First of the Few

No. 87 Squadron was one of only four Squadrons which had two (as far as is known there were never more than two) Australians, F/Lt J. R. Cock and F/0 R. L. Glyde. John Cock had shot down one of the squadron’s very first kills of the war. It happened late one afternoon towards the end of March 1940 in that period known as the ‘Phoney War’. The squadron had moved to France and was stationed at Le Touquet at the time. Two aircraft were required to patrol over Bercq because a bandit Had been reported in the area. Two Hurricanes took off one piloted by John Cock and the other by Roland Beamon! ‘who, after the war, was to become chief test pilot at English Electric and to be instrumental in the development of the P. 1 Lightning.

They soon spotted the German plane on a parallel course 3000 feet (91 5 m) above them and recognised it as a Heinkel 111. The two Hurricanes stood on their tails in an effort to give chase. It soon became apparent that they had been spotted because black smoke streamed from the German plane’s engine as the pilot opened the throttles. Beamont’s Hurricane was climbing faster than the Australian’s and by the time he reached 1 7,000 feet (51 82 m) he had closed in to around 600 yards (549 m). The Heinkel’s rear gunner began firing wildly. Cock could see the tracer directed at the other Hurricane but he thought that the range was too great for any chance of a hit. They were still climbing and soon they were up to 23,000 feet (7010 m).

Something was wrong! Beamont’s plane was flying in an erratic banner. Was he hit? No response on the radio. Slowly the Hurricane rolled over into a spin and fell away out of sight.

Cock continued the chase, determined that the German plane would not escape. Slowly the gap closed and after what seemed like hours he was at last in range. The gunner was still shooting when Cock pressed the firing button and the Heinkel fell in flames.

When, he landed back at Le Touquet, Cock found that Beamon! s Hurricane was there on the ground. It was undamaged. Relieved, Cock greeted the Englishman with a grin. Beaumont explained in an embarrassed way that, in his haste to take off, he had forgotten to connect his oxygen mask. At 23,000 feet (7010 m) he simply blacked out and did not recover until he found himself in a spin at 11,000 feet (3353 m).

Five weeks later the Phoney War erupted into Blitzkrieg violence as the Germans swept into the Low Countries. Belgium and Holland fell quickly and soon the British Expeditionary Force had to be evacuated from Dunkirk. RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires gave air cover from bases in England and both sides suffered heavy losses. On June 14 the Germans entered Paris. Meanwhile, of the 261 Hurricanes that had been committed to France, only 66 were able to be flown back to England in the middle of June. Altogether, Fighter Command had lost a quarter of its existing overall strength.

Eighty-Seven Squadron re-formed at Church Fenton and then moved to Exeter for convoy patrol duties. It was not until July 10 that it again made contact with the enemy. Three Hurricanes were on a routine patrol over Portland when they ran into a huge formation of Ju 87s. Four Stukas were shot down without loss.

Next day, Dick Glyde, John Cock’s compatriot in 87 Squadron, found his Hurricane badly shot up after an engagement with the Messerschmitt Bf 11Os of 111/ZG 76. 3 He had destroyed one of them for certain but now he had to nurse his aircraft home. His landing was successful and the plane was able to be repaired.

Dick Glyde’s story was one of outstanding determination in spite of the disability of a slight physical defect. He was the fastest air cadet through the flying course at Point Cook, reaching solo flying after a total of five hours’ tuition. Unfortunately, he was rejected by the RAF because of a slightly crooked spine which was considered in those pre-war days to be sufficient reason to bar him from being granted wings. But Glyde was determined to be a flier. He had medical treatment, went to England as a civilian, and joined the RAF. He was commissioned in 1937 and promoted to the rank of Flying Officer in 1939.

On the same day that Dick Glyde managed to land his shot-up Hurricane, a coastguard on the coast of Cornwall noticed German He 59 rescue floatplanes carrying out patrols out to sea, looking for ditched aircraft. He noticed one of them, apparently with engine trouble, come down and make a landing on the surface of the water. A second He 59 landed nearby, possibly to render assistance or recover the crew. He reported the incident.

Two destroyers were put out from Plymouth in an attempt to capture the enemy planes and three Blenheims from 236 Squadron were detailed to provide air cover. One of the pilots was P/O B. M. McDonough from Victoria. He had arrived in England in March 1939 on board the SS Ormonde as a member of a group of Australian volunteers for RAF training. This group was typical of numerous other groups that had preceded it each year. After flight training, McDonough had been posted straight to 236.

As the force arrived in the area, the destroyers came under attack by a Ju SBA of I/KG 51. The Blenheims closed in and shot it down into the sea. Shortly afterwards another German bomber showed up. This time it was a He 111 of I/KG 55 and McDonough went after it. He scored hit after hit but the Heinkel Managed to escape. German records show that this machine landed safely back at its base but it had suffered 80% damage and two crew members were listed as missing in action.

German records also indicate the loss of one He 59 on this day, so apparently the second floatplane rescued the crew of the first aircraft which probably sank.

Queenslander Gordon Olive was 26 years old at the time and, together with the other pilots of 65 Squadron, he also flew to intercept the anti-shipping attacks. Losses began to mount on both sides. This was a matter of grave concern to the officer in charge of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding. Dowding was fully aware that he could not afford to fritter away his fighters before the heavy attacks that would obviously come in the near future. He needed every one of them and only grudgingly allowed them to be committed to battle. His instructions were that fighter formations were not to be heavily engaged, and the main defence measures were to be directed against the bombers. RAF fighters were forbidden to operate in France.

But to the fiery young pilots of the RAF, these tactics were frustrating, sometimes too much so . . . On July 20, Gordon Olive was on a patrol over the Channel near Dover looking for enemy aircraft reported to be approaching a convoy below. What he witnessed filled him with frustrated anger. There, at 9000 feet (2743 m), too far away for him to intervene, he saw a Hurricane flying along oblivious to the fact that a Messerschmitt Bf 109 was sitting behind him. It was all over in a helpless, slow-motion instant. The 109 opened fire, shattering the Hurricane’s tail which broke off and fell away. The British machine went into a vertical dive but fortunately, the pilot managed to bail out. Wildeyed, Olive rammed open the throttle of his Spitfire and went after the German plane, which was heading for France. The only thing that mattered now was to get that 109. And he did! The coast of France was almost directly below when he pressed the firing button. . .

