Flight Of The EMU’s

Meanwhile, on July 14, 1967, the Australian Government announced that eight RAN pilots with supporting personnel would join an American Army helicopter unit in South Vietnam. Other RAN pilots and crews would join No. 9 Squadron, RAAF, at Vung Tau. The Australians arrived on October 15 and from then on carried out training flights to familiarize themselves with local conditions before commencing operations. The motto chosen by the EMUs was both simple and graphic: “GET THE BLOODY JOB DONE.”

They flew the Bell UH-1B Iroquois turbojet helicopter known as the “Huey” by the US Army. This aircraft was built in a wide variety of versions. It was powered by a Lycoming T53-L11 turboshaft driving a 47 ft 9 in (14. 5 m) rotor. This gave a maximum speed of 130 m. p. h. (209 km/hr), a cruising speed of 100 m. p. h. (160 km/hr) and a range of just over 200 miles (320 km). It was manned by a pilot and up to three crewmen or a pilot, an attendant and six stretcher casualties. In the gunship form it could be armed with rockets, mini-guns and M60 machine guns firing from the side hatch. It was also deployed as a lightly armed troop carrier nicknamed a “slick”.

For a major part of the RAN involvement, the EMUs were controlled by the 164th Combat Aviation Group based at Bien Hoa, north of Saigon, and then later at Can Tho in Phong Dinh province.

The 1st Contingent RANHFV was commanded by Lieutenant Commander N. Ralph. When the Australians were integrated with the US personnel, he became second-in-command of the unit. The second senior RAN officer was Lieutenant Commander P. J. Vickers who also commanded the 1st Platoon.

The EMUs’ first major operation was carried out in conjunction with more than 80 other helicopters in Operation Santa Fe – one of the largest scale efforts of the Vietnam War up to that stage. 9 Squadron RAAF was also involved. The task of the helicopters was to airlift troops in a sweep against the 5th Viet Cong Division. Allied forces consisted of the 1st Australian Task Force, the 9th US Infantry Division and the 18th ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) Division. The EMUs worked with the Americans.

Later in November the first EMU helicopter was shot down. Two gunships were on standby when they were called out to aid a merchant ship which was under fire in the Rung Sat special zone. The helicopters located the enemy positions and began strafing attacks. On the second run in, the gunship flown by Sub-Lieutenant Anthony Casadio, RAN, and Warrant Officer Esterhazy, US Army, was struck by ground fire from automatic weapons. The port mini-gun and the fuel tanks were damaged and a fuel booster pump was destroyed. With fuel streaming from the punctured tanks, Casadio searched for a place to land. The VC kept firing as he brought the helicopter down in a cleared area nearby.

Casadio and his men quickly detached the machine guns and took cover. As the VC attempted to close they were met by a withering hail of bullets. They were also kept at bay by the presence of the other gunship which continued to circle overhead and give cover until it was short of fuel. Finally, it had to return to base but other EMU helicopters soon arrived. By the time the area was secured and Casadio and his crew picked up, they had accounted for two known Viet Cong dead and driven away an unknown number of others. Casadio’s gunship was later recovered by a Chinook and carried back to Vung Tau.

The most common EMU flights were troop insertions where about ten troop-carrying helicopters (slicks) transported soldiers from their base and landed them near suspected or known enemy strongpoints where they carried out search-and-destroy missions. The ten slicks were usually escorted by four gunships flying in pairs, known as “light fire teams”. While the operation progressed a command and control helicopter flew overhead. In this was the Air Mission Commander who coordinated the air and ground operations with the troop commander.

After dropping their troops, the slicks would fly to a safe staging point where they awaited their next missions such as evacuation of the wounded. ·With the operation over or at the end of the day, the slicks were again called in to airlift the troops back to their base or to take them to a night ambush position. The EMUs carried out their first successful night combat operation on December 16, when they evacuated the US 199th Light Infantry Brigade which had attacked a well-defended VC bunker system. Lieutenant Commander Ralph acted as air mission commander.

