Technology Explained – Desert Storm Lessons for Australia

What this suggests is that the NATO-Warpac central Euro- pean air battle would have probably followed a similar course, leading to the defeat of the Communists’ LADS (Integrated Air Defence System) within a week or so, in turn leading to air superiority in the following week, as the Communist air forces would have withered under the fire of the Allied counter-air campaign. Fortunately this never had to happen and the world has been spared the inevitable nuclear response to the lost air battle and hence total conventional defeat through attrition by air.

Several interesting observations must be made. First and foremost is the reality that the electronic battle must run concurrently with the counter-air battle. The attainment of air superiority requires the attainment of electromagnetic superiority- who controls the airwaves will control the skies.

There can be no doubt that the established model for the air war, ie the counter-air battle to achieve command of the air, accompanied by strategic air attack and interdiction cam- paigns to inflict attrition, must be expanded by the introduc- tion of an electronic combat campaign to cripple the opponent’s C3 and LADS, while hunting down the opponent’s air capability. It must be noted that while the foremost objective of the electronic combat campaign will always be the destruction of the opponent’s air defence capability, by encompassing the opponent’s total C3 system as a target for attack one has advanced the process of the strategic interdiction campaign by implementing its first phase concurrently with the electronic campaign.

The Gulf War was so one sided because the electronic battle was so lopsided. The US and UK are acknowledged to be the most capable in the West, insofar as electronic combat capability goes, whereas the Iraqis were utterly inept in the discipline, if they at all even recognised its existence as such. How much blame for Iraq’s defeat must be attributed to Iraqi stupidity at a senior and operational command level, incompetence at the cutting edge, and how much is due to fundamental flaws in Soviet air battle doctrine, may be difficult to determine. What is certain is that even extremely competent air defence forces will not perform well once their C3 net- work is shattered. A highly centralised system breeds an inability to function without a C3 network and thus the effect of removing it exposes the basic limitations of the system. In this fashion Allied strategists attuned their campaign to a fundamental structural flaw in Warpac air battle doctrine. The deluge of jamming and anti radiation missiles represented nothing less than a war of attrition against electronic assets. In this respect the electronic battle has acquired the fundamental characteristic of the counter-air battle, it is a war of attrition. As such it is a battle where mobility confers a major advantage in allowing the choice of entering an engagement or not, and that mobility is an attribute of the attacking air force, weighing heavily in its favour.

An aircraft can jam and dodge a missile, whereas a land based radar or SAM system can neither jam nor dodge an antiradiation missile. It can only shut itself down and by doing so withdraw from the engagement, this unilateral move may not prevent a SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defence) tasked aircraft from locating and destroying the shut down radar. Decoy emitters only delay the inevitable.

It follows, therefore that an air battle doctrine which relies heavily on ground based radar and SAMs is analogous to a doctrine of static fortification engaging a manoeuvre land force. Unless the attacking air force is particularly ill matched to the task, the advantage must lay with the attacker. Historical evidence easily supports this assertion, the only times when SAM based defences were successful was during the transient phase of deploying a new technology (SA-2 and 3 in SEA, SA-6 in Yom Kippur), once the limitations of the new weapon were understood the war of attrition swung rapidly in favour of air power. This would have also been true of the SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 in any recent European conflict.

An Australian Perspective

From the Australian perspective several issues become very clear. Reliance on a static air defence system is a flawed strategy as it forces a defensive posture where air assets become committed to protecting air defence infrastructure, rather than winning the air control campaign. This may not be clear enough to many of the laymen who determine Australia’s policy in this area and it is up to those who know to press this argument vigourously.

Whilst an OTHB (Over The Horizon Backscatter) radar network such as Jindalee is a potent long range early warning asset, it must be supplemented by AEW&C platforms to provide close control of the air battle. There is a body of thought in the Australian defence establishment (interestingly enough, counter to stated government policy) which treats the two systems as mutually exclusive. This is both technically wrong and dangerous, in that use of OTHB alone encourages the static IADS mindset which is so clearly un- workable in the modern air warfare environment. The crux of the problem lies in the reactive nature of the static IADS, where its user ultimately loses the initiative in the air battle, being committed to defending airspace and ultimately, air defence assets, in response to the opponent’s attacks. The ALR-2002 airborne Radar Waming Receiver (RWR) is a significant step in Australian electronic combat systems development. Designed and developed by Australia’s DSTO and AWA Defence Industries, the ALR-2002 was created with the objective of transferring DSTO’s electronic warfare capability into a real system which would meet RAAF operational requirements, while being competitive with established overseas designs. The programme began in December, 1991, and the Concept Demonstrator system was successfully demonstrated to the RAAF in March, 1993, this being a key milestone for domestic electronic warfare capability. The use of domestically designed, built and supported equipment such as the ALR-2002 provides the ADF with both major cost savings in foreign revenue, and the flexibility to tailor both hardware and software to uniquely Australian requirements. The latter is of key importance in any real confrontation, as the ADF is not tied to foreign sources for urgently needed software upgrades, which inevitably occur as intelligence is gathered. Note the handle which gives an impression of scale. (DSTO) In the same context the utility of SAM and AAA systems is doubtful. They cannot prevent air power from inflicting attri- tion and themselves inflict only questionable levels of attri- tion on an attacking force. Where low level SAMs are the only types available, using PGMs from medium altitudes defeats the SAM and AAA defence totally. While the ADF is woefully weak in this area, it is worth stating that resources should not be expended on SAMs or AAA, in preference to fighters and AEW&C. The payoff is simply not there. (The conventional argument for SAM/AAA defence is that it can deny the use of airspace, particularly at low altitude, thereby forcing less accurate delivery from higher altitudes. The massed use of guided bombs which are highly accurate whatever the delivery regime, must place this orthodoxy in question).

