Air War In The South Atlantic

The bustle and activity at Yeovilton was incredible. I have never witnessed anything like it before, what with all the preparations, and the personnel and the stores that were being organised for delivery to Portsmouth and embarkation.

By 1600 hours, we were embarked in Hermes with eight instead of our usual five aircraft. The additional aircraft belonged to 899 Squadron, many of whom embarked with us. For the remainder of the weekend we helped store ship – officers and ratings alike, we all joined the long lines of men who were passing tons and tons of stores aboard. Whether food or equipment, it just disappeared into the ship to be stored in any available area. After storing ship to levels suitable to support an extended deployment 8000 miles away, Hermes and Invincible sailed with their escorts on Monday, April 5. A further three aircraft embarked during the weekend and the twelfth shortly after sailing.

After we left Portsmouth – and the departure was amazing with the shores black with people all cheering and waving, with banners flying – we settled down to the real work in hand. We all knew we had to ‘get up to speed’ on the enemy order of battle and get to know the type of equipment that would be ranged against us. Having established that, we then began to investigate the various counter-measures open to us and appointed groups of pilots to look into the areas likely to affect us. These groups reported back to the senior members of the squadron and the discussions were then taken a stage further, to provide a firm base for future training and other actions. The one thing we did find was that our training, even though orientated largely towards the NATO scenario, would stand us in very good stead to meet the threats we were likely to face in any action of the South Atlantic.

Having dealt with the theory, we then set about conducting a flying programme geared towards meeting the requirements of a campaign in the Falklands, to work up a number of experienced pilots and to familiarise the others who had less experience. One of the younger pilots had been taken from his Sea Harrier conversion course with less than 30 hours on type. Several others, although experienced Harrier pilots had just begun their ‘re-fam’ flying.

All the new pilots quickly achieved a satisfactory standard of deck operations and the ship meanwhile worked up to intensive rates of flying operations, typically 40 Sea Harrier sorties per day as well as operating antisubmarine warfare (ASW) routines and drills and flying the helicopters. By the time the task force arrived off Ascension Island, the pilots were in good flying practice in the attack role and had first-hand experience in the practical techniques of rendezvous and transit flying in large formations and in ship attack profiles.

Unfortunately, due to the large amount of air activity at Ascension, we were unable to practice ground attack missions while we were there. Departure from the island was more hasty than intended due to the sighting of what a look-out believed to be a submarine periscope. He was wrong, as it turned out.

Having sailed at action stations, the task force remained on a war footing with Sea Harriers maintaining an around-the-clock alert state. An alert state of one form or another was maintained by the Sea Harriers from that time until we once again reached Ascension on the way home. It was only two days after leaving Ascension on the way south that we made our first contact with the Argentine Air Force Boeing 707 reconnaissance aircraft and this became a daily event as they monitored our steady approach. We maintained a continuous combat air patrol of two aircraft by day and one by night once we reached latitude 35 South.

Each carrier had been allotted its own particular tasks and areas of responsibility. HMS Invincible was to provide CAP while we in Hermes undertook the ground support role. But it was not quite that clear cut as it turned out later.

We came to the first raid against Port Stanley on May 1. We launched all 12 Sea Harriers from Hermes in just under four minutes, nine directed against Port Stanley airfield while the other three, led by Lieutenant Commander R. Frederiksen, hit Goose Green. For the mission, the aircraft carried a variety of weapons. including cluster bombs. and 1000 lb direct action and air burst bombs. We returned on board to change over to the air defence role, launching the first aircraft less than 30 minutes after landing. We anticipated retaliation, but nothing happened. Hostile aircraft were observed on radar to the west of the task force, but none came further east than over the islands. Later that day events hotted up again and we had our first victory when Flight Lieutenant Bertie Penfold of 899 Squadron, shot down a Mirage. 801 Squadron had already got their first kill that day in which I believe there was a total of three engagements, two against Mirages and one against Canberras. In each of the Mirage engagements, two Sea Harriers and two or three Mirages were involved, the latter coming down from height, releasing their missiles head on at about a five-kilometre range.

All the approaching missiles were successfully evaded by the Sea Harriers, and in the resulting combats two Sea Harriers achieved confirmed kills on two Mirages. The three Canberras encountered had been detected by Blue Fox radar at low level, and were intercepted at between 500 and 1000 feet. One confirmed kill was achieved and a second Canberra was seen to depart from the area trailing smoke.

After this initial period of frantic activity, events became shrouded in Falklands fog- our first experience of several days of extremely poor visibility. Excitement during these days was provided by the need to operate in minimal weather conditions often with a cloud base as low as 200 feet and visibility at half a mile at the most. In these conditions, pilots were greatly assisted in approaching the ship for landing by the Blue Fox radc1r, one Sea Harrier actually recovering to the ship with visibility down to 200 metres.

