Desert Storm Air War Analysis

Giulio Douhet We watched it unfold on our television sets, the grandest tactical air offensive in history. There are no precedents for what was achieved by Allied pilots on the 17th January, 1991. Air warfare history was being made, as Allied tactical jets thundered across the desolate sands of the Saudi desert. By the textbook they hammered one of the world’s most dense air defence systems out of existence, crippling C3, surveillance, SAM and AAA systems and cutting runways at major air bases. The result has been in air warfare terms a rout, an overwhelming defeat resulting in initial air superiority and after two weeks, air supremacy. While the opposition had an inventory of largely obsolescent aircraft and SAM/radar systems, they nevertheless had the advantage of numbers in SAM/ AAA systems, a well established infrastructure, hardened facilities and above all, were operating over home ground. In this sense the setting was not unlike North Vietnam prior to Linebacker I/1l or Germany post 1942, The latter of these campaigns saw initial strategic bombing loss rates of the order of 15-30% levelling off at 3-6%, while the former saw initial loss rates of 3-6% levelling off to a cumulative rate of 1. 5%. Desert Storm has consistently seen peak daily loss rates below 0. 25% with a cumulative rate well below 0. 05%. Barely any greater than what often would be expected in an intensive wargame environment.

Desert Storm is significant in that it finally proves the Douhet-Mitchell doctrine of strategic air warfare, a fundamental tenet of Western air power doctrine which has for so long been questioned and criticised. The combination of modern defence suppression weapons, electronic warfare and standoff precision guided munitions has finally yielded the long sought philosopher’s stone of the Western air warfare strategist. The proof of the Douhet-Mitchell doctrine is a campaign where strategic air strikes yield the sought payoff, the demonstrable crippling of an opponent’s warfighting capability due to direct attack on his tactical systems and indirect attack via the destruction of the supporting infrastructure. . Unconstrained. ” “application of Allied air power for the first time since 1945 aided by the open desert terrain and Irag’s lack of serious industrial manufacturing infrastructure have provided conditions where this has demonstrably occurred.

Clearly the rate of destruction of facilities and equipment via air strikes has exceeded by a large margin the rate at which these could be replaced or repaired. For any strategic bombing campaign to be effective, the aggregate exchange ratio must be such that sustained loss rates and operational T costs are lesser than the damage inflicted to an opponent. Until the mass deploy J ment of the PGM and the modern suite of hard and soft kill defence suppression systems, this was a difficult goal to achieve. Historically, heated debates have raged over the usefulness of strategic bombing, the key counterargument revolving around loss rates. Desert Storm will hopefully put the debate to rest (Authors note: strict theorists will argue that Irag’s unwillingness to submit under strategic air attack disproves Douhet’s axiom, but the counterargument lies in the interpretation of the axiom, ie whether they do or do not submit the side with air superiority will eventually totally destroy its opponent’s assets and resources and hence wins by default through attrition).

Desert Storm – an Air Warfare Strategy Perspective

From the outset it was clear to Allied air warfare strategists that any campaign against Irag’s massive air defence system would have to be well planned, well implemented and involve large scale application of hard kill defence suppression weapons from the very outset. The US experience in Vietnam had clearly illustrated that a gradual build up in the intensity of an air campaign allows an opponent to learn and adapt tactics and deployment before decisive damage can be inflicted. The NVAF demonstrated this in Linebacker | and Il during 1972, when they inflicted loss rates exceeding 1. 5% on US tactical and strategic aircraft, using the relatively inflexible SA-2 Guideline/Fan Song/Spoon Rest air defence system. This was achieved in spite of the USAF’s and USN’s application of ARM firing Wild Weasel and Iron Hand aircraft. Competent application of even mediocre air defence weapons achieved a visible, albeit strategically sustainable loss rate. The objective of an initial knockout blow against a Soviet style Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was achievable, the Israelis demonstrated this in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 (see AA June 1983) when 19 SA-2, 3 and 6 batteries were crippled in a matter of hours. This was achieved with an integrated operational plan coordinating the use of AEW, standoff jamming platforms and ARM firing tactical jets. The battle was short and fierce and saw the Israelis win with a negligible loss of a couple of aircraft. Irag’s IADS however was a harder nut to crack, in comparison with Syria’s forward deployed SAM systems. The nucleus of Irag’s IADS was a force of over 70 batteries of SA-2, 3 and 6 area defence SAMs, supported by an estimated 100 plus surveillance/acquisition and early warning radars, with hardened C3 facilities. This force was backed up by over 40 mixed point defence batteries of mobile SA-9/13 SAMs and ZSU-23-4P AAA, these supplemented by an autonomous force of over 100 Euromissile Roland and SA-8 point defence SAM systems. With acquisition radars co-located on the launcher vehicles, the mobile Roland and SA-8 can be elusive targets, while capable of operation independently of the IADS. The SAM force was backed by a network of largely Soviet Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radars supporting an interceptor force of up to 150 MiG-21/J-7 Fishbeds, 100 plus Mirage F1EQs, 50 or so MiG-23 Flogger E/G and 50 or so MiG-29 Fulerum A.

With over 300 aircraft available, the interceptor component of the IADS certainly had the numbers to disrupt any air offensive simply by presence in the air alone, cf the success of the NVAF’s then obsolete MiG-17 and MiG-19 force in 1972.From the outset it was clear to Allied air warfare strategists that any campaign against Irag’s massive air defence system would have to be well planned, well implemented and involve large scale application of hard kill defence suppression weapons from the very outset. The US experience in Vietnam had clearly illustrated that a gradual build up in the intensity of an air campaign allows an opponent to learn and adapt tactics and deployment before decisive damage can be inflicted. The NVAF demonstrated this in Linebacker | and Il during 1972, when they inflicted loss rates exceeding 1. 5% on US tactical and strategic aircraft, using the relatively inflexible SA-2 Guideline/Fan Song/Spoon Rest air defence system. This was achieved in spite of the USAF’s and USN’s application of ARM firing Wild Weasel and Iron Hand aircraft.

Competent application of even mediocre air defence weapons achieved a visible, albeit strategically sustainable loss rate. The objective of an initial knockout blow against a Soviet style Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was achievable, the Israelis demonstrated this in the Bekaa Valley in 1982 (see AA June 1983) when 19 SA-2, 3 and 6 batteries were crippled in a matter of hours. This was achieved with an integrated operational plan coordinating the use of AEW, standoff jamming platforms and ARM firing tactical jets. The battle was short and fierce and saw the Israelis win with a negligible loss of a couple of aircraft. Irag’s IADS however was a harder nut to crack, in comparison with Syria’s forward deployed SAM systems.

The nucleus of Irag’s IADS was a force of over 70 batteries of SA-2, 3 and 6 area defence SAMs, supported by an estimated 100 plus surveillance/acquisition and early warning radars, with hardened C3 facilities. This force was backed up by over 40 mixed point defence batteries of mobile SA-9/13 SAMs and ZSU-23-4P AAA, these supplemented by an autonomous force of over 100 Euromissile Roland and SA-8 point defence SAM systems. With acquisition radars co-located on the launcher vehicles, the mobile Roland and SA-8 can be elusive targets, while capable of operation independently of the IADS. The SAM force was backed by a network of largely Soviet Ground Control Intercept (GCI) radars supporting an interceptor force of up to 150 MiG-21/J-7 Fishbeds, 100 plus Mirage F1EQs, 50 or so MiG-23 Flogger E/G and 50 or so MiG-29 Fulerum A. With over 300 aircraft available, the interceptor component of the IADS certainly had the numbers to disrupt any air offensive simply by presence in the air alone, cf the success of the NVAF’s then obsolete MiG-17 and MiG-19 force in 1972.

