basic flying training and are then streamed onto drones, graduating as Remotely Piloted Air Systems pilots, with a distinctive brevet, and destined to spend the bulk of their careers as RPA specialists. The USAF, too, has now introduced a specialist category for drone pilots.

A consequence of the RAAF’s existing policy is that hard-won RPA expertise is lost when Heron pilots return to manned platforms. The issue, though, is force flexibility. The RAAF is smaller than the RAF and the USAF, and managing numbers and the spread of talent is always a challenge. The freedom to shift pilots between types is important, and allowing some to specialise on RPAs could undermine the balance of the total force.

On the other hand, the rise of drones will be irresistible. There are indications that the ADF will retain its Heron capability when Australian forces withdraw from Afghanistan, and the acquisition of broad area RPAs seems to be a matter of when, not if.
If the ADF is to maximise its expertise, it will need a policy on how best to pilot its RPAs sooner rather than later.