Australian Fighter Aces

We saw in the introduction to our series that the scores by all aces in World War I were almost double the scores in World War II and noted that there were several reasons for this. It should be clear that many excellent and skilful pilots were never able to become aces, either because of lack of opportunity or other reasons. Many of them, of course, were killed or injured before they obtained the required number of victories. Others served in quiet areas. To judge a fighter pilot entirely by the number of victories is unjust and, as already mentioned in previous articles, the concept of “ace” has never been officially recognised in either the RAF or the RAAF. To compare the scores from the two world wars would be equally unfair unless one takes into account the different circumstances.

In our first article, we also presented a list of the top 20 aces from all countries in World War I and another table with the names and scores of the top 20 Allied fighter pilots in World War II. At the time the latter list was prepared by the author figures for other than the allied countries were not readily available. However, figures from other countries have now been researched with some interesting results. In further support of the danger of trying to draw any specific conclusions by comparing scores, it is worthwhile for a moment to look at the top-scoring German aces in World War II. One of them exceeded a score of 300 and another 200 by wide margins, and four of them shot down more than 100 each. By comparison, the top three Allied aces in the same war were Prattle from South Africa with a score of 41, Bong (USA) with 40 and Johnson (Britain) with 38.

Most of the above German victories, however, were achieved on their Eastern (or Russian) front. They were also scored by experienced pilots with vastly superior machines. Given the same conditions as the Germans experienced, there is no doubt that many Allied pilots might have been equally successful. For the record, the top German scores were:

Major Erich Hartmann   352
Major W. Nowotny   258
Werner Molders   115
Adolf Galland   103

As a matter of particular interest to Australia, the top-scoring Japanese fighter pilot was Sub-Officer Hiroyoshi Nishizawa, with a total of 103 to his credit. The next top-scoring Japanese was Saburu Sakai with a mere 641 Whatever the score, and whatever the country, however, there is one thing which is certain. Wherever they fought, and whoever they were, there was no way of knowing if they would ever be aces. They were all as different as they were individuals. The Russians even claim to have a top woman ace in the person of Lieutenant Lila Litvak with a score of 13, all won on the German Eastern front. To complete our picture, the top Russian ace appears to have been Maj Gen Ivan Nikitaevich Kozhedub with a total of 62. A complete list of the most successful fighter pilots from all countries engaged in World War II is included in this article.

By way of yet further comparison, it is of particular interest to note the extremely low scores that occurred during the Korean War. But no one would doubt, or suggest, that the war in the air in that conflict was any less severe, or that it was not conducted with any less aggressiveness or skill. The results relate simply to the nature of the war and the equipment involved. This was the first time that the jet was matched against the jet and the initial advantage undoubtedly lay with the Chinese. The top-scoring fighter ace in Korea was Captain J. C. McConnell of the USAF with a score of 16 MiGs to his credit. This also makes him the first, and top, jet ace in history. There were no Australian aces in the Korean War and in fact, there were only nine on the entire United Nations’ side, and they were all Americans. A list of their names and scores is set out below.

McConnell, USAF   16
Jabara, USAF   15
Davis, USAF   14
Garrison, USAF   10
Johnson, USAF   10
Parr, USAF   10
Gabreski, USAF   6.5
Bolt, USMC   6
Thyng, USAF   5
Creighton, USAF   5

With our general background now complete, it is time to return to our main theme and have a detailed look at our Australian aces in World War II.

The Australians

A glance at our last article will show that in the First World War, a total of 61 Australians qualified for the accolade of “ace”. Of these, however, almost half did not wear the uniform of the Australian Flying Corps but served with either the RFC or the RNAS. In the Second World War most served with the RAAF but we only had a total of 73 aces, despite the far greater numbers and the much, much longer time on active service. This only serves to demonstrate that it had become much harder to qualify for the necessary five aircraft destroyed, and the overall lower scores also not only reflect this fact but make the feats even more noteworthy.

The top-scorer, by a wide margin, was undoubtedly Group Captain C. R. Caldwell, and it is with his story that we begin our series on aces of the Second World War.

The Ace

Group Captain C. R. Caldwell, DSO, DFC and Bar, Polish Cross of Valour, was the top ace not only within the RAAF but also of all Australians wherever they served in WWII. He was a product of the Empire Air Training Scheme and was the first EATS graduate to become a flight commander and the first to become a squadron commander. His great successes were in the Middle East while flying with, and later commanding RAF units. It was there that he received his DFC and Bar. After the outbreak of war with Japan he was returned to Australia where he led, and also later commanded, No 1 RAAF Fighter Wing in the defence of Darwin. It was there that he was awarded his DSO. After a short spell as Chief Flying Instructor at No 2 (Fighter) OTU he returned to the forward zone to command No 80 (Fighter) Wing, which he continued to do until just before the end of the war.

