The Helicopter Quandary

To be fair, though, the FFG helicopter question is almost as complex, in its own way, as that of the New Tactical Fighter. The decision will carry much more sway over the DOD than simply a small number of helicopters for a handful of destroyers. And this is where the waiting begins and the complexity of the issue surfaces.

You see, if the RAN decided to acquire the British Westland Lynx (the Lynx and the US Sikorsky Seahawk being the two major contenders for the FFG order) then Westland would be in the box seat for marketing its new WG30 troop helicopter to the RAAF as an Iroquois replacement. In addition, it keeps the RAN in the Westland fold which again augurs well for that company’s WG34 which will be an eventual Sea King replacement for the Royal Navy. In addition to this, there would also be a reasonable chance that the battlefield Lynx would find its way into either RAAF or Army service as an Iroquois/Kiowa replacement in training, liaison and attack roles.

On the other hand, if Sikorsky succeeded with their SH-60B Seahawk LAMPS helo for the FFG, then the door will be open to that company to market the Blackhawk utility helicopter to the RAAF and a possible sale of later-generation Sikorsky dedicated ASW helos in the Sea King replacement role during the nineteen nineties.

Either way, this adds up to a possible market for as many as 150 aircraft totalling upwards of a billion dollars. The stakes are high and this is largely why a decision has yet to be made on stage one of our forces’ helicopter replacement program, namely the FFG requirement.

But why does a purchase of one particular type tend to isolate us from that company’s products for so many years to come? Firstly, there is the aspect of commonality, that magic word that keeps popping up in equipment acquisition whether or not the topic revolves around Army trucks, Navy radars or Air Force fighters. Today, systems are so complex that a measure of commonality in parts and equipment between various weapons systems is essential to keep down maintenance costs. A classic example is the use of the same family of engines for both the RAAF’s C-130s and P-3s. Similarly, if the Grumman E-2C was purchased then the fact that it, too, has the same powerplants as the Hercules and Orion provides a real saving in terms of manpower and long-term maintenance costs. In most cases this can equate to a saving of as much as 20 per cent in annual maintenance support costs most importantly saving in this age of scant and expensive skilled manpower.

Secondly, by purchasing a family of aircraft from virtually the one manufacturer the buyer has a lot more influence over the product he will eventually receive and the amount of AIP involved. Obviously, purchasing 150 helicopters from one supplier is going to mean a lot more in potential offsets and AIP than purchasing a similar total number from several manufacturers. Add this factor to the all-important commonality aspect and you have two very important reasons for making a correct choice of helo for the FFG.

But what are the options?

Basically speaking, there are only two real contenders – the Sikorsky SH-60B Seahawk and the Westland WG13 Lynx. The American Sikorsky is a highly sophisticated helicopter specially designed for the LAMPS role in support of US Navy FFGs, Aegis cruisers and 00-963 destroyers. The Sikorsky Seahawk is a navalised version of the UH-60A Blackhawk utility helicopter airframe and is due to enter operational service with the USN in 1983. The Lynx, on the other hand, has been in operational service since 1976 and is in widespread use with ships as small as our current River Class frigates. The Lynx, being smaller, is also less capable in total mission capability when compared directly with the much larger Seahawk, but again it is said to be as much as a fifth the flyaway price.

The real cost of the FFG program is where much of the DOD stumbling has occurred. It is no secret that Sikorsky prefers not to discuss the price tag of the Seahawk. Inflation in recent years and the fact that this aircraft is crammed with highly sophisticated and hence highly expensive avionics. in addition to it being early days in the flight test program, there have laid fears that the eventual flyaway cost (as distinct from program cost, which is usually double the flyaway cost) would be in the region of $20m per unit. Compared to a C-130, a P-3C, even the NTF or an E-2C, that is a lot to pay for one helicopter.

The smaller Lynx on the other hand is fully developed and benefits from current widespread naval service and several years· mission experience in the log book. The Lynx is now fully de-bugged and is said by reliable sources to be available flyaway for around $3m per unit. By now you are totally confused. perhaps, it is opportune to have a closer look at each type and assess their follow-on capabilities in terms of RAAF and Army requirements.

The Sikorsky product is a first-class aeroplane. as indeed all Sikorsky helicopters are. The BlackhawktSeahawk family pioneers many new features of helicopter design and has been built with the emphasis laid upon reducing maintenance per flight hour. The Seahawk design evolves around the US Navy’s LAMPS requirement for operation from light to medium ships of the USN. The Seahawk is powered by two General Electric T700 turboshafts of 1630shp each. These engines employ the latest technology to gain maximum reliability from a turbine engine. The commercial derivative of the T700 is the CT? which is to power the new Saab Fairchild 340 commuter airliner described elsewhere in this edition. Performance characteristics of the Seahawk indicate a time-on-station of three hours at a radius of action of 57 miles or one hour at 173 miles from the base. Armament is comprised largely of ASW homing torpedoes as the LAMPS’s primary role is to get the submarine. The Seahawk is under flight test now and will enter squadron service in 1983. The USN is using Kaman Seasprite helos for the LAMPS role till its own Seahawks are ready for service.

