Winning

Our mission that day was to provide MiGCAP with a strike flight that was going in to hit Thai Nguyen. After dropping off the tanker, we proceeded up to Yen Bai, at the northwest end of Thud Ridge. As we crossed the Red River, we punched off our centreline tanks and descended to an intermediate altitude to set up our orbit. As we approached our orbit point we could hear radio calls which indicated that the MiGs had attacked some of our aircraft near the north-east railroad. The MiGs had come out of Phuc Yen and Gia Lam.

Shortly after reaching our orbit station, we began receiving calls from our controllers indicating that one of those MiGs was heading west toward us, probably to recover at Phuc Yen. The engagement opportunity looked good, so we decided to go after him. We turned east-southeast, and head­ ed for Phuc Yen. We kept receiving GCI information on him but were not able to pick him up on our aircraft’s radar. Final­ ly, we picked him up visually when he was about five miles out from Phuc Yen. He was on final approach and had his gear and flaps down. He hadn’t spotted us yet, and I pulled in behind him. It was a silver MiG-21 and it looked as though we couldn’t possibly miss it. I told Chuck to go boresight and lock on. I squeezed off two Sparrows, but both of them missed. Our overtake was so great that we quickly passed through the minimum range. I finally stopped in the MiG’s 2 o’clock posi­ tion at about 1-2 thousand feet. He saw us, pulled up his gear and flaps, lit the afterburner and started to accelerate. It look­ ed as though the engagement was going to turn into a real manoeuvring fight. I punched off my wing tanks and started scissors to get behind the 21. After two turns I was again behind the MiG but still inside the minimum range. Tibbett called that he was in position, so I cleared him in. Just as I did, the MiG turned away from me, putting me at his 6 o’clock, parameters for a shot. I told Brian to break off because I was in a better position now. He didn’t hear me and continued his attack, leaving me no alternative but to cover him. Brian fired two missiles, both missed, but he had a gun, so he moved into gun range. As Tibbett fired his gun we could see the 20mm strikes all over the top of the MiG. The MiG driver had had enough . . . he punched out. His airplane rolled over and crashed on the perimeter of Phuc Yen.

We had maintained our flight integrity throughout the fight, so I called a turn to a heading that would take us back to our assigned orbit point. We were no sooner steady on our new heading than I received a call from the controller indicating that we had a couple of bandits at six o’clock. I called a turn back into them. We turned around and started looking for them. Chuck picked them up on the radar at 10 degrees port, 15 miles and called “alligators” to let the flight know we intended to attack. I called that the MiGs would be at 11 o’clock. Shortly thereafter, my number two man, Mike Francisco, spotted them there about one and a half miles out. It was a pair of MiG-19s. One was camouflaged and the other was aquamarine blue – they were flying a fighting wing for­ mation. I called a turn into them. We pulled hard, about six G’s, and went through about 90 degrees of turn before they spotted us. When they saw us they began a hard turn toward us and punched their wing tanks off. I increased my turn to about eight G’s. It was all I could do to get the pipper on the trailing MiG. After about 180 degrees of turn, I fired a Sidewinder. It was a reasonably high angle-off shot, but the missile guided perfectly, exploding close to the MiG’s tail. We had started the fight at about 1500 feet, with about 550 to 600 knots of airspeed, so there was not a lot of room to manoeuvre. I continued after other MiG by performing a low-speed yo-yo to pull in behind him. As I pulled up, I fired another Sidewinder. It too guided perfectly, impacting the MiG’s tail. The MiG relaxed his turn, rolled inverted crashed into a rice paddy and exploded. The whole en­ counter had taken less than two minutes, but we were near­ ing bingo fuel, so we turned to egress heading and exited North Vietnam at low level and high speed.

October 12, 1972 MiG-21
F-4D, 555th TFS, 432nd TRW A/C Ser No. 60-268, Call Sign
“Vega 1” Captain John A. Madden
Captain Larry Pettit

On October 12, 1972, Capt Larry Pettit and I were “Vega 01” leading a flight of four F-4’s. My wingman was Capt “Nordie” Norwood with Lt Dave Blair in his back seat. Number three was Capt Mike Francisco with Capt Mike Hilliard and Capt Bob Hornack with Lt John Laugerman was number four. We were MiGCAP for a strike force that was going to hit one of the bridges on the northeast railroad. As we came into the area, the MiGs launched out of Phuc Yen. It was obvious that they were going to attempt an attack on the strike force. Our radar surveillance watched them as they flew out parallel to the northeast railroad, in one of their customary attack profiles. They turned east, trying to get behind us to get at the strike force. Naturally, we tried 10 keep ourselves between the strike force and the MiGs. As they got closer, they turned to attack us.