His special qualities have been well summed up by the Official Australian War Historian, who has this to say: “Wing Commander Caldwell . . . combined great bravery with capable leadership and cool confidence . . . (he) was an alert, fast-talking, quick-acting man with an exuberant confidence . . . He showed great aggressiveness in combat. ” Let us now look at his story in a little more detail.

Clive Robertson Caldwell began his flying career in 1938 when he joined the Royal Aero Club of NSW. He soloed after only 3½ hours and had logged 11 hours by the time the Second World War began in September 1939. He enlisted in the RAAF the day after war broke out but was not called up until May 1940, when he was posted to an officer-pilot course. However, on learning that they would all be employed as instructors on graduation, he somehow managed to change over to the Empire Air Training Scheme and began his basic flying training all over again as an AC2 aircrew trainee. He was 29 years of age.

The various stages of his EATS training were carried out wholly within Australia and he finally graduated in January 1941. He was commissioned of course and sent to the Middle East with a posting to No 250 Squadron, RAF. This unit had only just been formed the month before Caldwell and seven other Australians joined it on May 5, 1941. The unit was equipped with Tomahawks and formed part of No 262 Wing, which was later to include most of the Australians serving in the Middle East, including No 3 Squadron, RAAF.

The unit was at first engaged in shipping-escort duties, but by June 11 they became heavily engaged in the operations leading to the relief of Tobruk. The first positive engagement for the squadron came on June 26 while escorting Blenheims on a bombing mission to Gazala. They were attacked by a force of 30 enemy aircraft and Pilot Officer Caldwell scored his first success by shooting down an Me109.

Only four days later, nine Tomahawks were escorting a Tobruk convoy when it was attacked by 20 Stukas escorted by a force of 30 enemy fighters. During this engagement, Caldwell destroyed two Ju87s and shared in the kill of a Bf-110. On July 7 he had yet another victory. On that date, he met up with two G-50s and after a brief engagement shot one of them down.

In a special reference to him at this time, the Official War History records that: “Caldwell was already developing an uncanny gunnery sense which was to bring him great success, and he assiduously practised this by low-level firing at his own aircraft’s shadow when other targets were lacking. ”

The squadron continued with convoy escort duties during July and August, being heavily attacked on August 18 and again on the 29th. Although the enemy tried to break up the escort on each occasion, they did not succeed and the attacks were beaten off. In one such attack (on August 29) Caldwell was hit and wounded over Tobruk by two Me-109s. The storey is best told in his own words, quoted directly from his own report:

“At approximately 1905 hours whilst acting as a weaver . . . I was attacked by two Me-109s, one coming from astern and the other from port side, neither of which I saw personally. Bullets from the astern damaged the tail, tail trimming gear, fuselage and starboard mainplane, while the aileron on that side was destroyed and a sizeable hole made in the trailing edge and flap . . . evidently by cannon shells, a number of splinters from which pierced the cowling and side of the cockpit, some entering my right side and legs. Fire from the port side . . . damaged the fuselage, a number of bullets entered my left shoulder and hip, small pieces of glass embedded in my face, my helmet and goggles were pulled askew across my nose and eyes – no doubt by a near miss. As a result of the hits on the main plane and probable excessive avoiding action, the aircraft spun out of control. Checking the spin, I blacked out when pulling out of the ensuing dive, recovering to find flames in the cockpit. Pulling the pin from the safety harness, I started to climb out to abandon the aircraft, when the fire, evidently caused by burning oil, and not petrol as I thought, died out, so I decided to remain and attempt a landing.

