Analysis – Combat Capability & the Coalition

Interestingly, the one component of the DoD which has been uniquely productive, DSTO, has suffered badly in the area where it has the most to offer, that being primary research into military technology. In recent years DSTO’s role has been largely focussed on expert consultancy to the ADF, and support for industry. The problem with this paradigm is that primary research is the means via which the knowhow to consult with is developed. The long term effect of strangling research is an inevitable loss in the national skills base.

The consequence of these circumstances is that the ADF at this time suffers from a lack of operational training hours, needless duplication in a number of areas, and in many instances has not received the capabilities it has long sought. The Coalition’s policy document, Australia’s Defence, promises to address many of the problems outlined above, but arguably doesn’t go far enough.

There are a number of areas related to military aviation where the Government could significantly improve the ADF’s capability with very modest resources. Indeed, if the rationalising of the civilian bureaucracy yields the dividends we can expect it to, these resources may be readily available. The Coalition has promised to expedite the deployment of an operational Airborne Early Warning & Control capability. Much effort has been expended in this area to optimise the eventual capability. Hopefully this critical programme will not encounter any further obstacles, and the ADF will receive the capability which it seeks, rather than a watered down political solution to the problem. The language in the policy document is unclear on the latter point.

The ADF’s electronic combat capability is another area which is woefully inadequate by world standards. While a number of programmes are currently in train, they in most instances reflect the replacement of existing systems. A major improvement in capabilities in this area is absolutely vital. Measures such as equipping the 707 tanker/transports for strategic Elint role be highly desirable, as well as the provision of a standoff jamming capability against radars and communications. Adequate stocks of anti radiation missiles are a must. This area has not received any coverage in the Coalition’s policy, and we can only hope that it will be addressed as a priority.

The electronic battle is the first prerequisite for air superiority, as evidenced in the Gulf War. Ignoring this capability is potentially suicidal, as was demonstrated in the Gulf War. Complacency in electronic combat is dangerous indeed.

The Coalition has committed itself to support the F-111 force into the next century, but has also committed no less than $A1.5m on a study for the replacement of its capability. Given the demise of the A-12 Avenger, there simply will be no real replacement for the F-111 until the USAF’s F-15E and F-117A run out of life cca 2020. Moreover the Coalition has committed a further $A1.5m to a study for standoff weapons for the Collins submarine. The question we must ask is whether there is any sense in debating the F-111 replacement now, let alone wasting precious resources on as marginal a capability as submarine launched land attack weapons.

If the government is to expend $A3m on strategic strike capabilities studies, these resources can be far better spent on developing specific enhancements to the existing F-111 force, and bringing the F-111G up to full operational capability. While the RAAF’s F/RF-111C force is receiving a potent capability and maintainability upgrade, the 15 F-111G aircraft are being cannibalised to keep six airframes operational. There is a very good case to be made for extending the current AUP programme to cover the F-111G, to bring these aircraft up to a similar avionic configuration to the F/RF-111C fleet. This is an area where modest expenditure can provide a significant improvement in capability across a broad range of roles.

If the government is serious, as it claims to be, about our strategic strike capability, then serious consideration should be given to the stealthing of the F-111 fleet, deployment of GPS/inertially guided bombs and glidebombs (very cheap munitions compared to cruise missiles), and the zero timing of the F-111 airframes. The F-111 airframe geometry lends itself to radar cross section reduction (stealthing) by detail modification and application of absorbent materials. This would preserve the investment we already have, and give us a major boost in capability for a modest expense.

The RAAF’s four 707 tankers really only provide the service with a AAR training capability. Equipping some of the forthcoming C-130Js with refuelling pods would be a great force multiplier.

Air-to-air refuelling (AAR) capability is not a stated priority in the Coalition policy document. The ADF’s four strong tanker fleet was sought to provide a training and limited operational AAR capability, and as such it is simply inadequate for the tasks it would be called upon in any serious situation. Moreover, the ADF’s best power projection tool and battlefield interdiction asset, the F-111, cannot be refuelled as the tankers do not have booms fitted (although the plumbing is in place). The provision of additional boom and pod equipped tankers is another vital force multiplier which can enhance the RAAF’s sustainability in strategic operations, as well as in joint operations. Tankers are area force multipliers across the spectrum of roles to be performed, and are an area which yields an excellent return in “bang per-buck”.

Moreover, consideration should be given to equipping a fraction of the new C-130J force with pods to provide AAR for the F/A-18 and the Army’s Blackhawk helicopters. Fitting some of the Blackhawks and the Army Chinooks with refuelling probes and night vision equipment would provide the ADF with the capability to insert and extract the SAS at a distance, as well as to perform combat search and rescue operations. Again this is an area where modest expenditure can yield important dividends in capability across the whole ADF.

The Coalition’s stated defence policy promises some major improvements for the ADF, and we can hope that our new government will follow through with many of its stated initiatives, given the climate of austerity required for “budget repair”.

The World is experiencing some significant changes in how wars are fought, and one of these changes is the increasing pre-eminence of airpower as a strategic and battlefield weapon. To overlook this could have quite a few undesirable long term consequences, given that the benign strategic environment we have enjoyed for several decades may not persist much longer.