Defence Update

In other words it is not, as some have interpreted Ministerial Consultant, Mr Paul Dibb, as inferring a question of having only OTHA in perhaps two and eventually four sites, or Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, about which the RAAF is now considering a spate of proposals it invited months earlier.

In July RAAF F-18 Hornets were used from Port Hedland, WA to ‘intercept’ F-111 strike jets acting as ‘enemy’ intruders to provide data on just what Jindalee could provide by way of information for our new interceptors.

In his speech at the Air Power dinner, the Defence Minister, Mr Kim Beazley confirmed the Government’s intention (announced in December, 1985) to develop the experimental Jindalee system into an operational system. “Further OTHR sites may be approved in future years if it is shown that orientation of OTHA to the north west, north and north east can provide effective radar coverage of our vast northern approaches,” he said. “There is still some concern, however, that OTHA, by itself, may not prove to be the panacea for the problems associated with acquiring adequate tactical information over the sea-air gap to our north. OTHA has a great advantage over conventional radars of not being limited in range by the curvature of the earth (it bounces signals off the ionosphere) and this enables detection of aircraft and ships out to more than 1000 nautical miles from our shores.

“Nevertheless even the co-ordinated use of, say, three OTHRs may not guarantee an effective barrier because of equipment limitations. Furthermore, there is some doubt that OTHA may not be as effective against some crossing targets as we would like. Perhaps the area of greatest controversy over the effectiveness of 0THR is not its ability to detect targets in the first instance, but to successfully vector our aircraft against these targets.

“It is insufficient to be aware of a threat without being capable of countering that threat,” Mr Beazley added. “If inadequacies in our control of the sea-air gap are confirmed and studies into this aspect are now going on in the Department, we may need to deploy an airborne early warning and control system. An AEW&C aircraft or platform, if found necessary, would complement our OTHA. The AEW&C platform would provide additional tactical intelligence and also would allow local control of countervailing assets. The system would provide the means by which broad-based information, say from the OTHA, could be refined sufficiently for an aircraft to effect an intercept. Such a system would need to mesh in with a national command and control network”.

The Minister then set out that manufacturers had responded to Requests for Proposals on AEW&C systems and this information on capabilities and costs would be linked with the departmental studies to allow the Government to come to informed judgements on the most appropriate capabilities to be acquired. He said he was not given to advocating high levels of redundancy in any aspect of A ustralia’s Defence Force structure but one candidate for a more generous attitude to redundancy (he was not talking about manpower but systems) “must be tactical surveillance. In the end it is the critical component of the technological fix for our geographic problem”.

“Hence OTHR and AEW&C should not be seen in hot competition. We can, however, afford to get AEW&C absolutely right before proceeding, given what we know of OTHR capabilities”. Mr Beazley has been a very strong proponent of Airborne Early Warning, so his speech to the Air Power Conference might be seen as being tempered by the Dibb Report which recommends deferral of the acquisition of AEW&C by a year to 1989-90, while evaluation of the proposals proceeds. As with a few other recommendations, this has raised the ire of the Air Force who believe the two systems are both complementary and necessary. (Other controversial topics which have seen the RAAF opposed to Dibb include the limited F-111 update, no support to provide in flight refuelling for the F-111s, the rejection of a strategic strike concept of deterrence and the ‘substitution’ of a Strategy of Denial and handing over battlefield utility helicopter operations to the Army). All this has seen the former Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal David Evans, spitting chips on a range of proposals, but notably about the shift from strategic style, delay in getting AEW&C and a downgrading of the F-111 strike aircraft.

One possible spanner in the Dibb proposals to possibly scrap the F-111s in the mid-1990s could be the acknowledgment at the Air Power Conference that the US Secretary of the Navy had so far ruled out a programme to fit improved F-18 s with all weather TFR (terrain following radar). Though the present terrain avoidance radar fitted to the F-18A is considered entirely adequate for low Intruder level strike has this mission mission with the the maritime environment. US Navy. Dibb suggested The A-6 acquiring 2 0-25 more Hornets to eventually replace the F-111 force.

A number of overseas companies interested in Australia’s  AEW&C plans presented papers to the Air Power Conference. We will look at some aspects later in this article. But firstly we should quote the current Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Jake Newham. Answering a question on Jindalee, he said: “At worst it is a very good . . . valuable . . . intelligence collector . . . (It is) a good cueing device. It may prove better than that and if it does provide intercept capability no one will be cheering more than the Air Force. ”

Air Marshal Evans was more pointed. Apart from saying it was to be hoped that Paul Dibb would move up from “his unsound strategy of denial to seize the initiative with aggressive action and surprise”. Evans suggested Dibb was ‘toying’ with an unproven Jindalee system and giving it a capability no other nation claimed. In doing so, he denied the proven AEW system. “I’m a great supporter of Jindalee,” Evans said. “I’ve given it full support all along. We need it to survey large areas and, when something is spotted, to put up an AEW&C aircraft. All I ask is that those pushing Jindalee be honest and admit it has some deficiencies. It will still not provide a stand-alone intercept capability”.

