Lop-sided Corners?

The Four Corners report fell down in many areas from both technical and balance viewpoints, not least in the opening stanza when the reporter referred to the F-35 as the “JSF-35”. The report then went on to suggest that, despite being nearly 40 years old and contrary to almost overwhelming evidence from senior RAAF officials, with a (costly and time consuming) upgrade the F-111s could operate effectively “forever”! The claim made in the report that the DSTO botched a 2002 wing structural test has also been rejected by Defence.

US defence analyst James Stevenson, a well known ‘go-to guy’ for controversial comments regarding the state of US Naval airpower, incorrectly stated that the Super Hornet the RAAF will be getting is nothing more than a previously rejected “dusted off ” proposal from 1990.

It is correct that the Hornet 2000 proposal was rejected by the US Navy in favour of the stealthy A-12 Avenger II which was subsequently cancelled in 1991. However, the Block I Super Hornet only built upon the studies conducted for the Hornet 2000, and then added many newer technologies such as advanced sensors and weapons, systems integration and low observability shaping.

The Block II which Australia will be getting has leapt half a generation ahead again, with the addition of the APG-79 AESA radar and even greater systems integration, giving its crews a level of situational awareness only dreamt about in the early 1990s. Interestingly and perhaps most tellingly, an extended version of the interview with Stevenson posted on Four Corners’ website reveals he advocates the acquisition of F-16s and A-10s to fulfil Australia’s future air power needs! The report also suggested that former Boeing Australia President Andrew Peacock, previously a Liberal government minister and opposition leader in the 1980s and 90s, had somehow influenced the Super Hornet decision. Even if Peacock had managed to open some political doors for the Boeing sales team, it is impossible to conceive that he would have had much input into discussions beyond that point.

Australian Aviation has generally been supportive of the decision to acquire the 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets.

However, we have also been critical of the suddenness of the government’s decision just weeks after Chief of Air Force AIRMSHL Geoff Shepherd told a Senate committee that there would likely be no capability gap. To the outsider, the timing of the Minister’s decision made the RAAF leadership look like fools, something which they are clearly not.

But to suggest the Minister made the decision to acquire the jets on his own after a sales pitch from Boeing is ridiculous. It has been well documented here and in other publications that the RAAF had done extensive research into the F/A-18E/F during the Air 6000 process and had kept a watching brief on the jet after the decision to head down the JSF route was made.

If there were any delays with JSF and a capability gap had started to open up, the Super Hornet was always going to be the fallback option. These and other facts were briefed to Nelson soon after he assumed the office in early 2006, but for some reason were omitted from the Four Corners report.

Other issues we had with the program include the fact that the Super Hornet’s only advocate to be shown on the report, Air Combat Transition Office head GPCAPT Steve Roberton, was on camera for less than 30 seconds. Defence sources have since told AA that Roberton had given the reporter a comprehensive 45 minute pre-interview brief on the issue, and had then recorded a one hour interview.

The reporter said that Minister Nelson was invited to appear on the program, but had declined. The same defence source said that the Minister said he would appear on the program, but only if he could do so live, ostensibly to avoid being adversely edited.

The two hypothetical scenarios conducted by retired RAAF officers AVM Peter Criss and WGCDR Chris Mills on the program failed to take into account fighter escorts for the F-111s in the 1999 scenario, nor how the F-111 would fare and the affect of AEW&C and F/A-18 fighter escorts for the KC-30B tankers in the 2012 scenario.

There was also no mention of the fact that Australia sent 14 F/A-18s to the Gulf region in 2003 to support operations against Iraq, and not the F-111, because of the F/A-18’s multirole capability, networking and coalition interoperability.

Four Corners has a right to report on such issues, particularly in the hot political climate of a Federal election campaign, and indeed has done so well in the past.

However, it also has the responsibility to provide fair and balanced comment, especially as the majority of its audience wouldn’t know a “JSF-35” from a Sukhoi anyway.