Oz Cooperation Essential to NZ Defence

This kind of activity is a reflection of the latest defence policy initiatives on both sides of the Tasman. Close cooperation between Australian and New Zealand defence forces has always formed an important part of defence planning for both nations, but the level of cooperation has been growing in recent years. Apart from major joint projects such as the ANZAC frigate deal, there have also been personnel ex-changes, joint training exercises, information exchanges, and help during war games.

The RNZAF’s contribution to general defence cooperation with Australia has been spearheaded by the six A-4KSkyhawks of No 2 Squadron stationed at NAS Nowra since early 1991. Their tasks include air defence training with the RAN as well as general work with the ADF. They would also be very likely to provide New Zealand’s first contribution if Australia was invaded; assistance to Australia in case of ‘incursion by foreign power’ is a stated aim of New Zealand defence policy. Other work by the Skyhawks includes dissimilar air combat training, pitting the refurbished A-4K Skyhawks both of No 2 and No 75 Squadrons against the RAAF’s F/A-18s. Direct association extends into other aircraft types as well. The RNZAF’s Andovers also work regularly with Australian trans- port aircraft, as in 1992’s Shorthaul exercises.

Cooperative work has extended lately into other areas. This year there was agreement on joint pilot navigation training between Australian and New Zealand air forces. Unofficially there has been talk of flying Australian Sea Kings from a new logistics ship to be acquired for the Royal New Zealand Navy – the RNZAF doesn’t have suitable aircraft for the job.

The close relationship between the NZDF and ADF is not surprising given the traditional association between Australia and New Zealand. International relationships are always an amalgam, the totality being a blend of economic, diplomatic, cultural, social and defence ties. It is rare to find one element much out of line with the others. With a shared origin as former British colonies, Australia and New Zealand have traditionally been very close at all levels – indeed, in 1900, New Zealand actually turned down an offer to federate with the six Australian colonies.

But although close military collaboration between Australia and New Zealand goes back to the Gallipoli campaign of 1915 and even before-the basis of that cooperation has been radically transformed in recent years. The key to the latest cooperative initiatives is the ability of the NZDF to complement Australian capabilities. Building on the strengths of the different forces to create a more effective whole is an important part of defence planning both in Wellington and Canberra.

This is particularly clear in the case of the air forces, the RNZAF’s Andovers, in particular, have a medium transport capability that can be matched efficiently to small loads. The modernised A-4K ‘Kahu’ Skyhawks also have significant combat capabilities-largely by virtue of their integrated weapons systems-similar to Australias F/A-18 and F-111 aircraft. With APG-66 radar, HOTAS, HUD and a modern INS system, the Skyhawks are among the most up to date fighter bombers in the South Pacific. The edge that this gives them in VR combat was highlighted last year during exercises with the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) forces, when the Skyhawks put up a superb showing in dissimilar air combat training against similarly armed but less modern Sea Harrier FRS. 1s.

By the same token, the RNZAF does not have aircraft with the all weather, long range strike capability of the Australian F-111Cs. The Skyhawks cannot match either the BVR air combat capability or the long range maritime strike potential of the RAAF’s F/A-18 s, mainly because the Skyhawk airframe is too small to carry the relevant weaponry-in this case, the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AGM-84 Harpoon. Nor does the RNZAF have the heavy vertical lift capability of the ADF Blackhawks and CH-47 Chinooks which are due to be returned to Australian Army service in 1995.

Both nations operate P-3 Orions and C-130 Hercules, and although the equipment fit of the Kiwi Orions in particular is quite different to that of the Australians, there is sufficient commonality to make joint operations less of a headachethan might otherwise be the case.

When New Zealand’s current defence policy was released in 1991, a series of reviews designed to optimise New Zealand’s forces were also announced. The White Paper announcing those reviews remarked that Australia shared with New Zealand a common interest in affordable anti-submarine capabilities’, and called for consultation with Australia when reviewing New Zealand’s anti submarine forces. Transport aircraft also came under scrutiny, and the paper remarked that ‘Australian capabilities could also be important’. Consultation with Australia was also required in respect of the Skyhawk strike force, primarily because of the functions performed for the ADF by the detachment of Skyhawks at Nowra.

Not all of these reviews have been completed at time of writing more than two years after they were first announced. Unofficial early results seem to indicate that any change may not be too dramatic. Preliminary planning has suggested that the RNZAF’s six P-3K Orions could be rewinged to extend their useful life-the question being whether Lockheed’s current production ‘wet’ wing can be mated to the early production fuselages of the RNZAF’s P-3Ks, originally delivered with lighter ‘dry’ wings. An audit conducted last year by the RNZAF also showed that the Andover/Hercules transport mix was ideal given the style and types of transport work normally done by the RNZAF. As experience this year in Somalia demonstrated, that same mix contributes equally well to meeting similar needs of the Australian forces.