Clearly the Iraqi IADS would not withstand a sustained air offensive but nevertheless had the nominal capabilityto inflict an appreciable initial loss rate if used appropriately, before its eventual attrition. The Allied total of air superiority and multirole fighters yielded a modest 2:1 numbers advantage, in a VFR dogfighting environment at extended operating radii hardly overwhelming.

This was clearly recognised by Allied air warfare strategists who correctly identified the need for a massive initial defence suppression strike against the IADS, as a priority target. The first and foremost objective of the opening phase of the air war was the crippling of the IADS. Once this was achieved, Allied aircraft would own airspace at medium to high altitudes, and be challenged only by uncoordinated AAA at lower altitudes. With this level of air superiority, Allied commanders could then ‘swing’ their multirole tactical fighter force away from air superiority and defence suppression into strike operations. In this fashion the numbers of dedicated strike assets would be enhanced considerably by the addition of over four hundred multirole aircraft.

The follow on air campaign would concentrate on the interdiction of battlefield forces in place, follow-on forces and strategic infrastructure usable for warfighting purposes. The application of PGM technology would ensure a high success rate per mission while minimising politically damaging collateral damage.

Interdiction of forces in place and follow-on forces would reduce the capability of these units to engage in land warfare, while also vastly diminishing their sustainability in the field through the destruction of stockpiled ammunition and supplies, and through the interdiction of road and where applicable railroad communications. This results in a combat force which can fight only with what it has in the field with it, ie there is no depth to the force’s nominal capability. Once the capability of Irag’s land forces had been reduced to a level judged appropriate, a land offensive would follow. The Allied land force order of battle clearly indicates a manoeuvre warfare force, largely composed of armour, motorised infantry and airborne forces. Such a force structure will be very effective at punching holes through enemy lines and rapidly seizing ground, it is however far less effective in close-in assaults against heavily defended objectives, particularly where these are well dug in. It follows therefore that Allied intentions were from the outset oriented toward using the land force to split and encapsulate elements of the Iragi occupation force, rather than fight heavy weapons battles at close quarters. This contrasts significantly with the Iraqi force structure, heavy in main battle tanks, infantry and artillery, a classical attrition strategy force. The Allied approach, typical for manoeuvre warfare strategy, forces the defending side to move its assets in order to prevent encirclement or disruption and hence the cutting of supply lines and ultimately the loss of these assets. The possession of total air supremacy however adds another dimension to this now classical land warfare scenario —once the enemy’s assets are on the move, they are no longer hidden from interdiction aircraft. Therefore it follows that the land force will as much seize hostile territory, as it will force the exposure of the opponent’s land warfare assets to air attack. In this fashion, the application of tacair to immediate close air support and battlefield interdiction would provide a decisive edge in Allied firepower — if the Iraqis were to remain dug in they would be cut off and starved into defeat, if they engage they would expose themselves to concentrated air attack.

The fundamental structural weakness of Iraq’s military is thus directly exploited. Inferior capability in air superiority and air defence leads to an opponent gaining air supremacy, the opponent then applies this to his advantage by systematically destroying land warfare assets and the infrastructure required to keep these assets resupplied and operational. At some given point, a deep operation manoeuvre land offensive is initiated against a weakened defender, who will have no choice than to expose his remaining assets to avoid capture. In doing so these assets will be open to destruction by air attack. The Desert Storm campaign is thus a case study in the application of the modern Western approach to the air-land battle as defined by the US Army’s Air-Land Battle 2000 doctrine. At the time of writing, reported campaign results very closely matched if not exceeded theoretical expectations.

Desert Storm – The Initial Two Weeks

The Allied build-up to Desert Storm, under the Desert Shield program, commenced shortly after the Iragi invasion of Kuwait. By the middle of January 1991 the USAF, USN, RAF, Armee de I’Air, RCAF, Royal Saudi AF, ltalian AF and the remnants of the Kuwaiti AF had assembled a substantial offensive and defensive air capability. While precise order of battle figures are not yet available, it is known that the USAF redeployed a substantial part of its USAFE and CONUS resources and the UK redeployed an appreciable part of its uncommitted strike assets. Amongst notable assets were both operational F-117A squadrons, the entire 48th TFW F-111F force, the majority of the USAF F-15E force, much of the available theatre tasked B-52G force, both E-8A JSTARS prototypes, a big slice of the F-4G Wild Weasel force and six carrier battle groups, the USS America, Saratoga, Kennedy, Roosevelt, Ranger and Midway. By mid January quoted numbers included well over 300 dedicated air superiority/defence aircraft (F-15C, F-14 and Tornado ADV), about 500 dedicated strike/CAS aircraft (F-111, Tornado IDS, F-117A, A-6, A-10, AV-8B, Jaguar), about 400 multirole aircraft (F-15E, F/A-18, F-16) and about 500 support and logistical aircraft (KC-135, KC-10 and Victor tankers, E-3 AWACS, E-2C AE_W. E-8JSTARS, TR-1, RF-4 recce, EF-111A, EC-130 jammers). With over 1,200 tactical aircraft, this was a force far larger than any deployed since Vietnam. Offensive air operations against Iraq commenced 17th January, approximately 03:00 hrs local time, when the first wave of 50

BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from cruisers and battle cruisers in the Guif began to hit key military command posts and government buildings. The first Allied aircraft to enter hostile airspace were the EF-111As of the 390th ECS, which jammed Iraqi radars, while evading scrambled Fulcrums and Foxbats. Thg Ravens were quickly followed by a massed 500 sortie air strike against the Iragi IADS. This strike involved HARM firing F-4G, F/A-18, EA-6B aircraft and ALARM firing Tornado IDS aircraft targeting air defence radars and SAM systems. Concurrently, Tornado IDS, F-111 and A-6 aircraft hit the runways, and facilities of key Iragi air bases with guided and unguided weapons.

While this transpired, the F-117A force struck key IADS command posts and C3 facilities with laser guided bombs, one of these targets was the air force HQ building, hit with two rounds directly down the lift well. CAP was provided by USAF F-15Cs and USN F-14 aircraft, with support and escort jamming provided by further EF-111s and USN EA-6Bs.

The BAF Tornado GR. 1 force played a major part in the counter-air interdiction strikes, cutting runways and taxiways with JP~?33 submunition dispensing pods, and firing ALARM antiradiation missiles at SAM sites. The scale of the attack against the IADS can be measured by reports of over 500 HARMs being fired inthe first 24 hours of the campaign. Iraqi resistance was by all accounts, minimal and poorly Some SAMs were fired and a few fighters scrambled, utmost defending fire came from AAA. An Iragi F1IEQ was reported engaged and destroyed by F-15s. The initial strike was followed by a series of ongoing strikes against strategic targets. These involved attacks on targets such as the Karbala and Al Hilah missile and propellant plants, Baath party HQ in Baghdad, the presidential palace, telephone exchanges, government and military HQ buildings and a Uranium processing plant at Al Quain in Northern Iraq. Scud production and support facilities at Fallujah and Mahmudiyah were hit, as were known fixed Scud bases at H2 and H3, near Rutba in Western lraq. These targets were high value fixed infrastructure assets which had to be destroyed before key equipment and personnel could be dispersed. The B-52G force was reported as participating in some of these strikes.

