CAA Regulatory Review Heralds Change

TheAirSafety Regulation Review Task Force represents a new era in civil aviation in Australia. Rapid change to aviation laws can no doubt be expected, especially now that the Government is seriously considering the problems associated with current CAA safety regulations.

To be fair to the CAA, however, it should be noted that this latest report is not the only step towards change being taken. Already the CAA is working closely with the Australian Aviation Advisory Committee (AAAC). The CAA has already begun implementing changes suggested by the AAAC, many of which are similar to suggestions made in this new report. The second report of the Air Safety Regulation Review Task Force unfortunately does not possess a shortened name to which it can be referred. Its contents, however, more than make up for this. Australian Aviation will preview just some of the more important or frustrating aspects of CAA administration that the report deals with. To give justice to the entire report is beyond the scope of this article. Detailed are some of the more important issues dealt with by the Task Force and the recommendations made. Some are already being acted on, others await long overdue attention.

Operational Control Services: The Task Force examined in some detail the ‘uniquely Australian’ situation whereby the CAA is able to exercise operational control of flights under CAR 98(1)(d), which cites that Air Traffic Control (ATC) has “. . . the control of the initiation, continuation, diversion or termination of flight in order to ensure the safety of aircraft operations. ” This is one of the most contentious issues concerning the aviation industry. Operational control has already received criticism in the Terrell Report (Commercial Review of Operational Control) released in June 1989, and the Task Force only supports its findings.

The Task Force, like the earlier Terrell Report, was strongly critical of ATC being able to exercise operational control of aircraft. It was perceived, for instance, that it is the pilot in command of an aircraft who “. . . is in the best position to decide whether conditions are acceptable to manoeuvre in the area or attempt takeoff or landing, since he can assess the situation visually and by reference to the weather radar whic his in real time. He does need to be aware of precautions to be observed . . . ” Because the pilot is in the best position to make judgments it was also suggested that ATC discontinue the practice of closing aerodromes for weather (cloud and visibility) reasons. The pilot should instead be allowed to decide whether it is safe to attempt a landing.

A similar view was expressed in regard to the Terminal Area Severe Turbulence (TAST) procedures in operation at Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. TAS T is designed to cope with potentially dangerous thunderstorms and ATC has the power to close all airspace within 60nm of an aerodrome. The information on which the weather situation is assessed by ATC, however, can be as old as 15 minutes when studied. Weather situations can change dramatically in only a short period of time, and this delay has resulted in aircraft being radar vectored through active storms rather than around them, or unnecessarily diverted. On one occasion, for instance, an aircraft was diverted from Melbourne to Adelaide because of the weather even though the pilot had the runway and the approaches visual. He refused the redirection and landed without incident. An updated system is presently under evaluation at Brisbane, but even though delays in weather information will be reduced, problems are still expected.

The Task Force recommended: 1) The practice of approving flight plans be discontinued; 2) CAR 98 be amended to place responsibility for the “initiation, continuation, diversion and termination of flight” with the pilot in command; 3) CAA abandon the practice of closing aerodromes when ground based observations indicate that weather phenomena are below the specified minima; 4) Withdrawal of the TAS T service at Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane in favour of Terminal Area Thunderstorm (TAT) advice.

The situation can perhaps be summed up by the submission that noted: “The good safety record of this country is predominantly due to the prevailing good weather and relatively low frequency of movements, not the provision of Operational Control. ”

VFR Traffic Lanes: Submissions to the Task Force suggested that there is a lack of VFR lanes, particularly at busy traffic areas around major capital cities.

One submission to the Task Force noted: “Overseas, many control areas have VFR traffic lanes to reduce workload on controllers and save delays. Australia has limited lanes . . . VFR traffic lanes in control zones would save costs and increase safety in just about every city control zone in Australia. This would reduce the amount of holding and radar vectoring of VFR aircraft. ” The Task Force, however, did not find that Australia was really lacking in VFR traffic lanes. The only noteworthy suggestion regarding new VFR light aircraft traffic lanes is that new lanes should be established from Archerfield to the north viaihe’ eastern side of Brisbane, and west of Coolangatta are desireable.