During the period July 10 to July 24, the Luftwaffe lost 93 aircraft to Fighter Command’s 48. 4

Meanwhile, on July 2, Adolf Hitler had ordered the Armed Forces to make provisional plans for an invasion of England. Two weeks later, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, and General Halder, his Chief of Staff, submitted ambitious proposals for the operation. These received Hitler’s approval and he instructed them to begin active preparations, but at the same time, he stressed that the attainment of air superiority was the indispensable prelude to carrying out a landing. In the Reichstag on the 19th, Hitler made ‘his last appeal for peace’, an offer which was rejected by the British Government three days later.

Following Reich Marshal Herman Goering’s orders, the emphasis on anti-shipping attacks was continued. These were carried out by Luftflotten 2 (Air Fleet 2), commanded by Field Marshal Kesselring, and Luftflotten 3, commanded by Field Marshal Sperrle. On July 25, Kesselring’s aircraft attacked a coastal convoy in the Straits of Dover after shadowing it from the Thames Estuary. At the same time, German surface craft also engaged but were driven off. They returned again at night. Out of 21 ships, 11 were sunk or badly damaged. The next day the Admiralty suspended merchant traffic through the Straits in daylight.

At noon of the same day, 238 Hurricane Squadron was on patrol over Swanage at 10,000 feet (3048 m). The leader of B Flight was F/Lt S. C. Walch of Sandy Bay, Tasmania. TwoThree-Eight was informed that bandits were in the area southwest of Portland at 12,000 feet (3658 m). Walch saw three BF 109s in a loose formation at 14,000 feet (4267 m) and, ordering his section into line astern, he climbed up after them. The Hurricanes came up from behind, in the enemy’s blind spot. Walch lined up the 109 on the right and fired a one-second burst. The German fighter half-rolled and dived, eventually going into a spin lower down. Then it broke up – the wings ripped off and the fuselage plunged into the sea. German casualty reports listed this particular pilot, Fw Boer of II/Jg 27, as missing in action. Meanwhile, the other two 109s had disappeared.

German efforts to halt sea traffic continued at night. Mine laying sorties were carried out by He 111s. Radar picked up one such bandit on the 26th over the Bristol Channel and John Cock of 87 Squadron was vectored onto him. At this stage of the war night interception was in its infancy, and a very haphazard affair which depended on the pilot’s eyesight and lot of luck. A few Blenheim Is had been fitted with the new 1. 5 m A. I. Mk IV interception radar and the first victory using this device had been scored four nights earlier. However, this equipment was virtually just out of the experimental stage and operators were only just beginning to comprehend its usage. It was at night that the British Isles were most vulnerable and even day fighters were sent up to attempt to intercept the enemy. John Cock was flying a Hurricane. Nevertheless, he sighted a Heinke! and opened fire. Results were difficult to assess, but he was certain that he had scored hits before it disappeared back into the darkness.

Shortly afterwards, at 12. 55 a. m. , a Heinke! Crashed at Longfield Farm, Smeathorpe. All except one of its crew perished. Uffz Strickstock had been wounded but managed to bail out after an explosion in the aircraft. It is believed that the explosion occurred as a result of John Cock’s attack. s

By now the Channel had become completely untenable for the Royal Navy during daylight and three destroyers were lost in as many days. The destroyers of Dover Command were withdrawn to Portsmouth on the 28th.

Next day, F/Lt Desmond Sheen rejoined 72 Squadron in Northumberland. Sheen was a regular Air Force officer whose hometown was Canberra. He joined the RAAF and entered Point Cook in 1936. The following year he took up service with the RAF and when war broke out he was already flying with 72 Squadron, which was at that time commanded by another Australian, Squadron Leader R. B. Lees. There was only sporadic activity for Fighter Command in those days.

Then, in early 1940, a mysterious appeal went around the RAF squadrons asking for pilots with navigational experience to volunteer to fly ‘something very fast’. The ‘something very fast’ proved to be highly-polished, duck-egg green, high-altitude Spitfires of 212 Squadron, Photographic Development Unit (POU). Sheen transferred to 212 in April.

The PDU was the brainchild of another Australian, Sidney Cotton, a colourful character from Queensland. Cotton was a veteran of World War I, having flown with the Royal Naval Air Service, and it was during this time that he invented the ‘Sidcot’ flying suit. He was an adventurous and determined aeronautical engineer and businessman and between the wars he, among other things, pioneered air mail and aerial survey work in Newfoundland and also carried out pioneering work in the development of colour photography. In 1938 he was approached by British Intelligence to carry out clandestine aerial photography of military installations in Germany, Italy and the Middle East. He was agreeable and made use of hidden cameras installed in his own Lockheed 12A. In August 1939, on the eve of war, Cotton’s Lockheed was the last civil aircraft to leave Berlin. His cameras were rolling all the way! With the coming of war, the RAF received the benefit of his many talents but that is another story.

Operating from bases in Southern France, Des Sheen flew numerous successful photographic flights over Northern Europe and later over Italy and Sardinia. When his Spitfire was destroyed by Italian bombers, he and other members of the PDU were evacuated from Southern France by a ship bound for Algiers. From there they undertook an adventurous journey across northern Africa until they reached Gibraltar. From there they landed in England on June 12. After a fortnight of debriefing, Sheen left 212 and returned to 72 Squadron – trained fighter pilots were urgently needed.

At the end of the month, Dowding received at least some news which was encouraging. The aircraft industry was making maximum effort in the production of fighters and Hurricanes and Spitfires were rolling off the assembly lines at a rate well above official estimates. In May, output figures exceeded estimates by 23%; in June, output was up by an astounding 53%; and in July the output was up yet again by 51%. More than 1200 fighters had been delivered since May 1.

The pilot situation was more difficult to remedy. It took time to train a pilot, time for him to become proficient and time for him to become experienced in combat. The situation became critical later in the Battle when the pilot loss rate exceeded the replacement rate, and the new pilots arriving on operational squadrons only had 12 to 14 hours on Hurricanes and Spitfires.

Only one Australian pilot was lost in July. On the 13th Red Section of 238 Squadron, led by F/Lt J. C. Kennedy, pounced on a Do 17p on a reconnaissance mission over Chesil Beach. It is thought that Kennedy was hit by return fire from the Dornier which crashed into the sea. Twenty minutes later, as he was coming in low, bringing his Hurricane into land, his plane stalled and crashed when it swerved to avoid high-tension cables. Kennedy was buried in Warmwell churchyard.

On August 1, 1940, Adolf Hitler issued Directive No. 17 – For the conduct of air and sea warfare against England. In this, he ordered (in part):

1. The German Air Force is to overpower the English Air Force with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing anti-aircraft equipment. . .

5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.

6. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after August 5th. The exact time is to be decided by the Air Force after the completion of preparations and in the light of weather . . .

