Defence Update

It also recommends a greater role for the Defence Minister and Parliament in the formulation of Defence policy and at least a revision of the time-consuming and often confrontationist Defence committee system. Further, it advocates that the Joint Force System, not long introduced, be expanded to include two ‘theatre’ or functional commands, a Ready Reaction Command and a Home Defence Command.

There are a host of other recommendations which we will list later. There are also some critical comments about the way both the civilian and military senior level officials and officers have built up in the past 1 O years or less.

There is uncertainty about when Mr Beazley will make his formal response to Parliament but initial indications suggest little change this year in the status quo and that, if there are variations, they will be measured and unhurried.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade delegated its inquiry into the Management of Australia’s Defence to the Defence Sub-Committee chaired by Brisbane MP, Mr Manfred Cross which in two years produced a 450 page Report together with a table of contents, appendices, various tables, a foreword and summary of principal conclusions and recommendations.

Its terms of reference were ‘to investigate and report on the management of the Department of Defence and the Australian Defence Force with particular reference to:

(a) The determination, management and implementation of Defence policies; and

(b) The suitability of the existing Defence organisation for peace and war. ‘

The Defence Sub-Committee in the Parliament prior to July, 1987 comprised: Mr Cross (chairman), Senator David McGibbon, Senator Graham Maguire, Mr Peter Baldwin, Mr Graeme Campbell, Mr John Gayler, Mr Bob Katter, Mr Lewis Kent, Mr Ted Lindsay, Mr Michael MacKellar, Mr Ian Robinson and Mr Roger Shipton. The 35th Parliament’s Defence Sub Committee changed membership a little, dropping Messrs Baldwin, Campbell, Gayler, Kent, MacKellar and Robinson and adding Senator Grant Tambling, Senator Jo Valentine, Mr David Charles and Mr Bob Halvorson. The Secretaries to the two SubCommittees have been Mr P F Bergin (to October, 1986) and Mr P J Stephens. The Defence Adviser to the full committee, chaired by Mr Gordon Bilney (with Mr MacKellar as Deputy Chairman) is Dr G L Cheeseman.

The early reports of the Committee’s findings and recommendations positively glowed with possibilities. They referred to the original Cross Report of some three years earlier which comprehensively slated as inadequate the capabilities of the Australian Defence Force to meet low level threats and sustain a force in the field for even a short term. In part the Dibb Review, although later seen as missing the bus on certain strategic points, and then the Defence White Paper addressed many of the weak points that should be implemented over the next 15 years.

Unfortunately, although Minister Beazley insists that the basic scenario of the White Paper remains intact, a series of budgetary cuts, and mounting losses of highly trained officer and specialist NCO manpower have eroded that objective to some degree.

Now we have the second Cross Committee highly critical of the way Australia’s Defence apparatus is managed and recommending significant changes. In this it is strongly supported by most informed commentators, the Returned Services League of Australia, and, not unnaturally from the political perspective, by senior Federal Opposition spokesmen.

The RSL welcomed the report and urged the Government to take immediate action to implement its recommendations. In calling for the government to give serious consideration to the major recommendations, the ASL National President, Sir William Keys, expressed surprise about reports that the Defence Minister had already rejected the main recommendations. “It was surprising that the Minister could concede the need for major changes to the higher Defence organisation should a threat to Australia arise when he has done so much to encourage the joint force concept around which Australia’s defences are planned,” Sir William said. “The issue of Command and Control of the Australian Defence Force is one of extreme importance to Australia’s future security. For many years the League has criticised the organisational structure of Defence with its inherent conflict between military and civilian responsibilities for strategic planning,” he said. “The Report supports this view. ”

Sir William said the ASL specifically welcomed:

• The suggested Review of the distribution of power between the CDF and the Secretary, with the aim of ensuring the CDF was responsible for the operational element, the Department its enabling element.

• The proposed Review into the organisational arrangements affecting the relationship between the Defence Minister and his Department.

• The recommended study into the utilisation of the civilian and Service workforce, with the view to releasing Service personnel to operational or logistic support roles.

• The reduction of ‘top heaviness’ in the Defence establishment.

