Vale: CAA Operational Control

At New York’s Kennedy Airport an Avianca 707 crashed short of the runway after running out of fuel. The aircraft had been delayed en route twice by air traffic controllers regulating entry into the severely congested New York terminal area in very bad weather. Not until it was too late did ATC realise how low the aircraft was on fuel though it would have helped if the crew had been more forthcoming as to their true fuel state earlier in the flight.

In Australia, until the 10th January 1991, CAA Air Traffic Controllers especially trained for the task maintained an Operational Control watch over all IFR movements in controlled airspace. Their job was to help the pilot safeguard the conduct of each individual flight in terms of fuel endurance, changing destination weather, navaid unserviceability and all the dozens of other factors which can effect an aircraft’s operation. The controllers acted as a filter for the mountains of information passing through the ATC system. They ensured that each pilot got exactly the information needed and, just as importantly, only the information needed.

Some readers will have heard message! similar to the following, probably while in holding patterns: “Sydney still closed, duration not known. Melbourne, Brisbane and Canberra plus thirty holding, suitable. Report intentions and latest divert time. ”

This information was being requested by the Operations Controllers and the replies used to confirm the flight plan details held, coordinate landing times and, in some areas, tarmac capacity. If a pilot’s choice of alternate may create problems then another will be suggested.

Operational Control started at the flight planning stage when your plan was ‘approved’, an unfortunate term meaning only that it is considered to have complied with all the regulations. After you left the briefing area details of your flight appeared in front of the Operations Flight Controller (OFC). He or she was advised of your departure and any subsequent changes to flight plan, including holding.

Anything passing across the OFC console (and everything does) that is relevant to your flight would be relayed to ATC or Flight Service for onward transmission. If everything went according to your plan, that’s it, there was nothing more to it. As far as you’re concerned anyway. Behind the scenes the weather may have been changing. The OFC would be reviewing your fuel, the navaid state at any possible alternates. He knows where you can go and your chances of getting in. The Senior Operations Controller will have conferred with Met, your destination Tower supervisor, and alternate airport staff. He has a complete and up to date picture of the state of air traffic and the weather at your destination and your alternate. At no stage has anyone interfered with your command responsibilities, the whole system is simply poised to help when help is needed. The flow of essential information will still be coming to you, the decision on when and where to divert will still be made by you. In practice, only as a very last resort, would the SOC use the authority vested in him by the Australian Government, and direct the action of the pilot in command. Importantly, it was a pro-active service. If you had not diverted by your ‘Latest Divert Time’, then the checks on your safety will start. Perhaps you have slightly more fuel than you anticipated. But then again, perhaps a vital piece of information has not reached you. The Avianca pilots in New York had an aircraft running low on fuel but were unable to get the message across to busy controllers actively handling aircraft. Our Australian way until January 10th, was for a specialised part of the air traffic control system to actively monitor fuel states and weather conditions.

Another feature of the Operational Control system is the authority given to ATC Towers to close airspace due to hazardous weather or below-instrument approach minima conditions. This authority in the case of hazardous weather only will continue.

It is an ICAO recommendation that all revenue earning flights have a State (Country) licenced operational control service to assist the pilot in command with the safe conduct of the flight. Australia is unique in that the State decided to operate the service itself through Air Traffic Control, and provide it to the airline industry. Prior to ‘cost recovery’, virtually free of charge. A feature of the service that many pilots take objection to arises from that decision. In the same way that a pilot must obey an instruction given by a controller unless it will endanger the aircraft, he similarly must obey an Operational Control instruction given by a controller. There is nothing more sinister to it than that. In practice it is a co-operative effort between the controllers, the pilot, and the operating company. Only in exceptional circumstances will the Senior Operations Controller (SOC) exercise his or her ultimate authority. That power, of course, has the obvious effect of putting the safety authority between the pilot in command and the commercial demands of the company. This may have been in line with the ‘fatherly’ role of previous Departments, but perhaps does not sit well with the CAP. :,s more partnership-orientated approach. We have yet to see how far down the road of a ‘If you think it’s safe, do it’ attitude the public and politicians will allow the CAA to go.

In an IFR twin you suffer an engine failure. The remaining one sounds OK but you would prefer to get your feet on the ground. You transmit a pan call and request assistance to reach a suitable airport. The message is flashed immediately to the Operations Control Centre (OCC). The OFC who is watching over your flight, has a dual role, he or she is also an Assistant Search Mission Co-ordinator (NSARMC). His boss, the Senior Operations Controller, is a fully trained Search Mission Co-ordinator (SARMC). They quickly get your position from the traffic controller or flight service officer talking to you. Locate a suitable landing point. Ensure that the busy traffic controller has obtained all the relevant information from you. If your landing point will be outside Controlled Airspace they will brief the Flight Service Supervisor on your problems and arrange for the continuation of radar services OCTA until you can fix your position visually. They will have already alerted and briefed the local emergency services and sent them on their way to the airport. If you are unfortunate enough to disappear en route they will mount a full search and rescue operation from the Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) adjacent to the Operations Control Centre (OCC). In this way two very important services to the aviation community are provided with very efficient use of staff.

The CAA practice of having the SAR service operating continuously through Operations Control has positive benefits for the flying public. Many potential SAR incidents are resolved in the developing stage and never become full emergencies. This is particularly true where pilots become unsure of their position. Unlike the OperationalControl task the role of SAR Co-ordination extends outside the control area, and controllers are often called upon to mount rescues for shipping. How this essential SAR service, at time of writing, will continue once Operational Control disappears has not yet been resolved. The Commonwealth Government is phasing out its financial support to CAA safety related services (refer p. 4Dec 90AA). In future they all must be funded by the aviation industry. Will the industry, which is largely the air travelling public, want to pay for a service which spends most of its time locating lost or crashed General Aviation aircraft?

Operational Control through ATC was a unique Australian answer to a specific problem. The rest of the world chose to do things differently. In line with CAA policy we are logically moving towards an ‘internationalised’ system. Hopefully after January 10th nothing much will seem to have changed and our skies will continue to be the safest in the world. But for those that believe it can’t happen here . . .

September 15th, 1990-Williamtown RAAF Base-A Boeing 707 freighter en route from Honolulu to Sydney landed after being directed to divert by the Sydney Senior OperationsController. The aircraft suffered engine failure on final approach and was unable to taxi clear of the runway under its own power due, it is believed, to fuel exhaustion. At time of writing, the exact circumstances were still under investigation by BASI though even a non pilot would question the capability ofa loaded 707to fly against the winds over such an incredible distance!