Honing the Edge

War is and always has been, at least for the defenders, an action of last resort to reclaiming territory or rights lost to an aggressor. And whilst war is a high price to pay it is unfortunately also the only way that any air arm really knows just how viable it is in executing its mission. To this end the major allies, the USA, Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, emerge from the Gulf War in a far better state of preparedness than they would have been a year ago. For allied pilots, the chance to fire live ordnance on the peacetime bombing range are few and far between. How many allied pilots, for instance, had ever fired air-to-air missiles let alone flown in a high threat environment that also fired back with real bullets and missiles? Events in the Gulf have now provided allied aircrew with hundreds of sorties into hostile airspace, locating, targeting and hitting real targets with the threat of real return fire. Additionally, the very high state of readiness and the mass of day to day logistical and operational problems that have had to be resolved leaves the major allies in a situation of being highly combat proficient for adecade or more to come.

With the USSR in such dire straits, Warpac well and truly dead and the last vestiges of Communism merely a bankrupt theory then the military of particularly Britain and the US can at least look forward to perhaps a decade or more of operational superiority which should hopefully help dster the possible expansionist aspirations of any would be aggressor. If for instance, the USAF/ USN and RAF had to engage the air arms of the Soviet Union today then it would most probably be a far more decisive outccome now than it would have been a year ago, just on the wealth of real world experience, confidence and tactical honing that unfortunately only comes from engaging in real combat. For Australia, the entire Gulf experience has served to bring our RAN units to a very high state of operational capability. It would probably be an understatement to say that each of our ships that have served return with crews now trained to a higher level of situational awareness and combat proficiency than at any time since WW2. They have served us well, we certainly have good reason to be proud of them. Wim Thorn)

Australia’s Crucial Role in Desert Storm

When Dr Des Ball of the ANU’s Strategic & Defence Studies Centre stated that our joint communications bases had a bigger and more significant role in the Gulf War than our ships, a lot of people began to take note of just how important early warning surveillance satellites actually are.

The US currently has a vast array of satellites positioned over the Middle East. These consist of electronic eavesdropping, photo-reconnaissance and missile launch warning satellites which relay direct to Pine Gap, near Alice Springs, and Nurrungar inthe SA desert. North West Cape at Exmouth, WA is primarily a long range naval communication station. Nurrungar and Pine Gap are certainly the most important of these bases and are the first to receive warning of an Iragi Scud launch via orbiting US.

Defence Support Program (DSP) satellites.

Following a Scud launch, using its array of infra-red sensors, the DSP satellite relays instantaneous data to both Pine Gap and the US Space Command’s missile warning centre in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The trajectory data from the DSP satellites. is then compared between Cheyenne Mountain, Pine Gap and Nurrungar to fine tune the missile’s likely trajectory. The elapsed time between launch and positive track identification is around two minutes. A typical Scud flight is in the order of five to six minutes so in most cases this leaves an effective warning time of around 90 seconds to missile impact for the civil defence units in Israel or Saudi Arabia. Whilst 90 seconds may sound a very brief period, itis in fact vitally important in terms of allowing people in the known target area to don gas masks and for the Patriot batteries to go to launch status.

In addition to being able to provide warning of inbound rocket attacks, the data received via Australia’s joint bases is also used to pinpoint their approximate launch position and to vector in orbiting strike aircraft to bomb the launch vehicle. Unfortunately, whilst it still takes at least one hour to prepare a Scud for launch, once fired, the mobile launcher can be moving again within a minute or so, making the task of locating and destroying them at night a difficult assignment indeed.

Satellites in use over the conflict area include both standard and advanced versions of the very large KH-11 photo reconnaissance satellite, the Mentor intelligence satellite, DSP missile warning satellites and the LaCrosse radar imaging satellite which can penetrate cloud cover and even peer up to three metres into the earth to image buried tanks, bunkers or more importantly, mobile Scud launchers. A measure of the extent to which the allies are relying upon their electronic eyes and ears in space is that the US now has more surveillance satellites in orbit than at any period in the past twenty years. (Jim Thorn)

By the end of the first 24 hours of operations, over 1,200 sorties were reported flown with the loss of only 3 aircraft, a Tornado GR. 1, an F/A-18 hit by a SAM and a Kuwaiti A-4, yielding a loss rate of 0. 25%. Iraq’s IADS had been paralysed and most of its air force remained grounded in hardened shelters, with fuel and munitions for at most just one or two sorties. The USN had fired well over 100 Tomahawks against a range of targets with a reported success rate in excess of 90%. Most of Irag’s nonhardened command and control facilities were destroyed and

much of the radar and SAM facilities were destroyed. This was a crucial initial win in the battle for air supremacy, as the Iragii’s ability to resist the air offensive would depend largely upon the attrition its SAMs and fighters could inflict upon the Allies.

The following two weeks saw a gradual increase in sortie rates, as the Allies grinded away at Iraq’s remaining air defence assets and high value infrastructure targets. Daily sortie rates reached over 2,500, and close air support assets were applied to battlefield targets in Kuwait, while SAC’s veteran B-52G force struck at a range of strategic targets in Southern Iraq. The counter-air aspect of the campaign was an initial priority; the RAF Tornado force expended a large part of its JP-233 stock in keeping Iraqi runways and taxiways unserviceable, to enable F-111s, Tornados, A-6s and F-117s to hit the hardened shelters housing Iraq’s air force and facilities. The longer the Iraqis remained grounded, the less infrastructure would remain to support their remaining air capability. This effort did exact its toll, with 5 RAF Tornados falling to AAA fire the first week, a consequence of flying delivery runs at 100ft AGL over heavily defended airfields. The lraqi air force did attempt to engage Allied aircraft in the first few days, flying mainly F1EQs and Fulcrums against the USAF F-15 force. By day two the Americans claimed 8 kills and two probables, for no loss in air-to-air. The biggest single engagement saw six USAF F-15s engage multiple Fulcrums, resulting in three killed Fulcrums and one probable. By the end of the first week, the Allies claimed the destruction of 8 Fulcrums, 8 F1EQs, 2 Foxbats and 1 Flogger in air-to-air engagements.

Over this short period, most Iraqi air defence activity collapsed into uncoordinated AAA and small arms fire into designated areas, relying on large barrages of poorly aimed fire. Guided SAM firings largely ceased after the first few days. The sustained effort against the IADS thus yielded its payoff as Allied air losses dropped sharply after the first week, by the end of the second week it was clear that 80% of total Allied losses had occurred during the first week. Numerous reports indicated Iragi radar activity had dropped to about 5 to 15% of its initial level. These results match the attrition vs time characteristics of Linebacker II, albeit with Allied losses an order of magnitude lower. The effectiveness of the counterair campaign may be judged by the fact that only 5 of 66 Iraqi airfields were capable of generating sorties by the end of the first week. Total Iraqi sortie rates dropped from about 120 on day one to 40 or less by the 24th January, while Allied sortie rates surged to over 2,500 a day. The total number of Allied sorties was at 15,000 for 18 combat losses to AAA and SAMs, a cumulative loss rate of 0. 12%. The aircraft with the highest loss rate was the RAF Tornado GR. 1, with 5 for over 300 sorties, ie cca 1. 6%.

