Battlefield Helicopters for the Army?

Some of the more astute army officers around the world, including our own Lieutenant Colonel Richard Williams (later Air Marshal Sir Richard Williams), realized that the strategic bombing and air defence roles were not entirely relevant to Army. They believed that the Army, primarily concerned with the conduct of the land battle, would not give priority to the development of aircraft for other roles and that therefore the full potential of the aeroplane would not be realised. Consequently, they sought the creation of a new Service to develop the doctrine and techniques necessary for the employment of the aeroplane specifically for the conduct of war in the air. That they were successful is a matter of record. The Australian Air Force was raised on the 31st of March 1921 and we, as a nation, are indeed fortunate that it was. There was, however, one unfortunate result of the raising of the new Service. The decision was taken that all aeroplanes should in future be owned and operated by the fledgling air force. What was not appreciated at the time was that the use of the aeroplane as a fighter or bomber had not made its other Army tasks obsolete. It was simply not recognised that the new roles were additional, but not replacement functions. And just as Army may not have given a high priority to the development of a strategic capability, because this was not directly relevant to Army’s role, so the Air Force has not over the years attached a high priority to the development of its Army support capability. Thus viewed as a whole, the defence force had fixed one problem at the expense of another.

While we were not at war, this lack of Army aircraft probably did not seem to be a major problem and undoubtedly it saved money at a time when money was in very short supply. However, during World War 2, the Army was again in the field and as history records, without much air support particularly in Greece and on the Malay Peninsula. Consequently, army cooperation units were raised to try to redress some of the problems, but Army never regained the basic capability it had during the Great War to be able to see beyond the next ridge’ until the raising of 16 Army Light Aircraft Squadron in 1960. (There had been two half-hearted attempts to provide Army with aviation support during the period 1950 to 1960, resulting in the raising of 16 Air OP Flight (RAAF) in 1953 and a new Army unit, 1st Aviation Company. Using civil chartered aircraft, in 1957. Neither of these ventures though proved to be an adequate solution to the problem. ) The new unit was raised at Amberley and relied very heavily on Air Force support, but gradually the RAAF presence in and control of the unit and its successors, diminished to the point where the Army Aviation Corps is now a fully-fledged flying organization, relying on Air Force only for such aspects as ab initio flying training, some instructor flying training (fixed wing only) and those logistics and engineering functions best conducted centrally by a joint staff. The Corps now flies and maintains in excess of 70 aircraft, both fixed and rotary winged, single and twin-engined. It is in its own right a viable aircraft operating arm. Just as the balloon and later the aeroplane had a significant impact on land force capabilities and consequently on tactics, organizations and operating procedures in earlier years, so the helicopter offers the same quantum leap in capabilities for the army of today. But the helicopter is no more relevant to the conduct of war in the air than the strategic bomber was (or strike aircraft today are) to the conduct of land operations. The battlefield helicopter of today is not an air asset. It contributes nothing to air power, but it can contribute much to ground power if properly employed. Just as it was earlier considered by Army aviators such as ‘Dickie’ Williams that the full potential of the aeroplane in a strategic sense would never be realized while it was operated by a Service preoccupied with the land battle, so the potential of the helicopter is unlikely to be realized while it is owned and operated by a Service quite properly preoccupied with the air battle. Development of its full tactical capability will under those circumstances never command the high priority needed in this era of financial constraint.

Were the helicopter capability to be properly developed, the operating units would be organized, trained and equipped to take their place within the land force, with which they would be arranged. But this is not currently the case. The operating units are not trained or organized to become part of the land force. The commanders and pilots are trained to play their part in the air battle. Only Army trains its commanders and pilots for the land battle. The resource is not arranged with that element of the Army (the ODF) which it must be prepared to join in the event of conflict occurring. Neither is it located in one unit, despite the fact that the entire resource is required to provide the most basic capability, the lift of a single company group.

At the recent ANU Conference on Air Power in the Defence of Australia, it was suggested that the best solution to the present question of who should own the battlefield helicopter fleet would be to raise a joint unit, which would remain nominally Air Force, but which would employ some Army personnel. Others have suggested that the best solution is to retain the asset in the Air Force, but allot it under the operational command of the land force commander when needed on the battlefield. Both of these suggestions are at best ‘band-aid solutions and merely distract attention from the fact that for a resource to achieve its full potential under stress, such as in combat, it must be properly trained, organized and equipped for the job in peace and it must be instantly available and totally responsive to the commander who needs to employ it. Our whole defence structure is based on the premise that a commander should be given the tools he needs to fulfill his responsibilities except in the case of battlefield helicopters.

A number of reasons have been put forward for not transferring ownership of the battlefield helicopters to Army.

