Recce

Our own situation though is rapidly becoming critical with exCAS, Air Marshal David Evans recently quoting that while the average RAAF pilot attrition rate over the past two decades prior to 1983 was 42, the attrition rate for 1984/85 was 60, for 1985/86 was 70, 1986/87 was 107 and for the first five months of fiscal 1987 it was a horrid 75. And horrid it is, because nowadays even the crack F-18 squadrons are losing pilots to civilian life, something that would have been unimaginable not so many years ago.

The reasons for the exodus from the ADF, which is now topping 10% annually and will see half of its personnel leave over the next five years, are many and have been well documented (refer Reece Nov AA) in previous editions of this and other publications. That there are solutions to the current problems is obvious, it is just that the existing Defence hierarchy – the Chiefs, the senior Defence bureaucrats and the two Ministers responsible don’t seem willing, interested or in the least sincerely anxious about the disaster that is rapidly taking hold within our defence forces.

One such solution is simply to do what the Americans, Swiss and a number of other nations do – simply retain that vast pool of expertise via a properly organised reserve flying organisation. This of course is not new to Australia. We had a very effective and capable flying corps within what was then known as the Citizens Military Forces (CMF) from the nineteen twenties right through to the late fifties. The weekend warriors acquitted themselves with distinction during WW2 and the units were only disbanded as more technically advanced aircraft (the CA-27) began to replace the CMF’s Mustangs and Meteors of the fifties.

Nowadays though the picture is a little different. , According David Evans, it costs $1. 1m to train a pilot to graduation level and at least $1. am to full F-18/F-111 status. A further $1m is expended each year (conservatively) in honing his skills so after a decade’s service, it is not inaccurate to say that our young Squadron Leader has now absorbed training and expertise to a value approaching $12m in then year dollars! Nowadays a growing proportion are choosing to leave and with them goes that irreplaceable fund of talent, experience and capability that converts a modern tactical aircraft from just a collection of superplastics, titanium and electronics to a state of the art fighting machine. Without a highly trained personnel structure, both in the air and on the ground, the weapon system is just so much garbage – a succession of Middle East wars has proven that time and again.

Wouldn’t it be better if that departing pilot was still able to be included within the RAAF’s pool of expertise by flying in special part-time Reserve units? And for one moment we don’t suggest that the fast jets (18 and 111) be included in this scheme, they are simply too complex and expensive to be operated by pilots who might be flying less than a hundred hours annually on type. What we are saying is that active Reserve pilots, who now fly full-time with the airlines and in areas of GA, could more than adequately fit into the right seat of an Orion, a 707, Herc, 748, or Caribou in addition to becoming instructors on CT-4s, Macchis and PC-9s. Additionally, there would be no conversion training required if the departing RAAF pilot remained flying the aircraft he was lastly current on. If the conversion was required, surely it is not too big a job to convert across a chap who is flying Boeings for a living from say, an Orion to a Caribou. (I could personally think of a score of frustrated domestic jet skippers who would just love to come to grips with tactical flying again aboard. a Herc or Caribou)

One of the many good things about living in Canberra (perhaps Australia’s most misunderstood city) is that you get to constantly mix socially with a lot of military air crew, both serving and retired. Almost all the ‘retired’ pilots got out because they had come to the end of their practical flying careers, a fact that even now DOD still doesn’t seem to appreciate. However, the majority, irrespective of their current employment would dearly love to have the opportunity to contribute something to the RAAF in·the way of active Reserve flying. Performed to similar guidelines as the existing Reserve units in all three services, this should provide no real problems that couldn’t be overcome by a modicum of logic and flexible thinking. The benefits are vast in that the crew-short squadrons and training units would then have a reserve of backup manpower which, spread through the squadron, would alleviate the present overworked situations that are one of the reasons aircrew morale drops in the first place. This is particularly relevant to the Maritime Wing at Edinburgh where there always seems to be one or two Orion crews less than is required even to satisfy peacetime obligations.

What we are saying isn’t radical, it was successfully employed in Australia for nearly a half-century. It is very successfully employed throughout the USA and by Switzerland while a number of other nations have variations of a flying reserve.

Whether or not it ever gains impetus in Australia though must depend upon a flexible and forward-thinking political leadership, reporting to an enthusiastic and laterally thinking command structure ruled primarily by the military and not a population of concrete-minded bureaucrats. That this situation doesn’t reflect the circumstances of Australia in its 200th year, is more the tragedy.