The only MiG I saw, we engaged head-on, at 9 mach, at 25,000 feet. He went by my left side, about a thousand feet away, in a slight left turn. He was close enough for me to identify the national markings as he flashed by. I turned hard down to the right, calculating that to be the fastest way to get in behind him. He had continued his left turn, and as I rolled out behind him, he pulled hard into me, forcing us to overshoot slightly. We were still behind him though, and as I tried to get into the inside of his turn, he pulled harder yet, lit the afterburner and rolled inverted, pulling through in a splits. It was as though he had had enough and wanted to disengage in the quickest possible way.

About 4000 feet below us was a cloud deck, which was maybe two thousand feet thick. Apparently, the MiG figured he would get away by diving through it. We rolled over after him though, and when we broke into the clear he must have been looking over his shoulder and saw us coming, because he just continued down in about an 80-degree dive, with his burner going. There was another layer about six or seven thousand feet above the ground which went almost down to the ground. The MiG decided to go for it so doing committed himself to a manoeuvre from which he could not recover. Without even firing a missile, we drove him into the ground near Kep Ha. That was my “Cost Effective Kill”.

October 5, 1972 MiG-21

F-4E, 34th TFS, 388th TFW A/C Ser No. 68-493 Code “JJ” Call Sign “Robin 1”
Capt. Dick Coe
1/Lt Ken.Webb

We were flying out of Korat RTAB at the time of my kill.

The 388th was a composite wing at that time, consisting of two F-4 squadrons, and the only F-105 “Wild Weasel” squadron in Southeast Asia. All of our missions were to route package six in North Vietnam. The majority of our flights were in support of strike flights, and in some cases in support of the Wild Weasels.

On the day of my kill, I was assigned as the only spare flight lead for three MiGCAP flights and two flights in support of the Wild Weasels. As soon as I got on the ground frequency, the leader of the last flight in support of the bombers aborted. He told me to go ahead and take his flight. I started my engine and began to taxi. At that time my number three was aborted, leaving me with only two and four. We took off and headed for our rendezvous with the tanker. About halfway to the tanker, number two aborted. Number four, flown by Captains Dave Ladd and George Sebren, both of whom were TOY from Lakenheath, England, and had very little experience in missions over North Vietnam, closed in on my wing and we continued the mission. At the time we were not supposed to go into the target area on a support mission with only two fighter aircraft. However, since it was the last strike of the day, and it was a very strategic target, I decided to press on anyway.

When we hit the tanker, I came up on the discreet frequency and briefed my wingman on what our tactics would be. We were flying what the Air Force calls a “Double Attack” type of formation, in which it is assumed that each man in the element is of equal ability and the man that spots the MiG first goes after him, with the other man covering his six.

We dropped off the tanker at the same time as the bombers we were escorting. They were four F-4s loaded with laser-guided bombs. Their target was the Northeast Rail Line. Since we were the last strike flight of the day, as we began our ingress we heard and saw a lot of airplanes leaving North Vietnam. We levelled off at about 20,000 feet and took up our covering position for the strike flight. I called the Navy CCI Controller and he acknowledged that he had us loud and clear. His call was followed immediately by a call from the airborne Air Force CCI controller who also had us loud and clear, and was getting good radar coverage. The Navy relinquished control to the Air Force, and he immediately began calling positions on MiG aircraft. We were still out over the Gulf of Tonkin at this time and the action sounded pretty good. The controller called two MiGs at about 30 miles off of Hanoi, which were intercepted by two other MiGCAP F-4s, which forced the North Vietnamese to hustle back to Hanoi.

We hit our IP about the time we coasted into North Vietnam, close to the Chinese border. We were doing about 450 knots, trying to keep our energy up, while the strike flight was only doing about 350 to 400 knots. In order to maintain position we were performing a constant weave, which enabled us to check their six and ours simultaneously. As soon as we crossed the coastline, we began to get more calls of MiGs out of Hanoi, plus we had indications that they were sectoring us with the AAA radar and that the SAM radars were looking at us. Many times they will just do all of this as though they were flexing their muscles. We felt that they intended to do a little more today though, since we were getting all of these indications simultaneously. (They do this to keep you busy looking for SAMs and flak, figuring that you’ll be too busy to check your six, and maybe they’ll sneak a MiG up on your tail). Our GCI controller continued to call the positions of the MiGs, and you could tell by the direction they were heading that they were being vectored at us. When they were about 20 miles away, by the calls, the strike leader came up with; “Hey guys, that’s us!” (We were trying to maintain as much radio silence as possible because the bombers had to talk back and forth a little to get themselves set up for the laser bomb drops).