Most VFR traffic lanes are located next to busy primary control zones’and are used by pilots at all levels of training and experience. For this reason a grave problem exists with light aircraft venturing out of the lanes into potentially dangerous situations – this includes a near miss with a 747. The problem is particularly evident over Sydney where there is only one (busy) light GA traffic lane heading north of Sydney, below it a sea of red tiled roofs and a confusing railway network making navigation quite difficult. Light aircraft pilots are losing direction to the point that there is now an average of four unauthorised entries per day into restricted military airspace. To help alleviate this situation, the AAAC has suggested that the CAA establish a new coastal approach lane for light aircraft into Bankstown, and that aircraft operating in the Sydney area be transponder equipped to make use of a proposed radar advisory service for pilots experiencing navigation problems.

The Task Force has made no such suggestion. The problem it has identified, however, is that VFR traffic lane maps are inadequate for navigation, particularly by inexperienced pilots. This claim is supported by the AAAC and no doubt by many pilots. The report notes that “The map is cluttered with unnecessary detail and is difficult to read. It cannot be folded so as to present both the normal scale map and the inset large scale map at the same time. The pilot is obliged to refold the map in flight to reference the inset map. Experienced instructors verify that this is a problem for the inexperienced low time pilot. Landmarks are difficult to locate on the map. The high intensity light symbols should be more conspicuous. They can be confused with the red star symbol which is used to denote light aircraft holding patterns. The lights are too far apart, particularly for operation in conditions of poor visibility. ”

The VFG also leaves much to be desired. The key concern is that it contains too much information just not needed by the GA pilot, such as international flight details.

The Task Force recommended that: 1) Additional VFR traffic lanes be established at Brisbane and Coolangatta; 2) All VFR traffic lane maps be revised to eliminate non-essential clutter; depict landmarks with more accuracy; include more arrows to denote direction, together with time intervals for typical airspeeds; high intensity lights should emit 3 or 4 rapid flashes rather than a single flash and should be spaced closer with more regard for minimum visibility conditions; replace the red star symbol denoting light aircraft holding points with one more representative of the pattern; and change the VFG map layout so that both the normal scale and the large inset map can be referenced in flight without the necessity of refolding.

Fortunately, this aspect of the report is already in the process of change. In a recent interview with AA, Capt Buck Brooksbank, Chairman of the AAAC, noted that new style VFG booklets are already being prepared. Several formats are being considered, and industry is being approached to provide comments and decide the best layout.

Control Zone Size: Several submissions drew attention to control zone sizes.

Typical of comments received was that control zones in Australia “seem to be up to six times larger in area than those in the USA and Europe. ” Others drew attention to the problems associated with some Queensland tourist resorts: “To protect the privately owned airfield on Hamilton Island . . . the CAA recently gazetted a control zone for 60nm around it. This cuts right across the main corridor north-south on the Queensland coast, certainly makes it hard to fly into other islands and, if the pilots observe the rule, will track them well out to sea or inland into a most dangerous area of the Great Divide . . . ”

CAA field officers in Queensland confirmed a problem with the Hamilton Island control zone leaving little space available for light aircraft to fly between the island and the coast. The problem has arisen largely because of an increase in traffic to the island. A large control zone is necessary, though larger than ICAO PANS OPS (Procedures for Air Navigation Operations) criteria.

Other control zones, such as Wagga and Albury, were also found to be too large, though contact with both the ATCs revealed that there are very few delays to overflying aircraft whilst Wagga provides additional protection for the large number of overflying training aircraft. Brisbane control zone could also be redrawn to PANS OPS criteria to widen the western lane which is desireable due to turbulence and frequent strong winds in the area.

