Interview with Jake Newham

JN: First of all the total loss of manpower is not in that order. It’s risen a few per cent from the average of 9% but the percentage has been below the average for the past two years and then of course that backlog caught up in the last year. Pilot wastage is very high, about two and a half times the ten year average for this last year.

What is being done about it? We’ve stepped up production in all our training establishments. We’ve always had a loss to civil industry and indeed we’ve seen ourselves as a major contributor to the industrial strength of this country; Defence contributes a lot more than the average taxpayer realises.

Some of our engineering officers and some of our doctors are leaving at a higher rate. In the technical area we can hold up as long as we can retain a good number of officers and senior NCOs, the older heads. The latter are the glue that keeps the whole organisation together. That was why I was very disappointed in the service allowance award. It doesn’t give proper recompense for the long hours of work and the responsibilities and technical qualifications of top people.

Pilot retention is a difficult area because there is a strong worldwide demand. The United States alone is looking for 6,000 new civil pilots this year. The Norwegians, Canadians, Swedes, the British and the New Zealanders are in the same position. The New Zealanders and the British have introduced draconian measures. I was reluctant to do that as a means to hold people. Incentive bonuses and pay is a better answer.

I don’t believe that an Australian serviceman should be treated any differently from anybody else in this community. There is a freedom within the community to be able to move. So the answer is for us to trade our way out of trouble and we’re doing that by stepping up the training rate. This does, however, lower our operational efficiency. The second step is to try to induce a few more people, particularly at the supervisory level, to stay on. And I hope that aircrew pay rates, which are being looked at by the Review Tribunal of Pay Review Tribunal, will recognise their special qualities and the tremendous investment placed in their training. They’re very expensive commodities and to pay out a few thousand dollars a year to pilots to retain them makes economic sense to me.

JT: Airline pay rates are of course a sizeable attraction, though we feel the primary reason many pilots decide to leave the Services after the 20 year term is that they will most surely be grounded before their 40th birthday, just at a time when most of them feel they have reached their peak. This and the spectre of moving continually from one desk job to another, just at a time when they have come to grips with the task, is perhaps also just as mentally demeaning to what are highly trained and educated professional flyers. Why does the air force ground its aircrew at such an early age, knowing full well that this is a significant reason for their choosing to go civil, and why are so many people immediately transferred as soon as they have gained operational expertise in their tasking?

JN: I don’t like the term ‘grounding’. We don’t actually ground people. We do transfer pilots to ground jobs and indeed those jobs and the whole operational structure of the air force cannot operate without the benefit of people who are very experienced in the field to influence the planning and operational activities. I don’t agree that any of those jobs are demeaning. A lot of the pilots enjoy them very much. They enjoy the break. They are career air force officers – a thing sometimes forgotten when our flying training system is being looked at; we’re not just training pilots we’re training career officers for the air force.

Notwithstanding a lot of pilots just want to fly.

We try to accommodate them as best we can. We’ve always had pilots leaving the Air Force for the civil airlines or other forms of aviation; that will always continue and we’ve accepted ii as long as we can get a reasonable return of service from the Nation’s investment. The career people of course, do accept the need to pull shift in ground jobs.

I remember leaving 3 Squadron as the CO in 1968 and thinking that’s the end of my flying and feeling very sad about it. I later got two full flying posts after that at more senior levels. With the new operational command structure developing in Operational Command there’s plenty of scope for senior aircrew to fly. Some indeed need a rest from the type of flying that we do in the services. It is rigorous.

Why are people leaving? There is no single answer to cover all cases. The money available outside is a major attraction; other reasons can aggregate to trigger the decision to move on; and these apply across all ranks and musterings. Firstly, housing has long been insufficient and below standard; I hope the newly formed trust gets the funds and impetus needed. Secondly, there is a reasonable expectation now for one’s wife to work; frequent moves and isolated bases frustrate these aspirations. I’ve found talking to pilots who quit that there’s rarely a single reason.

JT: Some of the most competent and professional of air arms – the USAF, USN and that of Switzerland and Israel – operate highly effective reservist flying units. Why can’t Australia do likewise, just as it did up till 1960 when the popular CAF was disbanded? Surely it would be viable for ex-military civil reservist pilots to fly such types as Orions, Hercules, Caribous and the 707s which would leave more full time aircrew for the more demanding !as!jet types.

JN: The United States is much larger than we are and the four services produce a tremendous amount of flying. I think our defence effort or our flying effort is about 5% of the United States which puts us into perspective. There’s not enough money for us to put into reserve pilots on a large scale and keep them current. We do have a few, we’re trying to sneak up on it and get more into the system operating with the reserve squadrons which are very valuable.