Later in December, the EMUs moved from Vung Tau, which was a secure base, to Camp Blackhorse, some thirty-five miles (56. 3 km) away. The move committed them to the support of more units over a wider area. The 18th ARVN Division which was responsible for the northern area of Saigon, and the US 101st Airborne Division to the west of Saigon, could also call on them now.

On January 12, two Australians, Naval Airman K. Wardle and Leading Mechanic K. French were injured when their gunship helicopter was forced down into the jungle. The wreck burst into flames and they had to clamber out quickly and dive for cover to avoid being struck by exploding ammunition. Smoke from the fire attracted the rescue helicopters of 9 Squadron RAAF onto the scene and they were winched to safety.

For the people of Vietnam the celebration of the Chinese Lunar New Year or Tet is an important event similar to our own Christmas and New Year festive season. In 1968 it fell at the end of January and both sides called for a temporary cease-fire. The Viet Cong announced that they would observe a seven-day truce from January 27 to February 3. However, intelligence reports suggested otherwise. Massive and widespread arms buildups were known to be occurring throughout the northern provinces of South Vietnam. General F. Weyland, the US Deputy Commander, placed the Allies on full alert 36 hours after the beginning of the declared cease-fire.

On January 30, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese launched their Tet Offensive. Bitter fighting seemed to break out everywhere. Attacks were made simultaneously on the Government in Saigon, on provincial and district capitals and on key Allied military installations. Viet Cong guerillas raided the US Embassy in Saigon but were wiped out after a six-hour battle. The huge US air base at Da Nang was attacked with mortars and rockets and six planes, four F-4 Phantoms and two A-26 Invaders were destroyed. There was heavy fighting in 26 of the country’s 44 provincial capitals.

Meanwhile, on January 29, because of the temporary absence of Lieutenant Colonel Cory, Lieutenant Commander Ralph found himself in command of the EMUs when the fighting began – thus becoming the first ever RAN officer to command a unit of the US Army. Two days later, while acting as air mission commander, he and his crew emerged unscathed from three separate mortar attacks on the ground while working with the US 25th Infantry Division west of Saigon.

On February 8, the US 9th Infantry Division found itself heavily engaged against a strong force of VC near My Tho. The EMUs airlifted the troops in and Lieutenant Commander Vickers led the slicks. On the third run-in, automatic fire hit one of the American helicopters flown by Captain R. D. Freer, US Army. The aircraft crashed into the jungle and there were no survivors. These were the first EMU airmen to be killed in action.

In this same battle, eight helicopters were struck by ground fire, two of them being damaged beyond repair. Two Australians were forced to land their machines because of battle damage and they spent the night with the American troops before being lifted out and back to Blackhorse.

Lieutenant Commander Vickers was again piloting the lead slick two weeks later on February 22. The mission was to airlift troops of the 18th ARVN Division from an area near Xuan Loe. As he brought the helicopter down the enemy opened fire and Vickers was hit. He passed out. Acting quickly, his co-pilot immediately took over, rushed back to Blackhorse and landed back on the hospital pad within five minutes. Unfortunately, in spite of this gallant effort, the Australian died without regaining consciousness. Vickers was granted the posthumous award of Mention in Dispatches for ” . . . repeated acts of heroism and meritorious service as a pilot . . . ”

The EMUs had their revenge the next day by killing twenty Viet Cong while providing continuous air fire support for the 25th ARVN Division south of Saigon.

The Tet Offensive had been the enemy’s bid to win the war in one bold stroke but, thanks to accurate intelligence information and Allied preparedness, by the end of February, although sporadic fighting continued, it was obvious that the bid had failed. The Communists suffered heavy casualties.