The tyranny of distance is an attribute of Australian geography which raises the importance of resilient C3 networks, particularly in the deep North. Any opponent who is serious will target the fixed C3 sites and in doing so will make life very difficult for the ADF. There is reasonable justification for the idea of airborne command posts, implemented by acquiring AEW&C platforms and equipping the RAAF’s tankers as VHF/ UHF/satellite communications relay platforms which may double up as command posts to provide some additional redundancy over fixed installations (not unlike the RAF’s tankers).

The resilience of our national C3 network is something to seriously ponder, should we ever become embroiled in a neighbourhood brawl. Distances what they are, crippling our C3 network could allow an opponent substantial freedom of operations in the North. Lacking anything even approaching an IADS, the issue of its crippling isn’t really applicable, but selective operations targeted at fixed C3 sites, Jindalee and primary radar facilities could have a similar effect should we become overly reliant upon them. The reality is that static systems are targets which can’t run away and therefore cannot be expected to survive for long unless disproportionate resources are assigned to defend them (Jindalee’s saving grace in this context is its remoteness from the likely area of operations). Diversity and redundancy are the key to survivability, and exclusive reliance upon any single class of asset is a flawed strategy.

What must be seriously questioned is the ADF’s failure to commit to the development of a substantial support jamming and SEAD capability. If such a programme exists it is a well kept secret of which there is no visible evidence.

The ADF’s electronic combat capabilities as a whole are in need of a substantial increase in funding priority.

Much has been achieved in this area over the last one half decade, which is a tribute to the dedicated individuals who have contributed. Of pivotal importance was the creation of the RAAF’s EWOSU (Electronic Warfare Operational Support Unit) in South Australia, a unit which provides software and engineering support for the RAAF’s Electronic Warfare sys- tems, be they warning or jamming systems. This is the first step in developing an indigenous capability to conduct inde- pendent Electronic Combat operations without being wholly dependent upon outside parties for every threat library update needed to be done.

The RAAF’s recently adopted policy of acquiring Electronic Warfare systems only with full software support packages is a major step forward in this respect, as the ability to update threat libraries quickly and quietly is fundamental to success in the Electronic Combat game. Electronic Warfare systems with obsolete or inappropriate threat libraries are useless ballast. Buying canned systems from overseas without the software support package is an utter waste of tax payer’s money.

Our defensive electronic warfare capability is by all standards modest and SEAD capability at this time is nonexistent. The F-111 and F/A-18 carry defensive ECM and RWRs, while the P-3 force carries ESM equipment. There are no ELINT, SEAD or Support Jamming assets by tasking or functional specialisation and given stated policy at the time of writing, they are unlikely to be acquired in the near future. This is at major weakness stemming from a lack of policy direction, in turn stemming from a lack of understanding in non-technical decision-making circles. Again it is up to those who know to push the point vigorously. The non technical are not equipped to judge the pivotal importance of such capabilities to a smaller defence force such as the ADF.

Tentative steps are being made in the right direction, a good instance being the RAAF’s P-3C ESM programme, where the ADF is gaining a long overdue and substantial capability. In any confrontation the ability to determine the opponent’s electronic order of battle is of paramount importance. Whether this is achieved by specialist aircraft or by fitting additional mission consoles and ESM receivers to P-3Cs is a matter of implementation. A little capability in this area goes a very long way, and we can hope that this capability will be eventually expanded so as to provide enough ELINT assets to support serious Electronic Combat operations.

