Comment- Defence Delays

It is in the aviation field that the phenomenon is most marked and there does seem to be a consistent explanation that is at once plausible and dangerous.

A major project was the intended purchase of a new seaborne aircraft platform, which, in my ignorance, I will continue to refer to as a carrier. Despite the long drawn-out gestation period, the announcement, when it did come, blandly said that no decision on aircraft would be made until much later. The only commitment made was that the ship would operate some unspecified type of helicopter.

On the basis that the carrier is only useful if it carries – and operates – aircraft, this half decision does not make sense. An ASW helicopter carrier is a very expensive investment, much more so than a multi-purpose carrier operating a mix of fixed and rotary-wing aircraft.

The last of the current projects is, of course, the FFG-7 Destroyers for the navy, the first of which has just been commissioned.

The whole rationale for these big destroyers was their ability to carry and operate two helicopters. The original concept – back in 1966 – was for a small ship, one version of which would carry one helicopter for surveillance and limited strike operations. Then, after a string of operational studies, it was announced that the ship must have two helicopters and must, therefore, be much bigger. This is fair enough; that’s what the experts said would be needed in the strategic environment. I certainly am not prepared to argue that assertion.

Now, however, we have the situation where the ships are coming forward without their helicopters and there is no sign of any acquisition before 1986. On the navy’s own criteria, these very expensive ships are of very limited value.

Apart from these publicly announced projects, there are others – the RAAF advanced trainer, the Caribou replacement and the Iroquois replacement. Nothing appears to be happening. No doubt, work is being done, but given the usual spate of public announcements at an early stage in any project, the Public can only assume that any acquisition is a long way off.

The explanation seems to me to be that whenever Defence gets close to a decision, something that promises to be a bit better emerges on the horizon.

No one aircraft is ever perfect for the role envisaged so when something which may be better appears, there is a strong psychological pressure to wait and see what turns up.

And when delay can be excused on the basis of the officially abandoned but persistent “no threat for ten years” orthodoxy, the possibility of getting something better in two, five. Or even ten years – just when we need it – begins to look very attractive to both the operators and the politicians who have to find the money.

The whole delay syndrome is the product of a defence establishment and Government that does not know what it should be doing – and, in some circles, does not want to know.

However much the apologists may plead uncertainty or potential benefits as a reason for the delay, the fact remains in Defence as anywhere else that a refusal to make a decision is a decision in itself and, more often than not, a bad one.