“Looking behind me as I crossed the coast at about 500 feet some six miles east of Sidi Barrani . . . I saw a number of planes manoeuvring . . . in a manner suggesting an engagement. As my plane seemed to answer the controls fairly well, apart from turns . . . I made a gradual turn and climbed back towards said aircraft, finally carrying out an attack on what I believed to be a Me-109 . . . Having previously lost the pin to my harness, I was holding the straps in my left hand for security, which, together with damage sustained to aircraft . . . (made it) inadvisable to attempt much in the way of a quick change of altitude, so I carried straight on to very low level and continued to base arriving at 2010 hours. Using half flap only (because of damage), I landed to find the starboard tyre flat as the result of a bullet hole . . . ”

Although not mentioned in the above account, it is recorded elsewhere that the attack he made on the Me-109 on his way home, whilst wounded and in a badly damaged aircraft, was successful, and it was officially added to his score. For this exploit, he was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

September was fairly quiet, with the squadron mounting standing patrols and continuing escort duty to convoys. It was about this time that No 250 began operating as an integral part of No 262 Wing. This brought together most of the RAAr pilots operating in the area, as well as No 250 Squadron, including No 112 Squadron, RAF, and No 3 Squadron, RAAF. In October these three units, operating as a wing, began to carry out sweeps over Cyrenaica to test enemy reactions but without any significant result. On November 23, however, Caldwell shot down another Bf-109 and damaged another.

On December 5 Caldwell succeeded in shooting down five Ju-87s in the one sortie, and for this, he received a bar to his DFC. He had recently been made a flight commander, and on this occasion was leading No 250, with No 112 as top cover, when they met 40 Ju-87s in company with 15 enemy fighters. The tactics were for No 112 to engage the enemy fighters while No 250 dived to destroy the Stukas. Flight Lieutenant Caldwell’s score of five was part of the total squadron score of 11 destroyed and three possibles. A further nine of the enemy were accounted for by No 112 Squadron. Caldwell’s success was undoubtedly due to his extremely accurate sense of gunnery and the determination with which he always pressed home his attack. Again, the story is best told by extracts from his own combat report:

“I was leading the formation of two squadrons, 112 acting as top cover to 250 Squadron, to patrol a line approximately 10 miles west of El Gubi and had just reached this position at 1140 hours when I received R/Twarning that a large enemy formation was approaching from the north-west at our own height. Both squadrons climbed immediately and within a minute the enemy formation, consisting of Ju-87s with fighter escort, was sighted on our starboard side . . . 250 Sqn went into line astern behind me and as 112 Sqn engaged the escorting enemy fighters, we attacked the Ju-87s from the rear quarter . . . At . . . 300 yards I opened fire with all my guns at the leader of one of the rear sections of three, allowing too little deflection, and hit No 2 and No 3, one of which burst into flames immediately, the other going down smoking and went into flames after losing about 1000 feet. I then attacked the leader of the rear section . . . from below and behind, opening fire with all guns at very close range. The enemy aircraft turned over and dived steeply down with the root of the starboard wing in flames . . . (at another Stuka) I opened fire again at close range, and the enemy caught fire . . . and crashed in flames near some dispersed mechanised transport . . . I was able to pull up under the belly of the one at the rear, holding the burst until very close range. The enemy aircraft dived gently straight ahead, streaming smoke, caught fire and then dived into the ground. ”

The land battle continued in pursuit of the enemy and advanced past Benghazi. Tobruk had been relieved, convoys had greater freedom of movement, and the threat to Egypt was removed. The Air Force was engaged mainly in attacks on airfields transport columns and supply dumps. Air opposition and anti-aircraft fire were negligible and squadrons were able to take a well-earned rest and begin re-equipping. Nevertheless, Caldwell was able to obtain another victory on December 20 by shooting down yet another Me-109. On January 13 he was transferred to No 112 Squadron, RAF, to command. His score had by now reached a total of 18.

No 112 Squadron was the famous “Shark” squadron which had been formed with Gladiators in 1939 for the defence of Cairo and the Nile Delta. During the latter part of 1940, it took part in the early campaigns in the Western Desert and was then moved to Greece, still operating Gladiators. It gave a good account of itself against the Italians, but was withdrawn to Palestine once the Germans appeared with their Messerschmitts. The squadron was then re-equipped with Tomahawks and moved once more to the Western Desert. It was at this time that the shark’s head with open jaws began to appear on the nose of the squadron aircraft and became the squadron emblem. The unit had already been re-equipped with Kittyhawks in December before Caldwell joined them.

In this new aircraft, Caldwell had his first success in the squadron when he led them into battle on February 21 against seven Me-109s. He personally destroyed one of the enemy, with one other falling to the guns of another squadron pilot. On March 14 he was in action again, destroying a Macchi 202 and sharing the destruction of an Me-109. On another occasion, he was not so lucky. He was leading six aircraft of the squadron when they were “jumped ” by a large formation of German fighters. Caldwell and only one other survived, and even then he had a very close call. Two 20 mm shells passed through his cockpit. One just flicked across the top of his leg and missed his wrist by a fraction, whilst the other exploded behind his armour plated back-rest. He was unharmed.

