Air Force Trainers-What Do Other Services Get Out Of Them?

Those 250 flying hours leading up to operational conversion – and particularly the last 80-100 hours- are the key to cost reduction. By making the correct choice of trainer aircraft, not only can the cost of those hours be reduced but their training value can be optimised to ensure a very significant reduction in the cost of operational conversion training and so a reduction in the running cost of the operational fighter fleet as a whole.

By their very nature, the aircraft employed to carry out advanced and tactical training can and should have a secondary operational role in both Close Air Support (CAS) and air defence. Flown by instructor pilots in wartime, these aircraft will be a useful force multiplier while, in peacetime, they can carry out cheaply and effectively many of the tasks, such as Fleet Support and joint service training, which are an expensive burden on the operational fighter fleet. Not only does this reduce the peacetime training costs of all three services without affecting training value, it prevents unnecessary airframe fatigue and consumption of engine life by the frontline aircraft.

In certain air forces the introduction of a new advanced trainer type opens up new operational horizons; many tasks which were simply beyond the capability of older types of trainer, and too numerous or non cost effective for the air force’s finite number of expensive frontline types, are back on the tote board.

Economics of Training

The keys to cost effective pilot training are: careful selection and grading of trainees; careful selection of trainer types, achieving maximum training value from each type employed; and employment of the smallest number of different types consistent with the training requirement.

Every consecutive stage in a typical flying training syllabus involves an increase in hourly flying costs. A common syllabus nowadays is: piston engined primary trainer (for grading and elementary flying training); turboprop basic trainer (taking the student up to about ‘wings’ standard); and then advanced and tactical training, possibly using two separate jet trainer types. It makes obvious sense to get the utmost from each stage of training before passing the student on to the next, more expensive stage. Ideally, the number of hours flown at each stage, from basic through tactical, should fall. The most expensive stage in terms of fuel and ordinance expended, maintenance man-hours and wear and tear on the aircraft is the last one. Even this is cheap, however, compared with flying an operational frontline aircraft.

At a conservative estimate, a frontline type such as the Tornado or F-18 can cost six or eight times as much to operate per flying hour as a typical advanced jet trainer. One hour cut from the fighter’s operational conversion syllabus is an enormous saving – even if two hours must be flown on an advanced trainer to achieve the same training value, the saving is still very significant. And if that trainer can be used for other peacetime tasks previously carried out by the frontline fighter (such as Fleet Support or the training of Forward Air Controllers), the cost savings to whoever pays for the flying hours – and that is not necessarily the air force itself – can be huge.

The economics of flying training are a function of the learning curve to which the student is subjected. Too large a gap between advanced/tactical trainers and frontline aircraft places a massive burden on the student. It is at the frontline fighter’s Operational Conversion Unit (OCU) that many students finally drop out of pilot training, having incurred considerable costs in their training to date (and particularly so at the OCU itself) but without having reached a skill level which would sustain them through a highly intensive conversion syllabus. The alternative to a high drop out rate at the OCU stage is a protracted syllabus with a gentler learning curve but a significant rise in flying hours, and hence cost. There is an irreducible minimum number of hours in which a pilot may convert to his operational type, but there is no upper limit to this figure. So the OCU learning curve must be balanced against the need to reduce costs, and the pilot training system up to the point of OCU entry must be tailored to optimise this process.

The requirement, then, is for a cost-effective advanced and tactical trainer which will impart as many skills as possible in the pre-OCU phase of advanced and lead in fighter training. The trainer must simulate faithfully the operational environment. The aircraft should have a supersonic capability, teaching the student the feel of transonic and supersonic flight but without incurring the cost and low speed handling penalties normally associated with a truly supersonic design. Conversely, it must also be simple and forgiving enough for rapid conversion to type by a student graduating from a basic trainer such as the turboprop Tucano or PC-9.

Its cockpit procedures and controls should replicate as far as possible those of the frontline aircraft – this means having, among other things, a glass cockpit, Head-Up Display (HUD) and Hands-On Throttle and Stick (HOTAS) controls. The aircraft must handle well and at the outer corners of the flight envelope should be predictable and forgiving with particular resistance to departure from controlled flight. The aircraft must also be designed with a long fatigue life in mind; it will be more heavily used than conversion syllabus. In fact, very few air forces subject their students to such a ‘great leap’ – those that do usually have a specific reason for doing so and have made a conscious decision to pay the considerable extra costs involved. Besides, the operational capabilities of such a trainer will be inherently limited, denying the use of the aircraft to friendly forces in wartime.

It has been demonstrated by many air forces that a single advanced trainer type used for both advanced and tactical (or lead in fighter) training is cost effective. That is demonstrated by the trainer’s ability to shoulder some of the OCU’s traditional training burden and so reduce pressure on the frontline fighter fleet. However, this effect is achieved only if the choice of advanced/tactical trainer is made with the ultimate training requirement in mind and not dictated solely by narrow, short term financial considerations. An advanced trainer of the type outlined above will, by its very nature, lend itself to operational roles, thus ensuring the availability to the air force in wartime of both airframes and instructor pilots who might otherwise be lost to the system.

