Defence Update

Before examining the involvement of the scientists in the TFF Fighter Force Project, it is necessary to look to the immediate future, and also to the history of the process to replace the Mirage Ill fighters acquired in the 1960s with the two-jet McDonnell Douglas F /A-18.

A US Navy team led by Captain Joe Cole was in Melbourne in April for another half-yearly Project Management Review with Australia’s Project team led by Air Commodore Hans Roser and Mr Peter Hider. Major items discussed included the scheduled handing over to the RAAF in the US in October of the first two Hornets from the McDonnell Douglas factory at St Louis, and operational and training procedures for RAAF air and ground crews.

Initial training of six RAAF aircrew and about 100 maintenance personnel is being undertaken in the USA. Some already are training with the US Navy. The two ferried Hornets will go on strength with No 2 Operational Conversion Unit (2OCU) at Williamtown along with the first of the Australian assembled fighters. A US Air Force C-5 Galaxy flew in two disassembled F-18s in crates to Avalon in Melbourne on June 6. The first of these -No ARF3 -which will be less disassembled than the other, will be re-assembled at the Government Aircraft Factories over four months.

It is planned that this aircraft will make its first test flight from Avalon on November 16 a historic milestone for the project. This plane will undergo trials out of Avalon until it goes to Williamtown in April next year to link up with the two ferried fighters to build up 20CU to handle Hornet conversion training.

No ATF4, the second of the disassembled planes arriving in the giant C-5, deliberately will require longer assembly procedures as part of the learning curve for the Australian factory workers, and will not come off the Melbourne production line until mid-1985.

The arrival of the disassembled F /A-18s (Australian subcontractor component manufacturing already is underway in some areas) and the handover of two Hornets in the US in October, represent something like an eight-year timetable since a RAAF ‘Request for Proposal’ to replace the French-designed Mirages was put out in November 1976. The TFF Project Office started work just before Christmas that year. The RAAF first expressed interest in replacing the Mirage about 1968 there was concern about the unknown fatigue life of the Mirages.

The formal Request for Proposal drew 11 responses from world aircraft manufacturers. This was reduced to six in 1977, including the British Tornado and the Swedish Viggen, and then to four contenders in 1978.

These were the Mirage 2000, the F-18L (a land-based version of the F /A-18 proposed by Northrop), the General Dynamics’ F-16 (later to be called the Fighting Falcon) and the F /A-18 Hornet. On November 21, 1979 the Defence Minister, Mr (later Sir James) Killen announced the selection would be reduced to two – the F-16 and the F-18.

The aim was to finalise the choice before the end of 1980.

But in September 1980, Sir James said that with an election likely to be called, he did not feel the final selection of the new fighters should be announced in the heat of the election campaign. That was a relief to many of the government’s senior advisers who felt they needed more time to evaluate some of the problems and uncertainties about both final contenders.

Sir James Killen told Parliament on December 4, 1980 that the decision would be deferred because it was ‘imprudent’ to proceed in the face of the advice of Professor Fink, and the Chief of Air Force Technical Services, Air Vice Marshal Rod Noble.

After more solid work by the various analysts and committees, Sir James Killen was able to tell Parliament on October 20, 1981 that the government had decided the F /A-18 would be ‘better suited to our needs.’

Professor Fink detailed the progress of the TFF Project in a paper delivered to the Royal Aeronautical Society (Sydney Branch) at the Sir Charles Kingsford-Smith Memorial Lecture on September 22, 1982 on the role of science and technology in the selection of the new fighter. It was little publicised at the time but remains an invaluable backdrop as the project begins to start to show more tangible results.

For example, it is important to remember, as Professor Fink recalled, that based on extensive studies and advice, Sir James Killen told Parliament that the government had to choose between two magnificent aircraft, both in their different ways are splendidly impressive and capable machines. However it has become clear that, in relation to (our) operational factors, the F /A-18 will be better suited to our needs.’

Sir James Killen did say in his statement that the overall project cost for the F-16 would have been some seven per cent less than for the F /A-18. However it is estimated that when we take account of running and support costs and of attrition throughout the life of the aircraft, this difference will be substantially reduced.

While outlining the vital functions of the Defence science input into the selection of the RAAF’s new fighter,· Professor Fink supports the notion that a machine must be made fully acceptable to its operator. ‘Full automation of tactical air appears to be well in the future. and pilot opinion continues to be a major determinant,’ he wrote.

‘Advanced technology is often ·cost-effective and often increasingly costly. We need to maintain critical skills in Australia to ensure that the right questions can be asked: Will it continue to work? Can we support it? Can we afford it? Can we afford to be without it?’

At the start of his lecture, Professor Fink compared the performance between the SPAD-7 (1916) and the F/A-18 (1982). The SPAD wing span was 25 feet. The F-18 spans 40 feet. The SPAD had a maximum take-off weight of 1550 lb, the F-18’s 52,000 lb. The SPAD had a maximum climb angle of 15 degrees as against the F-18’s 90 degrees. The SPAD had a top speed (level) of 120 knots. The F-18’s stated top speed is 1.8 Mach. Professor Fink said that in looking at the characteristics of the SPAO which he described as an early multi-role aircraft and what had happened since:

• Aeronautical engineering advances enabled an only 50% bigger machine to carry 33 times the weight and to fly at 8 times the top speed.

• Propulsion advances give us 65 times the thrust – even without afterburner – and enable vertical climb.