Camp Blackhorse was not directly attacked during Tet, but there were skirmishes on the boundaries and the supply roads were frequently mined. However, it was subjected to a mortar attack on March 9. Only eight people were injured and there was some minor damage to some of the buildings.

Early in May, a convoy of the 18th ARVN Division was ambushed on Highway 1. A quick counter-attack by the Emu gunships, combined with tactical air support, helped to break the ambush and kill two hundred Viet Cong.

Not long afterwards, during an insertion mission on May 18, an enemy force ambushed a flight of Emu slicks and gunships. The VC opened up as the soldiers were leaving the slicks. Of the ten aircraft hit, seven were disabled and two had to be written off. Lieutenant B. C. Crawford had a narrow escape when a bullet smashed through the windscreen of his helicopter not more than three inches (75 mm) from his head.

It was obvious that the slicks were most vulnerable when they were either disembarking or embarking troops in the landing zone. New tactics were needed to protect them. It was decided to employ one heavily armed helicopter as a “smokeship” to cover and lay a smoke screen in front of the slicks. A Huey was modified by placing a spray ring on the exhaust. This sprayed oil into the hot exhaust air and created a dense white vapour. There was one drawback. While this provided excellent cover for the others, it made the smokeship an obvious target. The risk had to be taken and the new technique proved successful.

August, 1968, saw increased enemy activity and Camp Blackhorse was the target of a mortar attack during the early hours of August 15. There was also heavy fighting near the camp on the 23rd.

Lieutenant Casadio and Petty Officer 0. C. Phillips led an EMU light fire team in support of ARVN units defending the area on the 21st. A low cloud base kept the helicopters at tree top level. Suddenly, Casadio’s aircraft was hit by a rocket grenade. Flame belched from the jet pipe. The helicopter crashed down through the trees into a ditch and exploded. There were no survivors. Anthony Casadio was awarded a posthumous Mention in Dispatches.

The Second Contingent RANHFV arrived at Camp Blackhorse on September 9, under the command of Lieutenant Commander G. R. Rohrsheim, who took over from Lieutenant Commander Ralph as executive officer. For a while the two contingents operated together until the First left on October 16.

VC activity was light until October 23, when the US 9th Infantry Division met heavy resistance south-east of Ben Tre. The EMUs, led by Lieutenant Commander Rohrsheim, made seven landings and during the operations two aircraft were shot down and seven were damaged. One of the downed helicopters was piloted by an Australian, Sub-lieutenant T. F. Supple. He and his crew were rescued by another Australian, Sub-lieutenant A. J. Huelin.

In mid-November, the EMUs were moved to Camp Bearcat, 20 miles (32 km) north-east of Saigon in Bien Hoa province. The enemy was more active in this area and Bearcat, early in the new year, was subjected to a number of mortar attacks.

On January 3, Sub-lieutenant Huelin was detailed to fly from Bearcat to the Seven Mountains area, some 140 miles (225 km) away. Low cloud and fog prevailed at take-off but, because of the importance of the mission, Huelin decided not to abort. He took off early in the morning and a short time later, hampered by thick clouds, he collided with powerlines near Saigon. The helicopter crashed and exploded. There were no survivors.

At this time the EMUs were under the control of the 214th Aviation Battalion and they conducted numerous successful operations against the Viet Cong in support of the 7th and 9th ARVN Divisions in the campaign to the northern IV Corps provinces. These actions continued through January and February 1969.

In what is described as a “vigorous action” on February 2 in Vinh Long province, Sub-Lieutenant Supple and Sub-Lieutenant W. E. Symons were forced down in their gunship. They dismantled their M60 machine guns from the helicopter and carried on a running gunfight with the VC until they were rescued by a slick that had been recalled from Ben Tre. Symons was wounded later on a night action on February 22. During February the EMUs flew a total of 2979 hours, had 48 hits on their aircraft and killed at least 52 Viet Cong. They accounted for 80 VC killed in March and added another 56 in April.