On August 6th Reichsmarschall Herman Goering held a conference with his Luftwaffe commanders and outlined their task, naming the day for launching the great attack ‘Adlertag’ (Eagle’s Day) and nominating the day as August 1o. It was estimated that four consecutive days of continuous assault would be enough to overcome the fighter defences of Southern England, and four weeks to eliminate the entire RAF so that the first order of Directive 17 would be fulfilled. This would pave the way for invasion in mid-September. Seelowe (Sea Lion) was scheduled for September 15.

Accordingly, by August 10, the three Luftflotten (air fleets) of the German Air Force were poised and ready to attack. The main attacking force was Kesselring’s Luftflotten 2 operating from bases in north-eastern France, Belgium, Holland and Northern Germany. Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3 operated from northern and western France. Both of these threatened Southern England up to and including the Midlands during the day and wider afield at night. The third force, Luftflotte 5, commanded by General Stumpff, was smaller in numbers than the other two and it flew from airfields in Norway and Denmark to threaten north-eastern England and Scotland, which had the effect of dispersing the British defences.

RAF Fighter Command under Dowding was divided into four groups. Covering south-eastern England and bearing the brunt of Luftflotte 2’s attacks was 11 Group, commanded by the resourceful New Zealander, Air Vice-Marshal Keith Park. Behind 11 Group, covering the Midlands, was AVM Trafford Leigh: Mallory’s 12 Group. To the south, covering the southern coast and Wales, was 10 Group under AVM Sir Quinton Brand, and finally to combat Luftflotte 5 from Norway and Denmark, AVM Richard Saul’s 13 Group defended northern England and Scotland.

In the period between July 10 and August 10, the Luftwaffe as a whole lost 217 aircraft, Fighter Command 96.

At this stage the weather deteriorated and ‘Adlertag’ had to be postponed both on the 10th and 11th. Then a high-pressure zone over the Azores promised finer conditions for the next few days. Goering fixed zero hours for 07. 30 hours on the 13th.

There was air fighting on the 11th and 12th and 87 Squadron was in the thick of it. The squadron claimed the destruction of nine German aircraft for the loss of three and all of the pilots were safe. John Cock shot down one Bf 109 but later he was attacked from below and was obliged to bail out over the sea. He swam ashore minus his trousers, much to the amusement of his fellow pilots. During the same period, Dick Glyde had a miraculous escape when a bullet shattered the cockpit hood only millimetres from his head. He would not be so fortunate during ‘Adlertag’.

To the British, it seemed that the main attacks started on the 12th. The Luftwaffe struck out at airfields and radar stations along the south coast and at shipping in the Thames Estuary. The radar station at Ventnor on the Isle of Wight was disabled until August 23, but the others sustained only minor damage and were still operational. It is fortunate that the Germans did not sustain their attacks on these stations because without them the British defences would have been seriously blinded of the airfields, Lympne, Manston and Hawkinge were damaged, but they were all operational again within 24 hours.

Manston was the home of 65 Squadron which scrambled as the German formations came overhead. They took off with bombs bursting all around them and miraculously they all made it. With a touch of humour, Gordon Olive later told the New Zealand ace, Al Deere, of the attack and of Jeffrey Quill. Quill was a test pilot at Supermarine who was on a short attachment to 65 Squadron to witness first-hand the Spitfires and their pilots operating under combat conditions. A veteran flier, he claimed that the younger pilots were too slow strapping in and starting off in a scramble. He boasted that he could beat them hands down. On the 12th, after clearing the airfield in that mad rush to get airborne, Gordon Olive looked back and saw the last Spitfire appearing safely out of the smoke and he realised that its pilot was Jeffrey Quill. Perhaps the falling bombs had given the younger men the necessary extra impetus, but Quill never mentioned the subject again.

One of the other 65 Squadron pilots caught in that mad scramble was a young Irishman called ‘Paddy’ Finucane. Before his death in July 1942, Finucane would reach the rank of Wing Commander, become a 32 victory ace and be attached as a flight commander to 452 Squadron, RAAF, Australia’s first fighter squadron in England. It was largely his influence that helped to build 452 into one of Fighter Command’s most successful units during the 1941-42 period.

August 13 dawned grey and overcast. The Luftwaffe’s early morning attacks were called off until later in the day, but not all units received the message in time. The Dornier 17s of KG 2 made a successful single-handed attack and were amazed to learn on their return that they had been the only unit in action. They had been very lucky because the British radar had shown them as only a few aircraft and accordingly only one squadron of Spitfires was scrambled. Nevertheless, at least four Dorniers were shot down.

The real fighting began in the afternoon when the Luftwaffe launched a two-pronged attack. Kesselring sent his bombers over Kent and the Thames Estuary while Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3 attacked airfields in Hampshire, Dorset and Wiltshire. The raiders met strong opposition and lost 45 aircraft. Fighter Command lost 13 fighters, but only seven pilots. At least five German pilots were shot down by Australian pilots, with Gordon Olive accounting for two Bf 11Os.

The pilots of B Flight, 87 Squadron, had been too late to join in on one of the battles but found a stray Ju 88 which they shot down into the sea. As they re-formed, they noticed white smoke coming from Dick Glyde’s Hurricane. When they looked around again the plane had disappeared. Dick Glyde was one of the seven lost pilots.

P/O H. C. Mayers of Sydney was one of the six pilots who lived to fight another day. He and the rest of the 601 Squadron met a force of 24 heavily escorted Ju 88s. 601 flew alongside the bombers until they were slightly ahead of them and then hurtled around to attack. At the same time, the escort came diving back. Mayers made a climbing turn into an attacking Bf 110 and fired a three-second burst. He saw part of the canopy and fuselage break away from his target which continued to dive, but he did not witness what happened to it after that. He then went after the bombers and managed to shoot down a Ju 88 before both he and his Hurricane were hit. He bailed out and came down in the sea. Fortunately for the Australian, one of the 601 pilots had seen him come down and guided a patrolling naval Motor Torpedo Boat to the spot. Mayers was picked up and taken to the naval hospital at Portland, where his shrapnel wounds were X-rayed and treated. Late that night he was flown back to his squadron at Tangmere in a Fairey Battle bomber. The incident did not cool his ardour for battle and a few days later, on the 16th, he accounted for two Ju 87 Stukas.

On August 14, the Germans postponed large-scale operations because of the unfavourable weather forecast.