Since we were not flying MiGCAP, and consequently didn’t need radar coverage to the front (we were only worried about the MiGs coming up at our six) our backseaters were acting as a wingman would. That is, they were constantly checking our six. Ken Webb, my WSO, had been with me since he had come in-country and we worked well as a team. Ken is a big, husky guy, and can really look around while pulling a lot of G’s. About the time we got the last call from our controller, Ken noticed two aircraft off to our right.

We were pretty close to the Chinese border, and it’s possible that they were in China when we spotted them. l knew they weren’t F- 4’s, because they weren’t smoking enough, and they couldn’t be 105s, because there just weren’t any 105’s over there. I wasn’t sure at the time whether or not they were Navy aircraft. Later on, we found out that they definitely were MiGs. In the meantime the two MiGs coming out of Hanoi had been called at 15 miles, “in the dark”, meaning at low-level. Their manoeuvre was to go high, then unload and go low to pick up energy while they got into position at your six, then do a pop-up and fire a missile and run for home. It’s very difficult to pick them up when they come at Jou from down low, especially if they come at your blin six! The next thing we knew, the CCI controller was calling the MiGs merging with us . . . attacking! The strike flight lead said: “Alright, let’s start a turn into them!” We still couldn’t see them, but just as we started the turn into them, the number three man came up with: “I’ve got MiGs at my six o’clock!” My wingman came back with: “Are you sure? . . . I’m at your six!” He said: “No, no, they’re MiGs! . . . I’m getting out of here!” And with that, he jettisoned his bombs and started a hard break. I immediately jettisoned my tanks and went to the afterburner. In the process of doing this, while turning to get behind number three, one of my wing tanks rolled across the belly of the airplane and tore a chunk out of my aileron. It didn’t affect the performance of the airplane though, and we didn’t find out about it until we landed. I made about one and a half turns around until the whole strike flight was out in front of me where I could see them. About that time we got indications in the cockpit that the North Vietnamese were locked on with AAA and SAM radars. Now we were really looking around . . . Ken and I were yelling back and forth at each other to see if anyone had a contact. We still couldn’t see anything but good guys. But, as I completed my second turnaround, I spotted two MiGs out in front of me. They were MiG-21’s and I thought they were about three miles away at the time. (I had never seen one in the air, and their relatively small size fooled me on the range). I was at about 15,000 feet and doing about Mach 1. 6, having descended from 20,000 in my turns . . . The turns had been loosened up when I didn’t see the MiGs at first and I was unloaded and really accelerating. The MiGs were at about 20,000 as I turned into their six. They still hadn’t seen us. I had always thought that I would fire a Sidewinder in this situation since it is simpler and more reliable than the Sparrow. (Our Sparrows had been carried a long time on the aeroplanes without being fired, and we didn’t have much faith in them. I didn’t know it at the time, but our missile maintenance man had done an unnecessary complete preflight on our missiles before we took off).

The MiGs had started down and were accelerating pretty well. I figured that the only way to get them into Sidewinder range would be to fire a Sparrow at them to make them turn. I put the pipper on them and told Ken: “I’ve got them!” He yelled: “Auto Ace, Auto Ace!” I reached down to arm the missiles and Auto Ace and as I looked up, the MiGs were dis­ appearing into the sun. Without taking my eyes off them to see if I had a lock-up, I counted the required seconds to let the missile electronics settle and squeezed one off. I guess we were still going about 1. 6 and that the MiGs were doing 1. 1. Just then, someone screamed over the radio: “Somebody has a MiG at his six o’clock and he’s tracking!” I forgot about the missile I had fired and rolled up to check six. I glanced forward, noticed the contrail from the Sparrow, which had fired good, and then saw a huge black explosion, immediately followed by two puffs of white smoke, which seemed to come out of it. Just then Ken hollered for me to break. I didn’t ask why, I just pulled! The F-4 is supposedly limited to 8. 5 G’s, but I pulled a solid nine G’s in that break, and as I did, two other MiGs overshot over the top of me. I reversed to try to get on them, but in the process of turning lost sight of them.