• Armament – with associated sensors – now include IR short range and radar-guided medium range air-to-air missiles – and the 20 mm rapid fire cannon for emergencies is all that resembles the Vickers gun. The ‘A’ for attack in F /A-18 refers to the presence also of conventional or laser-guided bombs, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, fuel tanks and additional sensors, suspended from nine external hard points.

• Instruments were minimal: altimeter, compass, airspeed indicator, rev counter, oil pressure and fuel gauge. Professor Fink considers one of the most profound changes has.

So the eventual Mirage replacement requirement added up for an aircraft which was versatile in several roles – against both air and surface targets, including particularly, maritime strike, and in all weathers. Professor Fink noted that the new fighters should have the potential for adding improved weapons and other systems as they emerged into air staff requirements.

‘If such a multi-role aircraft could be found, there would be obvious advantages, not only for operational flexibility but also in savings in logistic support, industrial investment costs and in a reduced burden on training programmes,’ he said in his paper.

‘DSTO rose to the challenges of the NTF selection so well that both the overseas aircraft makers in the final competition assured us that they had not had to endure such strenuous examination of their claims in any other countries in which they were bidding,’ Professor Fink recalled.

Most of the DSTO elements were involved. Overall System Performance was handled by the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) in Canberra with some help from the Aeronautical Research Laboratories (ARL) in Melbourne. CSE did a lot of work on operations research relating to mission effectiveness – aided by ARL work on aircraft performance in air combat manoeuvres and work on vulnerability and survivability in wartime as well as estimates of attrition in peacetime use.

In his lecture he outlined how a defence scientist was involved early in data on radar detection range, and later on radar compatibility of various medium range air-to-air missiles.

Other scientific participation and consultation followed.

An interesting point made by the Professor concerns why the Mirage 2000 apparently was dropped from the list of contenders. He said it was relatively easy to drop the Northrop F-18L as It was still something of a paper aeroplane. ‘The Mirage 2000 was a much more serious contender with many plusses,’ he contended. ‘But it was at a disadvantage in payload/range, a particularly important factor in the Australian theatre, and its radar was a source of concern. This was because a specialised radar needed to be developed for the air-to-air role and a different radar for the air-to-surface role to meet all levels of capability sought by the RAAF.’ he said.

In his paper Professor Fink summarised the problems of comparing the F-16 which then had just entered service with USAF, although not in the form Australia wanted, and the F /A-18 which had not even begun its service evaluation flying.

‘The F-16 was and is a splendid aeroplane. USAF thought so and so did the Norwegians, Danes, Belgians, Dutch and Israelis,’ he explained. ‘The F-16 concept concentrated on high manoeuvrability and thrust-to-weight ratio for air combat situations. In the air-to-surface role it appeared to meet or exceed most of the RAAF’s desired operational criteria, at any rate when fitted with a separate navigation and targeting pod ‘ ..The F-16 also appeared to be significantly cheaper than its rival .. . ‘

But Professor Fink said the brilliant performance he set out demanded certain compromises. ‘For example, extended radar detection ranges and all-weather air-to-air missile fit were excluded. In the air-to-air role, equipped with a gun and infra-red missile only, the then F-16 was limited to clear air-mass weapon management conditions and therefore did not meet the RAAF desired criteria for an all weather and beyond-visual-range air defence capability.’

He said the F-100 engine, while more economic, was emerging from a period of significant engineering problems and there were doubts about maintainability and durability. To answer these doubts, MSIP (a multi-national staged improvement programme) was on the way with the aim of providing all weather capability with medium-range missiles and appropriate radar improvements. The navigation and targeting pod and improved engine reliability looked feasible.

But one problem Professor Fink explained which added to the uncertainties was that MSIP, it was claimed, would eat up all space for system growth in the more distant future and that the environmental control system might not cope with the extra air conditioning load of the proposed avionic enhancements.

The F /A-18 was not as far advanced and had not passed through the US Defence System Acquisition Review Council processes (DSARC) of which three approvals were required.

Professor Fink said the aircraft was full of new technology such as digital fly-by-wire fight controls, massive use of carbon fibre reinforced plastic and ‘altogether too much seemed to be promised by way of better maintenance and reliabilty of airframe and systems not yet in service.’

Its structural fatigue life was unknown.

Feverish activity was maintained to meet the original 1980 final selection timetable, later extended by a year. He recalled the various pieces of ‘disquieting news’, funding, accident, inadequate roll rate and engine problems.

Professor Fink noted that the RAAF required a longer service life than the US forces, of fatigue testing requirements, and the use of new alloys and materials. In the early days before various fixes were incorporated the F-16 design experienced fewer design problems than the F /A-18. He revealed the ongoing analyses of the engines and sub-systems such as radar, avionics and ergonomics. Some of the detail on these aspects will be worth recording later.

As for the final (extra) year of assessment and evaluation, Professor Fink recalled that ‘one regretted at times that we could not recommend in favour of each of the contenders.’ The DSTO studies involved mission effectiveness, availability, reliability and maintenance requirements and attrition estimates.

He also mentioned the argument about the value of both single and twin engined fighter aircraft and concluded that ‘other things being equal, the second engine is worth having!’

Professor Fink revealed that in the end DSTO had 25 rankings on the contenders to present.

He said the heavy involvement of DSTO in the selection of the new tactical fighter put the Defence Laboratories ‘in a good position to give both Air Force and Defence Industry higher technological support for the aeroplane. This is a useful contribution to the Government’s aim for increasing self-reliance.