The next day it was a different story. The Germans launched seven major raids using all three Luftflotten in a series of attacks on a wide front. Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2 bore the brunt of the fighting supported heavily by Luftflotte 3. Stumpff sent 72 He 111s escorted by 21 Bf 110s from Luftflotten S’s bases in Norway to attack airfields in the northeast. This force was severely mauled by the Spitfires of 72 Squadron and left behind eight He 111s and seven Bf 11Os, losses so severe that Stumpff never again sent out a major daylight attack. Des Sheen was credited with shooting down two, a bomber and a fighter. The action underlined the limitations of the Bf 110 as an escort fighter when confronted by the more nimble Hurricanes and Spitfires.

Meanwhile, the fighting was heaviest in the south. All told, Fighter Command lost 34 aircraft, the highest number in one day so far, and one Australian pilot was killed. P/O F. W. Cale’s Spitfire was shot down in flames by Bf 109s. Cale managed to bail out but landed in the River Medway. His body was recovered the next day.

German losses for the day stood at 75 and the highest-scoring Australian pilot was Bill Millington of 79 Squadron, who brought down three He 111s.

Another pilot who was successful on the 15th was F/Lt Pat Hughes of 234 Squadron. Hughes came from Haberfield, NSW, and in 1935, at the age of 17, he joined the RAAF as a cadet. Two years later he applied for a commission in the RAF and was accepted. He joined 234 Squadron at Leconfield, East Yorkshire, in November 1939. In Hull, he met an English girl, Kathleen Brodrick, and the couple were married just before the squadron moved to St Eval in Cornwall. Hughes was something of a character and apparently an animal lover, because he took his dog, appropriately named ‘Flying Officer Butch’ everywhere – including flying! Previously, in July, he had shared in the destruction of three Ju 88s, but his two victories on the 15th both Bf 110’s, marked the beginning of 24 days of intense combat in which he rocketed into being the highest-scoring Australian pilot of the Battle of Britain.

Hughes became heavily involved in a dog fight with Bf 109s the following day. He shot down two of them before having his Spitfire badly damaged. He managed a safe landing and his plane was able to be repaired.

August 16 was the third da:y of major operations and it cost the Germans 45 aircraft. But the British were being hurt too. Fighter Command lost 21 fighters in the air and several aircraft were destroyed on the ground, as well, heavy damage was inflicted on a number of airfields.

The fourth day of major attacks came on the 18th and again Pat Hughes accounted for a brace of Bf 109s.

The most critical situation now was the loss rate of Fighter Command pilots. Over one hundred and fifty pilots had been killed, wounded and were missing over the ten days ending on the 17th. If the same loss rate continued up to the end of the month. Dowding could be down 300-350 pilots. With only 70-80 replacements due to complete training by the end of the month, his squadrons would inevitably be bled dry. He made a request for pilots from Bomber Command to be transferred to him. The Air Ministry pledged about fifty volunteers and as an additional measure, it agreed to cut operational training to a minimum, just enough to give new pilots some basic knowledge of the aircraft they would be flying into combat. The danger of such a measure was obvious but the risk had to be taken.

One of the Bomber Command pilots to volunteer for duty in Fighter Command was F/O R. W. Bungey. Bob Bungey had been on operational flying against the Germans continuously since the beginning of the war. He had sailed for the United Kingdom in July 1937, after graduating from Point Cook. Four weeks later he was commissioned in the RAF. As a member of 226 . Squadron he flew obsolete Fairey Battle bombers in France. On the fuselage of his plane, he painted kangaroos arid dangling from the rear gunsight was a small koala doll. Now he found himself switching from a slow old Battle to a much faster Hawker Hurricane of 79 Squadron. The other Australian member of 79 Squadron was Bill Millington. Soon, on August 25, 79 would be posted to Biggin Hill and into some of the heaviest fighting of the Battle of Britain.

Meanwhile, on the German side, Goering was worried about his bomber losses and the lack of apparent weaknesses in the RAF defences. The Ju 87 Stuka dive bombers had to be withdrawn from the fighting, especially after their disastrous losses on the 18th. They were too vulnerable to fighter attack. At a conference on the 19th, he re-emphasised the importance of smashing Fighter Command and gave priority to attacking inland targets such as airfields and sector stations. Later, in a tour of his fighter squadrons, Goering was highly critical of the pilots and their lack of aggressiveness and failure to adequately protect the bombers. His words were unjust because in terms of fighter-vs-fighter combat, the Bf 109 pilots were shooting down more than they were losing. He ordered them to give the bombers closer escort. This was in reality a tactical blunder because close escort with the much slower bombers consumed precious fuel and hampered their efforts to cut off the British fighters before they attacked.

In the north, Stumpff’s Luftflotte 5 was stripped of its long-range fighters and henceforth it concentrated on night attacks. The Bf 11Os were given to Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3 because most of his short-range Bf 109 squadron had been transferred to Kesselring’s Luftflotte 2. Kesselring’s bombers were to be sent.

According to most accounts, Pat Hughes was killed on 7/9/40 when the Do 17 he was attacking exploded and he collided with the wreckage, As he had shot down his 14th confirmed kill, a Bf 109, the previous day, the Dornier should be counted as his 15th victim. This would give him 15 + 3 shared and rank him third on the above list.

Details and dates of his victories are given in Part 2 of this article over south-eastern England with the heaviest possible protection.

Unsuitable weather prevented large-scale operations until August 24. Between August 24 and September 6, the Luftwaffe made at least 33 major attacks, two-thirds of which were directed against the sector stations and airfields of 11 Group Fighter Command. On August 24, North Weald and Hornchurch were hard hit. Two days later Debden in 12 Group was bombed but assaults on Biggin Hill, Kenley, North Weald and Hornchurch were repulsed. Then, on the 30th, the Luftwaffe launched two determined attacks on Biggins Hill.

The first raid on that Black Friday came over shortly before noon. The defending fighters of 79 and 610 Squadrons scrambled in plenty of time and met the raiders fiercely. Ten of them were claimed to have been shot down. Bill Millington destroyed a He 1111 but was then attacked by Bf 109s. His plane was damaged but he was able to land safely. Most of the bombs fell wide and caused serious damage to the nearby villages.

At 6 p. m. , a small formation of nine Ju 88s succeeded both in evading the defences and in taking Biggin Hill by surprise. Damage was heavy and 39 of the ground personnel were killed, including a nursing orderly originally from Tasmania, Corporal Lena Button.

Next day there was feverish activity at Biggin Hill. In the morning 610 Squadron was rotated north for a well-earned rest. They were to be relieved by 72 Squadron, Des Sheen’s unit, which was corning down from Northumberland. The Spitfires had departed and 610’s ground crew were awaiting transportation when, punctually at noon, the Luftwaffe came again. Everyone scattered as a formation of Dornier 215s bombed from 12,000 feet (3658 m). A grounded Spitfire was destroyed, but most of the bombs fell on the runways which were so badly cratered that 79 Squadron, returning from a battle over Dover, had to be diverted to Croydon. However, by tea-time, one runway was repaired and the Spitfires of 72 Squadron were able to land at their new base.