An important saving arises in the context of the operational fighter fleet, a portion of which must be devoted to OCU duties. Depending upon the throughput of trainees, the more protracted the conversion syllabus, the more operational aircraft the OCU bleeds off from the frontline fleet. To maintain a certain force structure, therefore, may require the purchase of more aircraft to offset the numbers committed to the OCU; alternatively, the frontline fleet just gets smaller and the force’s ability to meet its peacetime commitments is compromised. In logistic terms, the greater the utilisation of aircraft in the OCU the greater the maintenance burden, fuel costs and airframe fatigue life consumption attributable to conversion training, as opposed to operational flying.

Many of the costs associated with operational conversion are unavoidable, they are the necessary price which must be paid for a professional air force. But careful control of costs and implementation of the most cost effective pilot training system can ensure that the best use is made of scarce and expensive frontline aircraft – more of each defence dollar is spent on the teeth and less on the tail.

Joint Service Support

The peacetime training requirement addressed by the aircraft described in this article so far is not confined solely to the air force itself. Fleet Support, to give one example, is an important commitment for most air forces today, with the navy’s need for cost effective simulation of a sophisticated air threat. The training value to a ship’s company of an aircraft able to simulate realistically a variety of high, medium and low level manoeuvring targets at over 588kt is immense. A worthwhile radius of action affords the aircraft flexibility in this role; a tactical Hi/Lo/Lo/Hi radius of as much as 300nm or the ability to spend two hours or more on station at ranges in excess of 100nm provide the surface fleet with a realistic amount of sea room in which to manoeuvre and time in which to practice and perfect defensive actions and crew coordination. Regular, routine training exercises of this kind lend themselves perfectly to the use of high performance trainers and cost a great deal less per flying hour than a frontline combat aircraft.

Combat Operations

Many customers for current advanced trainer types use these aircraft both as trainers and in operational roles. A genuine combat capability (as demonstrated by use of the Hawk in the air defence role by the RAF, or the Alphajet in the close air support role by the Luftwaffe) prevents the unnecessary dilution of more expensive resources which should quite properly be devoted towards the most critical interdiction, offensive support and air defence tasks.

To be operationally effective the trainer needs a combination of performance, agility, payload, range and first pass weapons delivery accuracy. In the attack role it must be capable of surviving in the modern battlefield environment- which means achieving dash speeds in the order of 580kt at low level carrying a militarily effective warload (up to 2,000kg-3,000kg) and self defence weapons. In this configuration it needs a radius of action that allows genuine flexibility when operating in remote areas with few runways and little infrastructure, or when facing the threat of runway closure through weather or enemy action. The need to be able to self ferry across long distances to more remote areas and operate there with minimal support is self-evident.

Given the growing threat from shoulder launched and light crew served anti-aircraft weapons in the hands of even the least sophisticated of potential enemies, the ability to carry Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) such as chaff and flare dispensers and a radar warning receiver is important. On board ECM systems are very rarely a standard fit on most trainer types but, consistent with the training philosophy outlined in this article, it makes sense for a tactical weapons trainer to carry them for both operational and training use.

In the air defence role the trainer must be sufficiently agile at both medium and low altitude and have sufficient thrust to be able to engage larger fighters and fighter bombers on favourable terms. When operating in a Mixed Fighter Force (MFF) the trainer must have sufficient performance and endurance to keep station with a radar equipped air defence fighter and not compromise the latter’s ability to remain on station and carry out its air defence task.

The Bottom Line

In summing up it must be said that the cost effectiveness of an advanced trainer derives from three factors·: first of all its effectiveness in the training role- its training value relative to the standard which the student must eventually achieve on his operational squadron; secondly, its cost of ownership – there is no worthwhile saving to the customer air force if the advanced trainer is ineffective in its role and shifts a major part of the training burden back onto the frontline fighter fleet; and thirdly, the ability of the trainer to carry out operational tasks in wartime, and contribute to a reduction in the peacetime running costs of he frontline fighter fleet by assuming some of its support and joint service training tasks.

The leading edge of training philosophy is advancing rapidly.

As frontline aircraft become more and more expensive and complex, advanced trainers must grow in capability to meet the training needs of the air forces operating them. Advanced trainers have a key role to play in helping to control the air force’s peacetime operating and training costs while helping to meet its operational commitments in both peace and war.

The challenge described at the start of this article remains, but the latest generation of advanced trainers offers to financially constrained modern air forces an opportunity to face this challenge squarely. The choices that certain air forces make today will, over the next 25 years or so, undoubtedly have a significant effect, for good or ill, upon both professional standards and long-term funding of that most flexible expression of a country’s commitment to its own defence – air power.