I would have liked to have built up the whole reserve and I’m quite sure my successor would like to do that too. However, it reduces to size of permanent units and money. There is a very fine balancing act in apportioning defence funds between manpower, operations and capital acquisition, that’s both capital equipment and capital facilities, and at the moment there is an emphasis towards the acquisition of capital equipment which means the operating side has had to pause for a while. I would hope that when some of the major projects are out of the way, that we could then build up our operational capability.

A point on pilots which I don’t think is readily appreciated. Those who have been in the services and currently keeping their skills alive are very valuable assets, national assets, and I’m sure that in a crisis a number could return to fly military aircraft. We must remember that Australia is a very aviation-oriented country and possesses a substantial air reserve; a lot of those pilots will be required in times of national emergency to do the jobs that they’re doing at the moment and also fly civil aircraft in support of Defence activities.

JT: From our own observations following an in-depth visit to study the Swiss Air Force and Swissair we recently noted that both parties actively work together to produce and retain a highly motivated and trained air corps. Why can’t the RAAF and the major Australian carriers form a similar relationship that would work to everybody’s long-term gain?

JN: Yes. We’ve only just started to talk to Qantas about this and to Australian Airlines. It’s under study. I concede the deficiency but something is being done about it by the Chief of Personnel, Air Vice Marshall John Paull.

Referring to the earlier question. I don’t know the Swedish or Swiss situation personally, I do though in Israel – the whole country mobilises when it goes to war. (The Swiss and Swedish situations are the same though fortunately they haven’t had to actually go to war in recent history. Ed). Their civil airline is government-owned owned and civil/military requirements are highly integrated. Unlike Australia, Israel has a threat, a real threat and they consequently maintain a high degree of operational preparedness. We don’t see the need for that at the moment. It’s very expensive and it’s probably the best extreme to look at when considering Australia’s position. I, therefore, can’t see the sense in maintaining a level of operational preparedness of that order when there isn’t a significant threat. It’s just wasting the taxpayer’s money.

JT: Your crew-to-aircraft ratio in most areas is now barely parity while to service any threat situation it really needs to be in the order of 2/1. Have you any comments on that?

JN: To get maximum use out of our very expensive capital equipment, we need many more pilots than we’ve got at the moment. We need many more technicians and if we were surprised we would have to adopt extraordinary measures to provide the correct crewing ratios. At the moment, we’re down a bit in the areas you mentioned.

The Orion situation is comfortable, though one more crew makes a big difference there in the amount of flying crews can handle comfortably: too little and they grumble; too much and they don’t have time to get on with essential study and personal administration; their home life is interfered with.

So that’s a bit of a balancing act, the F-111 and F-18 crews are too low. The change from Mirage to F-18 is costly in terms of training time. We will be able to plan a better balance when the transition is complete. If we crewed 2/1 we’d have to find much more money for ongoing operations.

JT: On to equipment. We believe the long-awaited avionics and systems upgrade for the F-111 is currently in the Project Definition stage, is this so and what extent of upgrade do you see these unique aircraft receiving?

JN: The primary objective is to improve the maintainability of the aircraft (refer p10, Sept AA). I’ve said in numerous forums that the number of sorties we can generate from one item of equipment is the biggest force multiplier I know. The F-111 analogue systems are old, they’re difficult to maintain and they’ve got to be replaced for that reason. I see this as a mid-life update or refit of the aircraft with digital systems to achieve the same sort of maintainability we get out of the main systems in the F-18. Basically we’re looking at digitising the nav/weapons computer, the radar and flight control computers. We will also change the associated test equipment aiming at fewer maintenance manhours per flying hour but at the same time we’ll improve the operational capability of the aircraft; that’s a bonus.

Modern weapon systems may be married easily to the aircraft because they themselves are digital. The Harpoon and Pave Tack (digital systems) are linked to the F-111 through complex analogue interface units. They work but it’s not desirable.

JT: Would this be basically the same as the US Air Force upgrade?

JN: I would hope the same. I also see significant scope here for Australian industrial involvement. It would take a very courageous decision to go solely Australian; even if we adopt the USAF upgrade or one of the American-designed systems, it will still allow a large Australian industrial/technological participation. The capability is certainly here to do that sort of work now.

JT: Do you think that later versions of the Hornet, with vastly expanded payload/range capabilities could ultimately replace the F-111 in the strike role?