They had not even settled in where they and 72 Squadron were sent out to deal with sporadic raids over Kent. Half an hour later, at 6 p. m. , ten Ju 88s made another surprise attack. With the Spitfires away, the Germans were able to carry out five full minutes of concentrated bombing. The few remaining intact buildings were all hit and the runways were plastered yet again. Biggin Hill had the doubtful honour of being the hardest hit of Dowding’s sector stations.

On this last day of August, 79 Squadron’s Bill Millington quickly disposed of a Do 17 and a Bf 109. He was chasing another Dornier when he was jumped by two more Bf 109s. He shook one off and hunted the second down to 3000 feet (914 m). The German plane finally crash-landed on Romney Marsh. Millington made the error of delaying to watch the pilot crawl out of the wreckage, temporarily forgetting the other 109. His Hurricane suddenly shuddered as it took a heavy burst of cannon in the engine. It was on fire and flames splashed back into the cockpit. Hot oil spurted into the Australian’s face and something struck his head. Retching and choking from smoke and fumes, he blindly dragged the canopy back and prepared to jump. The air blast cleared his vision and he saw a village below. It was highly probable that the out-of-control crippled Hurricane would crash into the centre of it! He decided, in spite of the fire, to stay with the plane and succeeded in guiding the burning machine into a glide, crash-landing in a nearby field. Badly burned and suffering from a head wound, he only just managed to drag himself clear before the Hurricane’s fuel tanks exploded.

However, Bill Millington’s injuries were trivial compared with those suffered by Richard Hillary on September 3. Hillary had been born in Sydney in 1919, but as a small child, he had gone to England with his father, who previously had been Secretary to the Australian Prime Minister. When war was declared in 1939 he was at Trinity College, Oxford, but by September 3, 1940, he was flying with 603 Squadron from Hornchurch. On that fateful morning, 603 broke cloud over enemy bombers but were bounced by the 50-strong Bf 109 escort. Hillary scored hits on one Bf 109 which began to trail black smoke but did not fall. He pressed the button for another three seconds but at the same time, his Spitfire was rocked by an explosion that wrenched the control column out of his hands. The fighter burst into flames and Hillary was trapped in the blazing cockpit. After agonizing and frantic seconds he at last managed to struggle out. His parachute brought him down into the sea near the North Foreland where he was rescued by the Margate lifeboard. His face and hands had been horribly mutilated and burned.

For Hillary, the next two years were filled with slow convalescence and numerous surgical operations, many of them using completely new and experimental skin grafting techniques. It was at this time that he wrote of his experiences in a book he titled The Last Enemy. It has become an aviation and literary classic. After recovery, he pestered the authorities to allow him to go back onto operational flying until he was at last posted to a night fighter training course. He later perished when his aircraft crashed while landing in January 1943.

Besides Dick Glyde and F. W. Cale, the month of August saw the loss of three other Australians. P/O B. M. McDonough belonged to one of the three Coastal Command Blenheim squadrons (235, 236 and 248) which were, for a time, attached to Fighter Command. He and his crew were shot down while on a bomber escort mission on the 1st.

Stuart Walch was killed in action on the 11th. He had shot down at least three enemy fighters in the vicious fights over the convoys in July and, because of his aggressiveness and leadership qualities, he had been appointed a flight commander. On Sunday, August 11, he led 238 Squadron into battle over Portland Harbour and a huge dogfight developed. His Hurricane was last seen tumbling down into Lyme Bay.

Next day, F/Lt L. C. Withall of 152 Squadron failed to return from a battle with Ju 88s south of the Isle of Wight.

Biggin Hill continued to be hammered. On September 1, it suffered its sixth raid in three days. Its effectiveness as a sector station was reduced – it could now only control one squadron instead of the usual three – but it was not out of action. 79 Squadron remained but 72 was moved to Croydon. On this day the defenders intercepted approximately twenty bombers escorted by an estimated 100 Messerschmitts over Maidstone. During the ensuing dogfight, Des Sheen’s Spitfire was hit and caught fire, but he managed to bail out safely.

The Germans bombed Biggin Hill again on the 2nd but switched to attack North Weald on the 3rd. On the 4th and the 6th, in an effort to cut off the supply of British fighters at their source, they extended their raids to the Vickers and Hawker factories near Weybridge, the latter being responsible for half the total production of Hurricanes.

On September 5, the Luftwaffe’s main assaults again headed towards Biggin Hill and North Weald, but they were beaten back. Des Sheen was leading 72 Squadron at 25,000 feet (7620 m) over Hawkinge when they were jumped by Bf 109s. Sheen had his controls shot away and he was wounded in the leg, hand and nose. The oxygen hose was also severed and as the Spitfire fell over into a dive he lost consciousness. At a lower altitude, he awoke to realise that his plane was completely out of control and hurtling down in a vertical death dive. He pushed back the hood, released his harness and was immediately sucked out of the cockpit . . . but he did not fall free. His feet were jammed by the top of the windscreen and he found himself trapped, straddled along the fuselage by the slipstream. He was completely helpless with death approaching at 500 miles per hour (805 km/hr). The ground loomed up. Then, with only seconds to spare, his feet were suddenly freed and he instinctively pulled the ripcord of his parachute. It opened just above the treetops which also helped to break his fall. The burning Spitfire crashed at Wildage Farm, Bladean. It would be over a month before Des Sheen, as a Flight Lieutenant with a D. F. C. , would return again to 72 Squadron.

Fighter Command was being steadily worn down and if the wastage of pilots and aircraft continued, the Battle could be lost. Between August 24 and September 6, 103 pilots had been killed and 128 severely wounded, while a total of 466 Hurricanes and Spitfires had been destroyed or heavily damaged.

Meanwhile, Sidney Cotton’s reconnaissance planes were bringing back photographic evidence of the build-up of barges in the estuaries and ports across the Channel. At Ostend alone, by September 6 there were over 200. As well, experts anticipated that the moon and tides would particularly favour a landing in England between September 8 and 10. These and other factors, plus the eroding effect of the sector station and airfield attacks, caused the British Chiefs-of-Staff to believe that pressure was building to the obvious next step – invasion! They therefore ordered Invasion Alert 2: Attack probable within three days.

