The case for Tiger

Calls have come from observers, commentators and even retired star staff for everything from additional mortars, artillery and even Abrams tanks to be employed in Afghanistan, while opposition defence spokesman, David Johnston has recommended a detachment of Army’s new Tiger ARH helicopters be sent in.

Whilst this writer doesn’t have the depth of knowledge in the land spectrum to know whether mortars or artillery are required, counter arguments that tanks would be severely restricted in the rough and mountainous terrain seem reasonable. “You may as well send them a submarine,” Prime Minister Gillard told the ABC from Brussels following her visit to Afghanistan in early October.

But it is the call for the Tiger to be sent in which seems to be a no-brainer. The French has had a detachment of just three Tigers operating out of Kabul for over a year with great success. Anecdotal reports indicate just the mere presence of these aircraft has meant the AdA’s Caracal CSAR helos have been able to perform their tasks almost unhindered, and that all convoys escorted by the Tigers have completed their journeys virtually unscathed. Industry reports the aircraft have had a better than 90 per cent availability rate, and that there have been few issues in supporting them in theatre.

The withdrawal of the Dutch from Oruzgan Province earlier this year meant the void left not only by their ground forces but also their Apache helos needed to be filled. The US surge has helped to fill that void, but the Australian government has acknowledged that additional US Apaches and armoured vehicles are required.

But why not send in Australian helos instead? Not only would the presence of a few ARHs at Tarin Kowt provide a tactically significant organic commitment to the Australian ground forces stationed there, increasing morale and confidence with just their presence, but it would also be an ideal opportunity to work the ARH capability up and develop concepts of operations which could be applied throughout the aircraft’s service life.

The introduction of the Tiger has been a painful one for the ADF due in part to delays in training and certification work in France and Germany, and the subsequent 12 month suspension of payments to prime contractor Australian Aerospace in 2007/08. Anecdotally, there have also been serviceability issues through a lack of spares for the half dozen or so Tigers based at the 1st Aviation Regiment at Darwin, resulting in one or more airframes having to be ‘Christmas Treed’ to keep the others flying. But with the first two aircraft delivered in December 2004, nearly six years ago now, and 18 delivered to date, surely it’s time the ADF stepped up to exercise the ARH system fully and work out any bugs that may remain.

An October 7 report in the Sydney Morning Herald says the government has justified not deploying Tigers because they are not scheduled to be fully operational until late 2012. But a capability doesn’t need to be fully operational in order to be deployable. Fully operational denotes all aircraft and basing and support facilities have been delivered, that the support and spares infrastructures and training systems have been established, and that a viable personnel base is in place.

But we don’t need to take 22 Tigers to Afghanistan, three or four will suffice.

The nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan is almost tailor made for the capability provided by an Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter, that is, aerial reconnaissance of a planned troop patrol area or convoy route, and providing fire support to troops in contact. It is this those deployed to Afghanistan have been desperately calling out for, and it is this for which the Tiger is ideal.