We reasoned that what had happened was that the MiGs I had shot at were the ones we had seen coming from China and that the ones I broke for were the ones out of Hanoi. We had negated their initial attack with our first turn and they had come through, turned around, and come back for another try at us. The whole thing had taken less than a minute, but as I rolled out my wingman, who had stuck close during the engagement, called that he had “joker fuel”, which is five hundred pounds above bingo. I told him: “Alright, let’s go home. ” Just as we rolled out of our turn, I heard the strike lead call that they were in on their target. When they had seen me engage, they just left and went to the target . . . minus number three. I looked out and saw number three going fast for the coast. Out of the corner of my eye, I saw something else . . . I looked again and saw that it was an Atoll missile . . . going right for his tailpipe. But he was going so fast that it didn’t have a chance to catch him, and it just petered out and hit the ground. I also saw two impacts on the ground, which turned out to be the wreckage of the MiG I had shot down. I still didn’t know that I had shot one down, and as we exited the area at a low level, my wingman asked me if I had shot someone down. I called the controller to ask if he had any MiGs down. He said that he didn’t. (He never picked up the two that came out of China). I finally told my wingman to forget it . . . let’s just get to the tanker and we’ll work it out on the ground later.

When we got back and I debriefed, the intelligence peo­ pie thought I had shot both MiGs down with one missile since they were flying a fairly close formation. (Remember the two puffs of white smoke). I had to wait until the follow­ ing morning to get the kill confirmed. It turned out that another flight had been exiting the same area at the time, and they had watched the whole thing from up above. They said that my missile had impacted the MiG in mid-fuselage, blowing off a wing, hence the two puffs of smoke and two impacts on the ground.

The kill was particularly gratifying for a couple of reasons. We hadn’t shot any MiGs down in our squadron, and at a squadron party the night before, Ken and I were telling everyone why. It was my opinion that we hadn’t gotten any because we weren’t shooting any missiles. I told them all that even if the MiG was out of range, you should shoot anyway, just to get him to turn and fight. This was greeted with a lot of yeah, yeah. I quit the party early, but Ken stayed on and his parting words were: “We’re going out there tomorrow, and if we see a MiG we’re going to shoot him down!” After we broke the ice with our kill the squadron got three more in rapid succession before the war ended.

I had wanted to be a tighter pilot since graduating from the Air Force Academy in 1968. When I came out of pilot training, there were no fighter assignments available. I was told to volunteer for a tour in Southeast Asia, and then volunteer for another tour in fighters. I flew one tour in AC-119 gunships, which I really enjoyed, and then was lucky enough to get the fighter assignment I wanted.

When I came out of RTU, at George AFB, I was assigned to the 34th TFS and also as an Air Force liaison officer with the Seventh Fleet on Yankee Station. While there I had a chance to talk to Mugs McKeown and some of the other MiG Killers on the Midway. I picked up some really good ideas on what to do and what not to do from those guys. As a result of this, I felt a lot more confident when we had our engagement.

August 19, 1972 MiG-21

F-4E, 4th TFS, 366th TFW A/C Ser No. 69-291, Code “LA” Call Sign “Pistol 3”
Capt Sam White Capt Frank Bettine

Sam White joined the Air Force in 1969. After his one year of pilot training, he was assigned to the F-105 Thunderchief. During his transition to the Thud, at McConnell AFB, the Air Force reassigned all 105’s to the Air Reserve and Air Guard. Sam was transferred to F-4 training at George AFB, California. Upon completion of the F-4 transition, he was assigned to the 4th TFS, 366th TFW. He reported to them in September 1971, at Danang AB, RVN. His one-year tour in the war zone encompassed all phases of the Vietnam air war, including in-country strikes in South Vietnam, strikes on the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos, close support missions against the North Vietnamese armies invading through the DMZ in the spring of 1972, and missions north during the linebacker campaigns. He flew a total of 205 combat missions. His 204th was the mission that compressed three years of training as a fighter pilot into a few crucial seconds and vindicated the hard· work and dedication he had put into those years.

About July 1, 1972, the 366th TFW moved to Takhli RTAB from Danang, in order to provide a better base for operations against North Vietnam.

