A Can of Worms

One of the most telling documents to land on AADR’s desk has been a special study into commuter airline safety, from the US. We hope that Transport Australia will come up with a similar document when official findings are concluded.

The American document has literally uncovered a can of worms, ranging from doubtful operations both in flight and in the hangar by certain operators, to pilot workload and training.

It is certainly not AADR’s intention to infer similarities by comparing American commuter operations with those in Australia.

But there are basic lessons to be learnt, situations to digest and in some cases remedies by reading some of the US findings.

Factors to consider include differing types of operation in the US and Australia, flight intensities, techniques and other items. But, we repeat, there are basic similarities in many aspects of commuter work in North America and Australia, including the official policing and surveillance, policy-making and regulatory work.

Firstly, that hairy question of single-pilot operations; most US commuter operations questioned have said quite openly that although they were authorised to conduct single-pilot IFR flights, the practice was at best marginally safe in many areas.

The primary objection was that in high-density ATC zones, the pilot can and does get quickly overburdened.

And that’s not all-compounding the situation were long duty days, extensive flight planning, loading and “other duties” required of a commuter pilot, they add.

“Finally, witnesses pointed out that if the pilot-in-command was incapacitated there would be no back-up in the cockpit,” said operators.

Sound familiar?

The American authorities sitting on this special study took a hard line when considering a two-pilot operation. Two drivers in the same cabin would send many small commuter operators to the wall (as had been aired to great length following the recent Lord Howe Island-Sydney incident).

But safety hazards involved in single-pilot IFR operations are compounded by the overall effects of pilot workloads, flight and duty times, and airport environments, and should be evaluated before granting single-pilot IFR approval, they recorded in their findings.

Their study uncovered many instances of weight and balance errors implicated in commuter airline accidents. There was a strong recommendation to use actual passenger weights rather than the average more often than not used, in aircraft with nine or fewer passenger seats.

Some accidents were caused by inadequate preflight planning or failure to follow approved procedures, noted the special study team. Why? Simply because the pilots and ground personnel, acting under orders to get airborne as quickly as possible or perhaps jeopardise their jobs, took shortcuts in both flight planning and other procedures.

The more one reads the findings, the more one is reminded of some Australian operators. . . no names, no pack drill. And certainly no comment on any statement that one is in business to make money and keep up with the rival operator next door.

The US findings weren’t just a one-off list of questions thrown at the odd operator. Forty-five commuter airlines were visited and a four-day public hearing was held in Washington, DC, where 40 witnesses from all strata of the industry were questioned by experts.

One of the big problems brought to the surface during the hearing was the lack of official policing-the Americans called it surveillance by the Federal Aviation Administration.

There just weren’t enough inspectors to go around. . .

Some mechanics and pilots at the hearing said that FAA inspectors rarely conducted maintenance surveillance after 5 pm and most of the commuter operators’ maintenance is done at night. Back on the pilot workload aspect, it was noted that most commuter pilots have to do things like refuelling, baggage handling and sundry other chores. These factors, concluded the team, can all contribute to pilot fatigue, with a possible resultant deterioration of flying skills and judgement.

At this stage, no doubt some commuter pilots in Australia are muttering, “If I don’t do the job, the boss will find someone else who will and I’ll be out of a job. . . ”

This leads one to the essential point: regulations with enough teeth to bring the actual operator to heel without jeopardising the job of a highly-trained specialist.

Flying hours in multi-engine types and ongoing training in emergency situations and other work came in for criticism during the US probe.

Several factors detracted from a company’s training program, according to several witnesses. They include

• Lack of aircraft which can be spared from money-making operations. The cost of training.

• What was called fluctuating pilot requirements resulting in hiring and training on a hurry-up basis.

• The turnover of pilots is higher than for certified route carriers, resulting in proportionately higher training expenses and training personnel needs. • And the lack of simulators.

Major maintenance problems were brought to the surface in the US study: there were eight significant shortcomings which included poor quality of maintenance management; shortages in the availability of airframe and engine mechanics to the commuter industry; high turn-turnover rate of mechanics; lack of company training for them; poor record keeping: undue pressure by “management” on the individual mechanics to short-cut procedures; failure to follow established maintenance procedures for what were called various reasons; and lack of effective FAA surveillance.

Once again, it all sounds too familiar to your average Australian pilot and operator, doesn’t it?

The limited single-engine climb performance of some commuter aircraft came in for some hammering. It’s worthwhile repeating the official findings in full, on this one:

“The limited single-engine climb performance characteristics of many Part 23. and especially non-turboprop Part 23 aircraft, compound the problems caused by flight operations errors such as weight and balance or centre of gravity miscalculations.

“Pilot error situations which result from inadequate training or inexperienced flight crews may deteriorate further when a pilot must contend with a limited climb performance in addition to an in-flight emergency. ” A high priority was placed on two programs for GA aircraft which are directly related to improving commuter airline safety the installation of flight recorders, and the identification and solution of crashworthiness problems.

The US National Transportation Safety Board, said the special study team, had called for the development of low-cost flight recorders-cockpit voice recorders (CVR) and flight data recorders (FDR)- for use on complex GA aircraft.

The NTSB had also called for interim measures to prohibit the operation of turbine-powered aircraft certificated to carry six or more passengers, needing two pilots as per certification, without an operable CVR capable of retaining at least ten minutes of conversation when power is interrupted.

The special study came up with 46 conclusions at the end of its job. Some of them have a bearing on Australian operations:

More surveillance by authorities; checks on pilots’ work hours; minimum multi-hours for pilots who get jobs with the commuter operators; less overload on middle and lower-level management in commuter operators; an increase in turn-round times rather than encourage corner-cutting in flight planning and other pilot responsibilities; stop the trend to- wards management deficiencies most apparent in new or rapidly-expanding companies.

Better supervision of maintenance procedures and less pressure on hangar technicians to get a job done super-fast at the expense of sacrificing proper maintenance procedures.

It all sounds great but the $64,000 question as far as Australian operations is concerned is, who is going to be brave enough to grasp the nettle and legislate for similar regulations to be applied in the name of safety and commonsense?