Enemy tactics constantly changed and now their units became smaller in numbers and more mobile. EMU tactics changed also and single gunships or small flights carried on with the hunt. On April 18, an EMU gunship in which Sublieutenant J. M. Hart was co-pilot, engaged a VC company, killed ten and prevented the remainder from escaping while ARVN troops closed in and took twenty-five prisoners.

In the middle of May, the VC increased their mortar attacks on Bearcat and the EMU helicopters had to be evacuated back to Blackhorse on several occasions. On May 31, EMU slicks came under heavy fire as they approached a landing zone five miles (8 km) west of Dong Tam. The covering gunships engaged the enemy force and the VC attempted to escape into a heavily wooded area. Leading Aircrewman N. E. Shipp was a door gunner in the leading gunship. In order to fire more effectively at the enemy he had to lean forward so that he was partially out of the aircraft. While he was doing this the helicopter came under heavy automatic weapons fire. The pilot was hit and the helicopter suddenly plunged down out of control. Shipp stayed at his post and continued firing until the moment of impact. There was an explosion scattering wreckage everywhere. There were no survivors.

Deteriorating weather in June caused the cancellation of numerous missions. On June 16, Naval Airman C. C. St. Clair, the gunner of one of three helicopters attempting to evacuate wounded AVRN soldiers, was himself wounded.

In a major action in July, Sub-lieutenants Supple and Symons, in two light fire teams, attacked and killed sixteen VC while ARVN troops captured eight others.

The first of the Third Contingent RANHFV arrived on September 10, 1969, under the command of Lieutenant Commander D. D. Farthing. Farthing officially relieved Rohrsheim on September 16. Lieutenant R. Giffin was the senior pilot.

On September 23, a gunship piloted by Lieutenant Giffin and

Sub-lieutenant Symons wounded and captured a Viet Cong in Sa Dec province. . Giffin himself was wounded in action on December 1.

Troop insertion and ground support operations continued. On November 18, Sub-lieutenant R. Marum received a shock when a bullet pierced the windscreen of his helicopter and ricocheted off his flying helmet. In a later incident on January 22, 1970, he was wounded in action.

Casualties were not only suffered on operational flying. Leading Air Mechanic E. Shelley was injured on December 23 while he was driving a supply truck. The truck was ambushed and subjected to rifle and mortar fire. Shelley was wounded in the neck.

Lieutenant R. Marum was back in action again on February 17 when his helicopter was again struck by enemy fire. An American crew member was fatally wounded. Later that month the EMUS obtained retribution by killing 27 Viet Cong in the same area.

And so the action continued. On March 6, as Lieutenant D. B. Gibson was bringing his helicopter down into a landing zone, a booby-trap was detonated. The explosion completely destroyed the slick and killed two soldiers. Gibson was seriously injured and was later evacuated back to Australia.

Meanwhile, events were happening in neighbouring Cambodia that were to have a serious effect on the joint Australian/ American unit. In spite of Cambodian neutrality, the VC had continued to build up for some time supply dumps and communications networks in the provinces adjoining South Vietnam. There was talk of a ’30-mile wide VC belt’ along the length of the frontier. In the middle of March, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian head of state, visited Russia to ask the Soviets to persuade the VC to withdraw. However, while he was there, he was deposed by the Cambodian National Assembly and General Lon Nal established a government.

There followed a period of confused factional civil war. General Lon Nol and his supporters, who were sympathetic towards U. S. policy in the area, opposed the VC presence and appealed to the U. S. , South Vietnam and Thailand for arms. However, since the Tet Offensive of 1968, there had been an overall change in U. S. policy. America was now in the process of gradually reducing its military presence in Southeast Asia. The Cambodian Army received limited aid from South Vietnam and Thailand but no materials came from the U. S. Little by little, over the next two months, the VC, and the factional groups supporting them, forced back the Cambodian Army and infiltrated much of the country. This also had the effect of re-opening the VC supply routes and of consolidating supply bases and troop concentrations in sanctuaries along the border with South Vietnam. Supplies could now freely flow over the border – but only at night.