Sir William Keys said that “what we must all remember is that the Chief of Defence Force is a ‘Commander’, while the Secretary is an administrator. Inherent in the definition of command is the authority the CDF must exercise over subordinates and the responsibility for planning and employing resources in the accomplishment of assigned means. Command, as defined, also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale and discipline, so it is clear that the Defence Force must have a greater say in the setting of conditions of service,” Sir William added. He said “The recommended reviews and studies must be conducted as a matter of urgency. . . . Inaction could lead to increased disillusionment. ”

The Opposition Defence spokesman Mr Peter White said the Report was “a valuable contribution to the Defence debate and points the way to a leaner, more efficient Defence Force”. He noted that the Report was unanimous with the majority of the Committee being Government Senators or MPs. ”. It is to the credit of the Committee as a whole that the Report has been brought down in an unbiased and balanced way,” he said. “The Opposition agrees with the general thrust and strongly supports many of the recommendations”. He urged that some recommendations should be examined and implemented by the Government without delay. These included:

• Increased authority for the CDF, with emphasis on a more supporting role for the Secretary and the civilian component of the Department of Defence.

• The requirement for increased funding for manpower and training.

• A reduction in the number of senior uniformed officers and their civilian counterparts and more responsibility given to junior military and civilian personnel.

• A consolidation of the Defence procurement and material management processes.

• An examination of the current high wastage problem.

• Greater emphasis being placed on a Joint Headquarters in Northern Australia, the development of Joint Force operations, and the undertaking of more Joint Force exercises.

“The most important of the recommendations is to restore the authority of the Service officer in the Defence Force – an authority that has been whittled away in recent years,” Mr White said.

There are other supportive remarks that have been published and the foregoing simply reflect a cross-section.

However Mr Beazley late last year indicated he was relatively happy with the way the higher management of the Department of Defence and the Defence Force worked. He expressed satisfaction with the responsibilities of the Secretary and the CDF but admitted that if Australia were preparing for military hostilities, the present directive probably would be amended and could require further redefinition if anyone mounted a threat against Australia.

Hence there appears to be the attitude, ingrained at least for 30 years, that there should be civilian ‘control’ in the ultimate above the most senior military commanders. Although there have been, and may well be further refinements, this writer doubts if that will change.

What this means in effect is that whatever the fairly recent. quite recent and projected restructurings in the civilian and military hierarchies, major changes in the civilian-military top level arrangements are unlikely in peace-time.

Yet the Cross Report, for the main part, suggests this is not good enough. It believes, for example that the existing distribution of power and responsibilities between the Secretary and the CDF be reviewed and that the Ministerial directive to the Secretary and the CDF jointly be amended to give the CDF a role in the management and development of the Department’s staff, similar to that exercised by the Secretary in relation to Service staff.

The Cross Committee does not accept the view advanced by some within the bureaucracy that the Defence Minister should be responsible only for broad policy formulation. It advocates a review of the organisational arrangements affecting the Minister and his Department which would aim to increase the political participation and involvement in the Defence decision-making process. The need for additional Assistant Ministers. Ministerial and specialist support staff and the potential role of Ministers in the Defence committee system should be addressed.

The Committee would like to see the Defence Minister or an Assistant Minister chair the top-level Defence Force Development Committee, which at present comprises the Secretary and the four Services Chiefs.

The Defence Minister is urged to appoint an external management review body to examine and report publicly en the management effectiveness and organisational and structural efficiency of the higher levels of the Department. Within this, it suggested the Secretary should have an Under Secretary to assist in the administration of the Department. (something that would appear to be fully justified).

The Committee does not support assertions made in evidence that the Defence establishment in Australia has too many civilians when compared with other Western nations and that the civilian-to-military ratio is increasing. However there may be some evidence that Australian military personnel are being used to carry out functions that either could or would be carried out by civilians. “If it is true, this would represent both a waste of resources and a drain on our operational forces,” it notes and suggests this be the subject of a detailed study.

The substantial growth in rank levels in the Higher Defence organisation is highlighted. The Committee says that on the military side the number of two-star (Major General or equivalent) positions at Russell Hill (the central Defence complex in Canberra) increased from 19 in 1972 to 27 in 1986 while the number of one star (Brigadiers or equivalent) increased from 36 to 62. The overall number of senior civilian posts increased from 80 to 129. Further, in 1972 only 19% of the senior civilian positions were in the Level 3 to 6 range, but in the current organisation, this proportion has increased to around 35%. The Committees accepts there may be good reasons for these changes (ie heavier and wider tasks and responsibilities) but notes that they are contrary to the expectations of the Tange Report of the early 1970s.