At a German High Command conference on September 1, Major Freiherr von Falkenstein of the general staff, speaking on behalf of the Luftwaffe and its conduct of the air war, claimed that the RAF had lost, since August 8, a total of 1115 fighters and 92 bombers. These figures were highly inflated and inaccurate, but they led the Germans to believe that it was only a matter of time before the last hundred or so British fighters would be destroyed and the first order of Hitler’s Directive 17 would be achieved so that Sea Lion could proceed. The provisional date for D-Day, September 15, had been set back to September 21 which meant that, because of the German navy’s need for ten days’ notice to launch the invasion, Hitler had to issue the order by September 11. The Luftwaffe had to achieve complete local air superiority prior to then.

Partly to achieve this goal, the Germans decided to switch targets. No more would they concentrate on sector stations and airfields – they would bomb London!

There were a number of reasons for bombing the English capital. It was believed that the deeper penetration into England and the status of the target would draw the few remaining RAF fighters into combat. It was possible that such attacks, backed up by night raids, could seriously disrupt the British Government. There was also a chance that the people would be terrorised into submission. Finally, in Hitler’s mind, the attacks on London would be an act of retribution. Back on the night of August 24/25 a small formation of German bombers had stayed intentionally over London and dropped their bombs. Prime Minister Churchill and the War Cabinet ordered RAF Bomber Command to raid Berlin in retaliation and the following night British bombs fell on the German capital for the first time. Other raids followed. Goering had given assurances that this would never happen! The Fuehrer had reserved to himself, in Order No. 5 of Directive 17, ‘the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal. ‘ By attacking Berlin, he reasoned, the British had initiated this type of action. He vowed vengeance and in a speech at the Sportspalast in Berlin on September 4 he threatened the British with ‘extermination of their cities.

They came 900 strong, 300 bombers and 600 short-range and long-range fighters, late on the afternoon of September 7. Goering stood with Kesselring and others on the French coast at Cape Blanc Nez watching them thunder on their way overhead. He had now, as he informed news correspondents, ‘taken over personal command of the Luftwaffe in its war against England. ‘

Most of the RAF squadrons ordered up to intercept eventually made contact, but few molested the German bombers before they unloaded on London’s dockland east of the centre of the city. The Luftwaffe had achieved a tactical surprise because Park’s squadrons were organised to meet the sector station attacks. Huge fires sprang up among the warehouses and these were to guide to the target that night a further 250 bombers from Sperrle’s Luftflotte 3. For the Londoners, the ‘Blitz’ had begun.

It was also a black day for the Australian pilots. John Curchin of 609 Squadron destroyed a Bf 109, his third victory, but two of the most experienced Australians were killed in action.

Dick Raynell, after a battle with BF 109s, was wounded and bailed out of his crippled Hurricane over Crown Point, Blackheath, but by the time his parachute reached the ground he was dead. Raynell had been a serving officer in the RAF in the 1930s and a member of 43 Squadron. There he met and became close friends with a South African pilot called Caesar Hull and both men were also members of the Squadron’s famous Hawker Fury aerobatic team. Their flying thrilled thousands at their many displays in England and on the Continent. The Australian later left the RAF and joined Hawker Aircraft Limited as a test pilot while Hull stayed in the air force. On August 26, 1940, although still a civilian, he rejoined 43 Squadron with the acting rank of Flight Lieutenant to note how the Hurricane stood up under combat conditions. He also renewed his friendship with Caesar Hull, who now commanded the squadron. Their friendship ended on September 7, when both men were shot down and killed, Hull went to the Australian’s assistance in a one-sided dogfight with the bomber escorts.

The second Australian casualty was Pat Hughes, who had just ended a shooting spree by destroying six German aircraft in three days. His advice to new pilots when they questioned him on tactics was: ‘Get as close as you can and you can’t miss. ‘ These measures had brought him fourteen successes in 24 days as well as shares in others, but on September 7, one month after his wedding day, they also brought about his downfall. As he attacked a Dornier it suddenly blew up and his Spitfire collided with the wreckage. He was posthumously awarded the D. F. C.

The change in German tactics to heavy daylight bombing of London was another piece of evidence which, when taken in conjunction with such things as barge build-ups, troop concentrations, airfield attacks etc. , led the British Chiefs-of-Staff to believe that an even greater degree of readiness for the Army was necessary. Accordingly, they issued the ‘invasion imminent’ signal, code-named ‘Cromwell’. A period of confused excitement followed. Home guard units had church bells rung to summon their men, but this was also the signal to indicate that German paratroops had landed. Meanwhile, the Royal Navy was brought to instant alert and awaited the order to sweep into action against the German invasion fleet.

Bomber Command, meanwhile, stepped up its attacks on French and Belgian ports, known troop and barge concentrations and supply routes. As in Fighter Command, there were no exclusively Australian squadrons in operation but there were 47 Australians sprinkled throughout the various RAF units. Five were killed and six were taken prisoner during the period of the Battle of Britain.

On September 8, bad weather inhibited daylight activity. Dowding used the time to give some of his battle-worn squadrons a rest. At Biggin Hill, 79 Squadron was replaced by 92 Squadron and sent to a quiet area in Wales. As well, the serviceability of aircraft was now proving to be a major problem (for both sides) and it was equally obvious that the supreme effort was close at hand.

Poor weather again limited operations during the morning of the 9th, but in the late afternoon 200 heavily escorted bombers again set out for London. This time Fighter Command was better prepared and half of the bombers were obliged to drop their bombs prematurely and few of the remainder reached their primary objectives. The German Naval War Staff made note of the fact that undisputed air supremacy had not yet been achieved.

The next day was cloudy and wet and there was only limited activity throughout the day, although after dark the nightly attacks on London continued. Hitler decided to postpone, until September 14, the decision to order the invasion to proceed because a conclusion in the air war had not been reached. He believed that Goering needed four or five consecutive days of good weather to finish the job.

September 11 was a day of German success. Kesselring attacked London with 100 heavily escorted bombers, while Sperrle raided Southampton. Both raids reached their objectives and for once Luftwaffe losses were lighter than those suffered by Fighter Command. Returning German pilots reported that RAF opposition was weakening.

The next two days were quiet because of unsuitable weather, but on the 14th Kesselring made his fourth daylight raid on London and again RAF opposition proved ineffective. Losses were even, 14 each. To Goering and Kesselring it seemed that the goal was well within their grasp at last, all that was needed was a day or two of fine weather which they could use to launch maximum-effort attacks against the British capital. Hitler postponed his invasion decision again until the 27th to let the Luftwaffe have its final chance. During the evening of September 14/15 only about 50 German bombers, instead of the usual 150, raided London in spite of favourable weather. The Germans were re-organising and preparing for the maximum effort to come.