The Allied interdiction campaign had broadened after the first few days as the highest priority strategic targets were destroyed. The B-52G force was directed toward the fortified positions of the Republican Guard forces in Southern Iraq. The Republican Guard was comprised of eight divisions of ‘elite’ forces, five infantry, two armoured, one mechanised with an additional special forces unit. Equipped with modern T-72 tanks and self propelled artillery, the Guards were Iraq’s strategic reserve and the nearest thing to manoeuvre warfare group in the Iragi inventory. Intensely loyal to Saddam Hussein, the eight 14,000 strong divisions were the only part of the Iraqi land capability seen as a serious threat by Allied planners. As the only unit capable of seriously hindering a deep thrust into the South West of Iraq or Northern Kuwait, the Guards were a priority target. Allied strategic interdiction missions saw the destruction of a wide range of infrastructure items, highway convoy and truck traffic, naval facilities in Basra and repeat strikes on Iraqi air force

Iraqi Air and Air Defence Assets

Order of Battle Summary – pre January 1991

Integrated Air Defence System

Iraq’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) was tasked with defending Iraqi airspace from hostile aircraft, by doctrine it was modelled upon the Soviet PVOS. The IADS employed a network of GCl radars, acquisition radars and a network of communications links, which supported interceptor aircraft for long range area defence, strategic SAMs for area defence and AAA and tactical SAMs for point defence. Iraq’s airspace was operationally divided into four defensive zones, covered by C3 centres in Baghdad, Nasiriyah, Routba and Kirkuk. The force had a total of around 375 aircraft of which only 50 were technologically current, the remainder being of sixties technology. A major weakness of this force was an Iragi air operations doctrine heavily biased toward the Soviet method of total radar ground control. The operational use of three Iraqi designed and built Adnan-1 AEW systems on II-76 Candid airframes would not have substantially altered the outcome of the campaign. Operational capability was further reduced as the Iraqis were deprived of Soviet maintenance staff, instructor pilots and spares, although some spares may have come from North Korea and Libya. Air Superiority/Defence Assets Summary: (all figures are approximate) 150 MiG-21 Fishbed; 100 Mirage F1EQ (multirole capability);50 MiG-23 Flogger; 50 MiG-29 Fulcrum: 25 MiG-25 Foxbat.

Air Superiority Types Review

50-60 MiG-29 Fulcrum A (10 or so trainers): Twin engined air superiority fighter comparable to F-18A in weight and size, but slightly more agile. Equipped with NO-93 radar comparable to APG-65 in detection range but its other avionics are inferior. Fulcrum is very maintenance intensive, requiring tens of hours per flight hour plus extensive spares inventory. The aircraft suffers poor endurance due to low internal fuel capacity and requires good dogfight manouevring skills to be used properly. The aircraft are known to have carried Apex BVR SARH AAMs and Aphid IRH AAMs, it is unclear whether the newer AA-10 and AA-11 were supplied. 150 MiG-21PFM/MF/J-7 Fishbed J: Vietnam era single engined interceptor used extensively over Hanoi, during the Yom Kippur and the Lebanese invasion, it is now considered obsolete due to inferior performance, range and austere weapon capability. The aircraft carries a range-only Jay Bird radar, with some aircraft carrying even older Spin Scan radars. The Fishbed has known handling problems, resulting from a poor static stability margin. Much of the Iraqi force were Chinese new build copies of the early MiG-21F It is known that the older Atoll RH AAM was carried and some reports suggest the Magic 2 all aspect IRH AAM was fitted.

100 Mirage F. 1EQ: The F1EQ is a custom new build version of the early seventies follow-on mode! fo the sixties Mirage Ill. It has similar performance to Mirage i due to the use of a later version of the same powerplant. The multirole F1EQ is considered obsolete in dogfight performance and weapon system capability, with two dozen aircraft fitted with anti-ship sea search radars and wired for AM. 39 Exocet ASMs. The F1EQ pilots are generally considered the best trained in the Iraqi air force, apparently most Iranian aircraft claimed were killed by Iraqi F-1s. The F1EQs were reported to carry the Magic 2 IRH AAM, the Super 530D BVR SARH AAM, the AS. 30L SALH ASM and the Matra BGL LGB. 50 MiG-23MS/M Fiogger E/G: A single engine swing wing multirole fighter comparable in performance to the Vietnam era Phantom, but inferior in turning ability. The Flogger is thus generally considered unusable for dogfighting. Most Iraqi aircraft are the Third World export E model with the primitive range-only Jay Bird radar standard carry common to Atolland with the limited Aphid Fishbed, IRH look-down although AAMs, while High someLark the aircraft Flogger radar are The GG may model Flogger also to carry EPVO. will SARH or IRH Apex BVR AAMs.

25 MiG-25 Foxbat A: A twin engined single seat high speed high altitude dogfighting Machdue 2. 8 interceptor, its poor turning the Foxbat performance is considered and unusable unsuitable for engine design for subsonic and transonic operations. The baseline Foxbat A has primitive vacuum tube electronics and no look-down Aphid radar. The IRH type AAMS. is known It is unclear to carry whether large Acrid any of BVR the Iraqj SARHaircraft AAMs were AAM capability.

Strike Assets

Units tasked with attacking hostile land and naval targets in support of Iragi army operations, equipped with aircraft mainly of Soviet and Chinese origin, partly maintained by Soviet technicians, with pilots trained mainly by Soviet instructors. The force was comprised of around 250 aircraft of which only two dozen Fencers were considered current, the remainder fifties, sixties and seventies technology. Most of these types have poor accuracy, payload and inferior or no defensive jamming electronics. All of these types cannot survive without air superiority, ie all are highly susceptible to fighter attack. Strike Assets Summary: 80 Su-7/20 Fitter; 70 MiG-23/27 Flogger; 40 MIG-19/F-6 Farmer (F-6 Chinese); 30 Su-25 Frogfoot, 25 Su-24 Fencer (all weather); 12 Tu-16/B-6 Badger; 5 Tu-22 Blinder.

Abbreviations: AAM ~ Air Air Missile; ASM – Air Surface Mis sile; LGB — Laser Guided Bomb; ARM – Anti Radiation Missile; Al – Air Intercept (radar); C3 – C cubed, Command/Control/ Communications; IRH ~ Infra-red Homing; SARH — Semi Active Radar Homing; CW ~ Continuous Wave; BVR – Beyond Visual Range; SALH — Semi Active Laser Homing; SAM — Surface Air Missile; AAA — Anti Aircraft Artillery; SPAAG — Self Propelled Anti Aircraft Gun; ZSU — Zenitnaya Samokhodnaya Ustanovka = SPAAG in Russian.

Strike Types Review

80 Su-7BMK/Su-20 Fitter A/C: Single engine VFR only strike aircraft for close air support and battlefield interdiction, export models typically equipped with crude ranging radar and simple nav attack avionics, although late model FA WS subtypes have been fitted with Doppler nav and terrain avoidance radar for all weather operations. By Western standards it has poor payload range performance. The Fitter is rugged but suffers from low accuracy and poor survivability due to inadequate manoeuvring performance.

Most Fitters carry a pair of wing root mounted NR-30 30mm guns and some are wired for Atoll or Aphid IRH AAMs.

70 MiG-23BN/27 Flogger D/F: Single engine swing wing VFR only strike aircraft for battlefield support and interdiction, a design derived from the air defence Flogger, with no radar and a ‘duck billed” nose. Generally considered comparable to the UK/French Jaguar but with a more powerful engine and inferior accuracy and combat radius. The Flogger has paor survivability due to inadequate manoeuvring performance. Some aircraft may be Soviet standard MiG-27 with 23mm gatling gun and Doppler nav/laser rangefinder for precision bomb delivery. Defensive armament is typically a GSh-23 23mm gun and Atoll or Aphid IRH AAMs. 40 Shenyang F-6 Farmer: The F-6 is an obsolete Chinese built copy of the Soviet MiG-19 air defence fighter, utilising fitties technology with sively noby radar the North and gun Vietnamese only armament. in 1972 asThean F-6 air defence was used fighter, extend in the Iraqi inventory it was used as a day only strike aircraft, where it suffered from its poor payload range performance and inadequate aglity. It was typically armed with three 30mm NR-30 guns and some may have carried Atoll IRH AAMs for self defence.

