The great Growler debate

However, some Defence insiders are not so confident the estimated $300 million in supplementary funding for the acquisition of six Growler ‘kits’, aircraft modification and the establishment of an AEA capability within the RAAF’s Super Hornet community can be found.

But the upfront cost of the Growlers may well offset a potentially much bigger financial impost in a few years by adding a true force multiplier to the ADF’s order of battle.

Such a capability would increase the combat capability of aircraft such as the classic and Super Hornet and the Wedgetail AEW&C by providing increased situational awareness to and protection for land and anti-ship strike missions. It also would provide more protection for surface ships such as the forthcoming air warfare destroyers and amphibious LHDs.

If this force multiplier effect can be fully exploited it may not be necessary to buy more Super Hornets to bridge any gaps that open between the wind-down of the RAAF’s classic Hornet capability from 2016 and the introduction of the F-35A JSF from 2018-19.

Further, a Growler would continue to be a force multiplier for the F-35 by complementing that aircraft’s already impressive low observable characteristics via the Growler’s power to electronically degrade the ability of an adversary’s integrated air defensive system to detect either aircraft.

History has shown that USAF B-2 and F-117 operations in recent conflicts almost always have been accompanied by standoff support aircraft such as EA-6B Prowlers, various EC-135 Rivet Joint and EC-130 Commando Solo variants and various other AEA and EW platforms. A platform’s ‘stealth’ characteristics are as much to do with how it is employed as it is with its shaping and construction materials.

But there are still many uncertainties over the government’s controversial proposed resources and carbon taxes and the billions in revenue they are forecast to reap. Combined with China’s plans to almost halve its planned growth next year and the likely effects on Australian mining exports, as well as the beginning of a trend showing Australia’s economy is already slowing, this could mean fewer supplementary dollars will be available to Defence.

And this at a time when more than $750 million worth of equipment in the form of HMAS Choules, 100 more Bushmaster vehicles and two more C-17s – none of which were budgeted for in the Defence Capability Plan – either have just been delivered or are on the way.

While the value of these platforms and the increase in capability they have brought is unquestionable, their acquisition has been made possible mainly through funding from recent Defence underspends in other projects such as the AIR 9000 Phases 2/4/6 MRH 90, AIR 5418 MRTT, AIR 5077 Wedgetail and other projects of concern delayed in recent years.

But with the uncertain state of the federal budget, it is unlikely future underspends will be redirected to other projects of opportunity. Rather, this money will fall off the end of the table into government’s consolidated revenue coffers and thus be lost to Defence forever.