Meanwhile, unknown to the Germans, their tactic of bombing London was actually working for the British. Prior to September 7, the relentless assaults on Keith Park’s 11 Group Sector stations and airfields had been wearing them down. These, plus the daily aircraft and pilot losses, had brought Fighter command in South-eastern England close to defeat – but then the pressure was eased at the critical moment.

Front-line fighter losses, although severe, were being met.

From the time the airfield attacks ceased, the wastage of aircraft had been more than counterbalanced by factory output. Production of Hurricanes and Spitfires for August exceeded estimates by 69%.

The RAF’s chief problem, which was not anticipated by the Germans, was its now acute shortage of operationally fit pilots. Until now, Dowding had persisted in his policy of squadron rotation rather than moving experienced pilots from quiet sectors to bolster squadrons in the battle zone. All too frequently it was the inexperienced pilots in the newly arrived squadrons who fell first in combat. Twenty-two-year-old, P/O J. D. Crossman, joined 46 Squadron in September but did not see out the month – his Hurricane was shot down by German fighters and crashed in flames at Tablehurst Farm, Forest Row. But now Dowding had no choice but to reinforce the depleted squadrons in the southeast with individual pilots, preferably with those who were skilled and experienced in combat. It was this change of policy that caused the two Australians in 79 Squadron, which was now recuperating at Pembrey in Wales, to be posted to other units. Bob Bungey was promoted to Flight Lieutenant and posted to 145 Squadron on September 18 and on the 19th Bill Millington, who had been awarded the D. F. C. after his release from hospital, was sent to 249 Squadron.

Sunday, September 15, dawned to be a day of mixed sunshine and cloud and it was the day that Goering decided to deliver his final blow. Every available bomber and fighter was gathered for two heavy daylight attacks on London. Keith Park committed every 11 Group fighter squadron, operating them in pairs, on each occasion. The Hurricanes and Spitfires harried the raiders all the way to the target and when they reached the capital there was another unpleasant shock waiting for them. They were suddenly confronted by 12 Group’s Duxford Wing of five squadrons of mixed Hurricanes and Spitfires led by the indomitable legless British ace, Douglas Bader. To the Germans, it seemed that the RAF was stronger than ever and was even meeting them with larger formations. Luftwaffe losses were heavy, although not as heavy as the 185 claimed by the British at the time. The Germans actually lost 56 aircraft while Fighter Command lost 26 but only 13 pilots. 6 It was enough; the Luftwaffe could not afford to sustain such losses of aircraft and men. Unlike the British airmen, German aircrew shot down over England faced captivity and were lost to the war effort – they could not return to fly again the next day.

On September 17, the Fuehrer postponed Sea Lion ‘until further notice. ‘ It had become obvious that air supremacy could not possibly be achieved in time.

Like the beginning of the Battle of Britain, controversy also surrounds a consideration of when it ended. The Luftwaffe’s defeat on September 15 and Hitler’s decision to postpone the invasion two days later made a logical climax to the struggle which is accepted by many. But in 1940 this ‘climax’ was not evident to the British, even though Hitler also sanctioned the dispersal of the invasion fleet on the 19th. The movement of the barges was attributed to the effectiveness of Bomber Command’s attacks. It was not until October 12 that German Supreme Headquarters formally renounced the proposed invasion of England in the year 1940 with the qualification that it would be considered again in Spring 1941.

Meanwhile, Herman Goering certainly did not reject the idea even now that the RAF could still be defeated through a combination of bombing and air combat. To send large formations of bombers to London was obviously not a viable proposition any more because the resources of the Luftwaffe had been stretched to their elastic limits – there was simply not enough serviceable aircraft available for such heavy attacks. He therefore ordered that, during the day, harassing raids, consisting of formations of up to thirty bombers, usually fast Ju 88s, with huge fighter escorts, were to be carried out while the main bombing of London would continue at night.

During the rest of September, the Luftwaffe only launched three major daylight attacks on London – on the 18th, 27th and 30th – and on each occasion the defending Hurricanes and Spitfires took a heavy toll. Total German losses over these three days amounted to 120 aircraft. It was a rate of attrition that could not be afforded. Between September 7 and 30 the Luftwaffe suffered 433 losses, while those of Fighter Command stood at 242.

Besides Dick Raynell, Pat Hughes and J. D. Crossman, who fell on the 30th, three other Australian pilots were killed in action during September.

On the 25th, 152 Squadron attacked a formation of He 111s and Sergeant K. C. Holland’s Spitfire fell out of the fight to crash near Church Farm, Woolverton. Meanwhile, another Australian, P/O I. N. Bayles, shared in the destruction of one of the Heinkels. That same day he also disposed of a Ju 88.

Two days later, over Dorchester, Gefr. Lidtke and Gefr. Jackstadt of 9/ZG 26 in their Bf-110C-4 watched as the Spitfires of 609 Squadron came at them head-on. There were two Australians in 609, P/O R. F. G. Miller and John Curchin who had just previously shot down four German aircraft in three days. One Spitfire kept coming in with its guns winking. It was Miller’s machine and it was coming too close. . . impossible to avoid! With sickening impact, the two planes collided and the Spitfire exploded, scattering wreckage in all directions. Jackstadt somehow managed to bail out but Lidtke and Miller perished.

The third Australian was F/Lt F. W. Flood, a Blenheim I pilot of 235 Squadron, Coastal Command. 235 was one of the units which had been attached to Fighter Command. It was based at Thorney Island and participated in both defensive and offensive fighter sorties. On August 21, Flood claimed a Henschel Hs 126 shot down into the sea off Le Havre. Three days afterwards, he was leading a flight of three Blenheims when they were mistaken for Ju 88s by the Hurricanes of No. 1 (RCAF) Squadron and attacked. One Blenheim was shot down into Bracklesham Bay. Another was heavily damaged and crashed while landing back at base. Flood’s plane was damaged but he landed safely. On September 11, he was one of two Blenheims who failed to return from escorting Fleet Air Arm Albacores attacking Calais. Both were shot down into the sea by Bf 109s.

On the first day of October another Australian Blenheim pilot was lost. P/O C. C. Bennett of 248 Squadron, formerly of Mount Gambier, was listed as missing in action when he failed to return from a reconnaissance patrol over the coast of Norway. 248 flew long-nose Blenheim IVs and, besides Clarence Bennett, it had another South Australian, P/O A. L. Hamilton, on its strength. The squadron had been incorporated into Fighter Command for a month or so to protect northern target areas such as Aberdeen from attacks by Stumpff’s Luftflotte 5. They operated from Dyce and for this purpose, their Blenheims were fitted with belly packs of four . 303 machine guns. When they were relieved by the Hurricanes of 145 Squadron, they again took up Coastal Command duties including anti-invasion patrol, long-range escort, and long-range reconnaissance. The day before he disappeared Bennett was returning from a similar patrol when he was attacked by an enemy aircraft. During the engagement, he was slightly wounded in the leg and finally had to break off because of a shortage of fuel. The experience did not deter him from going out on October 1. Prior to then, Bennett had asked Lewis Hamilton to ‘look after things’ should he fail to return and it was he who performed the sorrowful task of writing to his friend’s relatives.