30 Su-25 Frogfoot: The Frogfoot is comparable to the US A-10 tank buster inrole, but is smaller, more agile and carries a lower weapon load. It is a dedicated battlefield support aircraft which has poor survivability due to inadequate agility. Frogfoot was used extensively by the Soviets in Afghanistan, where many were destroyed by shoulder launched Stinger missiles. The Frogfoot carries a wide range of bombs and rockets, and is equipped with an internal 30mm gun.

25 Su-24MK Fencer: The Fencer is a long range, low altitude precision all weather strike aircraft comparable to the F-111 and Tornado in role, but equipped with less capable avionics. With two turbojets and a swing wing, it has good performance and payload, although itrequires a high level of maintenance and spares and also requires a very high standard aircrew and specialised tactical training. It is unclear whether the Soviets have supplied the full defensive jammer fit and the laser designator facility used on Soviet Su-24MKs. The Fencer is susceptible to the lookdown shootdown radar/missile systems used by teen series fighters under AWAGS control, and like the F-111 is at a disadvantage in fighter saturated airspace. Reports suggest the Kerry ASM and LGBs were carried. 12 Tu-16/B-6 Badger B/G: The Badger is an obsolete fifties twin engine subsonic bomber of Soviet origin; some Iragi aircraft were Chinese built B-6 copies. Badgers are slow and unmanouvrable, ‘with no avionics for low level penetration and inaccurate radar and nav attack equipment. The typical standoff weapon carried is the Kelt ASM, with three pairs of tail and turret mounted NR-23 cannon for self defence.

5 Tu-22 Blinder B: The Blinder is an obsolete early sixties twin engine supersonic high altitude bomber with poor or no defensive jammers and no avionics for low level penetration. Like the Badger it has inaccurate radar and nav attack systems, aithough it is faster with a similar 1,500nm class radius. Defensive armament is a single radar directed NR-23 tail mounted gun, the aircraft carry either a single large Kitchen ASM or up to 22,0001b of free fall bombs.

Ground Based Air Defences

The ground based component of the IADS was comprised of Air Force strategic area defence SA-2 and SA-3 SAMs with supporting radar systems, and army mobile area defence and point defence SAMs supplemented by mobile and static AAA systems. These weapon systems were tasked with shooting down aircraft which penetrated through the IADS interceptor umbrella. The area defence weapons were under radar control, these were mainly of Soviet origin, with some of French origin. The serviceability was questionable, given that maintenance support and advisors were withdrawn by the Soviets late last year. The Iraqi IADS operational doctrine was based upon the Soviet model, ie centralised control. The 8 naval SAM systems are included for completeness, although the low number of these would have been unlikely to affect the course of the campaign. The fundamental structural weakness of the system was a great reliance upon a centralised C3 system to report and assign targets. Destruction of the C3 network would cause a rapid loss of coordination allowing defence suppression aircraft to pick off individual air defence assets. Area Defence Assets Summary (launchers/platforms): 100 SA-2 Guideline (20 batteries); 100 SA-3 Goa (25 batteries); 100 SA-6 Gainful (25 batteries); 8 Aspide/Albatros (2 frigates, 6 corvettes). Point Defence Assets Summary (launchers/platforms): 100 SA-9 Gaskin (25 batteries); 60 SA-13 Gopher (15 batteries); 50 SA-8 Gecko (12-50 batteries); 50 Roland (12-50 batteries); hundreds of man portable SA-7, SA-14 SAMs; 200 ZSU-23-4P SPAAG; 100 ZSU-57-2 SPAAG. Static AAA Assets Summary: 200 KS-30/130mm; 200 KS-19/ 100mm; 200 KS-12/85mm; 500 S-60/57mm, 250 M1939/37mm; hundreds of ZU-23-2/23mm; hundreds of ZPU-1,2,4/14. 5mm.

Air Defence System Types Review

100 SA-2 Guideline (20 with Fan Song radar systems): The Guideline is a Vietnam-era command-link-guided two-stage area defence missile, with poor low altitude performance and no terminal homing. It is supported by Spoon Rest or Flat Face acquisition and Fan Song fire control radar, all of which are highly susceptible to ARM attack. Guideline’s command uplink is susceptible to jamming, as is the fire control radar. The system is static relocatable, typically six launchers in revetments to a battery.

100 SA-3 Goa (25 with Low Blow radar systems): The Goa s Vietnam era command link midcourse guided, SARH terminal homing two stage area defence SAM credited with good low altitude performance. It is considered comparable to early US Hawk missile versions. Truck mounted Goa is relocatable with four launchers typically per battery, supported by a Squat Eye acquisition radar and a Low Blow guidance radar. Both are susceptible to ARM attack and jamming.

100 SA-6 Gainful ZRK-SD 9MS (25 with Straight Flush guidance radar): The Gainful is a late sixties command link midcourse guided, CW SARH terminal homing ramjet SAM first used in the 1973 war, reported as having killed at least a dozen Israeli jets. The system employs a tracked mobile PT-76 chassis launcher with 3 missiles per launcher, and 4 launchers and 1 Straight Flush fire control radar typically forming a battery. The Gainful was the most effective missile in the Iraqi inventory although it is susceptible to ARM attack due to its single radar per battery, while the missile guidance is susceptible to jamming. In addition the Long Track and Flat Face acquisition radars are susceptible to ARM attack. As the latest model was captured in Chad in 1987 and tested in the UK the guidance of the SA-6 has been totally compromised. 8 Selenia Aspide/Albatros: The Aspide is an Italian built CW SARH derivative of the AIM-7 Sparrow family of missiles. The Albatros naval SAM system employs 4 or 8 round box launchers, supported by a search/acquisition radar and continuous wave fire control illuminators. Selenia claim superior performance to the Sparrow, both in range and seeker resistance to jamming. The Iragi navy employed the system on Italian built Lupo class frigates and Assad class corvettes.

100 SA-9 Gaskin: The Gaskin is a short range IRH SAM system on a BDRM-2 wheeled launch vehicle. It employs early seventies technology and has been widely exported. It is most often compared to the US Chapparel missile (ground based Sidewinder). Gaskin is associated with the Gun Dish radar and also uses optical tracking. Itis typically used in batteries of 4, mutually supporting 4 ZSU-23/4P systems, and is ineffective without acquisition radar support. 60 SA-13 Gopher: The Gopher is a short range IRH SAM system on an MT-LB tracked launch vehicle. It uses mid seventies technology and has been widely exported as a replacement weapon for the now obsolete SA-9. The Gopher uses a Dog Ear range-only radar and optical tracking, and the missile’s advanced heatseeking guidance can reject flares. It is typically used in batteries of 4 mutually supporting 4 ZSU-23/4P systems, and is ineffective without acquisition radar support. Saveral units were captured in Chad in 1987, therefore its guidance has been totally compromised. 50 SA-8 Gecko: The Gecko is a short range command link guided SAM system. It is comparable to the French/German Roland or UK Rapier. Gecko employs a fully autonomous acquisition and guidance radar system on each launcher, and hence can operate independently without support from other radars. A Gecko system was responsible for one Israeli loss in Lebanon in 1982, and this type was deemed to be the most difficult type to kill. It is considered to be quite effective against low flying aircraft if used correctly.