In the meantime, the concept of the fighter bomber had been developing. Some partial success had been obtained with the Hurricanes, but it was decided the Kittyhawk would be a better vehicle and No 112 Squadron was selected to convert to this role. On March 10 Squadron Leader Caldwell carried out a test flight to check whether or not the bomb would damage the airscrew on release. The test went well with a dummy and Caldwell immediately repeated the trial with a live bomb. As further proof of his confidence he then carried out a bombing attack on an enemy target with great success. The decision was then made to officially go ahead with using Kittyhawks in the fighter-bomber role, but Caldwell had already left for Australia before the first operational sorties took place.

Following the Japanese entry to the war in December 1941, the Australian Government sought the return of experienced RAAF members to help build up the forces in Australia and Caldwell was one of those specially asked for. About this time he was awarded the Polish Cross of Valour for his service with No 112 Squadron. Like most RAF units at the time, No 112 Squadron had quite a mixture of members from the various Commonwealth countries. Unusually, however, it also had quite a number of Polish pilots, and the award of the Polish decoration was a recognition by the Polish authorities of their appreciation of his special brand of leadership. The Polish Cross of Valour is the equivalent of the British DSO, and Caldwell is one of the very few Australians to be so honoured.

When he left the Middle East, Air Marshal Tedder wrote the following personal assessment in his log book: “A fine commander, an excellent leader and a first-class shot. ” This was a rare and highly valued honour from the AOC-in-C.

Caldwell came home via the United States, where he visited aircraft factories and addressed the workers on the performance and success of their machines. He also exchanged views on fighter tactics with the USAF and arrived back in Australia in September 1942. He was posted to the fighter operational training unit (No 2 OTU) as an instructor, training new pilots and testing the new Australian-designed and built Boomerang fighter. However, very shortly he was posted to the newly formed RAAF No. 1 Fighter Wing.

Mr Churchill had agreed on May 28 to a request by the Australian Government to send three Spitfire squadrons to Australia. Two of the squadrons chosen were Nos 452 and 457, both of which were completely Australian EATS squadrons formed in England in June 1941. The third squadron was No 54 of the RAF. The personnel arrived in Australia in August 1942, and 71 Spitfires had arrived by October. A further 33 were on the water, representing an estimate of four months’ reserve. The squadrons began training at Richmond and were formed, with supporting elements, into No 1 Fighter Wing before moving to Darwin, where the three squadrons were separately dispersed to auxiliary airfields. This was necessary for safety reasons but created problems in joining up and operating as one formation.

The wing was commanded by Group Captain A. L. Walters, of the RAAF, with now Wing Commander Caldwell as wing leader. Of the 95 pilots in the wing, only six were fully qualified, while 37 had had some fighter experience. The remaining 56, or more than half, had no experience. However, Walters and Caldwell, assisted by experienced squadron commanders, soon managed to build them into an efficient fighting force. Caldwell always put special emphasis on gunnery, which he practised continually himself. He often expressed the view that: “A pilot who cannot shoot straight may as well stay on the ground because he is useless in a fighter squadron. ”

As far as the aircraft were concerned, the Spitfire was less manoeuvrable at low speeds than the Japanese Zero. However, in a dive and straight and level flight, the Spitfire was infinitely superior. Although the Zero could climb faster, the Spitfire was generally considered to be the all round better aircraft. Nevertheless, as we shall see later, it was considered unwise to engage in dogfight tactics with the Zero, and pilots were eventually forbidden to do so. The tactics subsequently adopted were to make a pass at high speed and then break away in a dive until out of range, with a possible climb again for another high-speed attack ( which are standard MiG-21 tactics today).

First victory for the new wing was claimed on February 6 when a pilot of No 54 Squadron shot down a Dinah, but things generally remained quiet until March 2. On that date, 16 Japanese aircraft were detected approaching the Darwin area. Caldwell led No 54 Squadron in a successful interception and he personally succeeded in shooting down his first Zero, as well as a Kate torpedo bomber.

On March 7 No 457 Squadron had its first success, shooting down a lone Dinah over the sea just north of Darwin. Then another large raid by the Japanese occurred on March 15, consisting of 20 bombers and an equal number of fighters. This time the raiders were intercepted by the whole wing and a general dogfight occurred over Darwin harbour. The Spitfires shot down seven of the enemy and were also credited with damaging seven others. Although four of the Spitfires were lost, three of the pilots were recovered safely.