After the first troops were put ashore on May 21, CAPs were established around the landing area, which Sea Harriers were not allowed to enter and where surface weapons could be used freely against any aircraft penetrating this inner defence zone. A factor during the landing phase was the excellent weather and visibility which, while providing super conditions for the landing, also provided good flying conditions for the Argentinians. Naturally, they took full advantage of these conditions and launched a considerable number of attacks. Numerous engagements between Sea Harriers and Pucaras, Skyhawks and Mirages resulted. Harriers were directed on to incoming raids by ships’ radar and then made visual acquisition. Only a limited number of autonomous Blue Fox detections of low-flying aircraft were achieved. All engagements involved hard manoeuvring, typically  550 knots at 50 to 500 feet. On sighting the Sea Harriers, the
Argentines usually jettisoned their fuel tanks and weapons and manoeuvred hard to avoid us. Air combat did not result, probably due to the devastating effect of the Sidewinder AIM-9L missiles at low level. In three engagements on May 21, five Skyhawk kills were confirmed, four with Sidewinder and one with guns.

The Argentinians appeared unable to sustain the remarkable opening effort of May 21 and the squadron was involved in only three other engagements, all against Mirage aircraft at low level. In the first clash, two Sea Harriers took on two Mirages and shot one down; in the second, four Mirages were intercepted by a pair of our aircraft and three were splashed. That was on May 24. Again, on June 8, two of our Sea Harriers took on another formation of four Mirages and splashed the lot – all of them confirmed. The total Hermes bag amounted to five Skyhawks and eight Mirages- all in air-to-air combat- and two helicopters and a sizeable number of Pucara attack aircraft shot up on the ground.

I think on reflection, it probably took the task force five or six days of actual action to break the back of the Argentine air attacks. We continued to fly CAPs, but when these were not required, we launched bombing raids on Stanley airfield.

During the phase in support of the landing operations, and indeed throughout the Falklands campaign, Sea Harrier availability was excellent. At least 12 out of 14 aircraft were available
each and all day with pilots flying double sorties, remaining in the cockpit between flights and regularly achieving four sorties per day, with often as many as eight aircraft in the air at any one time from Hermes alone. This was in addition to the regular night bombing sorties flown against Stanley.

When the RAF detachment from No. 1 (F) Squadron arrived on board, we were relieved of much of the bombing work. My recollections of their integration into the ship’s routine are that it went well and they very quickly settled in. Of course RN and RAF Harrier pilots share the same training- at least in the early stages of conversion to V/STOL – so we were also meeting some old friends. RAF pilots were also on exchange in 800 Squadron, flying Sea Harriers.

An interesting development following the securing of the San Carlos beach-head was the use of FOB at Port San Carlos adjacent to the landing area. This was an 800foot aluminium plank
strip with refuelling facilities and little else. Harriers launched from Hermes for CAP over the island, and as long as weapons were not expended and the aircraft remained serviceable, it could continue to operate on CAP by refuelling at this forward base. Often as many as six Harriers could be found at the FOB at any one time. Pilots encountered no problems in translating from ship to shore operations and back again. Indeed on one occasion the landing ships HMS Fearless and HMS Intrepid were used for refuelling purposes. The aircraft landed vertically and took on sufficient fuel from the two ships, enough to get them back to the carrier.

Commenting generally on the squadron and its personnel during the campaign, I would like to say that I am extremely proud of the way everyone performed their duties. And when I say that, I am not just talking about the pilots, with whom I work very closely, but also the engineers, technicians and ground crew who together make up 800 Squadron. The maintainers worked 12 hours a day for three months non-stop and there was never any indication of breakdown, either organisational or personal. The conditions under which the men had to work, and work efficiently, were uncomfortable at times, to say the least. It was a crowded ship and the decision to close off No. 5 deck and below for safety reasons meant that the personnel who would have slept there had to squeeze in anywhere they could.

The flight deck crew had to work in temperatures that dropped to freezing, or in a very damp atmosphere with winds across the deck of up to 30 knots, and often in total darkness. The aircraft exceeded all our expectations, and as a complete system, including weapons, the Sea Harrier proved it worked, and in very tough circumstances.

Having returned from the South Atlantic, the squadrons reverted to peacetime strengths and organisation. 899 Headquarters and Training Squadron now have their aircraft back, 809 Squadron, which was raised only for the hostilities, is now disbanded and the two frontline squadrons, 800 and 801, are back to normal. As a parting remark about the aircraft, I would say the Sea Harrier not and can not be all things to all men, but I consider it the outstanding success story of the Falklands.

Air War Over The South Atlantic is derived from John Godden’s excellent book, Harrier, Ski Jump To Victory. This book is available in Australia through Pergamon Press (Australia) Ltd, PO Box 544, Potts Point 2011, and selected book shops nationally.

Air War Over the South Atlantic Will Be Continued in the Next Edition of Australian Aviation. Don’t Miss It!