50 Euromissile Roland: The Roland is a short range command link guided SAM system on a tracked or wheeled mobile or static launcher. It is used by the US Army and some NATO countries. Roland has a fully autonomous acquisition and guidance radar system on each launcher and therefore can operate independently ‘without support from other radars. A Roland was responsible for 1 Harrier killed in the Falklands campaign and is generally credited with being very effective against low flying aircraft if used correctly. 200 ZSU-23-4P Shilka: A quad radar directed 23mm SPAAG on a tracked chassis, the ZSU-23/4P was used extensively in Vietnam and the Yom Kippur war. It is considered highly effective against low flying aircraft and helicopters, it has a Gun Dish acquisition/tracking radar on every vehicle, with backup optical tracking included if jammed. The ZSU-23/4P s typically used in batteries of 4 mutually supporting 4 SA-9 or SA-13 systems. This system was responsible for most of the Israeli aircraft killed in 1973. 100 ZSU-57-2: The ZSU-57-2 is a twin optically aimed 57mm systemonatank chassis, itis similar to the ZSU-23 but with a lower rate of fire and no radar system for ranging and tracking.

Several hundred SA-7 Grail and SA-14 Gremlin: The Grail and Gremlin are shoulder launched heatseeking missiles comparable to the US Redeye and Stinger respectively. The Grail was used extensively in Vietnam, the Yom Kippur and Afghanistan, with unspectacular results. The newer Gremlin is considered very effective against helicopters and slow aircraft. Author’s Note: The compilation of an order of battle summary is always a risky proposition, where proper access to intelligence is unavailable. This table was compiled from a wide range of authoritative sources many of which disagreed on numbers of specific types, therefore all numbers must be treated with caution. In addition, the nature of Irag’s closed society makes it almost impossible to acquire any information on the competition, operational status and deployment of specific units. facilities. Increasing attention was paid to Iraq’s industrial infrastructure by USAF and RAF interdictors, while the Marines’ Harriers and the RAF and French Jaguars began to hit at battlefield targets in Kuwait. ) Irag’s principal response to the aerial campaign was political, ie the firing of Al Husayn (stretched Scud with additional fuel) ballistic missiles at civilian areas in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Fired from mobile MAZ-543 or articulated Scania 112/Al Waheed launchers, the Scuds can deliver a 500lb class warhead over 350nm with a CEP of about a mile. While initial strikes against Israeli civilian targets were successful, the deployment of US Army MIM-104 Patriot SAM/ABMs saw most subsequent Scuds shot down. The political uproar surrounding the Scud strikes on Israel led to a major diversion of tacair assets to strikes on detected mobile Scud launchers, most of which were well dispersed and camouflaged prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The Iragi ballistic missile force adopted the tactic of move by night, shoot and run, then hide— this proved to be quite successful in view of sporadic Scud launches as late as during the fifth week of the campaign. Allied Scud hunting patrols comprised of F-15Es with RSAF Tornado ADV escorts dropped area denial mines likely roads and into likely launch areas, while also attacking identified Scud launcher vehicles. By appropriate application, the tactically dubious Scud force thus tied down resources far in excess of its own value.

Battlefield interdiction operations were stepped up, as the air defence threat diminished. French Jaguars attacked a range of bunkers and hardened shelters in Kuwait and Southern Iraq with the highly effective 1,100lb AS. 30 Laser missile, while USAF aircraft dropped semi-active laser and television homing weapons on Iragi hardened shelters and bunkers, An aspect of the ‘bunker program’ was the systematic destruction of airbase HAS (Hardened Aircraft Shelters) at the Basra, Mosul, Rashid, Kirkuk, H3 and other airbases with GBU-10, 15, 24 and 27 optically guided bombs. The effect of destroying 100 of an estimated total of 300 hardengd aircraft shelters (HAS) in the first two weeks of the campaign was immediate, as the Iraqi air force abandoned the battlefield and fled to the sanctuary of Iranian bases. Iraqi assets which evaded destruction included Mirage

F1EQs, a number of the surviving Fulcrums, all 25 Fencers and reportedly two Adnan AEW conversions of the Candid transport. At the time of writing accurate figures were not available, although reports suggested up to 90 aircraft had fled. It is known that an appreciable part of the Fulcrum and Foxbat force has been destroyed in air-to-air combat, with USN F/A-18s claiming two of the Fulcrums. USAF aircraft are known to have destroyed a’large part of the Badger force and one of the few Adnan AEW aircraft in two strikes on the Taquadum air base.

Week two of the campaign also saw the virtual destruction of ghe Iraqi naval force as an entity with the Allies reportedly claiming 35 vessels sunk. Massive B-52 strikes on Basra destroyed most of the naval infrastructure and facilities and moored naval vessels, while Iragi naval vessels operating in the Guif came under the scrutiny of the USN and RN. Notably, on the 29th January, prior to the land incursion at Khafji, a USN SH-60 Seahawk detected a covert flotilla of aimost twenty patrol boats and assault craft. Lynx helicopters from HMS Brazen and Gloucester attacked the force with Sea Skua SARH (Semi Active Radar Homing) missiles sinking 4 and severely damaging a dozen. A Lynx from HMS Cardiff subsequently spotted another patrol vessel and also sank it with a Sea Skua.

The 30th January saw the USN play its part, when a force of eight missile boats, including Styx ASM equipped Osa boats, were caught by A-6Es and F/A-18s which promptly sank four and damaged three. The Lynx helicopters from Cardiff and Gloucester struck again, severely damaging two minelayers and then setting a former Kuwaiti Exocet ASM equipped fast patrol boat (FPB) on fire. Irag’s three Polnochny class SDK amphibious assault ships met misfortune when they were caught by RAF Jaguars which attacked with CRV7 unguided rockets, 1,000lb bombs and cannon. A pair of USN A-6Es subsequently assisted with the sinking of all three vessels.

The end of the second week also saw the curious Iraqi armoured and motorised infantry incursion into the lightly defended Saudi border town of Khafji. Clearly a suicide mission with political motives, the force met very light resistance from the Saudi and Qatari observation force, which cleverly retreated when faced with superior numbers. USMC AV-8B Harriers, AH-1 Super Cobras and TAC A-10s subsequently engaged the exposed tanks and personnel carriers with Maverick TV guided ASMs and TOW wire guided missiles, yielding very effective results.

Allied accounts indicate that 24 tanks and dozens of personnel carriers were destroyed, and several hundred Iraqi troops KIA. The Iraqi force was subsequently mopped up by the Saudi National Guard and Qatari infantry. Most of the Marine Corp casualties were in a LAV which was inadvertently hit by a Maverick fired by a TAC A-10 flying a night CAS sortie. Several Iraqi armoured and motorised infantry units in Southern Kuwait moved to reinforce the Khafji incursion and were promptly dealt with by A-10s, AV-8Bs and other Allied strike aircraft. A large number of tanks and other vehicles were caught in South bound columns and destroyed, a Marine Lt Colonel commented appropriately ‘it’s almost like you flipped on the light in the kitchen . . . and the cockroaches started scurrying, and we’re killing ‘em’.

After 16 days of operations, 41,000 missions were flown for 23 Allied aircraft lost to enemy fire yielding a loss rate of 0. 056%. Allied commanders claimed air supremacy — the air battle had well and truly been won.