From then until the beginning of May things were again very quiet, but on the morning of May 2 all squadrons were ordered into the air to intercept a large force of the enemy approaching Darwin. It was later confirmed there were 18 bombers and 27 fighters. With Caldwell leading, and the entire wing operating as a single entity, the 33 Spitfires climbed to a height of 26,000 feet at a position 10 miles north-east of Darwin. The enemy bombers were seen to be at 27,000 feet, and as our fighters moved to attack the enemy fighter escort was seen to be another 4000 feet above and in a much better position than the Spitfires. Caldwell made the decision to climb and attack the enemy fighter cover, rather than to run the risk of attacking the bombers before they dropped their bombs. After dealing with the fighters, he planned to get the bombers on their way out.

In the meantime, the bombers continued on their way and, although heavily engaged by the Darwin anti-aircraft guns, they dropped their bombs on target without any loss to themselves. However, Caldwell did manage to get all his squadrons into good positions and at an altitude of 10,000 feet above the enemy fighters. No 54 Squadron was directed to attack the fighters while No 457 engaged the bombers. No 452 was to give protection to the others. At the right moment, Nos 54 and 457 went in to attack with an angle of dive of about 70° and a speed of about 400 mph. The Zekes protecting the bombers turned head-on to No 457 Squadron, diverting them to such an extent that only four penetrated to the bombers.

All aircraft then immediately became engaged and there was a brief and furious dogfight. It was later agreed that six enemy aircraft had been destroyed with another four probably destroyed, with eight damaged. However, this has only been achieved with the loss of five Spitfires and two pilots killed. The other three were picked up safely from their rubber dinghies. In addition to direct battle casualties, there were others almost as serious.

Unfortunately, an excessive amount of fuel had been used in initially manoeuvring the wing and with the fast climb to altitude. A warning was issued by Caldwell for all pilots to check their tanks and if low on fuel to return to base. The warning was also repeated by the ground controllers. Nevertheless, five of the aircraft had to carry out forced landings due to lack of fuel before they could reach their base. A further three also made forced landings due to engine failures. All but two of these eight aircraft were later recovered, and none of the pilots were injured. At the time, however, it looked as if we had lost 13 aircraft for a known loss of only four of the enemy. The damage to Darwin, fortunately, was only slight and there was only one casualty. The fact that all the bombers had got through to their target without loss only made the situation look that much worse.

As if this was not enough, an unfortunate press announcement was released by Allied General Headquarters which, while certainly referring to the ground damage from the bombing and the number of casualties as “negligible”, went on to say that “our own air losses were heavy”. Much publicity was given to the fight and the press drew attention to the fact that this was the first occasion when any communique had reported heavy losses. The Japanese, of course, were able to make rich propaganda from the release. It all looked very bad at the time.

As a result, the Advisory War Council ordered a full enquiry and called for a special report from the Chief of the Air Staff. Following the official investigation, the fuel capacity of the Spitfire was greatly increased and tactics were changed to allow for earlier interceptions, as well as the banning of dog-fights by Spitfires. A more detailed analysis can be found in Volume II of the Official History, Series 3 (Air).

After this raid offensive Allied air activity in North Western Area began to increase, whilst the fighter wing was eager to prove its mettle and refute earlier criticism. However, for a while, there were only sporadic raids by small numbers of the enemy. The continuing attacks on enemy airfields and shipping by RAAF and USAF bombers were having their effect and it was not until June 20 that our fighters had their chance. On that date, there was a heavy raid by the Japanese on Darwin and 42 Spitfires took off to engage the enemy.

The raiders initially appeared to consist of a force of 20 bombers at a high level protected by about an equal number of fighters. However, while the main engagement was developing a further enemy force of 1 O bombers came in at tree-top height. Despite this surprise, the new wing tactics were most successful and a total of nine bombers were destroyed, together with five Zeke fighters (including one by Caldwell), with another possible 10 claimed as damaged. All this was achieved for the loss of only two Spitfires and their pilots. Congratulations were sent personally from General McArthur, and there was a complete and well-deserved restoration of confidence in the ability of the Spitfire wing.

They continued to fight with great skill and purpose until the end of July when the Japanese daylight raids finally ceased. From then on there were occasional small raids by night, but the main Japanese activity over the area was by an occasional single reconnaissance plane. The combined efforts of the Allied bombers and fighters had finally achieved an outstanding victory in the area.

