RAAF AEW Programme Matures

The first phase in the ADF AEW&C programme, designated Project Wedgetail, is the preparation of a comprehensive two-part study of Australian air defence capabilities and infrastructure requirements for defending Northern Australia. It is understood that the first part of this study, prepared jointly by the RAAF, DSTO, HQ ADF and other elements of the DoD, has concluded that an AEW&C capability is needed to complement existing capabilities. This study has involved a considerable effort by a large multidisciplinary team of expert defence scientists and air defence operations specialists, and is almost certainly the most comprehensive work of its kind ever produced in this country.

The first part of the Project Wedgetail study is now being considered by high-level civilian DoD committees, who have yet to endorse the conclusions of the study. At this time, approval has been granted to proceed with the second part of the study, which is oriented toward defining specific capabilities and performance requirements for an AEW&C system. To that effect, a DoD team, including a number of senior ADF officers, commenced a study tour earlier this year. The team will visit a number of AEW&C system users and manufacturers in the US, Europe and Israel. The intention is to gain a very detailed insight into the operating costs, risk factors and development maturity of likely candidate systems in any future ADF acquisition.

Factors which will be examined under the second part of the Project Wedgetail study are the suitability of particular airframe and radar types in relation to the Australian air operations environment, life cycle and support costs, and the scope of any Australian industry involvement in the project, should it proceed. There are a range of technical issues in relation to radar antenna technology which will come under close scrutiny, in particular the performance of conventional scanning (rotodome) systems, versus the newer but less mature phased array systems. The capability of some of the current phased array systems does not measure up to the expectations of a decade ago, and current thought in the ADF is that both conventional and phased array systems are likely to be evaluated.

The second part of the Wedgetail study is expected to be reviewed by a higher DoD committee toward the end of this year. Should the committee decide to approve the acquisition of an AEW&C system, it is expected that the ADF will provide an industry briefing early next year, followed by a formal RFT (tender) later in the year. Current planning objectives are understood to be aimed at an IOC toward the end of the decade.

The acquisition of AEW&C is long overdue, and until it is acquired and established in service, a substantial hole exists in the nation’s capability to maintain the sovereignty of its airspace. While the “no immediate threat” lobby will no doubt argue for deferral, as it does with every capability, what must be understood in this context is that it takes years to mature operational methods and fully integrate what is essentially an airborne command post into any defence force without such a capability. The expectation that such a capability can be properly acquired and integrated in a short timescale is quite naive, and we can hope that the lay participants in the essentially political approval process are made fully aware of this. AA will be watching the evolution of this particular programme very closely.

Should tensions arise in the region, or even conflict, surveillance and control of airspace become vital to a nation’s ability to understand and if necessary control the immediate situation. The presence of an AEW&C platform is a politically stabilising influence, as it removes the uncertainties which can otherwise develop where an evolving military or political process or situation is not well understood. In a strictly political context, deployment of an AEW&C platform to an area of political friction is a very benign but effective means of demonstrating commitment to allies more immediately threatened, and the US has capitalised on this effect repeatedly.

From a more immediate perspective, the ability to rapidly deploy what is essentially an airborne air traffic control system and command post would be vital in situations such as natural disasters, where the ground-based infrastructure has been destroyed by the elements. Similarly, surveillance and control of air and sea traffic in isolated regions of the North is a current operational and strategic deficiency which would be remedied by the deployment of AEW&C systems. With the evolving political situation in the Far East, it is not unreasonable to expect that the seaborne refugee problem will not improve.

There are a number of good political, strategic, operational and technical reasons why the ADF should proceed with an AEW&C capability, and the ADF Project Wedgetail is hopefully the first step in the process of providing that capability. We can hope our military will receive the support they deserve in this vital matter.