Desert Storm — The Second Two Weeks

The beginning of the third week saw the Allies consolidating the gains of the previous two weeks. Counterair and strategic infrastructure strikes continued, albeit at a slower pace, while the road and bridge interdiction campaign was stepped up.

Additional resources were poured into battlefield interdiction strikes, with a large proportion of these directed at the well hardened facilities and positions concealing Iraq’s strategic reserve, the Republican Guard divisions.

The collapse of the Iraqi IADS was now complete, with Allied E-3 AWACS and E-8 JSTARS moving very close to the front line to provide full coverage of Iragi airspace. An unconfirmed report suggests some E-3 missions involved actual penetration of hostile air space. That was certainly the case with numerous tanker missions supporting CAPs on deep penetrations, some of which succeeded in bagging Iragis on the run to Iran. In one engagement, 6th February, a pair of Frogfoots escorted by a pair of Fishbeds were all engaged and destroyed by a pair of USAF F-15Cs. By all accounts, Iraq was in a situation not unlike that of the Third Reich in its last weeks, its airspace undefended by anything other than sporadic AAA fire.

The bridge and road interdiction campaign had proven to be particularly effective, with numerous reports indicating major arteries clogged with the wreckage of destroyed vehicles. Typically a bridge busting mission would cause convoy traffic to ank up for several miles, after which follow up sorties would deal with the hundreds of trapped vehicles. The Baghdad/ Amman highway, a major channel for blockade breaking road traffic, was swept repeatedly resulting in substantial losses in heavy road transport vehicles, many of which were tankers attempting to resupply units in Western Iraq where most Scud launchers were dispersed to. The television footage of bullet riddled trucks on the Baghdad/Amman highway was clear evidence of the USAF’s AC-130s at work, the aircraft often attacking in pairs given the target rich environment. One AC-130 Spectre gunship was reported MIA, hit by a SAM off the Kuwaiti coast, presumably en route to the highways North of Kuwait city. The scale of the bridge and road campaign may be judged by the destruction of 29 bridges on arterial routes to Kuwait, with a resulting 90% reduction in vehicular movements on these routes. This effectively strangled the required 20,000 ton/day Storm — The Second Two
flow of supplies required to sustain operations in Kuwait.

With a Sense of Deja VU

With ever increasing tension the crew peer forward at the first distant sight of the enemy border as their bomber drones on towards its critical mission of destroying the enemy’s central command bunker. Intelligence reports indicate that the bunker complex, which is indeed perhaps one of many, is located deep beneath metres of earth, concrete and steel plate. It is fully self contained with its own independent power, fuel and water supply and yet must be destroyed, or at least rendered unserviceable if hostilities are to quickly end. As the bomber drones onwards its crew know that ‘their’ single bomb will do the trick in bringing the fire of battle to the very heart of its perpetrator. The incredible thing though is that this particular aircraft on which so much is riding is not a B-52 (itself now an almost vintage aircraft), an F-111 or even a Rockwell B-1B but rather a tired old Avro Lancaster. The weapon in its belly is a 22,000lb Grand Slam, an ‘earthquake’ bomb that in the latter stages of WW2 proved so effective at destroying buried fortifications similar to those which ahalf century later hide the latest Middle East monster.

Itis perhaps interesting to look back in time and note with perhaps a sense of deja vu that the only conventional weapon capable of making an impression upon Saddam’s lair is the Grand Slam and its Lancaster delivery system. The bomb bays of all modern bombers, including the G & H models of the giant Stratofortress, are simply too short to carry such a uniquely sized purpose built weapon. In the meantime, a weapon combination not dreamed of in the days of Sir Barnes Wallis, the father of the Grand Slam and a plethora of other WW2 winning weapons, was at press time being prepared to do the job. Plans were for a simultaneous precision strike of four to five 2,000lb GBU-15s to be dropped from F-111s at thirty second intervals right atop the bunker complex. The resultant hole would then be penetrated by three Durandel runway piercing bombs strapped together. Alternatively if this isn’t successful then 2,000 fuel air explosives may be used to literally reduce the hidden complex to rubble. (Paul Caldwell) fter initial losses to AAA the RAF reviewed its Tornado force operational tactics and shifted away from night low level radar and visual dive bombing, both of which exposed the aircraft to AAA in return for high accuracy. To provide an operational laser designation capability at short notice, while the very new Tiald pods were being deployed, the RAF resorted to the geriatric analogue Westinghouse AVQ-23 Pave Spike pods and deployed the more so geriatric Blackburn Buccaneers of 237 OCU, and subsequently, 208 Sqn. After day 17, hunter-killer pairs of Pave Spike equipped Buccaneers and 1,000lb Paveway 2 carrying Tornados commenced a highly effective Linebacker style daylight high altitude bridge interdiction campaign, supplemented by strikes on oil industry facilities. The latter had received considerable attention from both USAF and RAF aircraft, resulting in the destruction of most production capacity at the Baghdad, Basra and Baiji refineries and major damage to storage facilities.

The interdiction and strategic strikes against the Iraqgi land forces were no less spectacular in effect. The Iragis had built up an astonishing array of buried reinforced concrete bunkers and shelters, particularly in Southern Iraq, to hide their principal land warfare assets and associated troops. Most of these were built by European contractors during the mid eighties, and many are known to be better hardened than NATO’s facilties. After the debacle at Khafji it was clearto the Iraqis that short term survival meant remaining out of sight to avoid the scrutiny of Allied aircraft. For the Allies, this meant that targets became increasingly difficult to find. Four principal types of target were sought —tanks. /AFVs, soft vehicular convoys, artillery pieces and hidden supply and personnel bunkers. The class of mission was typified by are ported strike by four AV-8Bs on a column of 25 tanks, resulting in most of the tanks being destroyed. The Allied force had accumulated 44,000 sorties by the 4th February, flying 2,700 sorties that day, of which several hundred were directed specifically against the Republican Guard. The cumulative total of Iraqi air assets destroyed on the ground was revised to about 100.

By the end of the third week, Allied commanders acknowledged that while the BAI strikes had destroyed several hundred tapks and artillery pieces, the Republican Guard divisions were still quite capable of offensive operations and that further strikes were necessary to inflict substantial damage. Historically this situation had clear precedents in Italy and Vietnam, where a well hidden and dispersed land warfare force resisted air interdiction for a substantial time. An openly acknowledged problem was the shortage of tactical reconnaissance assets for BDA (Bomb Damage Assessment), a task which had fallen largely upon the Vietnam era RF-4C. The RF-4C employs geriatric film cartridge technology, the new ATARS pods for the F-16C still being very much in the development phase. The RAF rapidly deployed a handful of Tornado GR. 1A strike/recce aircraft, with newer sensors, to help alleviate the problem. While satellite reconnaissance was available, it has fundamental limitations due to cloud cover and orbital dynamics, the latter severely limiting the number of passes flyable if precious propellant is not to be exhausted in manoeuvring.

Additional B-52G aircraft deployed to RAF Fairford in the UK and shortly thereafter commenced operations, supported by 12 KC-135 tankers based at Avord and Mont de Marsan in France. he B-52G force was used primarily for the delivery of guide 5001b Mk. 82, 2,0001b Mk. 84 and 75¥)lb M-117 demgli(ion gomebg from high altitude, against identified battiefield area targets. loaded with Mk. 82s the B-52G will carry 27 internally and 24 on inboard wing pylons. On some missions, television guided propelled AGM-142A Have Nap glidebombs were used to hit point targets, eight may be carried. Tactically SAC abandoned the costly formation flying of Linebacker, choosing instead less predictable attacks from different headings converging on the target area, exploiting the accuracy of the B-52s recently upgraded nav-attack system.

