The carrier returns?

Respected analyst Dr Alan Stephens also raised the possibility of an ADF F-35B capability in an October 2011 Williams Foundation paper, asking “…will the introduction of the LHDs generate pressure for the ADF to acquire a small number of F-35Bs?” and adding that “…as the in-service date for the LHDs grows closer, calls to acquire STOVL F-35Bs for the Fleet Air Arm will increase. ” The Joint Strike Fighter is currently being developed in three versions and is planned to replace the F/A-18A/B in RAAF service later this decade in its F-35A conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) incarnation under Project AIR 6000 Phase 2A/B/C. The F-35B short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) variant was designed primarily for service aboard US Marine Corps LHDs and the UK’s new QEII class aircraft carriers, while the F-35C carrier version (CV) will be fitted with catapult and arrestor wire gear for US Navy ‘big deck’ carrier operations.

The three versions of the F-35 share many common design elements such as primary structures, cockpits, avionics, sensors and combat systems, mission system software load, and engines. But they also have many key differences that are unique to their specialist roles. The F-35B’s complex lift fan and roll post configuration that allows it to land vertically is an obvious physical example, one that results in a reduced internal fuel load, smaller weapons bays, and greater structural limitations for that variant.

What is not widely known is that the ADF has more or less been down this road before. As long ago as 1981, a year before the RAN’s last aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne and its A-4G Skyhawks were decommissioned, serious talks were conducted between the Commonwealth and the UK government about possibly transferring the Royal Navy’s HMS Invincible ‘through-deck cruiser’ and a brace of Sea Harrier V/STOVL fighters to the RAN.

Anecdotal reports from the time suggest that, while the RAN was keen to retain an organic air combat capability, the RAAF and Army were less than enthusiastic at the prospect of such a large slice of the ADF’s funding pie being directed to what had been and would continue to essentially be a token capability of limited utility. As it happened, the Falklands War of 1982 saw the UK decide to retain Invincible.

In 2002 when Australia signed up to the Joint Strike Fighter Program as a second tier partner, the idea of acquiring a limited number of F-35Bs to operate from a then nascent LHD requirement was also studied, before reportedly being “shut down from a high level”. But rumours of a possible third LHD equipped with F-35Bs being high on an RAN ‘wish list’ trickled out in 2008, at a time just before the global financial crisis when the government was enjoying a budget surplus. This coincided with a looming fleet-wide obsolescence and engineering crisis within the RAN, while the RAAF and Army were enjoying dramatic increases in technology and capability.

Studies were even done in the early 2000s on a proposal to look at operating two or three F-35Bs from an Austal/Incat high-speed catamaran type vessel, or converting commercial container vessel designs for STOVL ops, but neither idea appears to have been progressed.

But the financial climate today is a very different one to that of just five years ago. The GFC has left investor and consumer spending confidence in tatters, tax and mining revenues are down, and the surplus is long gone. And the current government has not only left the stated “three per cent real” increased Defence funding objectives of the 2009 Defence White Paper far behind, but has actually reduced real Defence funding in order to fund its return to a federal budget surplus in 2012/13, a goal which it now admits it can’t reach.

As a result, the RAN has already had elements of its SEA 4000 Hobart class Air Warfare Destroyer (AWD) project delayed. Additionally, only seed funding has so far been allocated to studies into the SEA 1000 Future Submarine project, while the looming SEA 5000 Future Frigate, SEA 1180 littoral vessel, and SEA 1654 Phase 3 support vessel replacement projects have made little headway. It basically looks as if AWD and LHD – while great capabilities – are all the RAN can look forward to for the next decade.

But the case for Australia to buy a small sub-fleet of F-35Bs and operate them from the LHDs appears, on face value at least, to have many benefits and few drawbacks. Spain’s Armada Española plans to use AV-8B+ Harriers (and possibly F-35Bs down the track) from its own Juan Carlos I (L61) class vessel upon which the RAN’s Canberra class LHDs are based. The L61 has a capacity of up to 30 aircraft including eight AV- 8Bs plus helicopters.

But before considering this option, it is imperative to look at why Australia is buying the LHDs in the first place. The main justification for buying these vessels was to replace HMA Ships Kanimbla and Tobruk in order to support “large-scale humanitarian assistance” operations in our region, and to provide an amphibious assault capability for low-intensity operations, either alone or as part of a multi-national force. In the original requirement and in an Australian concept of operations scenario, the vessels were never intended to embark combat aircraft for sustained periods, and thus – apart from the ski-jump ramp on the deck which would have been a costly re-design to remove – have no dedicated facilities to support such a capability.

The only incidences ever envisaged for the ships to embark combat aircraft were for short-term cross-decking with USMC or RN vessels during exercises or on operations. Air support was to be provided from USN or RN carriers/LHDs in multi-national amphibious scenarios, or from land-based aircraft supported by air-to-air refuelling and other force multipliers such as AEW&C.

