Comment: Let’s have a genuine systems planning

The fact is that items of equipment are purchased to replace existing items with little or no consideration of whether they are appropriate to our needs or whether they can do the job they are needed for. Some cynics would hold that the Defence Department does not know what job they are supposed to do and does not care so long as the operators are placated.

In this context, the “no threat for ten years” scenario has a comfortable ring about it, ensuring as it does that there need not be too many bureaucratic fights about who gets what.

The real problem is that, because we do not procure or construct defence systems, we produce armed forces which are probably second to none in the world in their ability to operate a sophisticated weapons platform or vehicle but we rate with the less notable nations of Africa in the effectiveness of our Defence Force to deter the emergence of that unidentifiable threat.

The classic example of our failure to introduce a weapons system is the purchase of the Leopard tank. The Leopard was selected to replace ageing Centurions of the Royal Australian Armoured Corps without any real further justification that replacement was due. Yet the logic of purchasing any tank can be queried in the absence of any solid strategic doctrine or policy that assesses where the Australian Army will have to fight.

If such an assessment was made, the area must be very limited because no serious provision was made to provide the force with the ability to move from its base at Puckapunyal in Victoria to other parts of the country. The railways cannot do the job – except in penny packets. The tanks cannot be moved long distances by road and the new Heavy Landing Ship will not be able to move the 1st Armoured Regiment except in stages.

No ammunition supply arrangements have been made, the offset program which was supposed to provide a spare parts capability in Australia has fallen through and these very expensive vehicles ($1 million each) do not have an adequate navigation system for the wide open spaces of the north or indirect gunnery. As a result, while we have the latest in armoured vehicles in fairly small numbers, it cannot be said that we have an armoured warfare system. It follows that, given the 1973 Middle East war experience, our lightly equipped infantry division would be massacred if it had to meet a reasonably well-equipped force in country suitable for armoured warfare.

Whether we look at armoured warfare, maritime strike, air defence or practically any other defence system in this country, we find that a collection of highly sophisticated vehicles have been provided, occasionally equipped with modern ordnance but usually lacking in every other essential component of a defence system.

Very briefly, these include such aspects as:

• a suitable weapons delivery system of sensors, processors and guidance systems;
• sufficient operational bases reasonably close to estimated theatres of operation and capable of refuelling, rearming, minor repairs and exercise of tactical control;
• the ability to disperse key components of the system away from a threatened area;
• systems for reconnaissance, command, control, damage assessment, communications etc;
• the fapacity to produce and maintain components of the system ,with a substantial guarantee of availability; and
• the ability to operate effectively in a wide range of geographic and climatic conditions.

None of these components can be shrugged off by “making do”, as we have done especially with the Mirage, the F- 111 and the tanks. Each component is of crucial value to the overall effectiveness of the system.

The time is now ripe to make a major break with the past because three major projects pending lend themselves to a systems procurement approach – provided always that the acquisition of such systems are in accord with an agreed strategic policy and doctrine. These are the TFF project, the aircraft carrier replacement and the follow-on destroyer program.

Unfortunately, there is every indication that the TFF project is not based on a systems approach, with practically all the debate being about the vehicle, the whole vehicle and nothing but the vehicle. On the other hand, there is every indication that the MELBOURNE will not be replaced for cost reasons despite the very clear analysis by John Goble in the 1978 AADR which clearly indicates that the aircraft carrier constitutes. a systems solution to the problem of exercising airpower at sea. The TFF approach just as clearly does not! One major implication is below from the systems approach. Either much larger amounts of money will have to be spent on defence if we are to acquire high-technology defence systems or we must look to a lower-technology solution within the capability of Australian industry as It is today.

Whatever road we follow, the systems approach will ensure that Australia has a Defence Force capable of deterring attack even if it is more expensive or less glamorous than what we have today.