The Allies were aware that supplies were coming across the border and used their air power to stem the flow. Because of this aerial blanket, the VC were effectively blocked during the day. They could only move with any degree of safety after dark. New tactics needed to be evolved by the helicopter units to counter thesa nocturnal movements. Night ‘hunter-killer’ operations were introduced. This meant that a command and control helicopter, fitted with a powerful searchlight, flew at low altitudes and pinpointed potential targets. These were then illuminated by a higher flying ‘flare-ship’. The flare-ship was backed up by two gunships ready to attack.

Of great use in operations such as these was a device known as the Aerial Personnel Detector (APD), sometimes referred to as the ‘people sniffer’. This device could actually sense people hidden from sight under the cover of jungle foliage or of darkness. But in spite of these measures, an increasing volume of supplies filtered through.

Enemy activity increased sharply in the EMUs’ area of operations towards the end of March. April saw it at its highest level since February 1969. During a combat assault on April 28, Sublieutenant Mayo’s helicopter was struck by ground fire and his American crew chief was wounded in the legs. On the credit side, at least 30 Viet Cong were killed in the same action.

It was becoming increasingly obvious that something had to be done about the enemy base camps and sanctuaries in Cambodia. For this purpose, the United States/South Vietnamese drives across the Cambodian border were initiated. Limited invasions, supported from the air, were mounted into the sanctuaries in the areas known as the Parrot’s Beak, the Fish Hook and the Bulge. These actions caused a serious split in the 135th Assault Helicopter Company.

Although the EMU helicopters took part in the initial operations, they did so without the Australian crews. For political reasons, Royal Australian Navy personnel were not permitted to participate. In spite of being fully integrated into the American unit, they were not allowed to be used in any role that compromised the Australian Government’s policy on the employment of its forces in Vietnam. The absence of the Australians severely hampered the operational efficiency of the EMUs as a fighting unit and eventually the 135th had to be re-assigned to support operations in the Mekong Delta. The political differences of the two separate national groups did not disrupt the harmony that existed between the men.

The EMUs were involved in heavy action in Kien Hoa province on May 18 where the regional outpost had been captured by the VC and then heavily fortified. Three battalions of ARVN troops were inserted by the EMUs. Lieutenant Commander Farthing acted as air mission commander. The leading slick, piloted by Lieutenant Marum, took numerous hits and had to return to Bearcat. Sub-lieutenant A. C. Perry volunteered to lead the remaining troop insertions but his aircraft was also struck by ground fire during the first night mission. Unable to lift off, emergency repairs had to be carried out in the landing zone in spite of heavy enemy fire. When he was at last able to take off, he led the flight for two more insertions which also met heavy resistance. It was discovered later that more than 50 of the enemy had been killed in this action. Local villagers had been forced by the VC to carry off the bodies.

During June, VC activity declined, mainly due to the loss of their Cambodian supply bases. However, on July 2, Lieutenant Marum acted as air mission commander in a dangerous lift-out of an ARVN battalion. The slicks were mortared during all of the six landings to evacuate the dead and wounded.

For his actions in Vietnam, Marum was to receive the D. F. C. and it was he who, on July 13, saw a number of Viet Cong in the open and called in the gunships led by Sub-lieutenant G. F. Cooper. Nineteen of the VC were killed. Two days later, Cooper accounted for seven more.

Early in August, the EMUs airlifted a U. S. Navy Special Warfare Unit, called a ‘Sea, Air and Land’ team (SEAL) into a suspected Viet Cong village in coastal Kien Hoa. The helicopter force consisted of two slicks accompanied by a command and control helicopter and two gunships. The attack achieved total surprise and the VC scattered in confusion. At least 12 were killed by the gunships. Then the SEALS landed, killed several more and took a number of captives. This success led to other SEAL operations.