In some respects the wheel has turned full circle. Before the First World War, all Australasian defence was provided by Britain, which regarded Australia and New Zealand as a single strategic unit. Their military deployments reflected this concept. The Australasian Squadron of the Royal Navy, based in Sydney, was charged with defence of both Dominions. Then Britain grudgingly allowed Australia to buy ships of its own in 1909, the latter put pressure on New Zealand to contribute to a joint squadron as the only economic solution to defending both countries. New Zealand refused, the Liberal government of Sir Joseph Ward arguing instead that both countries should contribute instead to a stronger Imperial defence.

New Zealand thinking was very much in line with prevailing British views, and cooperation between Australia and New Zealand was based around that concept for many years. However, the events of late 1941 revealed that Britain could no longer effectively defend the two former colonies. The Canberra Pact was one concrete expression of this new perception. Another was a renewed drive by Australia to build an independent defence. By the end of the Second World War, Australia had the world’s fourth largest air force. ‘ The end of that war brought dramatic changes. In a decolonising world, both Australia and New Zealand looked to the United States for protection and alliance. The ANZUS alliance brought both countries firmly into the American umbrella. New focus on South Pacific and Asian interests led to the Five Power Defence Arrangement with Singapore, Malaysia and Britain. Australia still has those ties with the United States, but New Zealand was cast out of that alliance in 1984 by virtue of its hard line anti nuclear stand. In many respects it was the breakdown of ANZUS that led to the current drive to strengthen New Zealand’s bilateral cooperation with Australia, although this was never in question even at the height of the ANZUS dispute. Financial stringency has also had a profound effect. Whereas in earlier years the Australian and New Zealand defence forces tended to plan independently, collaborative development has obvious efficiencies. The latest cooperative ball began rolling during the late 1980s when a series of ‘memorandums of understanding’ were signed between the Australian and New Zealand defence forces.

The end of the Cold War also brought new strategic imperatives. In the absence of a nuclear standoff, regional wars have become possible. The rising power of Asian economies has turned the attention of South Pacific nations northwards, and Australian policies have reflected this change. As far as the RAAF is concerned this has meant new air bases across the north of the continent to cope with the limits of the relatively short legged F/A-18. The purchase of additional F-111s is another means by which new defence requirements are being addressed.

In 1991, New Zealand announced a new defence policy, putting into black and white the policy developments that had been percolating for several years. Policy now recognises that as a maritime nation absolutely reliant on trade, New Zealand has particular vulnerabilities. The defence problem is not invasion – it is strangulation. Direct attack on trade, or large scale trade disruption following any attack on New Zealand’s trading partners, could have a serious effect on New Zealand’s prosperity. Even instability or tension falling short of war could affect New Zealand’s trading position. The knock-on effect this would have on inbound tourism also would be critical considering the crucial importance this industry now has for both nations.

As a relatively small nation, New Zealand cannot afford the level of defence forces needed to protect its interests. The solution has been the adoption of ‘self reliance in partnership’. Australia has been the primary focus of that partnership not only because of traditional ties, but also because Australia shares many of the same perceptions and vulnerabilities. Policy is broader based than this main focus would indicate; the FPDA also features in New Zealand’s security thinking, and there has been talk at Parliamentary level in New Zealand of seeking fresh ties with the United States.

Just how important defence cooperation of all kinds is to New Zealand, is clear from the budgets voted for the NZDF. Under a private enterprise style management regime, the New Zealand Defence Force produces annual Corporate Plans identifying specifically what will be done with the defence vote. The cost to New Zealand of Specific Australian cooperation has not been identified, but the overall cost of meeting regional security objectives amounted to a little over $NZ681 million for the 1992/93 financial year. These objec- tives include deterring and countering incursions in the South Pacific; assisting in countering incursions in Australia; and assisting with the protection of regional seaborne trade. The 1992/93 Corporate Plan remarked that this last ‘would most likely call for a combined response from the ADF and NZDF”.

Some $NZ275 million also went towards ‘collective security operations’ – primarily New Zealand’s United Nations obligations – and a further $NZ14 million was set aside for contribution to exchange programmes and other alliances – primarily those New Zealand holds with Australia. ‘ New Zealand does not spend much on defence by comparison with Australia – even when viewed in proportion to the disparate sizes of the two national economies. Military spending in New Zealand has been slashed to the bone in recent years, falling from 2. 1% to just 1. 6% of gross domestic product since 1988. This is one of the lowest levels in the world-and it includes funds to pay for the Anzac frigates. Australia by comparison continues at around 2. 4% of GD-Porabout $NZ13bn for 92/93.

Just before the 1992 budget, the Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, said that the defence budget could not be cut further without affecting force levels; and events have borne out this statement. For this reason alone, cooperation with Australia would be mandatory even if the two South Pacific nations were not traditionally close friends.

Footnotes:

1 The RAAF comprised 182,000 personnel and 6000 aircraft at the end of the Second World War, and was bettered only by the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain. Most of the RAAF’s forces swiftly fell victim to peacetime defence cuts, as did the indigenous CA-15 piston-engined fighter.

2 Figures cited in the Ministry of Defence/NZDF 1992-93 Corporate Plan.

3 Matthew Wright wrote his Master’s thesis on historical aspects of Australia-New Zealand defence policies.