“In our view there is some justification for the criticism that the higher Defence establishment has become too big and ‘top heavy’ and that it draws too many military personnel away from other duties,” the Report says. It recommends that: (a) the overall number of senior military and civilian appointments at Russell Hill (which presumably includes the Campbell Park and Anzac Park West buildings) be reduced; (b) the upper rank structure of the Defence establishment be ‘deflated’ by streamlining the present personnel structure. and delegating more authority and responsibility to middle ranking officers and officials. The Committee also recommends that the proportion of military to civilian personnel within the higher Defence establishment be reduced keeping in mind a need to retain adequate military input into the policy process.

The Report also examines comparisons of civilian/military ratios in the Australian, Canadian, United Kingdom and United States Defence Forces.

It is interesting, at this stage, to deviate from the Report and recall some points made by Senator David Hamer in the Senate on November 27, 1986. Speaking on the Dibb Report, he said that one of the things which causes vast friction between the military and the civil components of the Defence Department “is the adversary relationship which has been built up”. He said that nothing was more likely to provoke this than to have the recommendations of the professional officers second-guessed by a civil department which was not responsible under the same structure. He noted there had been an ‘explosion’ of senior ranks in the Services resulting from the amalgamation of the separate Service departments into the Defence Department and that one of the ‘bizarre’ results of the Tange Report was that the civil servants were given quasi-military ranks, ie Assistant Secretaries were described as One-star Officers or Brigadiers, First Assistant Secretaries were described as Two-star Officers or Major Generals and Deputy Secretaries as Three-star Officers or Lieutenant Generals. Senator Hamer said all this has had some very unsatisfactory structural effects on the Defence Force. For example, there was one Lieutenant General in the Australian Army and 10 quasi-lieutenant Generals among the Defence civil services. He said that the criterion was pay yet it had nothing to do with responsibility.

Senator Hamer gave a fairly recent example. He said there was a very important submarine project headed by a Commodore. “They wished to appoint an Assistant Secretary to his staff but according to the system you could not have an Assistant Secretary reporting to a mere Commodore, so the Commodore had to be converted to a Rear Admiral,” he said. “We now have 14 Admirals and 27 Commodores; 15 Generals and 45 Brigadiers; 12 Air Marshals and 29 Commodores.

The Navy fought the Second World War with 45,000 men, three Admirals and four Commodores. Now the Navy has 15,000 men, 14 Admirals and 27 Commodores. Worse still there is only one sea job for an Admiral and no sea job for any of the 27 Commodores. ”

“This is an absurd situation,” Senator Hamer said. “It has been caused by the linking of ranks of the Public Servants to the Servicemen and the requirement of equivalent ranks to serve on all those Joint Committees . . . . and had no sensible corresponding operational efficiency”. But the Senator admitted the system was not going to be easy to change.

The Cross Committee compares the rank distribution of civil officials and officers and gives considerable thought to what it calls ‘overranking’, but apart from recommending reductions in Canberra, it does not take further initiatives on this topic.

It shares the widespread concern over the relatively high and continuing wastage rates of Services officers and senior NCOs, suggests the annual separation rate of around 10% which has persisted for some years is likely to continue or increase for at least the next two or three years and considers the ADF can ill afford a continuation of the current separation pattern.

It recommends an examination of the problem and of giving priority to enacting policies that improve retention rates and attract key skills back into the Defence Force. The Committee itself is to inquire into this matter.

The Report advocates the enhancement of the Strategic and International Policy Division. The Defence White Paper is praised as a significant and timely advance in the approach to Defence policy-making in Australia since it provides broad political and strategic direction to the decision-makers. But this is seen as still insufficient to facilitate the development of the most appropriate Defence Force structure and the detailed capabilities that are needed to satisfy our basic Defence interests and objectives. The Committee therefore feels there is a need for a more comprehensive planning document. It sees inadequate control and direction, inadequate involvement of the CDF and HQADF, the predominant role of the Services and inadequate involvement of the Joint Force Commanders as current deficiencies in preventing Defence from issuing adequate Defence guidance in the past.

“It is also clear that the present process of formulating Defence guidance and selecting new weapons and capabilities for inclusion in the Five Year Defence Plan (FYDP) does not have the complete confidence of the military,” the Report says. “. . This lack of confidence is a major contributing factor to the strained relations between military and civilians within Russell Hill which in turn adversely affects the efficiency of the central policy process. The Committee expresses concern that the Force Development and Analysis Division (FDA) is being called on, or is seeking to play, a much greater role in the formulation of basic military concepts and the selection of competing military capabilities or weapons systems that it either should be or is capable of doing properly. ”

The Committee recommends that the FDA Division and other elements of Defence Central concerned with the development of Defence Guidance and the preparation of the Defence Program be placed into the HQADF under the control of the CDF.