On September 6, the EMUs moved from Bearcat to Dong Tam, a primitive camp in Dinh Tuong province. This move took place in time for the arrival of the Fourth Contingent RANHFV on September 10. These were the advance members, the remainder came on October 8. Lieutenant Commander W. P. James relieved Lieutenant Commander Farthing on September 17 and Lieutenant J. Buchanan was the senior pilot and second in command.

Heavy monsoonal rain in October flooded the Mekong Delta and kept enemy activity at a low level. The rain also interfered with EMU operations. There were several mortar attacks during October and November, most of them aimed at the U. S. Navy compound about a mile to the south. Five EMU personnel were injured during an attack on November 3.

The Fourth Contingent’s first major action occurred on October 11, when they carried out a troop insertion near Kien Long. ARVN troops were landed against a well-entrenched, battalion-strength enemy force. The EMUs landed four times on a site exposed to heavy mortar fire. Five helicopters were hit and one, with Lieutenant B. G. Abrahams as co-pilot, was forced down close by. The enemy withdrew as night fell leaving behind 26 dead.

On December 4, Lieutenant Buchanan was the co-pilot of a helicopter carrying out a MEDEVAC from a disabled patrol boat when the VC opened up with heavy mortars. A sampan fifty yards away exploded as the wounded Vietnamese were being loaded aboard the hovering aircraft. Realizing the danger of the situation, Buchanan hooked the skids of the helicopter onto an upper section of the patrol boat and towed it away to a safer area out of range.

On Christmas Eve, the EMUs were required to supply a security force to cover President Nguyen Van Thieu as he spent the night with ARVN troops in the Ca Mau peninsula.

On December 30, the EMUs were involved in a heavy engagement in combination with ARVN troops, gunships and air strikes. Of fifty VCs left dead in the field, twenty were credited to the EMUs.

Combined offensive operations took place in January 1971, in the Seven Mountains area and the U Minh. On January 16, one EMU, while attempting to evacuate a wounded U. S. Army adviser, was hit by heavy ground fire and crashed upside down. The American pilot had received a fatal wound and the members of the crew, including Naval Airman J. V. Shaw, were trapped. They had to spend an uncomfortable night defending themselves on the mountainside. They could not escape because they were pinned down by enemy fire from well-protected positions. Meanwhile, ARVN and American troops tried to kill the VC or drive them off but it was not until morning that they succeeded and the downed helicopter was at last able to be evacuated.

An insertion near Giong Tram ran into a VC ambush. The enemy chose his moment and opened up as ARVN troops were disembarking from the slicks. Out of forty men, twenty-two were killed and ten were wounded. Lieutenant Abraham, in the leading helicopter, quickly took off followed by the others. One slick was so badly hit that it had to force land nearby. Its crew came under heavy attack until rescued by the command and control helicopter.

Early in February, ARVN forces, with U. S. air support, crossed the border into Laos with the intention of blocking the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Progress was slow mainly because of poor weather conditions which hampered movement and grounded aircraft. Although the ARVN managed to establish a number of positions, mainly to the north of Route 9, traffic on the Ho Chi Minh Trail was not disrupted because the VC simply used roads and tracks further to the west which were out of danger. The VC also began to launch counter-attacks on the 17th which, combined with the bad weather, effectively bogged down the ARVN advance 15 miles (24 km) into Laos. Heavy fighting between February 25-28 saw the ARVN lose several strategic positions. In an effort to regain the offensive, at the beginning of March, strong ARVN reinforcements were sent in; but by March 12 VC and North Vietnamese troops, supported by tanks, were again counter-attacking. Under heavy pressure, one by one, the positions held by ARVN troops were abandoned, often being hastily evacuated by helicopter. The last soldiers were lifted out on March 25 and on April 9 President Thieu officially declared that the operation was over.