As October progressed, the Luftwaffe continued its daylight harassment but gradually the bombers were replaced by Bf 109s with bombs up to 1000 lb (454 kg) carried below the fuselage. They were classed as ‘light bombers’. This measure was particularly unpopular with the German pilots because, by using the 109 in a role for which it had never been intended, one of the best fighters in the world at that time was transformed into a second-rate fighter-bomber. They complained loudly that even the Hurricanes could now fly rings around them! Park and Dowding, ever mindful of their pilot shortage, which was gradually becoming less of a problem, would not have been concerned with the BF 109s had it not been for the presence of the fighter-bombers. As it was, they had no choice but to intercept. These ‘light bomber’ raids continued, with varying successes on various targets, right through the month and tapered off after October 31 when the Germans reverted to scaled-down attacks on shipping in the Thames Estuary. The threat of invasion was obviously over.

From now on the Luftwaffe’s main assaults took place almost exclusively at night. Daylight ‘light bomber’ raids on London itself were discontinued on October 20, but after dark, between September 7 and November 13, there was only one night on which the capital was not attacked by a force that averaged over 150 bombers. This night ‘Blitz’ would continue, in London and other cities, until May 1941, when Luftflotte 2 was moved to the east in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, Hitler’s invasion of Russia.

With the approaching winter, the intensity of the air fighting faded. For statistical and administrative purposes the Air Ministry considered afterwards that the Battle of Britain officially ended on October 31. Before then, one Australian would be involved in a mid-air collision and another would disappear.

On the 24th, John Cock of 87 Squadron was leading a formation of four Hurricanes on a routine patrol when his engine suddenly cut out. Reacting quickly, his two wingmen swung away but the fourth plane, in the box of the formation, had no chance to evade – his propeller smashed into the tail of Cock’s plane, tearing the surfaces to pieces. The Australian’s machine dropped like a stone and disappeared. Meanwhile, the other Hurricane, with the stumps of its propeller spinning uselessly, started a controlled glide. The remaining two Hurricanes, one of them flown by Roland Beamont, escorted the crippled aircraft down. At 1800 feet (550 m) the pilot, 19-year-old English veteran, P/O D. T. Jay, decided to bail out. Beamont saw Jay push himself out of the cockpit and tumble away. But the parachute did not open. Horrified, he could only watch as Jay fell to earth. He was spared from witnessing the impact because his attention was diverted by a sudden sheet of flame as the empty Hurricane crashed into a nearby hillside. Looking around, Jay had disappeared. The sky was empty – no sign of John Cock’s Hurricane either. Two experienced pilots gone in seconds!

Beaumont and the other remaining pilot made their way back to their base at Exeter. As they landed they noticed a damaged Hurricane parked off the runway. Its tail surfaces were practically non-existent. It was Hurricane P3404 – John Cock’s machine. Relieved, they greeted the Australian who explained that he had managed to recover partial control and make a forced landing back at Exeter.

A few days later John Cock was posted to Training Command. The same thing was beginning to happen all through the RAF. It was time for the veterans to start passing on their knowledge and expertise to the new generations of pilots to come. When Gordon Olive finished his tour of operations (his third) in March 1941, he spent three months on fighter control duties and then formed and trained No. 456 (RAAF) Squadron as Commanding Officer. It was Australia’s first night-fighter unit.

In June 1941 Bob Bungey was appointed Commanding Officer of 452 (RAAF) Squadron, the first to be formed under the Empire Training

Notes.

1. Herrington J. , Australia in the War of 1939-45, Vol. 1 – Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1943, p. 33-37.

2. The number 22 appears in numerous publications but perhaps the most authoritative is: Mason F. K. , Battle Over Britain, P. 540.

3. BF 109 and Bf 110. These fighters were referred to during the war years as the ‘Me 109’ and ‘Me 11O’ but at the time of their design the manufacturing company was Bayerische Flugzeugwerke and the prefix ‘Bf’ was used in official German handbooks and documents. The design team was headed by Professor Willy Messerschmitt who joined the company in 1927 and eventually took over when it was reconstituted as the Messerschmitt A. G.

4. Like so many aspects of the Battle of Britain, the losses and victory claims of the combatants have always been subject to controversy. A typical example is cited in Note 6. The figures quoted throughout are those which have gained general acceptance.

5. The Heinkel He 111 H-4 belonged to 1/KG4. However, although John Cock identified his victim as a Heinkel, other sources suggest that he was mistaken and that his victim was really a Do 17z of 31KG 76, one of a group that had been briefed to attack Southampton.

6. September 15 claims by the British were as follows: 175 – Daily Express; 183 – Reported to Churchill on the evening of the 15th; 185 – Official History of the Second World War; 50 – German Hi.gh Command Diary; 56-60 – Post-war RAF claims; 61 – Latest research (Ramsey, Battle of Britain Then and Now, p. 707).

Scheme. Lewis Hamilton remained with 248 Squadron until the end of June 1941, performing the less spectacular but nevertheless essential duties of reconnaissance and long-range fighter escort for convoys, when he was appointed as an instructor to train aircrew in Southern Rhodesia. Ian Bayles eventually completed three tours of operations to finally end up flying in Burma. Only Des Sheen remained with his squadron to eventually, later in 1941, take over command.

Meanwhile, the Battle’s last Australian casualty was 249’s flight commander, Bill Millington, formerly of 79 Squadron, who fell on October 30. Since joining 249 he had shot down one Ju 88, shared in the destruction of two others and obtained at least one Bf 109 probable. All through the month 249 had been involved in intercepting the German fighter-bombers and it was from such a mission that Millington failed to return. He was last seen chasing some 109s out over the Channel.

And so it ended . . .

Fourteen Australians, over half of the known participants in the Battle of Britain, had made the supreme sacrifice. They were only a few of ‘The Few’, but the value of their contribution Cannot. be doubted.

Next Issue, Part 2:

The known Australian ‘Few’ – The 25 are listed and their service careers are outlined but. . . is the list complete? Are there others, who, because of confusion In the records, have not received their rightful recognition?