Chinook crash highlights capability gap

So on top of the death of an apparently talented army aviator – who had reportedly just arrived in country to be a Heron UAV operator and was ‘paxing’ on the resupply mission to familiarise himself with the terrain – one-sixth of the ADF’s workhorse Chinook fleet was also lost in the incident.

But the loss of one-sixth of the fleet is far more than one-sixth of the actual capability.

Rarely are there more than three or four Chinooks available at any one time, particularly in recent years when two machines have been deployed to the ‘sandpit’ that is Afghanistan for up to eight months at a time, year after year, and subsequently require a prolonged and extensive refurbishment when they return.

So, it could more realistically be said that as much as a quarter or even a third of the capability has been lost with this incident.

To date, it is not known whether the destroyed machine will be replaced in theatre for the remaining four months of the 2011 ‘fighting season’, or whether the one remaining machine will see the season out on its own.

The replacement of the battle-weary but still highly effective CH-47Ds with seven new CH-47Fs is still some years away, with the first aircraft not due to arrive until 2014, and still more years before the first of these will be available to be deployed. Meanwhile, the capability gap left by the 2009 retirement of the RAAF’s Caribou transports seems years away from being adequately filled, with no decision on a modern and much more capable Battlefield Airlifter (BFA) replacement appearing likely soon. Therefore, the ADF is going to struggle even more to fulfil that short range high capacity transport mission.

The King Airs currently being operated by 38SQN are doing an invaluable job of maintaining multi-engine crew and (to a lesser extent) maintainer proficiency and capacity for the RAAF, but they can hardly be called upon for tactical transport duties.

So if the C-27J the RAAF has long wished for cannot be afforded in the current economic climate, perhaps a brace of less capable and considerably cheaper platforms might be more appropriate to provide a bridging capability until a more permanent solution can be found. Aircraft such as the updated Viking Series 400 version of the venerable DHC-6 Twin Otter might be suitable, particularly on the short strips in PNG. Other options such as the recently restarted (by RUAG) Dornier 228 line, the Airbus Military C212 and the Cessna Caravan could be considered. All of these aircraft could provide a much more robust light transport capability, and apart from the Caravan, could also continue to provide the RAAF with the de facto ‘lead in multiengine’ capability it needs.

Or, Defence can accept that the C-27J just might be out of reach, and instead go for the much cheaper Airbus Military CN235 or C295M as a permanent BFA solution.

Many countries are now using this aircraft in Afghanistan – including the US Special Forces Command – to great effect, and while it has a much smaller cross section than the C-130 and C-27J, the 235/295 fuselage is a good fit for Chinook sized loads.

Of course, another option is to retain some or all of the CH-47Ds when the F models start to arrive, and rotate these though the CH-47F upgrade process in order to be able to maintain a core fleet of five or six available airframes at all times, particularly if the protracted Afghanistan mission is going to be extended beyond 2014.

This writer remembers former Helicopter Systems Division Head MAJGEN Tony Fraser telling me of his desire to retain the then just refurbished dynamic components and drivetrains of the CH-47Ds after they were gone, as Chinooks are in hot demand from around the world and thus spares can be difficult to come by.