The Task Force found that: Control zones should be no larger than necessary to meet the internationally accepted ICAO PANS OPS criteria, unless there are specific local requirements to be accommodated.

Runway Separation Standards: Wake turbulence is a potentially dangerous force that must be taken into account when in the takeoff or landing phases. The Task Force investigated the claim that Australian wake turbulence standards are too stringent and are causing unnecessary delays and costs.

Australian standards are based not on the distance between aircraft when airborne, but on time when the aircraft are departing. This system is slower than the American and Canadian standards – in which takeoffs are spaced by time – and are blamed for unnecessary delays. The situation has already been tackled by the Bigsworth Report (refer p. 21 Sept 89 AA), which suggested that the Australian standards be changed in line with the North American standards.

Wake turbulence is generated only when the aircraft is airborne. During takeoff ground roll jet blast is evident but the vortices associated with wake turbulence do not occur until the aircraft is lifting off. A smaller aircraft than that which has just taken off whose takeoff distance is substantially shorter will be airborne well above the previous aircraft’s area of wake turbulence. This applies in the case of, for instance, a commuter taking off after a heavily laden 747. The report has recognised that in this instance the second aircraft should be allowed to takeoff at the pilot’s discretion; this would allow even shorter periods of time between takeoffs and improve efficiency. Such a system already works well in the USA.

The report found that: Revised Australian wake turbulence standards, based on the standards of the USA and Canada, should be adopted:

Takeoff by lighter aircraft behind heavier aircraft (or by a following aircraft whose flight path will be above the leading aircraft’s wake turbulence) should be allowed at pilot discretion; More than one aircraft at a time should be able to line up for takeoff.

The Task Force was aware that the CAA is revising its standards to bring them more in line with those of North America. The new standards, however, do not at this stage make allowance for smaller aircraft to take off soon after larger aircraft.

Instrument Approach Minima: Submissions to the Task Force claimed that Australian minima for instrument approach are too conservative and that this is costly and too often aircraft cannot land.

This claim was discussed with the CAA, who noted that: “The design of Australian instrument procedures are, in other than exceptional circumstances, ted ICAO and general overseas practices . . . Current Australian procedures are designed to either 1971 or 1986 ICAO PANS OPS standards, with some unique differences which tailor those standards to Australian conditions. ” It was in fact noted that Australia’s Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) arrivals and descents are less conservative, both providing Australian aircraft with approach options not available’in most countries. ”

The Task Force was “satisfied that the above is substantially correct. Australia is less conservative with DME procedures, which have been used to great advantage . . . The only area of real conservatism was removed with the abolition of night minima in July 1987. ”

Helicopter Circuit Procedures: This area of flight operations, which specifies that helicopter operations must basically conform to the fixed wing circuit, is one that has long caused frustration for pilots of both rotary and fixed wing aircraft.

Of particular concern is that helicopters in Australia are made to perform the three legs of a fixed wing aircraft typecircuit when landing, and then approach the runway if no approved helipad exists. This means more flying time for helicopters performing what really is an unnecessary circuit; more flying time for fixed wing aircraft forced to enter a holding pattern; and considerably more costs for all involved. While taxiing, helicopters are often made to hover taxi to the runway before takeoff. This does not comply with overseas regulations which allow helicopters to operate like helicopters.

It was observed that in the USA, for instance, helicopters routinely avoid fixed wing traffic patterns as standard procedure; that they are allowed to fly below normal fixed wing traffic in the circuit area; that ‘approaches to airports can be made at 90 degrees to the runway; and that helicopters can land at other than designated helipads within airfield boundaries, subject only to traffic limitations. This system operates quite well and safety is not a particular problem due to the different operating requirements of the two aircraft types.

The report has found that helicopters should: be permitted to avoid fixed wing traffic patterns as normal operating procedure; be allowed to underfly normal fixed wing traffic in the circuit area (the preferred height is 500ft AGL); and approach to an airfield at 90 degrees should be allowed, and that landings within airfield boundaries should be allowed away from designated helistops, but subject to traffic limitations.