DSTO’s Electronic Warfare Division in Salisbury is another key contributor in this play and it is impossible to overstate the importance of their contribution. EWD is by all means our (left) The F-111 was the first RAAF platform to carry an electronic warfare fit of any significance. Until recently however, support of these systems was tled closely to the US vendors who manufactured the equipment. The RAAF’s recently formed EWOSU (EWOperational Support Unit) at Edinburgh now provides the capability to do much of this work domestically, freeing the RAAF from the time and cost constraints of contracting the work offshore. (right) The RAAF’s P-3C Electronic Support Measures (ESM) upgrade is a major milestone in the development of an Australian electronic combat capability. The availability of ESM systems provides for the first time an electronic reconnaissance capability, allowing the location and identification of an opponent’s electronic assets. (Defence PR) key national Electronic Combat technical asset. The nucleus of expertise within DSTO could ultimately provide the core of a wholly Australian Electronic Combat systems industry, and the dividends both in terms of increased ADF capability and export sales are substantial and not to be underestimated. The notion that a huge industry is required to produce such technology is wholly erroneous and more than anything reflects the cargo cult mindset which seems to pervade certain circles in this country, insofar as high technology goes software engineering tools, electronic design automation tools and automated production technology have created a situation, where technical genius can be translated into soft ware and physical hardware with very modest effort indeed (the author can say this from personal experience). The world has changed somewhat in the last decade, and many technological design tasks which may have required huge design teams no longer do. Alas, the inertia inherent in human value judgement means that many people have yet to appreciate the new reality. Yet again it is up to those who know to push the point.

A wholly Australian electronic warfare industry supporting the ADF and export sales is not only feasible, it is necessary if we are as a nation to have any real degree of self reliance in defence. Not to create such an industry is strategically suicidal in the long term, as we will lose the ability as a nation to determine whether we can or cannot use military force as a means of national policy. Withdrawal of support for high technology Electronic Warfare systems by the overseas manufacturer could well become a major constraint in determining national policy direction. In blunter terms, whoever controls the Electronic Warfare technology we use controls our policy on the application of military force.

This reality should be carefully considered by the government, which has made much political mileage out of its stated policy of defence self reliance. Should the government fail to support its own stated policy in this area, it could ultimately be the cause of that which it so seeks to avoid, ie a nation without the ability to determine its own direction in matters of defence.

Creating an Australian Electronic Combat Capability

With limited budgets and a weak domestic manufacturing infrastructure an incremental approach is the best possible choice. Electronic Warfare equipment falls into the category of very high value added products, and export sales offer a potent means of amortising costs incurred in development. By the same token, the cost incurred by importing Electronic Warfare equipment can also be vastly reduced by creating our own. The economic rationale alone should therefore be adequate cause to spur the creation of an Australian Electronic Warfare industry, if defence self reliance is not considered a sufficiently strong reason.

The long term objective should be a situation where most Electronic Warfare equipment in ADF platforms is of Austral- ian origin. This could best be achieved by an incremental phasing out of overseas equipment. When a new platform is to be acquired, or an existing platform is due for an Electronic Warfare equipment upgrade, foreign equipment can be replaced by Australian built systems.

Concurrently, specific new capabilities would be gradually phased in. These specific capabilities are an emitter locating system (ELS) for targeting antiradiation weapons, support jamming pods with noise, false target generation and communications jamming capability, and finally an integrated ELINT support system, to allow the rapid collation and analysis of electronic intelligence.

The regional environment will never have the threat density which requires capabilities such as those in the EA-6B Prowler, but a lesser support jamming capability based upon a family of jamming pods would both match the regional environment, and be readily accomplished technologically. A mix of noise jamming, false target generator and comjam pods carried by either of the tactical jet types could prove of substantial usefulness particularly during the crucial opening phase of any conflict.

Another core capability is an emitter locating system or homing receiver system, fitted to some of the tactical jet airframes, a device specialised to the task of hunting hostile radar. One approach would be a centreline pod with a quartet of dual baseline interferometers (eg conventional 5 x cavity backed spiral), feeding IFM receivers, the whole system thus capable of 360 degree coverage in operation from D band through J band. Such a pod would carry a processor to sort, identify and locate emitters based on receiver outputs. The pod could be integrated with the aircraft’s weapon system via the 1553B mux bus. An alternate approach would be an airframe specific design, derived from existing Australian radar warning receiver technology. The latter strategy would allow for more potent Phase Rate of Change (PRC) rangefinding techniques, such as those currently being tested in the US (eg Hughes DFLS).

Electronic Combat is neither black magic or unattainably difficult science, it is an established engineering and operational discipline where success is achieved through systematic effort. The Gulf War demonstrated beyond any doubt the central importance of electronic combat to the modern air war and those who fail to take heed today will be tomorrow’s losers. Failure to understand the dynamics and strategy of electronic combat is no longer excusable, and those who resist the acquisition of capabilities in this area are either stupid or in effect acting against Australia’s interests. The ADF to date has accepted the importance of Electronic Combat, but we have yet to see a serious commitment of resources.

Hopefully this will eventually take place, if it doesn’t we may become the losers in any future conflict. Linebacker II, the Beka’a Valley, El Dorado Canyon and Desert Storm did not happen by accident.