On Target

A new book by eminent American military historian Robin Higham casts an important light on the politics of air power. Titled Two Roads to War, Professor Higham’s study compares and contrasts the development of the French and British air services during the years between World Wars 1 and 11.

Although that period is now more than six decades past, his analysis contains powerful messages for contemporary defence forces.

Higham’s point of departure is intriguing. At the end of World War I, France’s and Britain’s air services shared many similarities and were the world’s two most powerful air arms. Yet only 20 years later when they had to face a rampant Luftwaffe, the Armée de l’Air was pathetic and the Royal Air Force magnificent. Why?

Well, perhaps the single most significant factor was that the RAF was independent and the Armée de l’Air was not.

The RAF was formed in April 1918 by combining the air services of Britain’s army and navy and had benefited during the inter-war years from strong, pro-air power leadership. In contrast, the Armée de l’Air had not become a separate service until 1933 and even then continued to be dominated by the French Army.

Consequently, Britain developed an air force with a strategic purpose and France did not — although it was not easy for the RAF.

For without the resolute and visionary leadership provided by such great names in military history as Trenchard, Dowding, and Portal the RAF might still have foundered on the shoals of army and navy insularity.

Across the Channel, the intellectually and organisationally subordinate Armée de l’Air was never regarded as a front-line defensive capability. France’s senior military commanders could never agree on the nature and responsibilities of their air force.
Thus, among other failings, an effective air defence system was never developed. But while the French procrastinated the RAF got on with building the integrated system of quality people, fighter aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, early-warning radars and command and control posts that was to win the Battle of Britain.

Nor was France’s air power doctrine any better. Despite the clear lesson from World War 1 that air power should be concentrated to the maximum extent possible, the French Army insisted on dividing the national air service into small ‘penny-packets’, one for each major army formation.

Reflecting the generals’ obsession with the ground ‘support’ role at the expense of the strategic dimension of air power, that arrangement was another impediment to the establishment of effective air defence, strike, and reconnaissance capabilities. Similar intellectual limitations saw the two countries follow dissimilar technological paths.

France was the world’s leading manufacturer of aero engines and propellers during World War I, exporting thousands, as well as providing for its own needs. And French strike/fighter aircraft were at the forefront of technology.

But post-war, intellectually moribund generals saw defence in precisely the same form that had existed in 1918 — massed armies fixated on seizing and holding ground, which led to the notorious Maginot, and essentially static formations, supported by artillery and machine guns.

Unsurprisingly, in that environment the research and development fundamental to advanced air power was largely absent.

French factories still designed and built airframes and engines but the leadership needed to ensure leading-edge experimentation and thorough testing was missing. Squadrons routinely were allocated new aircraft types that had not been fully tested and evaluated.

The contrast with events across the Channel, and indeed across the Rhine, could scarcely have been more pronounced. For example, before any new British aircraft was certified for combat operations it had to satisfy the demanding official standards.

Supported by enlightened politicians and modern business practices, great companies such as Rolls-Royce, Avro, de Havilland and Bristol flourished.

Today, the independence of advanced air forces is not at question, nor is the quality of the RAAF and its main allies. What is at question is air power’s role in national defence strategies.

And here, the problem within defence headquarters, including Australia’s, continues to be the dominance of army planners. Given the West’s wretched experiences during the army-led invasions of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, this situation is inconsistent with reality.

Perhaps senior Australian Defence officials would benefit from reading Robin Higham’s book.