So if you dig down a little deeper, the ability to effectively operate high performance combat aircraft and helicopters simultaneously from an LHD becomes somewhat problematic. The first consideration is the support footprint each different aircraft type requires – including specialised maintenance personnel, spares holdings sufficient for sustained operations at sea, support equipment and facilities (including specialised equipment for handling and repairing the F-35B’s low-observable coatings), a large weapons stowage area, and specialised deck handling equipment.

Rumours of a possible third LHD equipped with F-35Bs being high on a RAN ‘wish list’ trickled out in 2008.

An LHD is designed primarily to embark a battalion-sized force of about 1,000 troops along with sufficient heavy and light vehicles to support that force in an amphibious landing. The ship also has a large hospital for humanitarian or combat casualties, while the well-dock can support four large landing craft and half a dozen smaller boats. The 990m2 aircraft hangar is suitable for transporting (but not operating) aircraft up to CH-47D/F size, but is more suited to MRH 90s and Tiger ARHs which can be stowed relatively quickly due to their folding blades.

The requirement for additional support personnel and the plethora of specialised equipment for six-eight combat jets would mean fewer troops, vehicles and helicopters are able to be carried, thus diluting the amphibious or humanitarian support capabilities for which the vessels have been designed.

The F-35B cannot takeoff vertically with a combat load, and has a limited ‘bring-back’ load when landing vertically, especially in the tropical environment the RAN will frequently operate in. So in order to provide ‘air over the deck’ for the fighters to launch and recover with tactically relevant load-outs, the ship must be steaming into the wind. This could take it away from an amphibious landing area, and would make watercraft operations from its well-dock impossible.

Then there is the jet fuel the ship needs to carry for the embarked aircraft. An MRH 90-sized helicopter will typically carry up to 5,000lb of fuel, but the fuel load for an F-35B is three to four times this amount, meaning the LHD will run its tanks dry much quicker and will thus require more frequent refuelling from support vessels during flight operations. This would see the LHD having to withdraw from an area of operations more frequently in order to replenish its jet fuel stocks, or the support vessels would need to be positioned further forward, possibly in harm’s way.

For operations against any adversary that pose a threat to a high value target such as an LHD, it is likely as many as six F-35Bs would be required to provide a continuous combat air patrol (CAP) above the ship in order to protect it from air attack – two in the air, two more aircraft armed and fuelled on quick reaction alert to augment or replace the first two, and a further two jets being prepared for their next sortie. With these six aircraft committed to CAP duties, and one or two more likely to be unserviceable at any one time, this leaves just one or possibly no combat aircraft available for offensive operations.

Further, the combat operations centres onboard the LHDs are not equipped to support sustained fast jet operations and helicopter and amphibious operations simultaneously, and would require significant enhancements to their sensor and communications suites to do so. It could also be argued that an LHD with F-35Bs embarked and positioned off an adversary’s coast is a bigger threat and thus a higher value target than one with just helicopters and amphibious forces embarked.

It quickly becomes clear that, if F-35Bs are embarked upon an LHD to support amphibious operations, the ability to conduct such operations is severely compromised. While US Navy LHDs commonly conduct simultaneous operations, they are larger vessels (~50,000 tonnes versus 27,000) that have been designed from the outset to operate combat aircraft. And USN LHDs rarely operate alone – they are almost always in company with another LHD or a ‘big deck’ carrier, and can call upon USAF land-based AAR and AEW&C support from almost anywhere on the globe.

Perhaps one way to alleviate any potential dilution of the RAN’s LHD amphibious mission is to grant the Navy’s wish and build a third LHD, one that could be customised for and possibly dedicated solely to F-35B operations. The addition of a third LHD vessel would, due to ship availability/docking cycles, effectively double the RAN’s LHD fleet, and thus would also require the acquisition of additional combat support vessels such as oilers and replenishment ships, and possibly a fourth AWD for air-defence and anti-submarine escort duties. Carriers are big targets and big consumers of fuel and, as such, rarely go anywhere alone.

But putting any funding difficulties and political will for such a dramatic increase in capability aside, it is also questionable whether the RAN will be able to fully crew the two LHDs as planned – each ship has an operational complement of about 300 – let alone a third vessel plus additional support ships.

Dr Stephens wrote in his paper: “Ship-borne fighter operations… when done properly, they provide a unique capability by removing in one fell stroke the perennial strike/fighter problem of range and endurance. Take your own fighters with you, and that particular dimension of control of the air has been addressed. Great Britain’s recapture of the Falklands Islands from occupying Argentinians in 1982 could not have succeeded without the fleet protection provided by embarked RN and RAF Harrier strike/fighters. ” Some people use the Falklands scenario as a clear example of why Australia should re-acquire a carrier capability. But most of Australia’s territorial interests are far closer to home than the Falklands are to the UK, and are able to be covered by land-based fighters supported by strategic AAR and AEW&C aircraft. Indeed, a case could be made that the additional funding required to acquire a third LHD and a brace of F-35Bs would perhaps be better spent on an additional squadron of F-35As and two or three more KC-30A tankers.

The LHDs are not equipped to support sustained fast jet and helicopter and amphibious operations at the same time.