Our mission on August 19 was to act as MiGCAP for a flight of eight F-4 Chaff bombers. We were a flight of four F- 4’s. The chaff bombers go into the target area ahead of the strike force and, flying line abreast at relatively slow speed and medium altitude, lay down a carpet of chaff to screen the enemy radar. They use either bomblets or dispensers to do this. The result is a corridor on the ingress and egress routes that will, hopefully, confuse the triple-A and SAM radars and leave the bombers free to concentrate on their bomb runs. I was flying number three, leading the second element in our flight of four. Our configuration at take-off was three external fuel tanks, four Sidewinder missiles, and two Sparrow missiles, with ECM pods carried in the forward missile wells. Since we were flying the F-4E, we also had the 20mm cannon in the nose.

Take-off was late morning, and the summer sun had already filled the air over the runways of Takhli with heat waves as Pistol Flight roared into the tropic sky of Thailand. The four F-4s climbed away, heading east. Their route took them over Laos and northern South Vietnam. Once they reached the Gulf of Tonkin, they turned north for their rendezvous with the Chaff Bombers. En route to the rendezvous point, they made contact with KC-135 Tankers and topped off their tanks with fuel.

They made contact with the F-4 Chaff Bombers off the coast of Haiphong and got into position behind them for the run into the target area. MiG tactics during this time period had been pretty much limited to ground-controlled intercepts, in which the controller would bring the interceptor out low, positioning him behind the target aircraft before clearing him to climb into position behind the target for the missile shot. To combat this, Pistol flight stayed behind the Chaff Bombers, weaving back and forth as elements. The weave allowed them to keep up their speed, and to clear each other’s six o’clock. Any MiGs that came out to shoot down the Chaff people would have to fly right through Pistol Flight.

The ingress route was just north of Hon Gai, over what was known (to the people at Takhli) as “MiG Ridge”. MiG Ridge is a mountain range that runs in an east-west direction, from the coastline to the flat lands around Bae Giang. Pistol Flight was tuned to the radio frequency of “Red Crown”, the Navy cruiser in the Gulf of Tonkin that monitored the air space in Northern North Vietnam with its radars, providing information for American aircraft flying strike missions on the whereabouts of MiGs. During their run on the target area, the 12 Phantoms would also be covered by a flight of F-105F Wild Weasels, who would stay low and try to knock out any SAM sites that threatened the mission. The F-105’s were designated “Eagle Flight”.

Shortly after they ingressed, Pistol lead checked in with Red Crown, and seconds later the F-105’s were spotted low at nine o’clock. The mission proceeded smoothly, with White and Bettine checking the armament switches as they weaved back and forth behind the Chaff F-4’s. Pistol lead called to remind them to check their ECM pods “on”. They had blown their centreline tanks off as they crossed the coastline and were burning off the fuel in their wing tanks as they pressed on into North Vietnam.

They could hear the Eagle Flight working on SAM sites, the SAM crews turning on their radars for short periods, then abruptly shut them down as the Wild Weasels began to home on them. Then, suddenly, they had their first indication of a possible engagement. Red Crown came up with: “Possible bandits, one three five, Bullseye 12”. (“Bullseye” was the name assigned to the centre of downtown Hanoi. The above call indicated that the contact was on the 135-degree radial, 12 miles from “Bullseye”). The adrenalin pumped a little faster . . . there were MiGs airborne! The calls from Red Crown continued: “Red Crown with confirmed bandits, zero nine five, Bullseye 40. ” “Red Crown with bandits, one zero zero, Bullseye 44, headed east. ” Pistol Lead reminded the rest of the flight to keep their heads up . . . it appeared that the MiGs were coming their way.

“Red Crown with bandits one zero zero, Bullseye 45, headed for the Eagle Flight. ” “Eagle copy. ” “Eagle copy. ” The Wild Weasels now diverted their attention from SAM hunting to the possibility of a MiG engagement. White looked out and saw the F-105s go to the afterburner.

“Red Crown, bandits zero nine eight, Bullseye 48, altitude is unknown, estimated low. ” “Bandits now zero nine five, 49 Bullseye. ” Bettine came up with: “They’re only 40 miles ahead of us!” “Red Crown, bandits are now two zero zero, about 10 miles from the Eagle Flight. ” Eagle Lead came on with: “Roger that!” “Red Crown, bandits are in the dark, estimating zero nine five, Bullseye 52. ” “Bandits now heading zero five zero, altitude estimated low. ” “Red Crown, bandits zero nine one, Bullseye 55. ”

The North Vietnamese had run a perfect intercept. The MiGs had come out of Phuc Yen, made one high-speed pass over the centre of Hanoi, dove for the deck, and headed east. Red Crown had done an admirable job of picking out the MiGs from ground clutter as the enemy interceptors had positioned themselves down low for their run on the Phantoms. Pistol Flight continued their weave, with the back seaters constantly checking six o’clock for the MiGs.