JN: Well it might have to. But to do what the F-111 can do would require a big change to the Hornet in both its physical characteristics and its innards. For a start terrain following radar would have to be added. The Hornet is a very good aircraft and can cover a large percentage of the jobs that the F-111 can do. But at the moment it’s not an F-111, it doesn’t have the legs, it doesn’t have the payload capability. It certainly has the potential and I’ve heard that McDonnell Douglas is confident that an evolution of this aircraft will eventuate. You must remember that McDonnell Douglas has produced an attack version of the F-15 which is getting more into the F-111 category. I hope they do follow this up with a modified strike-optimised F-18; it would be a very efficient step operationally and from the management aspect to ultimately be able to eliminate one type in the inventory. The prospect seems a long way off; we presently have the F-111 with 20 years life left in it.

JT: The F-18 itself, how is it performing and have the recent reported problems with spares been accurately reported in the lay media?

JN: Operationally the aircraft’s doing everything we expected of it. It’s first class. It’s operational flexibility is superb and all the systems work extremely well. A number of the Hornet in both its physical characteristics and its innards. For a start terrain following radar would have to be added. The Hornet is a very good aircraft and can cover a large percentage of the jobs that the F-111 can do. But at the moment it’s not an F-111, it doesn’t have the legs, it doesn’t have the payload capability. It certainly has the potential and I’ve heard that McDonnell Douglas is confident that an evolution of this aircraft will eventuate. You must remember that McDonnell Douglas has produced an attack version of the F-15 which is getting more into the F-111 category. I hope they do follow this up with a modified strike-optimised F-18; it would be a very efficient step operationally and from the management aspect to ultimately be able to eliminate one type in the inventory. The prospect seems a long way off; we presently have the F-111 with 20 years life left in it.

JT: The F-18 itself, how is it performing and have the recent reported problems with spares been accurately reported in the lay media?

JN: Operationally the aircraft’s doing everything we expected of it. It’s first class. It’s operational flexibility is superb and all the systems work extremely well. A number of the  reported maintenance problems did arise from some pruning down during the various defence cuts. Pruning of the projects is not unknown and impacts directly on spare parts. Deficiencies have thus to be made up through the ongoing spares buys. As I remember it’s no different from the F-111, the Sabre and the Mirage acquisitions; we’ve always had this problem with bedding an aircraft down, with the best crystal ball in the world you still can’t forecast all the spares requirements. It means greater pressure on operating costs.

JT: And what will happen to the Mirage fighters as they are paid off in the coming few years?

JN: They will go up for disposal, although a number of institutions around Australia are after them as museum aircraft. There are a number of stories going around about enterprising companies who wish to take them on for sale but that would require a major refurbishment. It’s a very costly business updating such high time aircraft. And of course our usage is planned to take them up to a major servicing at the time we phase them out.

JT: The Committee structure within Defence central nowadays appears to be creating more problems than it solves. Do you think that a return to the pre-Tange days of air force office making its own decisions would be more productive, efficient and better for morale?

JN: The present system does cause some frustration, but I’m sure it’s here to stay. It’s too well established and in the main it works with reasonable efficiency but I don’t believe that it’s any more efficient than the system we had going in the 1960s when the Air Force embarked on some major projects without the benefit of the complex committee system. I thought we did rather well at it then. The Macchi and the Mirage came in on time and on cost and with excellent Australian industrial participation; I don’t see any project in my experience in recent times that’s done any better than that.

JT: There seems to be a fairly strong lobby in the Air Force for additional Hercules, would additional Hercules ultimately replace the ageing Caribou and the expensive to operate Chinooks or would these assets be retained?

JN: Yes. I think it’s probably not so much within the Air Force but within the whole Defence machine. When an emergency pops up there just aren’t sufficient C-130s. I did elude earlier to the civil air reserve, I think in an emergency it would be very wise, given the tyranny of distance in this country, to immediately call upon assistance from the large civil fleets. But we could do with more C-130s to do the specialised jobs in both the strategic and tactical airlift areas. There’s a very small number of them when you consider the large country/ small ADF/dispersed operations equation.

There’s a school of thought that we should replace the Caribou with more helos on one side to give battle flexibility and with additional C-130s on the other. But the Caribou can operate into areas where C-130s can’t. The Hercules needs more in the way of.strip preparation, a few more feet, perhaps another thousand, and a stronger surface. A helo is more expensive. Though its old and slow and noisy, the Caribou is still a first class aircraft for the job that it’s doing and we’ll keep it going. We’ve looked a number of times at re-engining it, but that’s very expensive so we believe for the time being we’ll keep going with the R2000 radials. So yes, I believe that we should be looking at getting some more C-130s in the fullness of time.

We should also ultimately replace the Caribou as a battlefield type transport, ie. one useful in redistributing people and supplies from airheads within the battlefield; the Caribou is about the right size. The C-130 would be an overkill for that sort of job.

