Profile – Douglas DC-8 Part 11

Douglas, in fact, had to follow the Boeing lead in manufacturing a large capacity, long-haul jet airliner, abandoning all thought of possible propeller turbine developments. The DC-8 was originally conceived for transatlantic routes, but other version were developed almost simultaneously, with different engines but with the same airframe. Pan American’s version was the DC-8-30, with Pratt & Whitney JT4A-9 engines, which went into service on 27 March, 1960, eleven days after KLM inaugurated its transatlantic jet service using the same aircraft.

The DC-8-10 made its first flight on May 30, 1958. It was a domestic version of the DC-8 and was capable of accommodating 176 economy class passengers. It made its first commercial· flight with two airlines on the sameday,September 18, 1959, with United Airlines and Delta Airlines. Of the series 10, 28 were built.

The series 20 followed the -10. It was similar to the series -10 but was tailored for ‘hot and high’ airfield performances with the 15,800lb st (static thrust) Pratt & Whitney JT4A-3 turbojet engines reducing the takeoff run by 10%. It first flew on November 29, 1958.

The series 30 was tailored for long-range intercontinental operations. It was basically similar to the -20 but extra fuel for the 16,800lb st Pratt & Whitney JT4A-9 turbojet engines added up to another 30%. Other models in the series also used 17,500lb st Pratt & Whitney JT4A-11 turbojet engines. The upgraded engines increased the range with its max payload (which was itself increased by 2,860kg) by 650nm (1,205km) to 4,692nm (8,690km). There were 57 built in this series.

The series -40 introduced the 17,5001b st Rolls-Royce Conway bypass turbojet engines to the DC-8 series. It was designed as a long-range intercontinental version, similar to the -30. It first flew on· August 23, 1959. Nearly two years later on August 21, 1961 a DC-8-40 with modified wings (as stated below) became the first jet transport to exceed the speed of sound, in a shallow dive at 40,350ft. Its true air speed was 579kts (1,073kmh) (Mach 1. 012). On the same flight, it carried the equivalent of its normal payload to a height of 52,090ft.

A major improvement in the later series (from the series -40) was the installation of a different leading edge. This changed the wing profile and increased the wing chord by 4%. It reduced drag and improved the speed and the range of the DC-8. It became standard on all the late models in the series and was even fitted retrospectively to some earlier models. The series -50 was introduced in December, 1960 after first flying on the 20th of that month. It was basically similar to the series 30 but carried the heaviest payload of the DC-8 family and had a range of 5,931nm (10,985km) thanks to a greater fuel economy of the 17,000lb st Pratt & Whitney JT3D-1 turbofan engines. There were 88 built in this series, and some earlier models were converted to series -50 standard. On February 13, 1962 a DC-8-50, with JT3D-3 turbofan engines, set a distance record for commercial transport aircraft by flying non stop 7,565nm or 14,010km from Tokyo to Miami, in 13hr 52min. This distance exceeded by nearly 1,474nm (2,730km) the previous longest flight by a commercial airliner.

The -50 series also featured a cargo/passenger version known as the DC-8F Jet Trader. It is a turbofan variant of the DC-8-50, designed basically as a combination cargo and passenger transport.

ThebasicDC-8F Jet Trader was the Model 54, developed from the standard DC-8-50. It was powered by 18,000lb st Pratt & Whitney JT3D-3 turbofan engines and also incorporated all the latest aerodynamic refinements developed for the later DC-8 series. The maximum payload is 43,219kg and the Model 54 can carry its full payload non stop across the Atlantic in both directions, between New York, London, Copenhagen, Paris against winter headwinds. A typical payload for the 54, with ah operating range of 4,000 miles was 54 passengers with baggage, 24,688kg of cargo and normal fuel reserves. However, the bulkhead between flight and cargo sections is moveable, to permit adjustments of the passenger section to seat 24, 54, 84 or 114 people. In an all passenger role, it can accommodate 189 all economy class passengers. lt first flew on October 29, 1963 with initial deliveries to Air Canada on January 30, 1964.

The Model 55 was basically similar to the Model 54, but with increased takeoff weight and many detailed refinements, including the latest JT3D-3B engines. The departure from the standardised airframe was announced on April 15, 1965, when details were given of three new and advanced series 60 versions of the DC-8.

The first of the series was the Model 61. It had the same wing and engine pylon structures as the Series 50, but the fuselage was extended by the insertion of a 6. 1Om plug in a section forward of the wing and another 5. 08m section aft of the wing. The accommodation provided for up to 252 passengers and cargo space under the floor was increased significantly to 71. 50m3. All versions of the 60 Series have 18,000lb st Pratt & Whitney JT3D3-38 turbofan engines. The gross takeoff weight was approximately that of the earlier DC-8-55 and so the additional passenger capacity was achieved at the expense of range. The range thus fell from 5,004nm (9,260km) to 3,450nm (6,390km). This Model saw sales of 78 aircraft as well as 10 of the Model 61CF convertible passenger/freight version.

The Model 62 followed. It was intended for very long-range stages and featured further aerodynamic improvements to reduce drag under cruise conditions. These improvements included a 1 metre wing tip extension, low drag engine pods and redesigned engine pylons. The engine pods were also of new design which augmented thrust and reduced drag by ducting bypass air through the entire length of each nacelle. The fuel capacity was also increased by the wing extension and the basic DC-8 fuselage increased by 2 metres. This was achieved by plugs of 1 metre of cabin section both fore and aft of the wings, giving standard accommodation tor 189 passengers. It had the same payload capacity as the DC-8-55 in its basic form, though the Model 62H had better payload up to a range of 5,300nm (9,815km). It made the model capable of carrying 18,145kg payload non stop against prevailing headwinds, from points in western Europe to the West Coast of the USA, with ample fuel reserves. The later models 62CF and 62AF were convertible and freight versions of the Model 62, of which 106 and 51 respectively were built.