It advocates the establishment of a Defence Guidance and Capabilities Committee (DGCC), chaired by the VCDF, to take over the current functions of the Defence Operational Concepts and Capabilities Committee and the Force Structure Committee. It recommends that consideration be given to making the CDF responsible, within the overall policy and resources constraints set by the Minister, for the development and implementation of Defence policy and guidance (as opposed to national security policy), the preparation of the annual Defence program, and day to-day management of Defence activities. It says there should be urgent consideration given to the development of a new Defence Capabilities Paper or Defence Guidance document.

The Report outlines deficiencies in the Equipment Acquisition and Project Management areas which it believes are contributing to excessive delays in the development and deployment of new weapons systems, unnecessary ‘cost overruns’ on individual programs, increasing pressures to spend more on the capital equipment vote in order to maintain existing force levels and capabilities, and an increasing concern over whether Australia is buying the right systems for its evolving Defence strategy. It calls for further reforms in the management and oversight of the acquisition of new equipments and weapons; the definition and selection of new equipments and weapons systems; and the control of the cost of the major capital equipment vote.

It recommends that the present ‘dual-hatted’ arrangements affecting the Chiefs of Materiel and the three Services be abolished and that the Materiels Divisions be made solely responsible to the Chief of Capital Procurement. Further that the Materiel Divisions be grouped with the remainder of the Capital Procurement Organisation in a single location. The Report also recommends that the three Service material divisions within the CPO be rationalised into a single organisation responsible for managing both minor and major Defence procurement projects, but that the Services continue to pursue the introduction of specialist career paths fur staff within the area of materiel acquisition and management.

The Committee considers that the senior post within the CPO should be open to both civilian and military officers, but that the span of control of the CCP is excessive.

Other key recommendations to arise in the Report include:

• That the CDF, within the guidance and policy constraints laid down by the Minister, be responsible for preparing a consolidated list of operational requirements and major equipment proposals for inclusion in the Five Year Development Programme (FYDP).

• That appropriate operational requirements and planning and policy staff be transferred from the single Services to HQADF.

• That the Defence Force Development Committee membership be restricted to the Minister for Defence (or Minister Assisting) as Chairman, the CDF and the Secretary and his principal financial adviser.

• That financial resources allocated to capital assets should be controlled so that hardware needs do not swamp other Defence activities and priorities such as manpower and operational readiness.

• That the Australian Defence Force be divided into two discrete elements – an operational element comprising HQADF and the appropriate Joint Force Commands, and a maintaining or administrative element providing combat ready personnel and assets to the Joint Force Commanders, and for raising, training, supplying and maintaining these basic assets in accordance with directions issued by the CDF and the Secretary.

• That Joint staff appointments be increased.

• That the possibility of establishing permanent ‘theatre’ joint force headquarters in the North and North-West of Australia be investigated (which it is).

• That the Joint Force Commanders be responsible only to the CDF and that rank parity be established between the Joint Force Commanders and the Services Chiefs of Staff.

• That establishment of a fully unified higher Defence organisa tion in Australia would have considerable advantages due to a more efficient and effective approach to Defence decision-making, reduction of the size of the higher Defence establishment which would release more resources for operational units and activities, and a more cost-effective use of Defence resources.

There is a lot more detail. What remains to be seen is what, if anything, will be done about this illuminating Report and its interpretations, inferences and intentions. Will it be left to gather dust in pigeon holes?

One contention is that the Cross Committee’s wide-ranging review would have been more realistic if it had called for evidence from the Secretary, the CDF and some other top officials and officers. However one imagines that, if not totally representative, the evidence given by Air Marshal Ray Funnell on April 23, 1987, should have been reasonably reflective of higher joint command thinking and that of the various Deputy, First Assistant and Assistant Secretaries who gave departmental views. Representatives of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and of the RSL also gave extensive evidence and there was a host of documents available for reference.

Perhaps it might be better in future if the Secretary, CDF, Service Chiefs and some of the departmental Deputy Secretaries were asked to make submissions and give evidence at future Parliamentary Defence Sub-Committee hearings. Whether this would make a great deal of difference is difficult to evaluate.