One obvious solution that pops out is that the Osprey tilt rotor could replace both the Caribou and the Chinook; that might well be the solution. It’s a very interesting aircraft and it’s development is coming along very well. We’d need though to look very hard at doing the Caribou-type jobs with that sort of an aircraft. It’s going to be expensive to acquire and expensive to operate. However, the Osprey has a number of unique attributes which we should not overlook.

JT: Would you look at an aircraft like the DHC Buffalo, Shorts Sherpa or Casa?

JN: Yes. There are a number of aircraft around; there would be pressure to design/build one in Australia I suppose. However, I am against a fresh design when there are so many of those types of aircraft around. It’s a very small world market.

JT: Is the RAAF looking at an additional 707 tankers, and will any of the aircraft later be modified to carry the boom system required for tanking the 111?

JN: When the chips are down you can never have enough tankers. At the moment four is pretty good, gives us a very good potential and a very good capability particularly if we fit the boom to all of them, to really extend the F-111 ‘s capability. Two more 707s just for strategic airlift to free the competing demand on the tanker aircraft would increase our operational capability immeasurably. But there is nothing going on at the moment that I’m aware of. We just keep an eye out. The acquisition of 707 aircraft is quite inexpensive, but they’ve got to be maintained and crewed.

JT: There is a fairly powerful bomber, transport and fighter lobby within Defence Central but not really an equivalent for AEW. Notably AEW also has enemies in the Defence Science camp to ensure that Jindalee is allowed the funds it requires. In this situation how do you see AEW actually fitting into the context of our defence acquisition programme in view of the long-term spending crunch that Defence continually suffers from? Do you think we will ever get an AEW force?

JN: A complete air defence system would be quite deficient without airborne early warning. The ground infrastructure comprises Jindalee which is a wide area OTHB radar system and intelligence collector and potentially very valuable. Then there are the ground based microwave radars around our vital areas which are essential parts of the system. The Navy’s contribution is important also, warships have good radar systems which can be integrated with the air defence system (indeed we seek their participation in our exercises). The next element is airborne early warning. It is the only way to get an assured look-down capability with a reliable microwave radar which can be linked to the ground-based system and move quickly and react quickly both in a strategic sense and in a tactical sense when it might be under threat. AEW&C is the essential ingredient if we’re at all serious about the air defence of Australia and knowing what goes on in our own sovereign airspace. It is a pity AEW is seen as a threat to 0TH developments and a greater pity that 0TH is presented as a panacea. I do not personally support either view.

Mini Newsdesk. . .

New Agile Falcon Could Hamper Development of Rafale and The European Fighter Aircraft:

Following US Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger’s recent announcement that the US would have to place a higher priority on upgrading existing assets rather than developing costly new systems, both General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas have released plans for upgraded versions of the F- 16 and F-18 that would ultimately compete heavily against the development of France’s Dassault Rafale and the EFA.

The GD proposal is designated Agile Falcon and involves rewinding the existing F-16 airframe with a resultant increase in wing area from 300sq ft to 375sq ft, a move that would bring the wing loading back to around 68Ib/sq ft or the same as for the original F-16A. As the Falcon has developed it has also grown heavier and more complex with the result that it has lost some of its much publicised manoeuvrability. The Agile Falcon programme aims to not only recover this manoeuvrability but to also introduce new lightweight composite airframe sections with a vastly upgraded avionics suite and an even more powerful and fuel-efficient F110 engine from General Electric.

Agile Falcon is expected to be operational by 1995 and could become a joint development and production programme in concert with the four NATO nations (Belgium, Holland, Denmark and Norway) as these countries have expressed a requirement to replace or upgrade their existing early model F-16As during the latter nineteen nineties. If this should eventuate, and the Europeans are presently actively discussing the programme with GD, then it could scuttle the chances of either of the new European fighter aircraft being purchased by these air arms.

France is committed to the acquisition of the Rafale and Italy, West Germany and Britain are sponsoring the EFA programme though they could be induced to join the Agile Falcon programme if the terms were satisfactory. Whatever happens, the US move is seen as a destabilising influence on the EFA programme at a time when it is fighting for funding to even get to the initial development stage.

The other aircraft slated for development is our own F-18 Hornet. MDC have been promoting the concept of a Super Hornet for some time though at presstime full definitive data on the precise extent of the upgrade had not been released. MDC have been holding discussions with Hornet operators, including Australia, as to the possible joint involvement of these nations in the proposed development programme. If the Super Hornet gets the go-ahead then it too will be actively marketed in the European environment. It is expected that full details of the proposed programme will be available by year-end.