At the ANU Conference, a senior RAAF officer asked what it was that Air Force was doing at present that was so terribly wrong that it demanded a change in responsibilities. But this question is not relevant. Instead, one should ask what is so terribly wrong with Army that it should be prevented from receiving the assets it so clearly needs to perform its allotted tasks? It was also argued that it would be costly to transfer the asset. No doubt Lieutenant Colonel Williams and his peers were frequently confronted with the same argument, but fortunately it did not prevent the raising of a new air force, albeit with gift aircraft provided by Britain. Others have argued that the provision of a trooplift capability has always been a RAAF responsibility and should therefore always remain with RAAF. This argument however is blatantly simplistic. If it were valid, there would be no room for change. Tanks on today’s battlefield would continue to be manned by Navy and all aircraft by either Navy or Army. There would be no Air Force. The simple truth is that no country of our size can afford to allow money or effort to be wasted in its defence and the assets should be distributed and redistributed if necessary, to Services on the basis of requirement for each Service’s role.

An equally simplistic argument would suggest that since Army is currently responsible for the refuelling of all aircraft in the field, it should be given the aerial refuelling tankers. However, Air Force would of course rightly point out that the tankers are essential to the conduct of their long-range missions and they could not operate effectively if they had to rely on another Service to provide such critical support. And this is of course quite valid. No one who has thought through the issue would suggest that an external agency, no matter how brilliantly it might be able to operate the tankers, could provide the same degree of responsiveness as a specially organized and trained organic asset. And so it is with the battlefield helicopters.

No amount of goodwill can equal adequate training and adequate training for the land battle begins as officer cadets, learning first to be riflemen, machine gunners, etc before learning to command, so that the implications of one’s future actions are well understood. It continues after graduation with a normal progression of career courses, all designed to better equip the officer to take his place in the land battle, whether as a pilot, a staff officer, or even as a unit or formation commander. But it is more than that. It is also the development of a state of mind and a sense of team spirit. in which the aircrew are very much members of the same team as other soldiers. They live in the same conditions as other soldiers (in the area in which they are deployed), they do their stint as duty officer, play their part in the defence of the area and knowing from first-hand experience the extreme physical demands placed on their walking brethren. They ensure that nothing they do adds to that burden. They understand when the hastily prepared pad is not quite up to specifications, or the patrol is a little late at the appointed rendezvous. But in the event that problems do occur, the members concerned can be quickly and effectively corrected, since they are members of the same Service.

Some people argue that we as a defence force are moving closer towards Jointery’ and that therefore it should not matter who flies the helicopters. The people who offer this view are those who argue most strongly that the helicopters should remain with the RAAF. Nevertheless, there is on the surface some merit in the argument. We do all have the same overall aim and it should not matter. History on the other hand is replete with examples of personality clashes, or sheer bloody-mindedness, which prevented adequate support from being provided, even in war. There can be no place in a defence force for an organizational structure that allows the effectiveness of a critical resource to be wholly dependent on the goodwill of the personalities involved if there is an alternative structure available. In this case, there is the possibility of transfer of the asset to Army.

One final argument put forward by some is that it makes perfectly good sense for all aircraft to be owned and operated by Air Force. Presumably, this would also mean that all watercraft would logically belong to Navy and all equipment not in the categories of air or watercraft and their crews, would belong to Army. But Air Force has its own air-sea rescue sections, probably because it believes that it needs to own the assets to ensure that they are adequately trained, organized and equipped for the role and that they attach the required degree of priority to the task. Similarly Air Force owns a great deal of wheeled equipment and Army owns some air and watercraft. This seems to indicate that the logical solution is to allot resources on the basis of what the individual Services need to fight their respective battles at sea, on land and in the air.

There can only be one valid reason to allot any resource to one Service or another and that is operational effectiveness. If the availability and standard of organization, training and equipment is critical to one Service for the conduct of its operations, there can be no doubt that resource is required to be organic to that Service. In a defence force as small as Australia’s, there can be no room for antagonism between the Services. As Air Marshal Funnell pointed out at the ANU Conference on Air Power in the Defence of Australia: ” “Nothing could be so destructive of the developing notion of a single, coherent and integrated Australian Defence Force as a protracted struggle between the Services over roles and missions. ” Our aim should be to develop the overall force to achieve maximum effectiveness and we should not baulk at unpalatable but necessary changes. There should be no question that all battlefield aircraft should belong to Army, just as the tactical fighter force, the strike reconnaissance force and the long-range transport aircraft should belong to Air Force. However, it will take a willingness to subjugate the individual Service aspirations to the broader needs of the ADF as a whole for this to occur. References: (1) Ball, Dr Desmond, ‘Conclusion: The Future of Air Power in the Def. ence of Australia’. Page 31.

Major Wesley-Smith is presently the Staff Officer Grade 2 (Air Mobility) within the Directorate General of Army Development in Army Office, Canberra. Originally enlisted as a National Serviceman in 1967, he was trained as a helicopter pilot and has held a wide range of regimental appointments within the Australian Army Aviation Corps, culminating in command of 171 Command and Liaison Squadron in 1980/81. He attended the Army Command and Staff College at Fort Queenscliff in 1982 and spent two years as an instructor in tactics and war administration at the Land Warfare Centre at Canungra. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect Army policy.