Suddenly, Captain Forrest Penney, in the back seat of Pistol Two, called: “Pistol one and two, we have a MiG at six o’clock! Break left NOWI”

White, on the left of the lead, looked back over his right shoulder and spotted a MiG-21 boring in on one and two. The MiG was about 3500 feet back, and just pulling his nose into firing position as the lead element broke hard left. White went to full afterburner, called the MiG to Bettine, and keeping him in sight, climbed and rolled over the top, hoping to scissors the MiG.

The MiG was by himself. Apparently, his wingman had gotten separated, and was on his own . . . he would later be chased home by another flight of four Phantoms.

As White rolled over the top, he could see the MiG start after the lead element then, as he realised that they had too much angle off on him, he made a feint for White’s element. But three and four were now planform to him, and above him. He had no chance at them, so he unloaded and split out between the two Pistol elements, now convinced that his best bet was a quick dash for home.

White continued his roll, making a 270-degree barrel roll change of heading, and coming out behind and below the MiG. He had gotten supersonic as he came out the bottom and, as he pulled into position behind the MiG, the Phantom’s stabilators dug into the air causing a slight “Mach Tuck” as they came back through the sonic barrier. (The Mach Tuck is a characteristic of the Phantom, occasioned by the increased effectiveness of the stabilators in the sub-sonic region. It can cause a two “G” pull to become five or six G’s if it is not caught quickly). White called Pistol Lead, confirming the fact that he was on the MiG, and telling the lead to reverse.

The MiG made a slight turn, spotted White, and with the afterburner going, climbed straight up. White overshot slightly to the outside, then corrected and started up after the bandit. The MiG started a barrel roll to the left, in an attempt to get the Phantom to overshoot out in front of him. White counter-rolled, coming out at the MiG’s blind deep six. Now the North Vietnamese pilot could not see him at all. The MiG rolled out the top, still unsure of where the Phantom was. White rolled out above and behind the MiG, as the enemy pilot, in evident confusion, started a slight right turn.

White, with his radar in boresight mode, pulled the nose of the f-4 down on the MiG and went to Auto Acquisition to get a radar lock on the MiG. White hit the ” Auto Ace” switch. The radar went out, strobed to the MiG, and they got a full system lock on. Bettine said: “You’re locked onto him!. . a delay. . . cleared to fire!” White pulled a little lead . . . just enough to give the missiles a better chance . . . and squeezed the trigger twice. There is a time delay of approximately one second between trigger pull and firing, and in that time he was able to check all the switches twice, shake the aeroplane, and start to bemoan the fact that they weren’t going to fire, when suddenly two big AIM-7E-2 missiles dropped out of their wells and, trailing huge smoke plumes, shot out in from of the Phantom. They both began tracking the MiG, pulling the perfect lead, just as though they were going to join up on his wing. The Sparrow’s rocket engine burns out in something like three seconds, but by that time it’s going somewhere in excess of Mach 3, which gives it a maximum range of 13 miles.

The first missile hit the MiG in the tail, causing a huge fireball. The MiG emerged from the fireball, trailing white smoke and fuel, and another explosion racked the doomed enemy fighter. It continued straight ahead, losing speed, for another 3000 feet or so before the pilot ejected. The MiG went into a spiral, still trailing smoke and flame, and eventually crashed into MiG Ridge.

White rolled inverted and watched his victim crash, while the pilot floated earthward in his parachute. Now out of Sparrows, White selected HEAT, thinking about the possibility of engaging the other MiG and firing his Sidewinders. But the other MiG was already in trouble, being chased by a following flight of f-4s. He was more fortunate than his leader, managing to barely stay ahead of the Phantoms, and eventually ducking into Gia Lam airport in Hanoi.

White and his wingman were at bingo fuel, so they turned east and headed out over the Gulf, picked up a tanker, topped off, and headed for home.

Pistol flight arrived back at Takhli with enough fuel to let the troops know that they had gotten a “Blue Bandit”. They did a four-ship diamond formation flyby to get the attention of those on the ground then, as they pitched out for landing, White sucked his gear and flaps up on final, and dove to 100 feet off the deck. With afterburners going, he did a victory roll and pulled up into a series of vertical rolls before coming back around to land. After landing, he and Fred Bettine were hosed down by a fire truck, which was conveniently on hand to add a splash to the impromptu ceremony.

(This series will be continued in the next edition of AADR. )