Certification of Overseas Airports: Several submissions were highly critical of the CAP.  The requirement to inspect and approve foreign airports prior to approving scheduled operations by Australian operators into the location in question.

Inspections have included some of the world’s largest and most efficient international airports and for years has had satirical overtones for all involved in this farcical requirement. CAA inspections have been made of the likes of New York’s JFK Airport, Seattle/Tacoma and Manchester in the United Kingdom. As noted in one submission, the CAA inspection “. . . normally calls for a visit by a CAA Surveyor and an Examiner of Airmen – regardless of the airport’s operational history. ”

Qantas routinely reviews each new proposed airport for layout, facilities, navigation aids etc, and for assessment of appropriate training requirements. The necessity of CAA duplication of this effort – at Qantas’ cost – is questioned. For example, Seattle/Tacoma airport, nearby the Boeing factory in Seattle required physical checks by an Australian surveyor prior to a once only Qantas commercial departure. The airport at the time was handling 6-8 Boeing 747 commercial flights per day. ”

This perhaps sums up the absurdity of this CAA requirement.

The Task Force has rightly pointed out that “specific information regarding any aspect of an airport can be obtained from ICAO documents or by enquiry to the responsible authority. First hand advice can also be obtained from operators who are familiar with the airport. There may be airports which require inspection, but they are likely to be few. ” The report recommended that use of such information as ICAO documentation be used instead of actual inspections.

The Provision of Rescue and Fire Fighting Services at Secondary Airports: All submissions received by the Task Force were opposed to the provision of Rescue and Fire Fighting Services (RFFS) at other than international airports, where ICAO requirements dictate it. Typical of submissions received were: “. . . general aviation doesn’t need it, doesn’t want it and doesn’t wish to pay for it”; “To our knowledge RFFS has never saved a single life in any general aviation accident at any Secondary Airport and is the most obvious example of ‘over-provision of service. “‘

It has been found that, during the ten year period to 1989, of the 2,880 recorded accidents, 148 involved fire after impact, plus 21 involved fire in flight or on the ground. Of the accidents, only six occurred within 8km of a secondary airport with RFFS capability, and none occurred at an airport. The inability of the RFFS to actually reach an off airport crash scene in the ICAO specified 3 minutes has also been highlighted. In 1978 it took a fireman 4 minutes to reach a crashed Partenavia at Essendon; it took the fire tender 8 minutes.

The apparent limited value of the RFFS at secondary airports led the Task Force to recommend that RFFS should be withdrawn from capital city secondary airports.

The Biennial Flight Review: Some submissions were received about the Biennial Flight Review. It was considered by the Task Force because it imposes additional costs on pilots.

CAO 40. 1. 2 Section 11. 1 states that a private pilot, in order to command an aircraft, must undertake a flight review of at least one hour’s duration with a Grade One flight instructor, at least every 24 months. This requirement has often been criticised by pilots who either disagree with the concept or do not appreciate the reasons for its implementation.

Because there has been no improvement in the accident rate in Australia since the implementation of the review, the Task Force studied the experiences of using the system in the USA and Canada. In both these cases their was overwhelming evidence to show that biennial reviews had significantly reduced the flying accident rate. As a result of this, it was recommended that the biennial flight review should be retained in Australia and that an explanatory statement, perhaps in the form of a newsletter, should be made available to pilots required to undertake the review so that they understood its purpose.

The above represent just a portion of the second report of the Task Force, though they are probably the more important aspects promising far reaching changes to long term CAA administration. Significant change is already occurring within the CAA, but this report will, without doubt, see the process speeded up. The change will be for the better, and with the AAAC now advising the CAA, it should prove difficult for the administration to regress.

How good it is to see, after so many years of pounding away in frustration, for the old guard to finally have their grasping hands wrested away from the controls they really could not handle.