Meanwhile, Caldwell had taken over command of the wing from Walters and his score continued to mount. On June 2 he had destroyed two more of the enemy and during the engagement of June 20, described above, he had added one more Zeke to his total. On June 28 he destroyed a “Betty” bomber and on the 30th he shot down yet another Zeke. Then on August 20 he scored a further victory when he destroyed a “Dinah” reconnaissance aircraft, but this was to be his last. His score had by now reached his ultimate tally of 28½, he was awarded the DSO and posted to OTU as the Chief Flying Instructor.

In may of 1944, he was posted back to operations as wing leader of No 80 Fighter Wing. Then in August he was promoted to Group Captain and appointed commanding officer of the wing. At this time the wing had moved to Morotai, but there was little work for the fighters to do in their primary role. They were mainly engaged in attacks against ground targets and barges. There was just no further opportunity for Caldwell to increase his score, or for that matter, for any of the other fighter pilots in the wing. While the main thrust of operations in the South West Pacific was moving towards the Philippines, the units of First (RAAF) Tactical Air Force, of which No 80 Wing was a part, had been left far to the rear. Their main task was to continue attacks and pressure on enemy forces which had been by-passed by the main advance.

By the end of 1944, although the RAAF had been left far behind the main battle, there was strong pressure on them to produce maximum effort in sorties and flying hours. Most of these targets were of no apparent importance and did not appear to justify the efforts involved. A growing number of RAAF pilots, including some squadron commanders, while not denying that by-passed pockets of the enemy had to be kept under surveillance, did start to question the nature of the targets they were sent to attack. They considered their role in the war had become unimportant and their tasks just not worthwhile. Morale began to suffer and pilots felt their lives were being risked on operations that would make no contribution to winning the war.

This conflict of opinion about unnecessary operations was, of course, not confined to the Air Force. The army had similar, and probably even more justified, complaints from the units left behind in the Solomons and New Guinea. Also, there was growing criticism of the same sort expressed in the press and in Parliament.

No 80 Wing, now under the command of Group Captain Caldwell, had only just moved to Morotai from Darwin. Caldwell noted at the time of the move that the spirits of his pilots had risen noticeably as they expected they would once more become engaged in fighter operations. This exuberance was short-lived when they found there was little opportunity to meet the Japanese in the air. Caldwell also rapidly came to the conclusion independently that the purely staffing operations they were expected to carry out failed to produce results sufficient to justify the accompanying loss of aircraft and crews. He reported his views privately to the Chief of the Air Staff, but otherwise at the time kept them to himself.

In December 1944 the Commanding Officer of No 81 Wing had drawn the attention of the Air Officer Commanding First TAF to the loss of aircrew and aircraft against unsuitable or ineffective targets. He was acting from a very high sense of duty and expected the position to be rectified. By April nothing appeared to him to have been done and he felt the operational tasks to be even more wasteful than ever before. Accordingly, he discussed the problem with other senior operational leaders, including Caldwell and the commanding officers of several independent squadrons. Eight of them, including Caldwell, resigned together as a body on one day as a protest and in the hope that something would be done.

They were asked to reconsider but refused, and there was then a high-level investigation conducted on the spot – and personally- by both the Chief of Air Staff, RAAF, and General Kenney, Commander of Allied Air Forces. As a result, the AOC and the two senior staff officers at 1st TAF were relieved of their appointments on May 10. The Government also set up an independent judicial commission of inquiry under Mr (later Justice) J. V. Barry, KC, to inquire into the resignations and other matters affecting 1st TAF. The commission found that the complaints were justified and the officers who had resigned, including Caldwell, were fully cleared and each was returned to his post and fully reinstated. The findings of the commission made it quite clear that they had acted from the highest possible motives.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1945, the war in Europe ended. With the immediate prospect of at least 17,000 airmen returning from Europe, it was fairly obvious that there would soon be a huge surplus available in the Pacific. Accordingly, the War Cabinet stopped any further aircrew training and ordered the release to civilian life of those surplus to requirements. Preference was to be given to those who had served the longest.

During June Labuan was captured and following this operation No 80 Wing Headquarters was disbanded on July 30. All personnel and units were absorbed into the newly formed (and larger) No 11 Group. This released Caldwell, who was posted back to Melbourne and released from the RAAF in February 1946. He went into a private business of his own, which he soon developed most successfully and in which he still continues to take an active and very effective part.

THIS SERIES has now covered the background and provided the highlights, as it were, of our subject. Further articles will continue to appear from time to time but not necessarily on a regular basis. They will concentrate more on the personal stories of our individual aces.