Dr Don Sinnott, Senior Principal Research Scientist with the Radar Division of the Electronic Research Laboratory at the Defence Research Centre, Salisbury SA, in an outstanding paper on Jindalee, argued that it was “grossly understating” the Jindalee OTHRs potential to consider it only as a trip wire which required other early warning systems to tell the RAAF where the enemy was. “OTHR can locate an intruder to a box of indefinite height with sides of the order of a few tens of kilometres and can plot the progress of this intruder,” he told the conference. But he admitted it had some deficiencies as regards accuracy and reliability at certain times and that it was an open question whether Jindalee could be developed to the point where it could vector F-18 fighters on to intruders.

Air Commodore (Ret) Tex Watson told the conference that no single sensor could provide the total surveillance needed. Watson, advocating a National Air Defence and Airspace Control System as the goal to satisfy national policies and meet national defence needs, has been conducting a study for the RAAF towards such an end.

This was in the context that the Australian (political} philosophy was to allow the enemy the first ‘hit’. Only then was Australia allowed the ‘second hit’. Therefore we had to stop an enemy being able to reach our shores. The discussion on AEW&C was spurred not only by the views of senior RAAF officers that the acquisition of say four airborne early warning and control aircraft was necessary for effective air defence and surveillance but by specific papers by major contenders who want to provide such systems. There also was discussion on the future role of airships and tethered balloons in the Defence environment.

The major papers came from British Aerospace with a proposal for an AEW derivative of their turboprop ATP AEW aircraft (Fokker have also submitted a proposal on an AEW version of the new Fokker 50 propjet), from Boeing Aerospace, proposing a simplified derivative of its highly successful E-3 AWACS, from the Lockheed Company with an AEW&C system incorporated in a P-3 Orion aircraft and from Grumman International offering an upgraded E-2C Hawkeye.

What is now going to happen following the closure recently of the receipt of invited proposals by the RAAF for airborne early warning and control systems is the elimination of quite a few of the proposals to a shortlist.

This may be about six months away. Then there could a funded study during which the shortlisted competitors made final proposals, including Australian Industry Involvement Packages and set down timetables and estimated firm costs. While we have no wish to dismiss any of the proposals at this stage and in fact do not have all the material available on which an assessment will be made, it is fairly clear the final battle is likely to be between Lockheed and Boeing as far as aircraft platforms are concerned. Though much will depend on final costs and All.

Although Lockheed has yet to produce a fully tested P-3 Orion fitted with all the required AEW&C systems, it is well down that path. It appears to have the advantage of having a platform that has commonality with the 20 RAAF P-3C Orions which carry out anti-submarine and maritime surveillance and reconnaissance missions from Edinburgh, SA. Senior RAAF officers certainly appear attracted to their proposition provided it is proven before long.

Boeing Aerospace has proposed a derivative version from its baseline E-3 AWACS which it says can provide a lower cost, long endurance AEW solution that is best suited to the immense areas to be surveyed in RAAF missions. It proposes that instead of the US Core E-3 which has 24 systems plus 1 O US systems with full maritime capability or the NATO Standard E-3 which has 18 systems the Australian requirements can be met by an E-3 with four systems and four displays. It also would be consequently reduced from 17 to seven. The display consoles would reduce from nine to four but full radar and maritime capabilities would be retained. The proposed RAAF aircraft would have CFM56 engines, a galley, six bunks, a large open space amidships (which could carry additional crew or equipment) and a lavatory. The only crew comfort facility missing from the standard E-3 would be six reclining passenger seats that can be provided if required. The proposed E-3, which could also be configured as a tanker, would have commonality with the four RAAF 707s in service.

The Lockheed proposal has now been slightly updated. In summary, Lockheed sees its latest P-3C AEW&C development as combing two principal elements, both proven in long service with the US Navy. These are the P-3 Orion and General Electric’s APS-138/145 radar which is the most recent update of the radar which has been the US Navy standard in the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye. The electronics include four identical tactical stations, each with a 19-inch colour display and appropriate controls and a fifth station provided for a mission technician. Space does not permit a complete survey of the main features of the competitors. But it should be noted that as an extra enticement, both Lockheed and Boeing are offering in flight refuelling capability with the AEW&C aircraft.

Costs being bandied about for four RAAF AEW&Cs range from around $500 to $1000 million but some of them relate to US dollar values and therefore are subject to considerable fluctuations. The lower the value of the Australian dollar the more expensive the programme becomes.

(Max Hawkins is the Editor of weekly DEFENCE INDUSTRY NEWSLETTER)