The fourth week of the campaign saw the shift in Allied targeting take effect. The proportion of Allied sorties flown against the’ Kuwaiti and Southern Iraqi target areas increased steadily, until over one thousand sorties a day were directed at these areas. By the end of the week Allied commanders claimed the de§truction of 1,300 of Iraq’s 4,280 tanks, 550 of which were hit durnjg the fourth week of operations, 800 of the 2,800 personnel carriers and 1,100 of the 3,100 artillery pieces. Artillery was a priority target given its inherent chemical munition delivery capability and this reflected in Allied claims of daily kill rates of the order of 110 pieces. Central Command stressed the quality of kills and insisted that the statistics reflected confirmed destroyed targets, rather than probables. BLU-82 15,000Ib parachute retarded bombs and Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) bombs were also deployed and used against minefields and fortifications, with devastating effect.

The shifting of emphasis to battlefield interdiction did not slow down Scud hunting operations, with USAF F-15E pilots claiming the de§truction of four Scud launchers inside Iraqg, a fifth unit exploding before a flight of F-16s arrived to attack it. The USAF 9Iso reported the loss of an EF-111AEW platform which crashed in Saudi airspace with both crew KIA while returning from a sortie into Kuwait. k By the end of the fourth week the cumulative total had reached 70,000 missions, with 2,800 flown on the 14th February.

Desert Storm — The Fifth and Sixth Weeks

Week five saw no slackening of the strategic and battlefield interdiction campaign. While about half of the sorties. continued to be concentrated on battlefield targets in the Kuwait/Southern Iraq region, the deep strike campaign continued. Baghdad was struck repeatedly by day and night throughout the week by Allied aircraft, with storage facilities, government buildings and identified C3 facilities being hit. Unfortunately, one of the C3 bunkers struck also housed several hundred civilians, many of whom perished as a result of the hit by two GBU-24s dropped by an F-117A (GBU-24 is a Paveway 3 LGB with a BLU-109/B penetrator warhead). Similarly several dozen civilians died during an RAF bridge busting raid on Fallujah, when a Paveway 2 guidance kit failed and the round went ballistic. In both instances civilian casualties resulting from poor civil defence procedures were exploited for propaganda purposes, not unlike the Libyans blaming the US in 1986 for casualties caused by proximity fused SAMs detonating off rooftops. How many Iraqi civilians suffered the same fate may never be known. Interdiction operations continued, Allied command stating on the 19th February that over 100 vehicles were found at a supply depot, with consecutive day and night strikes destroying 28 tanks, 26 other vehicles, 23 artillery pieces and three associated ammunition storage facilities. Scud hunting operations were also successful, with a B-52 strike on a launch site resulting in large secondary explosions and an A-10 pilot claiming the destruction of two launchers in Western Iraqg. 2,900 missions were flown that day, bringing the cumulative total to 86,000. By this time many Allied pilots were reported referring to the campaign as a “Turkey Shoot’, a term unused since the 19th June, 1944, Battle of the Phillipine Sea.

The intense pace of operations reflected in Allied losses, five aircraft over a span of four days. Two A-10s were lost in battlefield interdiction strikes, an RAF Tornado IDS was lost while hitting an Iraqi airfield and an F-16 was also lost, but fortunately the pilot was rescued by an Allied helicopter.

The close in nature of the battlefield strikes saw the US Army’s AH-64 Apache force play an increasingly important role. Groups of AH-64s penetrated often many miles deep into hostile airspace, attacking vehicles and fortifications with 30mm gun fire, rockets and semi-active laser homing Hellfire missiles. The most notable raid occurred on the 20th February, when a large unit of /AH-64s supported by OH-58 scouts attacked a complex of over a dozen bunkers well inside Iraqi territory, capturing in the process the 500 or so surviving occupants of the target complex. Given the distance involved, CH-47 heavy assault ships flew in with infantry on board to disarm the prisoners, who were then flown back. Earlier reports suggested a much smaller unit of Apaches had in one instance forced a group of Iraqi infantrymen out of their foxholes and then herded their captives away.

As the theoreticians had predicted, the massed application of the AH-64 saw the depth of the battlefront vastly increased, and the concept of vertical envelopment was demonstrated on a modern mechanised warfare battlefield. This style of deep penetration land warfare is typical of the Air Land Battle 2000 doctrine, and the US Army finally had its opportunity to put the strategy to the test.

By the end of the fifth week the Allies entered final preparations for the land warfare campaign, with daily raids by self propelled artillery and rocket units on border defences, and continuing probing thrusts by the Apache/Kiowa force. As the sixth week unfolded, the infrastructure interdiction campaign continued, with remaining electricity generation capability in Iraq being destroyed, the Baghdad area in particular receiving a lot of attention. This was a prelude to the land offensive, which officially commenced on the 24th February, 1991.

Summary

At the time of writing the end play in the campaign had just commenced, but the initial five weeks have already demonstrated beyond any doubt that tactical air power has come of age as amajor tool for power projection. Demonstrably the Douhet-Mitchell doctrine works when the conditions are appropriate, ie the technology is available, rational rules of engagement (RoE) are defined and there is sufficient concentration of resources. The last two major air cam

Not Every Patriot a Hero!

Whilst Raytheon Patriot SAMs were scoring impressively against Iragi Scuds a somewhat smaller namesake was quickly making a name for itself as a bit of a villain. Reports that a toy Patriot missile was going on sale in Australia brought a stern warning from the Civil Aviation Authority. Apparently when the toy Patriots went on sale in the UK they posed a potential threat to low flying aircraft. A CAA representative said: “People may think they are just the thing for chasing toy Scud missiles around the sky but regulations in Australia as to their use do exist. ”

CAA Regulation 295 totally prohibits the firing of rockets within five kilometers of any aerodrome, and prohibits the flying of rockets higher than 300ft in other areas without the approval of the CAA. The toy Patriot is powered by a solid fuel pack and is reported to be capable of reaching a speed of 260kt and a height of 1,300ft. (Paul Caldwell) paigns, Korea and Vietnam, both yielded questionable air war results largely due to the constraints of inane RoE, insufficient application of resources and often highly inappropriate ‘strategic’ objectives defined by lay politicians. It is clear at this point, that proper application of air power yields the desired result. It is also clear, that the RAAF’s existing approach to tacair, combining specialised and multirole aircraft equipped with precision guided munitions, is entirely consistent with the requirements of this type of warfare. What may be less clear, is the central importance of force concentration and RoE to the success of any such campaign. The destruction of Irag’s military potential will have required by the end of the campaign more than 6 weeks of sustained air attack by 1,200 tactical aircraft supported by similar numbers of specialised support air craft, and an enormous logistical chain to keep the system fed with munitions, fuel, spare parts and manpower. Low attrition was achieved by a systematic initial counterair campaign, only achievable under RoE permitting unrestricted attack upon any target capable of supporting air defence operations.

To the Australian observer the clear conclusion is that the RAAF may successfully wage a regional air war of attrition if so required. To do so however will require much effort in improving sustainability and additional force multiplication resources, such as tankers, AEW, electronic warfare assets and appropriate stocks of precision guided munitions. Hopefully our political leadership will finally take note of reality.

Acknowledgments: Special thanks to AYM Hans Roser (ret) for his most helpful critique of the initial draft.

An in-depth probing analysis of the specific lessons from Desert Storm be featured in a coming edition of Australian Aviation.