Air Combat Capability Review Options

But it is in the longer term air combat requirements being assessed under stage two of the ACCR where changes may be made. This will look out beyond 2015 to as far as 2045 in examining trends in air power, equipment andtactics development among Australia’s neighbours, and their relative merits against the currently planned for RAAF force of upgraded F/ A-18A/Bs through F/A-18F Super Hornets to the F-35A JSF supported by networked AEW&C and tankers, as well as against potential alternatives such as the F-22 Raptor.

Firstly, and despite its sparkling performance and stealth characteristics, and its barrow being pushed hard by various members of industry, academia and retired senior RAAF personnel in recent years, the RAAF and many other experts say the F-22 is not the right aircraft for Australia. They say it is too narrowly focused towards the air-to-air mission and that many of its systems were designed in the 1980s and will soon require costly upgrades.

Additionally, in order for it to be made available for export, the F-22 would be required to undergo a $1 billion plus modification program.

Other aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, Boeing F-15E and even the Sukhoi Su-30 seem even less likely as possible options to JSF. These aircraft are, at best, fourth generation fighters equipped with advanced sensors, communications and weapons, and are not in the same league as the F-35 when it comes to low observability, sensor integration, and software and weapons growth potential.

And neither is the Super Hornet for that matter, but that aircraft’s commonality with the RAAF’s ‘classic’ Hornets, its advanced AESA radar and the high levels of integration with other advanced sensors, as well as the important relationships already in place with the US Navy, Boeing and GE, made it the ideal ‘bridging’ fighter between the classic Hornet and JSF.

So the only real question facing the ACCR panel seems to be whether to go with the F-35A in the original timeframe which would see the first four aircraft acquired in 2013, an initial operating capability (IOC) of 27 aircraft in 2015/16, and a fully operational capability (FOC) of about 60 F-35s in 2018, or whether to defer the F-35 buy until additional risk and cost can be ‘built’ out of the program in the low rate production (LRIP) batches before full rate production commences in 2015.

And if JSF is deferred as has been predicted by some observers, will the 71 upgraded classic Hornets and 24 Super Hornets be sufficient to hold the fort for most of the next decade? Much of this depends on whether the full 49 airframe Air 5376 Phase 3. 2C Centre Barrel Replacement (CBR) plan, a program also likely to be reviewed as part of the ACCR, is realised in order to get sufficient airframes out to 2018 or beyond, or whether CBR is cancelled after the 10 aircraft currently contracted for in favour of additional Super Hornets. Other influences may be the AEW&C and tanker programs which, despite assurances from within DMO and from industry in recent months to the contrary, continue to be dogged by rumours of further development problems and schedule slips.

Unfortunately, some of these questions may not be answered for some time yet, as some insiders have suggested that Fitzgibbon and the NSC may choose to sit on the report until the release of the Defence White Paper in December, supposedly to ensure the two reports roughly line up with each other.

But with many of the capability-related goals of the ACCR directly linked to those of the White Paper, it may actually pay to sit on the public ACCR report and incorporate its findings into the White Paper.