The third, and final, in the series was the Model 63. It combined the long fuselage of the 61, with the aerodynamic and powerplant improvements of the 62. It was basically intended for transatlantic operation. The model was capable of flying stages of 4,000nm (7,400km). Of the series, 41 were produced, plus 7 all freight model 63CFs and 6 special all passenger Model 63PFs for Eastern Airlines.

Douglas’ Financial Problems

Douglas’ financial woes really began in the early sixties when, in 1960, Boeing, after gaining the upper hand in the long-range market, appropriated the middle ground with the new 727 Trijet and the domestic version of the 707 designated the 720. However, it wasn’t so much the Boeing move that started the slide, but rather the moves made by Douglas in response.

As the DC-8 was selling well, Donald Douglas Jnr, the new President of Douglas, courageously decided to try to trump the Boeing ace, the 707, by stretching the DC-8 with the stretched version offering 60 more seats with the same engines. Douglas Jnr became president in 1957, after Donald Douglas Snr gave control of the company over to him. Douglas Snr then became Chairman, while Douglas Jnr was given the position of President. However, the son was very different to his thrifty and hard-driven father who never delegated more than he had to. There had been cases where Delta Airlines founder,· C E Woolmand, ordered planes over the phone to Douglas Snr, ignoring contracts and paperwork which caught up months later.

What procrastination cost Douglas in the first instance, in not developing its jet earlier, recklessness cost Douglas more later when attempting too much simultaneously with three different versions of the Super 60 series. Despite this, it was and still is a fine aeroplane from every point of view. It should have been among the most successful of the jet transports and it would have been if the airlines that later bought 747s (even though the stretched DC-8s were vastly cheaper) had been more realistic and less susceptible to the lure of bigness for its own sake. Actually success eluded the DC-8 for many reasons, starting with Douglas Jnr. He decided to build three different versions of its latest development (the Super 60 series) instead of just one. The company was stretched financially at the time and Douglas Jnr turned what had been an astute move into extravagance that his company could ill afford at a time when the new wide bodies were looming large on the horizon. Among the effects were confusion and production delays. The problems for Douglas came down to its two major projects. The DC-8 and the DC-9. The DC-9 became a victim of its own success. During the latter sixties it was actually selling faster than it could be made. The Douglas delivery schedules painstakingly put together fell apart and airlines began to complain. One company, Eastern Airlines, sued for late delivery and collected. The Vietnam war also aggravated production by creating a shortage of major parts, such as engines and brakes, plus materials and skilled labour. At the same time Douglas was offering three new versions of the DC-8.

Quite apart from the heavy costs of custom building aeroplanes, Douglas was overwhelming its production base with too many models. However, the deepening gravity of the situation was overshadowed by the demand for the DC-9 and over optimistic forecasts for the stretched DC-8. There were also problems with the accounting procedures used by Douglas. The new President had introduced a system whereby Douglas hid the large development costs of new aeroplanes. lnstead , of being shown in current expenses, the costs appeared as deferred charges, to be written off gradually and in harmony with receipts. These procedures were also used by other aerospace companies, such as Lockheed and Rolls-Royce who were actually tracking for bankruptcy via the Tristar. Boeing, as had Douglas Snr, used the traditional methods and were aware of the increasing costs and were thus not really affected. But for Douglas, there were major problems. These included a gross misreading of the state of affairs. Only nine months before the merger with McDonnell, Douglas Jnr was quoted as saying the company was “In one of the most satisfactory phases of its history”.

By October of 1966, Douglas’ banks were losing confidence in the company. By December, bankruptcy seemed likely: the company’s own underwriter reported that a merger was necessary.

On January 13, 1967, the Douglas Aircraft Company merged with McDonnell. Under the new management, there were various other possible developments put forward in the late 60s and the early 70s, principally the 70 and 80 series. But the decision was made to kill it in favour of the DC-10 wide body Trijet. It was believed that the elderly design could no longer compete with the newer designs coming out from Boeing and Lockheed, namely the 747 and the L1011 TriStar. DC-8 production thus ceased on 12 May, 1972, with McDonnell Douglas completing delivery of the company’s 556th aircraft.

Flying Again

On April 15, 1981, the new DC-8-71 made its first flight. By 1983, the ‘new’ DC-8 began appearing in the skies. The Super Seventy Series are really re-engined series 60 DC-8s. The ‘new’ DC-B’s operated using Snecma CFM56-2-1C turbofan engines, the retrofitting of which involved approximately 110 DC-8-60s. The retrofitting involved aircraft for both passenger and freight configuration. There was no passenger capacity increase for the DC-8-61 and 63 in the transition to DC-871 and 73 but the range was increased dramatically from 6,210nm (11,500) and 7,641nm (14,150km) to 6,696nm (12,400km) and 7,884nm (14,600km) respectively. The new engines also helped boost the range of the already longest ranging DC-8-62, from 13,860km to 16,000km in the DC-8-72 retrofit. In addition to the range increase, the new engines are both significantly more fuel efficient and quieter. The first customer for the new series was United Airlines, having 30 DC-8-61s re-engined and redesignated, DC-8-71.

It is easy to look back in hindsight and criticise what one sees, but the DC-8 probably would have been profitable but for some questionable decisions by management, especially the decision to kill it in favour of the DC-10.

During its run, the DC-8 gave an admirable performance, in fact in the later years the DC-8s, especially the Series 60, were seen to be about the best moneymakers and the most versatile long-range passenger aircraft in the business- short of the wide bodies. It may have added to the downfall of the Douglas company but, when first produced, it returned what it could in the face of very strong competition.