Although the EMUs did not participate, the heavy fighting in Laos caused replacement helicopters, which would have normally gone to the EMUs, to be diverted to other units located in that area. This placed a heavier burden on the maintenance crews of the 135th and inevitably seriously reduced the number of gunships available for operations.

In 1969, a senior Australian Air Force officer, Group Captain J. I. (Bay) Adams, who had commanded the RAAF helicopter contingent in Vietnam, had warned, in an end-of-tour report, of the vulnerability of helicopters to ground fire. He stated ” . . . even with a limited amount of light anti-aircraft fire in any Area, this helicopter would not survive without a great deal of tactical fighter escort. Even then air assaults into forward areas would warrant the most careful consideration and planning. ” His words were prophetic.

U. S. helicopter units suffered heavy losses in Laos (the Americans admitted that 105 had been lost), and, in general, it seemed that the enemy began to react more violently to helicopter operations throughout South Vietnam as well. A four-helicopter EMU flight met very heavy opposition on March 21 but escaped without damage and killed seven VC in the process. On the 24th another EMU team accounted for four more. This situation continued, much the same, through April with forest regions in the U Minh becoming very dangerous.

The conflict in Vietnam was not a ‘popular’ war (if there is such a thing) and in the United States, it became increasingly unpalatable as the casualty lists grew into the thousands. Although the Tet Offensive of 1968 had resulted in a military setback for the Communists, in the political and propaganda areas it gave them a victory because it marked the real beginning of widespread public resentment of the war in the Free World. There were numerous moratoriums and demonstrations. By the early 1970s, American public opinion polls showed a majority in favour of U. S. withdrawal. President Nixon’s administration searched for a peace formula. The revelations of the secret ‘Pentagon Papers, which detailed aggressive American policies in Southeast Asia, further increased opposition to the war. Now, while American economic assistance to the South Vietnamese Government remained stable, military aid was steadily reduced. U. S. forces, which had peaked at more than half a million men in 1969, were, by 1971, being phased out at the rate of approximately 12,000 men per month.

Similar public resistance to the war was reflected in Australia where Vietnam was linked with the emotive issue of conscription. As in the United States, there were numerous demonstrations. In 1971, the Government decided to recall the bulk of the Australian Task Force with reductions to be continued through 1972. On April 30, 1971, the Minister for the Navy announced that the RANHFV would be withdrawn.

Meanwhile, in the war zone, flying conditions became more hazardous in May because of the heavy monsoon weather. Three EMU helicopters were hit by ground fire on May 18. Two days later, an Australian, Naval Air Mechanic A. S. Beales, survived the crash of a helicopter that was being test flown after routine maintenance. On May 31, EMU helicopters flew into Military Region 3 on a troop insertion to block and surround two North Vietnamese Army companies moving in the open about 15 miles (24 km) northeast of Dong Tam.

The last Australian pilot to have his machine damaged by enemy fire was Sub-lieutenant K. T. Powell while on a direct combat support mission. Then finally, on June 8, 1971, the RAN pilots stopped operational flying. For them the war was over. They returned home on the 16th.

During their four years of service with the 135th Assault Helicopter Company, the men of the RANHFV accumulated numerous awards and honours. These included three M. B. E. s, eight D. S. C. s, five D. F. C. s, one B. E. M. , twenty-four Mentioned in-Dispatches, thirty-four Naval Board Commendations and various Vietnamese and U. S. decorations. The RANHFV’s parent unit, 723 Squadron, was awarded the battle honour ‘Vietnam 1967-71’ on December 22, 1972.

In general, the members of the RAN contingents showed themselves to be highly skilled and experienced when compared with their American counterparts. This was because the Australians were all volunteers with long backgrounds of service while often included among the U. S. personnel were large numbers of conscripts. The integration of two different national groups into an Experimental Military Unit (EMU) had been an experiment. That it proved to be such a success reflected great credit on all involved, Americans and Australians alike.