From the RAAF point of view, a navy purchase of the Seahawk would open the door to the Blackhawk eventually replacing the UH-1B/H Iroquois. This would naturally delight the RAAF as the Blackhawk is shaping up as an ideal utility helicopter. The UH-60A Blackhawk shares identical mechanical commonality with the Seahawk and only differs in interior design and minor airframe considerations applicable to the role. The Blackhawk can carry a full combat assault squad in addition to an 8000 lb slung load, something that the current UH-1H could never do. Operationally, this would give the RAAF a far more capable helo than the present Iroquois H model while the slung-load capability would free the Chinook from this role in some instances thereby allowing greater flexibility for the RAAF’s helo units. The maximum speed of the Blackhawk is 224 mph at sea level, the cruise is 166 mph, while the UH-60A has a 2. 3 to 3-hour mission endurance. From a marketing point of view, primary rivals to the Blackhawk for the RAAF Iroquois replacement requirement (required mid-eighties) would be the Bell 214ST, Aerospatiale Puma. a military version of the MBB-Kawasaki BK 117 and, of course. our friend the Westland WG30, big brother of the Lynx.

Overall, this has Sikorsky looking at sales of upwards of 30 Seahawks (based on the eventual purchase of ten FFGs) for the RAN and upwards of 60180 Blackhawks for the RAAF.

The Lynx, because of its established history, needs very little introduction. Westland produced this helicopter for use aboard smaller destroyer frigate sized vessels of the Royal Navy. The fact that a dozen other services have also purchased the Lynx in its maritime and utility versions is testimony to the integrity of the basic design. Powered by twin Rolls-Royce Gem turboshafts of 900 shp the Lynx has a maximum internal fuel range of 391 miles and can ferry 787 miles using external tanks. The Lynx can operate in the ASW role laying sonobuoys and can be armed with two ASW homing torpedos. In the attack role the Lynx can be configured with four Sea Skua surface-skimming anti-ship missiles. Recently announced re-orders for both the navies of France and Britain were to be powered by the uprated 1060 shp Gem turboshaft which also powers the WG30. The Lynx is in service and could be in Australian service within two years of the order being placed if Canberra so desires.

On the other hand, the WG30 troopship is still very much in a flight development stage with what seems at times to be more interest being placed on a sale to British Airways of the civil WG30 airframe. The military utility version of the WG30 is under test though and is proving to be quite effective in that role. The WG30 benefits in being very similar in dimensions to the Lynx in addition to having in the region of an 80 per cent component commonality which makes operating the two types together (in a land battle zone) much more practical for the all-important maintenance people. If the reader thinks I am pushing the maintainability and commonality of this equipment a little hard then it is only because the lack of skilled personnel and the basic unreliability of weaponry under constant stress in any combat situation is what often loses the battle. The world’s greatest inventory of sophisticated aircraft is meaningless if it is not backed up by a similar maintenance capability. Australia does have this technical base on which to work, but people cost money and if systems can be simplified and reliability enhanced then that is as good as money in the bank. Ask any Israeli for his opinion of this situation and he will simply smile, they know what the ability to keep going when the heat’s on means.

The WG30 is more in line with current UH-1H capabilities, whereas the Blackhawk is significantly more capable than the current RAAF aircraft. This in itself may not be too detrimental to the Westland cause as obviously the WG30 price tag is somewhat smaller than the larger Blackhawk. Though we do know that the RAAF has expensive tastes!

As if the Lynx/WG30 collusion wasn’t enough to harry our defence planners (and their Treasury overseers) we have the Westland WG34 on the far horizon as a long-term Sea King deep-sea ASW replacement. This aircraft is only in project definition stage and will not fly till later this decade, though it will certainly embody sufficient technical advances to make the current Sea King rather dated by comparison. The WG34 will weigh in the 25,000 lb class and be dimensionally similar to the Sea King. Agusta of Italy are working with Westlands to produce their own version which will be known as the EH-101. Like the Sea King, the WG34 will also be produced in transport and utility versions and, who knows, Sikorsky might even join the team later in producing a US version just as the original Sikorsky S-61 design evolved via Westland into the current British Sea King! Anything is possible in the bright blue world of aerospace.

So that covers the Seahawk/Lynx background, but where does the Army come into the picture? Army Aviation currently operate the Bell Kiowa in the Light Observation Helicopter role and though they have often suggested having their own Cobra-style fleet of gunships one would have to be an eternal optimist to see this ever actually materialising. Firstly, the Army would need a true anti-armour/transport requirement and secondly they would need the full co-operation of the RAAF – neither is on the immediate horizon no matter how hard you look.

Lynx could replace the Army Kiowas in the long term though this would not take place till this decade had passed and by that time more modern helicopters would have entered the marketplace. The Lynx is also a capable gunship and the RAAF may not feel too inclined towards their khaki brothers having this capability. In summary, whichever FFG helicopter is required it is probably true to say that it would have little long-term effect on a future Kiowa replacement program.

So there you have it, two helicopters, two manufacturers and one very big long-term winner.

In the meantime, though, what of the FFGs? At the time of writing, Canberra was planning to use Navy Kiowas purely for inshore flight orientation and training purposes. The thought of a lone Navy pilot beating about the ocean hundreds of miles from shore and perhaps a hundred miles from his small ship in a Kiowa is a little too imaginative for even the most enthusiastic RAN pilot to digest. The Wessex is now being prepared for the role of utility troopship for operations aboard HMAS Tobruk, something for which it is ideally suited. Overseas, we could purchase such types as the Kaman Seasprite, the Aerospatiale Puma or the Italian Agusta Bell 205 maritime derivatives though even these, by the time they finally entered service, would be too little too late.

The fact that Canberra has over the years spent more time issuing press releases informing of program delays compared with rational debate on the subject leads this writer to feel that they are definitely going for the US Navy line of Sikorsky Seahawk in preference to the available Lynx. Either that, or the DOD is simply playing a waiting game and buying time till ii firms on its future (real term) FFG plans. They have done this before, the WWII Bofers aboard the Fremantle Class patrol boats being a prime example of bargaining your peacetime dollars against short-term security.

For a decision on the winner you, my friend, like me, will have to wait till 1982!